December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: On the crime bill and remailers
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: greg(a)ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles) > In general, scienter/mens rea requirements mean that you must have intended > a particular action (or failure to act) - the question is about your > understanding of the facts of a particular situation, not the legal status > of a particular situation. Given your example, it's illegal to drive > across the border, knowing your pickup contains ammunition - whether or > not you believe your actions are legal. It's not illegal to drive across > the border with a box full of ammunition if you thought you were carrying > a box full of clothes. > > The old saw "ignorance of the law is no excuse" is basically accurate. > Good-faith reliance on legal advice from competent counsel won't even > save you. (but it might get you a malpractice judgement/settlement). I don't know how true this is in general, but my research into the arms export question indicated otherwise. Here is part of a posting I sent to CP some time last year concerning a case in which the defendant did in fact drive to Mexico with a truck load of ammunition: > In U.S. v Lizarraga-Lizarraga, the appellate court wrote (in 541 F2d 826), > > "At trial and on appeal, the defendant admits that he purchased the > ammunition and that he intended to export it to Mexico. His defense is > bsed on the contention that he had no knowledge that his conduct violated > the law. Hence, the appellant claims that to be found guilty under > 22 U.S.C. 1934 [the predecessor to 22 U.S.C. 2778], the government must > prove that he intended to violate the statute.... We agree, and hold > that he was entitled to a specific intent instruction. Accordingly, we > reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial." > > The court discusses several reasons for concluding that "willfully" > implies a need to show specific intent, among them that the articles on > the Munitions List are not obviously illegal to export, finally concluding: > > "Accordingly, we hold that in order for a defendant to be found guilty of > exporting under 22 U.S.C. 1934, the government must prove that the > defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated a known legal duty not > to export the proscribed articles, and the jury should be so instructed." Perhaps the arms export laws are worded differently than some others and so the more stringent rules apply. Hal

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Re: On the crime bill and remailers Re: On the crime bill and remailers
by nobody＠kaiwan.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mr. Unicorn is rude and uninformed. He will go far. 1) The act does not make it a per se offense to have a remailer. 2) The act makes it an offense to aid a terrorist. 3) Query: is there a scienter requirement in (2)? [for the sake of simplicity, we will ignore the fact that there are scienter requirements in a related part of the bill already, and use Mr. Unicorn's hypothetical of no explicit requirement of scienter] 3a) There must be a scienter requirement to avoid turning the proscription in (2) into either (i) a per se offense, excluded by (1), or (ii) a violation of due process. 3b) Query: why would it be a violation of due process to have a ban on unknowingly aiding terrorists in the manner Mr. Unicorn wishes to read the satute? An analogy will make the point. Suppose the act concerned restaurant regulation, and made it an offence to "feed" a terrorist. Carlos walks into your joint in disguise, orders and duly consumes ham on rye. What verdict? Courts will do what it takes to say not guilty, whether via due process, the rule of leniency, or statutory construction. N.B. these problems could be cured, and due process observed, by finding a duty to make enquiry or imputing a negligence standard of some sort, but we do not see any hint of this in the statute. 4) Aha! you say, but terrorism is different from nice law abiding restaurants, and we brave c'punkers that we are, are on the Edge, not like the honest sandwitchman. The courts will not give us any breaks. Alas, there is the case of Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 655 (1994) [summary quoted below], in which the Supreme Court imputed a scienter requirement into a money laundering statute which on its face required no such scienter at all. 5) QED. (As for others who are as quick to damn as to praise...watch your cholestorol!) //QUOTING-- SYLLABUS: As here relevant, federal law requires a domestic bank involved in a cash transaction exceeding $ 10,000 to file a report with the Secretary of the Treasury, 31 U.S.C. 5313(a), 31 CFR 103.22(a); makes it illegal to "structure" a transaction -- i.e., to break up a single transaction above the reporting threshold into two or more separate transactions -- "for the purpose of evading the reporting requirement," 31 U.S.C. 5324(3); and sets out criminal penalties for "[a] person willfully violating" the antistructuring provision, 5322(a). After the judge at petitioner Waldemar Ratzlaf's trial on charges of violating 5322(a) and 5324(3) instructed the jury that the Government had to prove both that the defendant knew of the 5313(a) reporting obligation and that he attempted to evade that obligation, but did not have to prove that he knew the structuring in which he engaged was unlawful, Ratzlaf was convicted, fined, and sentenced to prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's construction of the legislation. Held: To give effect to 5322(a)'s "willfulness" requirement, the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that the structuring he or she undertook was unlawful, not simply that the defendant's purpose was to circumvent a bank's reporting obligation. Section 5324 itself forbids structuring with a "purpose of evading the [ 5313(a)] reporting requirements," and the lower courts erred in treating the "willfulness" requirement essentially as words of no consequence. Viewing 5322(a) and 5324(3) in light of the complex of provisions in which they are embedded, it is significant that the omnibus "willfulness" requirement, when applied to other provisions in the same statutory subchapter, consistently has been read by the Courts of Appeals to require both knowledge of the reporting requirement and a specific intent to commit the crime or to disobey the law. The "willfulness" requirement must be construed the same way each time it is called into play. Because currency structuring is not inevitably nefarious, this Court is unpersuaded by the United States' argument that structuring is so obviously "evil" or inherently "bad" that the "willfulness" requirement is satisfied irrespective of the defendant's knowledge of the illegality of structuring. The interpretation adopted in this case does not dishonor the venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a criminal charge, for Congress may decree otherwise in particular contexts, and has done so in the present instance. Pp. 5-15. 976 F.2d 1280, reversed and remanded. JUDGES: GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR and THOMAS, JJ., joined. //END QUOTE----------- SOLONg

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SHAMELESS PLUG
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Mark Chen wrote the follow about the scienter thread: ... Howard Zinn makes the same point in _Declarations of Independence_.... he concludes that law is made not by legislators and judges, but by the policman's club. But less and less every day. As Duncan and I--the official "Pollyannas of Privacy"--have been telling you, technology is on our side. As it advances, technology continues to shift the balance of power from the State to the individual. For my vision of technology in the service of civil liberties, see my upcoming article, "Support Your Digital Police," in the "Idees Fortes" section of December's Wired. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: SHAMELESS PLUG
by chen＠intuit.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy Sandfort writes: > Mark Chen wrote the follow about the scienter thread: > > ... Howard Zinn makes the same point in _Declarations of > Independence_.... he concludes that law is made not by > legislators and judges, but by the policman's club. > > But less and less every day. As Duncan and I--the official > "Pollyannas of Privacy"--have been telling you, technology is > on our side. As it advances, technology continues to shift the > balance of power from the State to the individual. Which is why, even with their exceedingly feeble perception of what these technologies portend, authoritarian structures are thrown into fits of nearly hysterical apoplexy when confronted by Things Crypto. > For my vision of technology in the service of civil liberties, > see my upcoming article, "Support Your Digital Police," in the > "Idees Fortes" section of December's Wired. I'm there. - Mark - -- Mark Chen chen(a)netcom.com 415/329-6913 finger for PGP public key D4 99 54 2A 98 B1 48 0C CF 95 A5 B0 6E E0 1E 1D

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DB Technology
by L. Todd Masco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For a good example of DB/Expert system technology used for good instead of evil ("A power so great...") check out ringo(a)media.mit.edu, body of mail "join". You tell it your musical preferences and it suggests albums that others with a similar taste to yours liked. It'll also tell you what to avoid. I intend to honor its advice, to avoid Neil Diamond, Tiffany, and Barry Manilow. -- Todd

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Re: Virtual Assassins & lethal remailers
by TJHARDIN＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Re: Virtual assasins and lethal remailers (Doug Cutrell) doug(a)OpenMind.com writes >>TJHARDIN(a)delphi.com writes: >>Adam is absolutely right.... Even if a killer is so anonymous that she can't >>be linked to a given crime by the employer who will talk 99.9% of the time >>any pressure is applied, she must still continue to accept various >>contracts. >>The police would then set up one of their stings & "hire" her anonymously >>for another job & snatch the killer up when she attempts to fullfill this >>contract. Likewise, the very first offer of employment may well be of this >>sort. >Once again (and hopefully for the last time!), I reiterate that it is the >person *placing* the contract who is at zero risk (except for the risk of >losing their digital cash). Stings can be set up to catch the killer, but >providing the person doing the hiring trusts no one but himself, there is >no risk to him. To the extent that there is *any* risk to this person, the >goals of crypto anarchy have not been met. This pertains to every >conceivable security leak that might affect the person placing the >contract. >Doug Sorry to have to repost on this, I only meant to make a brief point. To the following --> >the person *placing* the contract... is at zero risk To this entire point I must say Au Contraire!The person at greatest risk *is* the person placing the contract. This is the employer whom I said would fold under pressure 99.9% of the time. If the police are still around,they will use the classic investigatory method of cui bono? Who benefits? Who has motive?This was Adam's point & the one I was emphasizing. Even if the payment is untraceable, the police have often succeeded in bluffing suspects into confessing to crimes for which strong suspicions existed, but evidence proving guilt was entirely lacking. This will not change as human nature will not fundamentally change. As far as the assassin being unable to link the employer to the crime, or know who hired her, this is fine in theory, but it is likely that she two will ask the same question regarding the job, cui bono? & coming to the same conclusion. When arrested later for some other offense, merely providing law enforcement with the time, place, victim, & payment for various jobs will be enough to convict or scare most employers into confessing. After all the impatient heir will no longer be able to claim that Uncle Scrooge was a tragic victim of random violence. Now I know the idea is to reach a state where police forces no longer exist. But let's be realistic. -Publicly Supported- morality or Political Correctness Cheka's such as we know today will hopefully cease to exist, but it is extremely likely that Private Police squads will be hired by individuals & groups for protection & revenge. Such units/individuals have a long history in this country, & I knew (verrry casually- we frequented the same Houston New Wave hangout, Rudyard's in the early 80's) a hired killer named David West who was tripped up by a femme fatale hired by a private dick named Clyde Wilson who was hired by the victims' other daughters to get at the daughter who arranged their parents' murders. The case was solved entirely by these private cops & only turned over to HPD for arrest & prosecution. I am sure that if no HPD or State of Texas existed, the "good" daughters would have paid Clyde Wilson for more than just investigation. Actually, the natural condition of humans in anything more complicated than a small scale subsistence bands seems to be not living under powerful states, but rather private armies, condottieri, vendettas, etc. This was the state of affairs in the Italian Renaisance & which one of us would choose the deadly dull certainties of the Middle Age's dogmatic fideism over the brilliant explosion of that great liberation of the human spirit & potential? No one reads Aquin-ass- anymore or even knows who he was but the Borgias, Machiavelli, & Michelangelo are still remembered, read with profit, & restored...respectively even now. tjh 2.61 available

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Re: On the crime bill and remailers
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:45 PM 9/20/94 -0400, John Young wrote: >Hal and Tim point to the vulnerability of the person running >the remailer to being threatened through the equipment owner Soon most remailers will be run on equipment owned by the operator. At the last NJ computer show I attended, I could have purchased a 486/66 with a paltry 250 meg HD for $999. Then all we have to worry about are the network connections but in a few years, we'll be able to do high-speed "dial up" connections from our home boxes to other (and different) systems anywhere on the nets. Hard to track. >This isolation and elimination (or co-optation) of a target has >worked again and again to destroy networks once they become >serious threats to law and order. They can afford to intimidate a few remailers but "enforcement doesn't scale well." (Another DCF quote.) Networks, software, and hardware scale much better than enforcement resources. Swamping effect. DCF

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Re: THOSE DARNED HIT MEN
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > SANDY SANDFORT > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . >Would you do business with a escrow that was the bag man for >contract murders? But if the system is set up for total anonymity, _who would know_ that an escrow agent was the "bag man"? Just like no one would know who the contractee was, or the contractor: ========================================================= Date: 21 Sep 2003 07:59:53 -0700 (PDT) From: nobody(a)remailer.mafia.org Subject: HIT MAN Needed To: alt.jobs.hitmen Contract killing needed. 5,000 credit bonus if "accidental", additional 5,000 credits is done within 30 days. If interested, post MegaCrypted bid to alt.jobs.hitmen, specifying escrow agency, and using message ID in subject line. MegaCrypt v3.7 key: dijfwoiertqwgsdfjiwqfnwenfgwiegeowqt-384`=3jkig918ur5=`9ur2ihg roih2`-98tu`=0r`\012jri2nf92ur=0`9u3r9goi23`08ru2`=093r2`3ru23 ofn1-90401t9=039t30149t394t13=04t343049u=0349304109fj3=090458g ru2-983r3i3hg143594t=39jfv3jf0`2\203r9349ugpweokwoert213tr9u=0 flkj2-0r9`2=9t130gjf32if2-103r0134ui=109jf30uf=039r=0394jf3409 flk23fr09r092r9jfgiogif30rtu=09ru0jf02ijf029ru20`9u29ti3jfoi3i oiwf-90283r-9283ru2f2ijf20r-28ru89u2h28f2-98ru2-8r298h23ohf298 oifg213-09r12-03r-20rj20jf09rut034toi53ofeg0we9g34wjkego-i309g fi3r230ru2rij39rturt3iof8u1ru30rj3f285u^&*df23rt209342`j232t4j -98tu`=0r`\012jri2nf92ur=0`9u3r9goi23`08ru2`=093r2`3ru23ofn1-9 0401t9=039t30149t394t13=04t343049u=0349304109fj3=090458gru2-98 3r3i3hg143594t=39jfv3jf0`2\203r9349ugpweokwoert213tr9u=0flkj2- 0r9`2=9t130gjf32if2-103r0134ui=1 ================================================== My nickel's worth..... Dave Merriman (hoping I don't hear from the FBI about this :-) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender. PGP preferred. Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to *love* Big Brother.

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Re: HTTP authentication efforts
by Mark Hittinger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: paul(a)hawksbill.sprintmrn.com (Paul Ferguson) > Does anyone know, on the off-chance, who is currently working on > HTTP authentication processes for web browsing and Mosiac? Cern probably has this already done and under wraps by now. In the USA the recent NCSA/Spyglass, Inc press release implies that Spyglass will develop an "electronic commerce" capability for Mosaic. Tuesday's Wall Street Journal has an interesting article (Sep 20 C1 bottom) about the mysterious DE Shaw company. For those of you who don't follow every vital scrap of information pryed out of DE Shaw - they are a stock market related firm with very heavy investment in computer hardware and brain power. The article quotes Shaw implying the development of yet another electronic market capability - "commercial use of the Internet". Perhaps Shaw is funding some of Spyglass? Its odd to see program trading gurus get side tracked on this. mark.h

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HTTP authentication efforts
by michael shiplett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"pf" == Paul Ferguson <paul(a)hawksbill.sprintmrn.com> writes: pf> Does anyone know, on the off-chance, who is currently working on pf> HTTP authentication processes for web browsing and Mosiac? pf> Pointers appreciated. There is a www-security mailing list based at Rutgers (majordomo(a)nsmx.rutgers.edu; list name of www-security). From the introductory majordomo message: This list is intended for the discussion of World Wide Web security proposals, enhancements and issues. Ben Fried of Columbia posted to www-security some NCSA httpd/xmosaic patches to allow Kerberos 4 authentication. The University of Michigan is using these patches (with some bug fixes fed back to Ben) and a similarly patched lynx browser for authenticated web connections. I haven't looked at the code to know whether the network traffic is encrypted or not. michael

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