December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Brits propose internet voting
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The brits have the "american" disease, only they've done us one better. I just got through listening to the BBC World Service. It seems that some official commission or other over there proposed the Information Infrastructure thang with a couple of twists: polling and elections. They said that they could save mucho dinero by having people vote from home. Looks like someone over there did their crypto homework... Even cited Mr. Bill's (Clinton, not Gates) email address as a Good Thing. What's next, er(a)bpalace.gov, gov? <hyuk> Seriously, they couldn't be talking about this election thing unless they knew it was possible (no star wars flames, please). I wonder who put the bug in their ear? If anyone finds a copy of this report online (fat chance, I bet) let me know. Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

2 1

Re: Sternlight
by tim werner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 17:03:59 -0500 >From: "Bill O'Hanlon" <wmo(a)digibd.com> >Content-Length: 308 >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Precedence: bulk > >Has anyone else noticed that David Sternlight has been quiet for the past >two weeks or so? Sternlight does not belong to this list. Why are you looking for him here? tw

1 0

Re: NSA and competence
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Do not, however, assume that they do not know and perform their job to the best >of their abilities, or you will be in the position of the mark talking to a >cardsharp: 'I'm not any good at cards, but I sure do like to play for money.' OTOH, one need not assume that everyone at NSA is a rocket scientist and that they are miles ahead of us in this game. The long undistinguished history of federal agencies shows them to be full of incompetence, waste and usually gross fraud as well. Considering the huge budget and lack of accountability, NSA seems an unusual place to look for an exception. A truly competent and efficient government agency that can hold its own against competition from the private sector is a rarity indeed. Granted, NSA had a head start of a few decades, yet it would be surprising if their lead at this point is more than negligible. Yes, I have read Bamford (though - sorry - not Kahn): remember that Bamford's book is already 12 years old and was probably out-of-date WRT the technology when it was published. <not the same anonymous author>

2 1

NSA Agents Threaten to Kill Bidzos of RSA?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is a lead article in the New York Times Business Section today on Bidzos and RSA. It reviews current crypto, RSA, NSA and others. If there is interest I will transcribe the article for this forum. John

1 0

Markoff/NSA/RSA
by KillBarny＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's something to put in your FYI files... 6/28:PROFIT AND EGO IN DATA SECRECY By JOHN MARKOFF c.1994 N.Y. Times News Service REDWOOD CITY, Calif. - If the web of thousands of computer networks around the world can be thought of as an information superhighway, then Jim Bidzos is one of its best-placed toll takers. Bidzos expects to become very rich - unless the government has its way. As president of a Silicon Valley company called RSA Data Security Inc., Bidzos, 39, controls the patents for software crucial to scrambling and unscrambling computer messages so they can be sent confidentially. Just about anyone using a computer network - whether for sending personal messages, filing taxes electronically, or shopping from home with a credit card - would want such confidentiality. On the strength of its coding technology, RSA has sold more than four million copies of its software, and it has won wide support from industry giants like Apple Computer, AT&T, IBM, Lotus Development, Microsoft, Motorola, Northern Telecom, Novell and Sun Microsystems. Until recently cryptography, the science of sending secret messages, was a province generally populated by the armed forces, governments and their spies. But with the rise of commercial computer networks, cryptography has become an essential ingredient in information-age services. RSA's software is based on an innovation in cryptography that permits people to exchange private messages without actually getting together beforehand and arranging a secret password. In the past, cryptography required that the two parties to a communication first meet to exchange a large number that enabled them to encode and decode messages. RSA's system employs two keys, one for encoding a message, known as a public key, and another for decoding it, called a private key. People who wish to receive secret messages can freely distribute their public key, which enables senders to encode a message. Only with the private key can the message be decoded. A company selling products on-line, for instance, might make its public key widely available, which would enable customers to send in a coded message containing their credit card numbers that could not be intercepted and read by others. The company could decode those messages with its private key, which has a mathematical relationship to the public one. The government fears that should the RSA system become available abroad, it would lose its ability to eavesdrop and wiretap in cases involving risks to national security. It would much prefer that the global standard be based on its own Clipper encryption standard, which has a "backdoor" that law enforcement officials can peek through. Precisely because the RSA method has no backdoor, it is the choice of industry. But to some government officials, Bidzos is nothing short of a scheming businessman. "The government would like him not to exist," said Jeffrey Schiller, a computer manager at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who has negotiated a licensing deal with Bidzos. And Stuart Baker, who until several weeks ago was chief counsel of the National Security Agency, observed, "My sense is that his motivation is no more than trying to convince people to buy his products." Officials at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, another federal agency, say they want to create a standard that is not beholden to the patents of one small company. And the National Security Agency and the Justice Department want a standard that will allow law enforcement agencies to eavesdrop on suspected criminals or violators of national security. >From Bidzos' perspective, Washington remains bound up in a cold war mentality, and should simply get out of the way and let RSA Data go about its business. What is more, he complains, any number of foreign companies are developing encryption techniques just as hard to crack as his, so the government's efforts to keep him from exporting his software are useless, and perhaps counterproductive. Notwithstanding the official concerns, RSA has developed a loyal following among a wide range of computer, communications and software companies. "They have the strongest technology and the best reputation in the cryptography business," said William Ferguson, vice president of Semaphore Inc., a maker of data-scrambling systems that licenses RSA's software. Adding spice to this dispute is Bidzos' ability to outmaneuver the government, most recently by snatching a crucial patent from under the noses of officials who were planning to use it in an official standard they are trying to establish. Several years ago, two top computer scientists from the National Institute of Standards and Technology traveled to Europe to meet with a German mathematician, Claus Schnorr, who holds a key patent that the government's coding system may violate. When they returned to the United States, the scientists told their superiors that the United States should license Schnorr's patent. But Washington was slow to act. So in March 1993, while Bidzos was on a trip to France, he met with Schnorr for a four-hour lunch. By the end of the meal, Bidzos had a deal to use Schnorr's patent. Despite Bidzos' high profile in the world of encryption, RSA's revenue is small - somewhere between $5 million and $10 million annually. But analysts say that the company has the ability to grow substantially. "They have a huge opportunity in the Internet," said Lisa Thorell, a researcher at Dataquest in San Jose, Calif., referring to the global web of computer networks that is regarded as a working but primitive model of a global data highway. RSA is also playing an increasing role in the $500 million secure-communications business for equipment that permits safe financial transactions and voice and data communications. The issue clouding the future of the company is how severely it will suffer from export controls and competing standards backed by the National Security Agency. Last month the government made its own competing standard for signing electronic documents mandatory for all federal agencies, and declared that the digital signature standard, as it is known, did not violate RSA's technology. Bidzos thinks that Washington is infringing his patents, and, eventually, the strength of his patent claims will be tested in court. Rather then sue the government, Bidzos is likely to start with one of the small companies, like Group Technologies Corporation in Tampa, that is making components under a government contract, industry executives say. Bidzos, who is a Greek citizen and a permanent resident of the United States, was working at a small international marketing firm in 1985 when he decided to move from Florida to the Silicon Valley to help a friend save a failing business. "I wanted to do deals and stay in luxury hotels," he said recently at his office here. "I had no idea I'd be in the center of a political whirlwind." When Bidzos joined the company in 1986, RSA was a shoestring operation about to go into bankruptcy. With his help, RSA struck a deal with Lotus Development in 1987, in which the software giant agreed to advance money for the right to include RSA software in Lotus Notes, a program designed for work groups of office employees. A year later RSA was presented with an offer to be acquired by Rupert Murdoch in a multimillion-dollar deal. A Murdoch subsidiary, the News Data Communications Corp., was developing technology for Murdoch's Sky TV. So in 1988 Bidzos flew twice to Britain to attempt to negotiate a deal, but the sides were far apart on price. He says the offers to buy RSA still roll in. "I've received no less than five firm, written offers in the last two years," he said. He also says he doesn't think that the government can regain the upper hand in the cryptography wars. "They've fired every weapon they have at us now, and we're stronger than ever," Bidzos said. "All they can do is try and get RSA legislated out of business, and that will never happen, in my opinion."

1 0

NY Times on Bidzos and RSA
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From The New York Times, June 28, 1994, pages D1, D5: "Profit and Ego in Data Secrecy" [headline]. By John Markoff. Special to The New York Times. REDWOOD CITY, Calif., June 27 -- If the web of thousands of computer networks around the world can be thought of as an information superhighway, then Jim Bidzos is one of its best-placed toll takers. Mr. Bidzos expects to become very rich -- unless the Government has its way. As president of a Silicon Valley company called RSA Data Security Inc., Mr. Bidzos, 39, controls the patents for software crucial to scrambling and unscrambling computer messages so they can be sent confidentially. Just about anyone using a computer network -- whether for sending personal messages, filing taxes electronically, or shopping from home with a credit card -- would want such confidentiality. On the strength of its coding technology, RSA has sold more than four million copies of its software, and it has won wide support from industry giants like Apple Computer, I.B.M., Lotus Development, Microsoft, Motorola, Northern Telecom, Novell and Sun Microsystems. Not Just for Spies Anymore [subhead] Until recently cryptography, the science of sending secret messages, was a province generally populated by the armed forces, governments and their spies. But with the rise of commercial computer networks, cryptography has become an essential ingredient in information-age services. RSA's software is based on an innovation in cryptography that permits people to exchange private messages without actually getting together beforehand and arranging a secret password. In the past, cryptography required that two parties to a communication first meet to exchange a large number that enabled them to encode and decode messages. RSA's system employs two keys, one for encoding a message, known as a public key, and another for decoding it, called a private key. People who wish to receive secret messages can freely distribute their public key, which enables senders to encode a message. Only with the private key can the message be decoded. A company selling products on-line, for instance, might make its public key widely available, which would enable customers to send in a coded message containing their credit card numbers that could not be intercepted and read by others. The company could decode those messages with its private key, which has a mathematical relationship to the public one. The Government fears that should the RSA system become available abroad, it would lose its ability to eavesdrop and wiretap in cases involving risks to national security. It would much prefer that the global standard be based on its own Clipper encryption standard, which has a "backdooor" that law enforcement officials can peek through. Precisely because the RSA method has no backdoor, it is the choice of industry. But to some government officials, Mr. Bidzos is nothing short of a scheming businessman. "The Government would like him to not exist," said Jeffrey I. Schiller, computer manager at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who has negotiated a licensing deal with Mr. Bidzos. And Stuart Baker, who until several weeks ago was chief counsel of the National Security Agency, observed, "My sense is that his motivation is no more than trying to convince people to buy his products." Officials at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, another Federal agency, say they want to create a standard that is not beholden to the patents of one small company. And the National Security Agency and the Justice Department want a standard that will allow law enforcement agencies to eavesdrop on suspected criminals or violators of national security. Conventional Wisdom [subhead] >From Mr. Bidzos's perspective, Washington remains bound up in a cold war mentality, and should simply get out of the way and let RSA Data go about its business. What is more, he complains, any number of foreign companies are developing encryption techniques just as hard to crack as his, so the Government's efforts to keep him from exporting his software is useless, and perhaps counterproductive. Notwithstanding the official concerns, RSA has developed a loyal following among a wide range of computer, communications and software companies. "They have the strongest technology and the best reputation in the cryptography business," said William Ferguson, vice president of Semaphore, Inc., a maker of data-scrambling systems that licenses RSA's software. Adding spice to this dispute is Mr. Bidzos's ability to outmaneuver the Government, most recently by snatching a crucial patent from under the noses of officials who were planning to use it in an official standard they are trying to establish. Several years ago, two top computer scientists from the National Institute of Standards and Technology traveled to Europe to meet with a German mathematician, Claus Schnorr, who holds a key patent that the Government's coding system may violate. When they returned to the United States, the scientists told their superiors that the United States should license Mr. Schnorr's patent. But Washington was slow to act. So in March 1993, while Mr. Bidzos was on a trip to France, he met with Mr. Schnorr for a four-hour lunch. By the end of the meal, Mr. Bidzos had a deal to use Mr. Schnorr's patent. Despite Mr. Bidzos's high profile in the world of encryption, RSA's revenue is small -- somewhere between $5 million and $10 million annually. But analysts say that the company has the ability to grow substantially. "They have huge opportunity in the Internet," said Lisa Thorell, a researcher at Dataquest in San Jose, Calif., referring to the global web of computer networks that is regarded as a working but primitive model of a global data highway. RSA is also playing an increasing role in the $500 million secure-communications business for equipment that permits safe financial trasnactions and voice and data communications. A Question of Patents [subhead] The issue clouding the future of the company is how severely it will suffer from export controls and competing standards backed by the National Security Agency. Last month the Government made its own competing standard for signing electronic documents mandatory for all Federal agencies, and declared that the digital signature standard, as it is known, did not violate RSA's technology. Mr. Bidzos thinks that Washington is infringing his patents, and, eventually, the strength of his patent claims will be tested in court. Rather then (sic) sue the Government, Mr. Bidzos is likely to start with one of the small companies, like Group Technologies Corporation, in Tampa, that is making components under a Government contract, industry executives say. Mr. Bidzos, who is a Greek citizen and a permanent resident of the United States, was working at a small international marketing firm in 1985 when he decided to move from Florida to the Silicon Valley to help a friend save a failing business. "I wanted to do deals and stay in luxury hotels," he said recently at his office here. "I had no idea I'd be in the center of a political whirlwind." When Mr. Bidzos joined the company in 1986, RSA was shoestring operation about to go into bankruptcy. With his help, RSA struck a deal with Lotus Development in 1987, in which the software giant agreed to advance money for the right to include RSA software in Lotus Notes, a program designed for work groups of office employees. A year later RSA was presented with an offer to be acquired by Rupert Murdoch in a multimillion-dollar deal. A Murdoch subsidiary, the News Data Communications Corporation, was developing technology for Mr. Murdoch's Sky TV. So in 1988 Mr. Bidzos flew twice to Britain to attempt to negotiate a deal, but the sides were far apart on price. He says the offers to buy RSA still roll in. "I've received no less than five firm, written offers in the last two years," he said. He also says he doesn't think that the Government can regain the upper hand in the cryptography wars. "They've fired every weapon they have at us now, and we're stronger than ever," Mr. Bidzos said. "All they can do is try to get RSA legislated out of business, and that will never happen, in my opinion."

1 0

Lotto odds
by edgar＠spectrx.sbay.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May said, ...As for lotto, simple calculations tell anyone that the best way to win is not to play. The return _at best_ is 30 or 40 cents on the dollar, with the rest going to all the various programs the lotto is supposed to support. The more you play, the more you lose. Actually, if memory serves, the CA Lotto claims to return 50% of income in prizes with the remainder divided between schools and "administration." Better than 30-40, but still worse than odds on any casino game or even the "numbers racket" run by organized crime. However, one can improve the percentage by only playing lotto after 1 or more games where there was no perfect match, as often happens, where some of the prize money is carried over to the next game, and so on, until eventually somebody wins the grand prize. After some number "x" of passed games, the odds turn in favor of the player; but not by too much since this is just when large numbers of people play and if more than one perfect ticket is played, the prize is split. Calculation of "x" is not "simple", since you also have to figure in the 20-year (with no interest) payout of large prizes. One other tip for lotto players: Never mark your ticket with any recognizable pattern. The random "quick pick" is probably best. Reason: A pattern is equally likely to be picked at random as a "quick pick" but much -more- likely to also be picked by some other schmuck. So if your pattern pick wins, you're more likely to have to split the prize. -- edgar(a)spectrx.sbay.org (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

4 3

Sternlight
by Bill O'Hanlon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone else noticed that David Sternlight has been quiet for the past two weeks or so? I hope he's not like you-know-who in that mentioning his name summons the fiend. ObCrypto: Maybe he has decided that PGP 2.6 is okay, and now has had the wind removed from his sails... Doubt it. -Bill

2 2

Bidzos and the NSA
by Dave Otto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

posted to talk.politics.crypto in response to Tim's article... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I think the issue, at this point, is not so much whether the NSA goons actually threatened his life, but that they have consistently attempted to suppress crypto anyway they can. That the NSA has tried to intimidate Bidzos is no secret. That the NSA considers PGP a threat to their domain is also well known. Given that the purpose of the ITAR restrictions appear to be to prevent an international standard from forming, I think we need to refocus on the issue of presenting strong crypto as "a right", inevitable, and ubiquitous. CPSR and EFF are doing an admirable job of taking the fight to the beltway; but outside the net, the grass roots support just isn't there. As has been pointed out by PRZ et al., the primary reason to avoided hacks to PGP is that doing so fragments what standards we have now. The release of the MIT PGP was the first step in legitimizing cryptography. The next step is to install interoperable crypto on EVERY box out there. While I don't advocate bypassing your local sysadmin, try to get PGP installed on each machine you touch. Use 2.6 (MIT in U.S., _ui_ elsewhere). Publish your key. Tell your friends. Annoy your family. Irrate your boss ;-). My wife suggested that my activities would have gotten me "black-listed" 40 years ago. I suggest that the NSA would like to do exactly that to individuals like Bidzos and PRZ, but it is too late (and the net would make it virtually impossible anyway). Besides, some things are worth fighting for. Dave Otto -- dave(a)marvin.jta.edd.ca.gov -- daveotto(a)acm.org "Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain!" [the Great Oz] finger DaveOtto(a)ACM.org for PGP 2.6 key <0x3300e841> fingerprint = 78 71 3A 5B FD 8A 9A F1 8F BC E8 6A C7 BD A4 DD -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLhA9qCuceIAzAOhBAQHxjwP/eNcmflW3Pwve/ag8D7G0b5l39QKlNUSF nEcm3DJp0Mhnwd5SIvlOgwPb9K4nH9ASMyjl7NtKCbAEQK9T0XN5nTazg+EsyT2q qfm99I6ozFBQBe1XWMnCyNd6fr3fHoyqY8zIMMR7k29SByUaM9/lxK2ZawMoPgj1 6AS7r4xXFkw= =OISd -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Cryptography export legislation in need of help!
by Shabbir J. Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[URGENT ACTION REQUIRED BEFORE 10:30AM JUNE 30TH, 1994] [PLEASE CHECK THE "WHAT YOU CAN DO RIGHT NOW" SECTION!] ********************************************************************* DISTRIBUTE WIDELY ********************************************************************* Table of contents: Introduction & Alert Status of the bill What you can do right now List of legislators supporting HR 3937 (formerly HR 3627) List of legislators wavering on HR 3937 (formerly HR 3627) List of legislators opposing HR 3937 (formerly HR 3627) What is the Cantwell bill? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- INTRODUCTION & ALERT Voters Telecomm Watch keeps scorecards on legislators' positions on legislation that affects telecommunications and civil liberties. If you have updates to a legislator's positions, from either: -public testimony, -reply letters from the legislator, -stated positions from their office, please send them to vtw(a)panix.com so they can be added to this list. General questions: vtw(a)panix.com Mailing List Requests: vtw-list-request(a)panix.com Press Contact: stc(a)panix.com Gopher URL: gopher://gopher.panix.com:70/1/1/vtw WWW URL: Be patient; we're working on it. :-) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS OF THE BILL (updated 6/28/94) The Cantwell bill, that allows for fewer restrictions exports of cryptography, has an interesting history. It was rolled into the General Export Administration Act HR 3937. The House Foreign Affairs Committee passed the full strength version out of committee after open, public hearings. The House Intelligence Committee took the bill and gutted it after a day of closed, secret hearings. The gutted version is making its way to the House floor. There is a crucial stop-off point, however. The House Rules Committee will hold a hearing on Thursday June 30th, 10:30am in D.C. (Room H-13) to determine if the bill can be amended on the House floor (an "open" bill) or not (a "closed" bill). If they mark the bill as "open", then the Cantwell bill could be restored to its previous version, removing the language put in by the House Select Intelligence Committee which gutted it without a public hearing. It is crucial that you call of the members of the House Rules Committee before 10:30am Thursday June 30th and urge them to mark the bill as "open". This may be the last thing you can do for the cryptographic export legislation. Take the time to make a call! Chronology of the bill Jun 30, 94 House Rules Comm. decides whether to allow amendments on the bill when it reaches the House floor Jun 14, 94 Gutted by the House Select Committee on Intelligence May 20, 94 Referred to the House Select Committee on Intelligence May 18, 94 Passed out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 18 attached to HR 3937, the General Export Administration Act Dec 6, 93 Referred to the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Nov 22, 93 Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- WHAT YOU CAN DO RIGHT NOW Estimated time to do this good deed: Two minutes Show your support for HR 3937 (formerly HR 3627) by contacting a member of the House Rules Committee and ask them to mark the bill as "open" (allowing amendments) when it reaches the House floor. The phone numbers of the members of the House Rules Committee are listed below. Please pick one from your state and call them. If your state isn't listed please call the Chairman, Rep. Joe Moakley. Feel free to use the following sample communique: The Honorable ____________ address Washington DC, 20515 Dear Congressman or Congresswoman, Please mark the General Export Administration Act (HR 3937) as "open" (allowing amendments on the House floor). Recently the House Intelligence Committee removed several provisions of the General Export Administration Act, HR 3937, dealing with the export of cryptographic technology. The House Intelligence Committee did this in a closed, secret hearing which provided for no public input. The House Foreign Affairs Committee previously held an open hearing on the same issue and received a flood of people testifying in favor of the bill, which the committee then reported out in full. I urge you to allow the democratic process to take its course on the House floor and mark the bill as "open". Sincerely, _________________________________ Phone/Fax/Addresses of members of the House Rules Committee 103rd United States Congress, 1993-1994 All addresses are Washington, D.C. 20515 Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax ==== == ======================== ============== ============== 9 MA Moakley, John Joseph (D) 1-202-225-8273 1-202-225-7304 235 Cannon 3 SC Derrick, Butler (D) 1-202-225-5301 1-202-225-5383 221 Cannon 24 CA Beilenson, Anthony (D) 1-202-225-5911 1-818-999-2258 2465 RHOB (might not answer) 24 TX Frost, Martin (D) 1-202-225-3605 1-202-225-4951 2459 RHOB 10 MI Bonior, David E. (D) 1-202-225-2106 1-202-226-1169 2207 RHOB 3 OH Hall, Tony P. (D) 1-202-225-6465 1-202-225-6766 2264 RHOB 5 MO Wheat, Alan (D) 1-202-225-4535 1-202-225-5990 2334 RHOB 6 TN Gordon, Bart (R) 1-202-225-4231 1-202-225-6887 103 Cannon 28 NY Slaughter, Louise M. (D) 1-202-225-3615 1-202-225-7822 2421 RHOB 22 NY Solomon, Gerald B. (R) 1-202-225-5614 1-202-225-1168 2265 RHOB 1 TN Quillen, James H. (R) 1-202-225-6356 1-202-225-7812 102 Cannon 28 CA Dreier, David (R) 1-202-225-2305 1-202-225-4745 411 Cannon 14 FL Goss, Porter J. (R) 1-202-225-2536 1-202-225-6820 330 Cannon ------------------------------------------------------------------------- LIST OF LEGISLATORS SUPPORTING CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORT LEGISLATION The following legislators have formally registered support for cryptography export legislation. Call them with your cheers. All addresses are Washington, D.C. 20515 Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax ==== == ======================== ============== ============== 1 WA Cantwell, Maria (D) 1-202-225-6311 1-202-225-2286 1520 LHOB HR 3627's sponsor; thank her for her work! 16 IL Manzullo, Donald (R) 1-202-225-5676 1-202-225-5284 506 Cannon Cosponsored HR 3627 on 11/22/93 3 UT Orton, William H. (D) 1-202-225-7751 1-202-226-1223 1122 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 3 OR Wyden, Ronald (D) 1-202-225-4811 1-202-225-8941 1111 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 16 CA Edwards, Donald (D) 1-202-225-3072 1-202-225-9460 2307 RHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 19 OH Fingerhut, Eric D. (D) 1-202-225-5731 1-202-225-9114 431 Cannon Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 4 MA Frank, Barney (D) 1-202-225-5931 1-202-225-0182 2404 RHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 2 UT Shepherd, Karen (D) 1-202-225-3011 1-202-226-0354 414 Cannon Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 3 WA Unsoeld, Jolene (D) 1-202-225-3536 1-202-225-9095 1527 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 19 FL Johnston II, Harry (D) 1-202-225-3001 1-202-225-8791 204 Cannon Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 9 WA Kreidler, Mike (D) 1-202-225-8901 1-202-226-2361 1535 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 4 WA Inslee, Jay (D) 1-202-225-5816 1-202-226-1137 1431 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 7 WA McDermott, James A. (D) 1-202-225-3106 1-202-225-9212 1707 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 8 IN McCloskey, Frank (D) 1-202-225-4636 1-202-225-4688 306 Cannon Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 14 CA Eshoo, Anna G. (D) 1-202-225-8104 1-202-225-8890 1505 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 10 NC Ballenger, Thomas C. (R) 1-202-225-2576 1-202-225-0316 2238 RHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 05/04/94 2 WA Swift, Al (D) 1-202-225-2605 1-202-225-2608 1502 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 05/04/94 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LIST OF LEGISLATORS WAVERING ON CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORT LEGISLATION [Feel free to use the sample communique at the end of the FAQ when calling or writing a legislator.] 26 NY Hinchey, Maurice D. (D) 1-202-225-6335 1-202-226-0774 1313 LHOB Recently told a constituent that he is taking the Cantwell bill under consideration, but has "national security concerns" about allowing encryption to be exported outside the United States. 1 IA Leach, James (R) 1-202-225-6576 1-202-226-1278 2186 RHOB Has yet to answer a constituent letter with a stated position. 13 NY Molinari, Susan (D) 1-202-225-3371 1-202-226-1272 123 Cannon Has yet to answer a constituent letter with a stated position. (has taken inordinately long) 8 NY Nadler, Jerrold (D) 1-202-225-5635 1-202-225-6923 424 Cannon Met with lobbying constituent in April '94; no position taken yet 25 CA McKeon, Howard P. (R) 1-202-225-1956 1-202-226-0683 307 Cannon Responded to a constituent with a "non-position", May '94 Had a favorable meeting with a constituent and a VTW volunteer in May '94. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LIST OF LEGISLATORS OPPOSING CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORT LEGISLATION [Feel free to use the sample communique at the end of the FAQ when calling or writing a legislator.] Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax ==== == ======================== ============== ============== 5 AL Cramer Jr, Robert E. (D) 1-202-225-4801 1-202-225-4392 1318 LHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 8 CA Pelosi, Nancy (D) 1-202-225-4965 1-202-225-8259 240 Cannon FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 32 CA Dixon, Julian C. (D) 1-202-225-7084 1-202-225-4091 2400 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 40 CA Lewis, Jerry (R) 1-202-225-5861 1-202-225-6498 2312 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 46 CA Dornan, Robert K. (R) 1-202-225-2965 1-202-225-3694 2402 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 2 CO Skaggs, David E. (D) 1-202-225-2161 1-202-225-9127 1124 LHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 10 FL Young, C. W. (R) 1-202-225-5961 1-202-225-9764 2407 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 4 KS Glickman, Daniel (D) 1-202-225-6216 1-202-225-5398 2371 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 1 NE Bereuter, Douglas (R) 1-202-225-4806 1-202-226-1148 2348 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 9 NJ Torricelli, Robert (D) 1-202-224-5061 1-202-225-0843 2159 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 3 NM Richardson, William (D) 1-202-225-6190 1-202-225-1950 2349 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 1 NV Bilbray, James H. (D) 1-202-225-5965 1-202-225-8808 2431 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 17 PA Gekas, George W. (R) 1-202-225-4315 1-202-225-8440 2410 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 2 RI Reed, John F. (D) 1-202-225-2735 1-202-225-9580 1510 LHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 14 TX Laughlin, Gregory H. (D) 1-202-225-2831 1-202-225-1108 236 Cannon FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 16 TX Coleman, Ronald D. (D) 1-202-225-4831 None 440 Cannon FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 19 TX Combest, Larry (R) 1-202-225-4005 1-202-225-9615 1511 LHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 1 UT Hansen, James V. (R) 1-202-225-0453 1-202-225-5857 2466 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 6 WA Dicks, Norman D. (D) 1-202-225-5916 1-202-226-1176 2467 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- What is the Cantwell bill? The Cantwell bill would permit companies to export products with encryption technology in them. US companies are currently not permitted to export products (hardware or software) with this technology in them. What is encryption technology? Encryption technology, or cryptography, is the art of scrambling a conversation so that only the people communicating can decode it. Other people (such as eavesdroppers) cannot learn about the conversation. Where is cryptography being used? Cryptography is used to encrypt electronic mail to protect its confidentiality in transit. It's used by bank automatic teller machines to protect sensitive data (such as your account number, your Personal Identification Number, and your bank balance). It can be implemented into software (such as electronic mail programs and word processors) as well as hardware (such as telephones and "walkie-talkies") to ensure your privacy. Why is there a restriction on exporting products with technology in them? For many years the United States was a leading researcher in cryptography. High quality cryptographic technology was available only within the United States. The US government thought that if they did not let this technology be exported, foreign individuals would not be able to obtain it and use it against us (by keeping US intelligence agencies from eavesdropping on their communications) Since then, cryptography research has been published in international journals. Companies have been created throughout the world who export cryptographic technology from countries that do not have these restrictions. You can now buy the same, high-quality cryptographic technology from many international firms. Although the marketplace has changed, the regulations have not. Why should the regulations be changed? US companies compete in a global marketplace. Because of the export regulations, they often compete alongside products with superior cryptographic capabilities built into them. The result is that US companies build their products with an inferior encryption technology. The result of this is that you, as an American consumer, have great difficulty obtaining products with strong encryption in them. Because US products cannot compete against products with better privacy features, and because the laws are outdated, the regulations should be changed. The Cantwell bill fixes these regulations to more accurately resemble the current situation of the world marketplace. How can I help encourage more privacy-enhanced products and pass the Cantwell bill? Call or write your representative and ask them to support or cosponsor Rep. Cantwell's export provisions (formerly HR 3627) in the General Export Administration Act, HR 3937. You can base your letter on the sample communication below. SAMPLE LETTER OR PHONE CALL The Honorable ____________ address Washington DC, 20515 Dear Congressman or Congresswoman, As a citizen concerned for my privacy, as well as a supporter of American business, I urge you to cosponsor the Rep. Cantwell's cryptographic export provisions (formerly HR 3627) in the General Export Administration Act, HR 3937. The bill would allow US companies to produce and export products with cryptographic privacy-enhancing technology in them. These products are already available from firms throughout the world. US companies lose nearly $100 million per year in exports to them. By encouraging this industry, ordinary citizens like you and me would be able to purchase products with better privacy features. Please support or co-sponsor HR 3937. Sincerely, ___________________________________ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 0