December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

list test
by Gary Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

testing to see if list ok.

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Re: Technical Remailer Analysis.
by bogus＠no.return.address 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- From: Louis Cypher Hal Writes: >Good point. There is a related attack which Chaum pointed out in his >1981 CACM paper: the attacker intercepts and keeps a copy of an incoming >message, then later re-sends it. This one will go to the same place and >by repeating this multiple times we can figure out where the original >message went. This raises a fundamental problem with current remailers. It is clear that next generation remailers will have to encrypt all messages sent between them, on top of any nested encryption of the message done by the originator. Timothy C. May Writes: >157.3. Some possible fixes: > > 157.3.1. remailers can recognize duplicates and agree not to >remail them, or to remail them off in different directions (adding their own >hop-wrappers) > > 157.3.2. digital postage helps a bit, as the attacker at >least has to spend money > > 157.3.3. (If the inner layers of a message each have some >digital money, or a "one-use" coupon, then an attacker who copies and resends >the whole message is effectively double-spending and this should be detected. >Most simply, the "use once" coupon will only allow one passage through the >remailer.) If the remailers also batched messages to a given destination, or padded outgoing messages before encrypting them, they would be far less susceptible to this kind of attack. Re-encrypting the message with padding (to some standard size) would prevent attackers from recognizing their own messages in a flood attack, except by noting destination (which could be a giveaway). Batching would do the same, but would also hide the number of messages trashed or locally delivered. Neither of these does much against the concerted "spam attack". I think in the end, remailers will need to run something like encrypted links, sending a constant volume of data between them, which would be random garbage when not a real message. This leaves open the denial of service attack of sending more data per hour then the link supports, therefore causing long queues at the remailers. Sigh, I really need to get down to a library and dig up the Chaum articles I hate to always reinvent the wheel. While waiting for good digital postage, a substitute could be used. If one added a "Msg-ID:" header similar to the Ghio remailer's "Cutmarks", which contained a large random number, this number could be stored at the remailer, and messages with the same ID simply send to /dev/null. This would be simple to do with remailer chaining scripts like "premail". Hal writes: >If I follow this, the attack is something like, every time Alice sends >a message Bob receives one. Observing this happening over a period of >time we conclude they are communicating. Could this be defeated by >sending dummy messages so that Alice sends exactly 10 messages every day? >Then the fact that Bob receives messages on some day can't very well >be associated with Alice. Since I assumed that a typical user sends one message per day, Alice may draw attention to herself through this mechanism. 10 messages is not enough, it would leave some correlation. Alice needs to send at least one message per tick (e.g. 48 in my example), in which case she shown 100% correlation with all recipients always. There is no way to know that she is sending to Bob, but I suspect she will be on a short list at the FBI unless everyone else is doing the same (which violates my assumptions). If everyone sent a message every tick, traffic analysis would be impossible. Matthew J Ghio writes: >This attack can be defeated if both Alice and Bob are running remailers. >Then their correspondence is hidden in the 100 messages a day of >remailer traffic. An observer can not tell wether the messages were for >Alice or Bob, or if they were for the remailer (assuming latency was >used) or if they were bit bucket messages. Alice could even forward her >personal messages to a bitbucket (after saving a copy for herself) to >further increase security. This is why everyone should be running a >remailer if they are concerned about their privacy. I do not think that the "everyone is a remailer" idea works. At the assumed one message per day, and an average message chain of 5 remailers, then only 5% of users can maintain remailers with a real traffic flow of 100 messages per day. Other than that, this idea is functionally similar to Hal's. Sending messages on to bit buckets is a nice idea. Assuming cutmarks, or standard message sizes, and reordering are used, this is indistinguishable from a remailer which just delivers the local mail, and also sends out periodic junk messages to various bit buckets. As I mentioned in my original message, this should be done anyway to ensure complete mixing of all messages within the web during any given tick. -Louis Cypher -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLo557qyHUAO76TvRAQFSJwQAmenSoAZAkOtGww9F/giy80AmJJk30I6D y5Fp0d8fgNy3MiCnG6onlvvJdBShgonvsbKRF0r94cYtYgtnczK/rqmhIDyc/UB2 a0V55YRdb84YwGpGPmrFepH8yXdueEgQvUq5Fs1FV9jNtSAK9kK2G1+QmSVdq/Uy pkRIf8iPbJA= =xZdv -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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The benefits of commercialness
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As you can see, the remailer running with a profit motive (or at least a not-go-deeply-into-debt motive) is the most reliable. Last ping: Sun 2 Oct 94 17:00:01 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- c2 remail(a)c2.org **+-******** 13:29 99.99% wien remailer(a)ds1.wu-wien.ac.at ****#+**--#* 21:01 99.99% chaos remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu ***####**+## 2:54 99.99% leri remail(a)leri.edu ****#**#**** 6:45 99.99% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com **##*#+***#* 3:59 99.99% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com +*****-*+- * 1:53:42 99.99% =), -- sameer Voice: 510-841-2014 Network Administrator Pager: 510-321-1014 Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley Dialin: 510-549-1383 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

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Filing FOIA Requests
by ozymandias G desiderata 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A large group of my friends and I are interested in finding out exactly what the cheeseballs over in Intelligence, Inc. have on file about us. Does anyone have handy the details necessary to file a Freedom of Information Act request for your own file? Do y'all have some hints so that we can expect the best possible yield? On the same note, do any of you have any humorous / chilling stories about what you found out when you got your file? Thanks in advance for the info, ozymandias G desiderata

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List Down?
by werewolf＠io.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is the list down or is there nothing to talk about? I think I've gotten one message inthe last 36 hours.

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On Feistel Networks, S-Boxes, and Block Cipher Design
by schneier＠chinet.chinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ON FEISTEL NETWORKS, S-BOXES, AND BLOCK CIPHER DESIGN Claude Shannon defined the cryptographic principles of confusion and diffusion. Fifty years after this paper was written, these principles are still the cornerstone of good block cipher design. Confusion serves to hide any relationship between the plaintext, the ciphertext, and the key. Remember how linear and differential cryptanalysis can exploit even a slight relationship between these three things? Good confusion makes the relationship statistics so complicated that even these powerful cryptanalytic tools won't work. Diffusion serves to spread the influence of individual plaintext or key bits over as much of the ciphertext as possible. This also serves to hide statistical relationships, and make cryptanalysis more difficult. Confusion alone is enough. A cipher that consisted of a single lookup table of 64 bits of plaintext to 64 bits of ciphertext based on a key would be plenty strong. The problem is that large lookup tables require large amounts of memory to implement: 1020 bytes of memory for the above table. The whole point of block cipher design is to create something that looks like a large lookup table, but with much smaller memory requirements. The trick is to repeatedly mix confusion (with much smaller tables) and diffusion in a single cipher in different combinations. This is called a product cipher. Sometimes a block cipher that incorporates layers of substitution and permutation is called a substitution-permutation network, or even a SP network. Look back at function f of DES. The expansion permutation and P- box perform diffusion; the S-boxes perform confusion. The expansion permutation and P-box are linear; the S-boxes are nonlinear. Each operation is pretty simple on its own, but together they work pretty well. DES also illustrates a few more principles of block cipher design. The first is the idea of an iterated block cipher. This simply means taking a simple round function and iterating it multiple times. Two-round DES isn't very strong; it takes five rounds before all of the output bits are dependent on all of the input bits and all of the key bits. Sixteen-round DES is strong; 32-round DES is even stronger. Feistel Ciphers Most block algorithms that have appeared in the literature are Feistel Ciphers. The idea dates from the early 1970s. Take a block of length n and divide it into two halves of length n/2: L and R. Of course, n must be even. You can define an iterated block cipher where the output of the ith round is determined from the output of the previous round: L_i = R_(i-1) R_i = L_(i-1) XOR f(R_(i-1),K_i) K_i is the subkey used in the ith round, and f is an arbitrary round function. You've seen this concept in DES, Lucifer, FEAL, Khufu, Khafre, LOKI, and others. Why is it such a big deal? First off, the function is guaranteed to be reversible. Because XOR is used to combine the left half with the output of the round function, it is necessarily true that L_(i-1) XOR f(R_(i-1),K_i) XOR f(R_(i-1),K_i) = L_(i-1) A cipher that uses this construction is guaranteed to be invertible as long as the inputs to f in each round can be reconstructed. It doesn't matter what f is; f does not have to invertible. We can design f to be as complicated as we please, and we don't have to implement two different algorithms--one for encryption and another for decryption. The structure of a Feistel network takes care of all this automatically. Simple Relations DES has the property that if E_K(P) = C, then E_K'(P') = C', where P', C', and K' are the bitwise complements of P, C, and K. This property reduces the complexity of a brute-force attack by a factor of two. LOKI has complementation properties that reduce the complexity of a brute-force attack by a factor of 256. A simple relation can be defined as [KNU94]: If E_K(P) = C, then E_f(K)(g(P,K) = h(C,K) where f, g, and h are simple functions. By simple I mean that they are easy to compte, much easier than an iteration of the block cipher. In DES, f is the bitwise complement of K, g is the bitwise complement of P, and h is the bitwise complement of C. This is a result of XORing the key into part of the text. In a good block cipher, there are no simple relations. Methods for finding some of these weaknesses are in [KWA91B]. No Weak Keys In a good block cipher, all keys are equally strong. Algorithms with a small number of weak keys, like DES, are generally no problem. The odds of picking one at random are very small, and it's easy to test and discard them. However, these weak keys can sometimes be exploited if the block cipher is used as a one-way hash function. Strength Against Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis The study of differential and linear cryptanalysis has shed significant light on the theory of good block cipher design. The inventors of IDEA introduced the concept of differentials, a generalization of the basic idea of characteristics [LAI91B]. They argued that block ciphers can be designed in such a way to be resistant against this attack; IDEA is the result of that work [LAI91B]. This concept was further formalized in [NYB93], where Kaisia Nyberg and Lars Knudsen showed how to make block ciphers that were provably secure against differential cryptanalysis. Linear cryptanalysis is newer, and it is less clear what generic design techniques will protect a cipher against linear cryptanalysis. Knudsen has made some progress, considering some necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) criteria for what he calls practically secure Feistel ciphers: ciphers that are resistant to both linear and differential cryptanalysis [KNU94]. Nyberg introduced an analogy to the concept of differentials in differential cryptanalysis in linear cryptanalysis [NYB94]. Other work that extends the idea of linear cryptanalysis can be found in [PRE94A,KAL94B]. Interestingly enough, there seems to be a duality between differential and linear cryptanalysis. This duality becomes apparent both in the design of techniques to construct good differential characteristics and linear approximations [BIH95,MAT95], and also in the design criteria for making algorithms that are secure against both attacks [CHA95]. Exactly where this line of research will lead is still unknown. S-Box Design The strength of various Feistel ciphers--and specifically their resistance to differential and linear cryptanalysis--is tied directly to their S-boxes. This has prompted a spate of research on what constitutes a good S-box. An S-box is simply a substitution: a mapping of m-bit inputs to n-bit outputs. Above I talked about a single lookup table of 64- bit inputs to 64-bit outputs; that would be a single 64x64-bit S- box. A general S-box with an m-bit input and an n-bit output is called a mxn-bit S-box. S-boxes are generally the only non- linear step in an algorithm; they are what give a block cipher its security. In general, the bigger they are the better. DES has eight different 6x4-bit S-boxes. Khufu and Khafre have a single 8x32-bit S-box. In IDEA the modular multiplication step is effectively the S-box; it is a 32x32-bit S-box. The larger this S-box, the harder it is to find useful statistics about it to attack [GOR83]. Also, while random S-boxes are usually not optimal to protect against differential and linear attacks, it is easier to find strong S-boxes if the S-boxes are larger. Most random S-boxes are nonlinear, nondegenerate, and have have strong resistance to linear cryptanalysis--and the fraction that does not goes down rapidly as the number of input bits decreases [OCO91,OCO94,OCO94A]. The size of m is more important than the size of n. Increasing the size of n reduces the effectiveness of differential cryptanalysis, but it increases the effectiveness of linear cryptanalysis to a much greater degree. In fact, if n >= 2m - m, then there is definitely a linear relation of the input and output bits of the S-box. And if n >= 2m, then there is a linear relation of only the output bits [BIH95]. Much of this work involves the study of Boolean functions. In order to be secure, the Boolean functions used in S-boxes must satisfy specific conditions. They should not be linear, nor should they be close to linear [ADA90,NYB91,NYB93A]. There should be a balance of zeros and ones, and no correlations between different combinations of bits. The output bits should behave independently when any single input bit is complemented. These design criteria are also related to the study of bent functions. One property that seems very important is the diffusion of information: how many output bits of an S-box change when some subset of the input bits are changed. This is called the avalanche effect. It's easy to impose conditions on Boolean functions so that satisfy certain avalanche criteria, but constructing them is a harder task. The strict avalanche criteria (SAC) guarantees that exactly half of the output bits change when one input bit changes [WEB86]. A few years ago cryptographers proposed choosing S-boxes so that the different distribution table for each S-box is uniform. This would provide immunity against differential cryptanalysis by smoothing out the differentials in any particular round [ADA92,DAW91A,DAW91,NYB91]. LOKI is an example of this design. However, this approach can sometimes aid in differential cryptanalysis [BIH92B]. Actually, a better approach is making sure that the maximum differential is as small as possible. Kwangjo Kim proposed five criteria for the construction of S- boxes [KIM93A], similar to the design criteria for the DES S- boxes. Choosing good S-boxes is not an easy task, and there are many competing ideas on how to do it. Four general approaches can be identified: Choose randomly: It is clear that small random S-boxes are insecure, but large random S-boxes may be good enough. Random S-boxes with 8 or more inputs are quite strong. And even more strength is added if the S-boxes are both random and key-dependent. IDEA uses both large and key-dependent S-boxes. Choose and test: Some ciphers generate random S-boxes and then test them for the requisite properties. See [ADA90] for an example of this approach. Man-made: This technique uses little mathematics; S-boxes are generated using more intuitive techniques. Bart Preneel stated that "...theoretically interesting criteria are not sufficient [for choosing Boolean functions for S-boxes]..." and that "...ad hoc design criteria are required" [PRE93]. Math-made: Generating S-boxes according to mathematical principles so that they have proven security against differential and linear cryptanalysis, and good diffusive properties. See [NYB94A] for an excellent example of this approach. There has been some call for a combination of he "math-made" or "man-made" approaches [ROB94], but the real debate seems to be between randomly-chosen S-boxes and S-boxes--whether created or culled--that have certain properties. Certainly the latter approach has the advantage of being optimal against known attacks--linear and differential cryptanalysis--but it offers unknown protection against unknown attacks. The designers of DES knew about differential cryptanalysis, and the DES S-boxes were optimized against it. They did not seem to know about linear cryptanalysis, and the DES S-boxes are very weak against it [MAT95]. Random S-boxes in DES would be weaker against differential cryptanalysis and stronger against linear cryptanalysis. On the other hand, random S-boxes may not be optimal against known attacks but they can be made sufficiently large and therefor sufficiently resistant. And they are more likely to be sufficiently resistant against unknown attacks. The debate is still going on, but my personal feeling is that S-boxes should be as large as possible, random, and key-dependent. [ADA92] C.M. Adams, "On Immunity Against Biham and Shamir's 'Differential Cryptanalysis,'" Information Processing Letters, v. 41, n. 2, 1992, pp. 77-80. [ADA90] C.M. Adams and S.E. Tavares, "The Structured Design of Cryptographically Good S-Boxes," Journal of Cryptology, v. 3, n. 1, 1990, pp. 27-41. [BIH95] E. Biham "On Matsui's Linear Cryptanalysis," Advances in Cryptology--EUROCRYPT '94 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1995, to appear. [BIH92B] E. Biham and A. Shamir, Differential Cryptanalysis of the Data Encryption Standard, Springer-Verlag, 1993. [CHA95] F. Chabaud and S. Vaudenay, "Links Between Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis," Advances in Cryptology--EUROCRYPT '94 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1995, to appear. [DAW91A] M.H. Dawson and S.E. Tavares, "An Expanded Set of Design Criteria for Substitution Boxes and their Use in Strengthening DES-like Cryptosystems," IEEE Pacific Rim Conference on Communications, Computers, and Signal Processing, IEEE, Victoria, BC, Canada, 9-10 Mary 1991, pp. 191-195. [DAW91] M.H. Dawson and S.E. Tavares, "An Expanded Set of S-box Design Criteria Based on Information Theory and its Relation to Differential-like Attacks," Advances in Cryptology-- EUROCRYPT '91 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 352- 367. [GOR83] J.A. Gordon and R. Retkin, "Are Big S-boxes Best?" Cryptography, Proceedings of the Workshop on Cryptography, Burg Feuerstein, Germany, March 29-April 2, 1982, Springer- Verlag, 1983, pp. 257-262. [KAL94B] B.S. Kaliski and M.J.B. Robshaw, "Linear Cryptanalysis Using Multiple Approximations," Advances in Cryptology-- CRYPTO '94 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1994. [KIM93A] K. Kim, "Construction of DES-like S-boxes Based on Boolean Functions Satisfying the SAC," Advances in Cryptology--ASIACRYPT '91 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1993, pp. 59-72. [KNU94] L.R. Knudsen, "Practically Secure Feistel Ciphers," Fast Software Encryption, Cambridge Security Workshop Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1994, pp. 211-221. [KWA91B] M. Kwan and J. Pieprzyk, "A General Purpose Technique for Locating Key Scheduling Weakness in DES-like Cryptosystems," Advances in Cryptology--ASIACRYPT '91 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 237-246. [LAI91B] X. Lai, J. Massey, and S. Murphy, "Markov Ciphers and Differential Cryptanalysis," Advances in Cryptology-- EUROCRYPT '91 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 17-38. [MAT95] M. Matsui, "On Correlation Between the Order of the S- boxes and the Strength of DES," Advances in Cryptology-- EUROCRYPT '94 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1995, to appear. [NYB91] K. Nyberg, "Perfect Nonlinear S-boxes," Advances in Cryptology--EUROCRYPT '91 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 378-386. [NYB93A] K. Nyberg, "On the Construction of Highly Nonlinear Permutations," Advances in Cryptology--EUROCRYPT '92 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 92-98. [NYB94] K. Nyberg, "Provable Security Against Differential Cryptanalysis," presented at the rump session of Eurocrypt '94, May 1994. [NYB94A] K. Nyberg, "Differentially Uniform Mappings for Cryptography," Advances in Cryptology--EURORYPT '93 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1994, pp. 55-64. [NYB93] K. Nyberg and L.R. Knudsen, "Provable Security Against Differential Cryptanalysis," Advances in Cryptology--CRYPTO '92 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1993, pp. 566-574. [OCO91] L. O'Connor, "Enumerating Nondegenerate Permutations," Advances in Cryptology--EUROCRYPT '93 Proceedings, Springer- Verlag, 1994, pp. 368-377. [OCO94] L. O'Connor, "On the Distribution of Characteristics in Bijective Mappings," Advances in Cryptology--EUROCRYPT '93 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1994, pp. 360-370. [OCO94A] L. O'Connor, "On the Distributino of Chracteristics in Composite Permutations," Advances in Cryptology--CRYPTO '93 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1994, pp. 403-412. [PRE93] B. Preneel, "Analysis and Design of Cryptographic Hash Functions," Ph.D. diss., Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Jan 1993. [PRE94A] B. Preneel and V. Rijmen, "On Using Maximum Liklihood to Optimize Recent Cryptanalytic Techniques, " presented at the rump session of EUROCRYPT '94, May 1994. [ROB94] M.J.B. Robshaw, "Block Ciphers," Technical Report TR-601, RSA Laboratories, Jul 1994. [WEB86] A.F. Webster and S.E. Tavares, "On the Design of S- Boxes," Advances in Cryptology--CRYPTO '85 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1986, pp. 523-534.

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He's dead Jim (Chomsky)
by nobody＠cass156.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Amazing, absolutely amazing! Perhaps we should stop reading Chomsky (if we ever did) and read James A. Donald--he obviously has not only a grasp of what it is people *really* mean, but also has the spurious arguments to back himself up! The Chomsky quote of the day: > In my opinion, not only mainstream intellectuals but also others > who produce a constant stream of lies, distortion, racist screeds, > etc., should be permitted freedom of speech. The state should not > have the power to stop them. The same freedom extends to > hypocrites, like faculty senates who choose one particularly and > usually quite marginal example because career and power interests > are served thereby, while ignoring vastly more significant and > awful cases because the opposite is true. And Congress, of which > the same is correct. In this, James A. Donald finds: >To put this in its proper context, Chomsky also believes >in socialism, in the sense of the "people" controlling the >means of production, distribution, and supply, and in >particular, the "people" running the mass media. What? Non sequitur! No where in Chomsky's quote do we find any remote resemblance of a reference to mass media; neither to production, distribution, nor to supply (nor to economics of any kind). If I had to piece this together, Mr. Donald erroneously finds the quote: "The state should not have the power to stop them" to mean that Mr. Chomsky is advocating that the "people" *should.* Mr. Donald continues: >In my previous writings on this thread I have shown >examples where Chomsky carefully chooses words so as to >convince us that freedom of speech is not freedom, and >that control of speech is freedom. Wrong again. In his previous writings, James A. Donald *tried to show* that Chomsky "chooses words so as to convince us that freedom of speech is not freedom, and that control of speech is freedom." Unfortunately (or fortunately, depending on one's personal bias), Mr. Donald's "arguments" were nothing more than simple speculations which lacked cohesiveness. He continues: >You will notice that Chomsky has carefully expressed >himself in the manner that is least likely to make us feel >favorable to freedom of speech. [snip] No, what I *have* noticed is that obviously Chomsky "has carefully expressed himself in the manner that is least likely to make" James A. Donald feel favorable to freedom of speech. I have no problem with the manner in which Chomsky has expressed himself--then again, I also see that Chomsky's quote is directed at more than one issue. Continuing... >The intended effect is to make us feel that such "extreme" >freedom of speech is a bit excessive and not really >necessary or desirable. > >In the above quote Chomsky implies that freedom of speech >is divisible -- he implies that we can suppress wicked, >obnoxious, and obviously false ideas, without closing down >everyone's ability to communicate political thought. Unfortunately, I think that James A. Donald is again missing the point. Let me help...it is just those "extreme" views which must be protected. Chomsky does imply that freedom of speech is divisible, but he also implies that freedom of speech *should not be.* Furthermore, Chomsky neither states nor insinuates that "we"--and I assume that James A. Donald is refering to "the people"--can "suppress wicked, obnoxious, and obviously false ideas" of any kind! What he does say is that those persons who form the power structure of this country--the mainstream intellectuals and the state--have the power to suppress ideas and speech. (Remember, Chomsky says "should not," instead of "does not" in reference to the state's power.) >Let us also look at the examples he gives of people abusing >freedom of speech. Notice that every example that he gives >are powerful and priviledged people who plainly need no >protection, never the weak and vulnerable silenced by the >powerful and arrogant: > >> hypocrites, like faculty senates who choose one >> particularly and usually quite marginal example because >> career and power interests are served thereby, while >> ignoring vastly more significant and awful cases because >> the opposite is true. And Congress, of which the same is >> correct. > > >Let me give a counter example to Chomksy's implied argument >that it is safe to silence dissidents, and that dissidents >are powerful and priviledged servants of capitalism. That's really an amusing twist of logic: 1) I have never heard anyone call a hypocrite a dissident, and 2) I have never heard Congress being referred to as a bunch of dissidents! Because Chomsky refers to faculty senates and Congress, James A. Donald automatically assumes that Chomsky views them as dissidents. A more logical approach would be to hunt for what role both faculty senates and Congress play in Chomsky's quote--i.e. the role of hypocrites who *are extended* freedom of speech, as opposed to racists and other ideological unsavories who "should be permitted" freedom of speech but are not. Chomsky does not call these people dissidents, just as he does not call mainstream intellectuals dissidents; none of these groups, because they are powerful, privileged, and *mainstream*, may qualify as dissident. Furthermore, how in any way, shape or form, can it be safe to silence dissidents if they are powerful and privileged! ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^ >I did not see this quote: I am relying on Todd for the >accuracy of this quote, but I have seen plenty of similar >hypocritical smears against liberty by Chomsky. The above >piece of catty nastiness is classic Chomsky, and I could >easily dig up a dozen similar examples of the kind of >support that he gives liberty. Apparently, Mr. Donald did not *read* this quote as well. It would be quite, quite horrifying to have James A. Donald "dig up a dozen similar examples." Quite, quite horrifying. >Is he a fool, or is he a monster? My question exactly. For those interested in what Chomsky really has to say, good or bad, ftp to the Chomsky archives at: ftp.cs.cmu.edu (128.2.206.173) user/cap/chomsky/ (note that there is no slash at the beginning of the pathname). On the Web: http://www.contrib.andrew.cmu.edu:/usr/tp0x/chomsky.html _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ I detest what you write, _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/ _/ but I would give my life _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ to make it possible for _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ you to continue to write. _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ --Voltaire _/ (in a letter to M. le Riche)

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Chomsky quote (thread from hell)
by jamesd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wrote: > > Of course Noam Chomsky is optimistic - he favors limitless and > > absolute state power and the forcible and violent silencing of all > > those who deviate from political correctness. "L. Todd Masco" <cactus(a)bb.com> quotes one of Chomksy's pious platitudes on freedom of speech: > In my opinion, not only mainstream intellectuals but also > others who produce a constant stream of lies, distortion, > racist screeds, etc., should be permitted freedom of > speech. To put this in its proper context, Chomsky also believes in socialism, in the sense of the "people" controlling the means of production, distribution, and supply, and in particular, the "people" running the mass media. Does Chomsky really believe that such a society can operate without its Gulag? Is he a fool, or is he a monster? In my previous writings on this thread I have shown examples where Chomsky carefully chooses words so as to convince us that freedom of speech is not freedom, and that control of speech is freedom. Let us examine the above quote from Chomsky. You will notice that Chomsky has carefully expressed himself in the manner that is least likely to make us feel favorable to freedom of speech. He piously declares himself in favor of it, but expresses himself in such a manner as to make an argument against freedom of speech. The intended effect is to make us feel that such "extreme" freedom of speech is a bit excessive and not really necessary or desirable. In the above quote Chomsky implies that freedom of speech is divisible -- he implies that we can suppress wicked, obnoxious, and obviously false ideas, without closing down everyone's ability to communicate political thought. Thus he is actually making a misleading and spurious argument *against* freedom of speech at the same time as he is piously declaring himself to be in favor of freedom of speech. Let us also look at the examples he gives of people abusing freedom of speech. Notice that every example that he gives are powerful and priviledged people who plainly need no protection, never the weak and vulnerable silenced by the powerful and arrogant: > hypocrites, like faculty senates who choose one > particularly and usually quite marginal example because > career and power interests are served thereby, while > ignoring vastly more significant and awful cases because > the opposite is true. And Congress, of which the same is > correct. Let me give a counter example to Chomksy's implied argument that it is safe to silence dissidents, and that dissidents are powerful and priviledged servants of capitalism. Edward O Wilson. Back in the late seventies, when political correctness was so powerful that we did *not* see two dozen books protesting about how powerful it was, Edward O. Wilson was silenced by threats and violence. Among other things he was accused of emitting "a constant stream of lies, distortion, racist screeds, etc." In fact he his heresy had nothing whatsoever to do with race -- indeed he was a political innocent with no particular political ideas, who was largely unaware that his work had political implications, unaware that his work would be used by other people to make the argument that property was a result of the nature of man, and that socialism was contrary to the nature of man. Because many of the thugs sent against him were black, the totally false claim was made, that he continually insulted black people with racist fighting words. Suddenly people realized, that just as in the market every thing is connected to everything else, so that one state intervention necessarily requires further state intervention in order to achieve the desired effect, in the same fashion, every idea is connected to every other idea, so silencing some ideas necessarily requires silencing other ideas. In the end the only way to coercively suppress ideas is to ensure that only a single voice is heard. Thus the backlash against political correctness started. What happened to Edward Wilson then, could not happen today, which is why it is now safe for academics to write books on how powerful political correctness is, something they would not have dared to do seven years ago. The full quote by Chomsky in all its pious hypocricy. >Noam Chomsky, in a 4/16/94 e-mail response to a question from Steve >Shalom, says: > > In my opinion, not only mainstream intellectuals but also others > who produce a constant stream of lies, distortion, racist screeds, > etc., should be permitted freedom of speech. The state should not > have the power to stop them. The same freedom extends to > hypocrites, like faculty senates who choose one particularly and > usually quite marginal example because career and power interests > are served thereby, while ignoring vastly more significant and > awful cases because the opposite is true. And Congress, of which > the same is correct. I did not see this quote: I am relying on Todd for the accuracy of this quote, but I have seen plenty of similar hypocritical smears against liberty by Chomsky. The above piece of catty nastiness is classic Chomsky, and I could easily dig up a dozen similar examples of the kind of support that he gives liberty. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we James A. Donald are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state. jamesd(a)netcom.com

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Re: Nom de guerre public key
by bogus＠no.return.address 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- From: Louis Cypher >> A signature on your PGP public key is a personal guarantee from the >> person who signed it that she has first-hand knowledge that the key's >> userid accurately names the person who physically possesses the key >> (i.e., the signature validates the binding between userid and person). >> But you do not have a binding between your userid and your person, >> because your userid is a pseudonym, and a pseudonym is a name not >> bound to a person. > >Actually, this is not true. A signature on a key is a personal >guarantee from the signer that binds the user-id to the _KEY_, not >necessarily a person. The problem is validating that key<->userID >binding in a pseuodnymous case. For example, in the case of a real >person, you can send me a message to "warlord(a)MIT.EDU" and later meet >me in person, and I can verify that I received the message by >responding in some appropriate manner. > >But you cannot perform this check for a pseudonymous identity, because >there is no secure way to prove that that key really belongs to some >identity. > >Just for an example, I am fairly certian that there is a single >identity behind Pr0duct Cypher (speaking of PC -- I heard from you in >a while), but it is difficult to securely obtain assurance of the >binding behind the key and the keyid. > With a pseudonym, all a signature really says is that this is the key that always goes with the posts signed by this nym. Assuming there has not been more than one key claiming to be the "real" nym, then after a while there can be no doubt that the key and nym go together (which is all that was to be proved). Personally, I sign nyms that have existed consistently for some time. I have never distributed any of these signed keys, but see no harm in doing so as long as the key's user-id field clearly indicates that the key is a nym and not a person. A sig on a key by a notable like Tim May would help keep new users from getting taken in my some interloper claiming to be Pr0duct Cypher. >> Unless you reveal your pseudonym to someone and identify yourself >> according to the rules of the PGP Web of Trust, you should not be able >> to get signatures on your PGP public key. > >Well, this isn't the case. It is possible to set up a server that >compares userID to mailID in some secure manner. For example, there >were some way to get a secure mail from a user to a server, and the >server could verify the mail address, and then validate the mail >address to pgp keyID. > >-derek If I am trying to maintain a truly anonymous pseudonym, I am hardly likely to allow to connect my key with an email address. All a sig on a pseudonym's key means, is that is the key which signs posts from that nym, not such a hard thing to demonstrate with enough empirical evidence. -Louis Cypher P.S. I can be reached privately by leaving a message in alt.anonymous.messages with my name in the subject line. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLo9uWKyHUAO76TvRAQFVpwP+PJ9Ratos4OirW5VvO+r8ZdYig4e4JsR1 T2UGzFsyCLJnG+IyPc3d2xh3ipyM4Ifaw9pcp4xNJuimzaWyU+MfAzCr4IF6CLB2 R8+s/HW8kH5uiXdV+NCv95OL7zBI4p9GiWBiphsfcEkKkhI1CiHXhcoDR6CIIfdO MVe2HEASEng= =Dfb5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Impact of Free Strong Crypto (Essay of sorts)
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If the below is cut off by your mailer or mine, please drop me a note and I shall send you a complete copy. -uni- (Dark) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Political Ramifications of Free Encryption Technology. To me the Cypherpunks represent the drive to free technology from a regimented, collectivist, and centralized regulatory structure. So deep does this inclination seem to run that even liberal programs that might extend the reach of high technology particularly communications and data storage or processing technologies, through social reform are looked at almost universally with distaste. There is almost a disgust at the mere notion of Federal Government involvement in the development and distribution of technology. (Reaction to Al Gore's programs are a demonstration of this attitude). Some on the list would certainly disagree, feeling that government should take responsibility to promise equal access in the face of the amazing disparity selectively distributed technology would create, but I feel these are mere philosophical differences in methodology, and not major conflicts in goals. In some ways this debate is so powerful and threatens to fill so much bandwidth that some Cypherpunks seem to resist any political content on the list. (Witness the many clashes about what the Cypherpunks list is really for, and whether political topics even have a place therein). A treatment of the merits of Government involvement in distributional aspects of technology, or the level of regulation required or desired goes beyond the scope of this work. I wish instead to focus on the likely institutional reaction to a Cypherpunk victory. This necessarily requires a good deal of assumption on my part. Probably also some assumptions that are likely to make as many people happy as upset. I think the underlying analysis below is sound whatever the political persuasions of the reader. That being said let it be known that I consider the following as a "Cypherpunk victory." 1. Complete freedom of technology, particularly encryption technology, regulated only by market forces. This implies the lack of import/export restrictions, and a complete absence of projects designed to limit technology, or to standardize it for nefarious ends like Clipper. 2. A wide market of hardware and software products allowing, among other things, strong, transparent cryptography for voice, data, fax, cellular, and video communications. 3. Active and profuse vendors of related applications of the above technologies, including among others, digital banking, and anonymous mail (in my use including video, voice, data, and true digital cash). I think these are all possible (however likely or unlikely) within the next five years. Many Cypherpunks will necessarily draw a "fall of modern government" effect from the above conditions. Others will see the existence of a regulatory entity much lessened in importance and control than today. Still others will predict little change at all. Whatever your position, I think it is clear that government, like any entity, will seek to survive despite the above conditions. I assume in my construct that the Federal Government has fought these points on all fronts (a safe bet in my view) but lost (a less likely scenario to me in the next five years). Given these facts, how is government likely to adjust? Surely not without a fight to survive even in the face of what many see as impending doom for revenue collection and law enforcement. I have often commented that Cypherpunks see things about 6 months to 2 years before the popular culture begins to catch the scents. It is surprising to me then that the list (as far as I know) has been so stuck in the present with regard to the likely reaction to long term Cypherpunk goals. Most political discussions deal either with the present Federal Government threat, (Clipper, Digitel, Information Superhighway) or with the long term promise of Cypherpunk technology, but not the future Federal Government response to said technology. Partly I think this is attributable to the perception that the Federal Government is as much behind the times as popular culture. Technically this is probably true on the whole. (Dorthy Denning being short sighted enough to insist that law enforcement needs wiretap ability because they have always had such an ability. Ms. Denning's similarly dense arguments based on statistics to the effect that since law enforcement has used wiretaps so often, they must be indispensable and thus must be preserved. What Ms. Denning never mentions, either accidentally or with intent, are the alternatives). But it is equally true that there is, or there appears to be, some foresight on the policy level as to the implications of the new technology on the long term. (The Clipper proposal is either a entirely absent minded program which can never work because the goal really is a non-mandatory non- regulatory standard creation, or it is an adept foot in the door coup. A tour de force program in conjunction with Digitel, Information Highway, and NIST designed to preempt technology.) So what if the Cypherpunks win? How will the complete inability of law enforcement (Federal or Local) to conduct wiretaps impact collection? Those who think that law enforcement will just have to go away might want to reconsider. Instead I think that law enforcement will simply become much more intrusive as a response to the unavailability of easy interception via wiretapping. Recently on the list it was pointed out that few if any serious ciphers have been cracked without a Human Intelligence component. Indeed many of the later successes against the Enigma machines could be found in German operator laziness rather than pure analytical prowess. One Signals Intelligence type mentioned that his job was made much easier by the propensity of the German communication officers he was responsible for to use obscenities for their Enigma keys. Currently wiretaps are so popular not because they are indispensable but because a series of court decisions have made them the simplest, and cheapest method of Criminal Intelligence. Cases like _Smith v. Maryland_, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) have placed a fairly low burden on the law enforcement officials seeking to intercept telephone conversations, and almost no burden on those who wish to intercept call setup information. It is no surprise then that they have become so frequently used in criminal investigation and are so often cited as well as jealously defended as critical. Given the national anti-crime sentiment (even far left democrats seem to have given up on rehabilitation, and any astute politician who aspires to another term is terrified of being portrayed as soft on crime), the position that secure communications will solve the lack of oversight and intrusiveness of law enforcement conveniently ignores the constitutional "adjustments" that were made in the face of the national neurosis with the war on drugs. Instead Federal and Local law enforcement will begin to rely on Human Intelligence as well as more intrusive site collection to work around the technologically intensive and prohibitively expensive Signals Intelligence in the new era. Courts, tired of dismissing hundreds of otherwise legitimate looking cases, are likely to judicially erode the constitutional protections protecting citizens from search and seizure particularly with reference to an increased law enforcement reliance on more intrusive room surveillance equipment. In the context of the Fourth Amendment's structure this becomes a particularly difficult problem. The Exclusionary Rule provides for the rejection of evidence collected in violation of the Fourth Amendment (there is no effective civil remedy) but as many commentators have pointed out this is a particularly difficult thing for a judge to do. Exclusionary Rule motions come in the context of a convicted criminal, who most often was fairly obviously guilty, but who would be released without the evidence in question. Most of today's Exclusionary Rule law comes from drug cases as it became increasingly difficult in the late 1970's and early 1980's to overturn convictions where two kilograms of cocaine was discovered by a questionable search. Will not this same judicial activism be used to expand law enforcement's freedom to use room bugs and other intrusive methodology in the face of the argument that wiretapping is impossible? Similarly is it likely that law enforcement will begin to rely on Human Intelligence to a much greater extent. Targeted political organizations will be infiltrated with a much greater degree of aggressiveness, perhaps even surpassing levels of the 1960's. Frustration in law enforcement inability to penetrate the more advanced criminal circles will probably result in very creative interpretation of the rules, if not an outright disregard for them, to secure convictions. More alarming perhaps are the ramifications for banking transactions. In the absence of an ability to monitor transactions electronically Human Intelligence will be forced to fill in the gaps, creating a great demand for informants within the banking and financial industries. The SEC simply will be unable to function as it does today without electronic monitoring of transactions. Instead brokerage firms, high profile investors and financial institutions are more likely to be attacked with Human Intelligence and informants, perhaps even outright theft of records. The implications for even the moderate level investor are ominous. Given the flexibility of constitutional interpretation demonstrated by the New Deal legislation, is it any mystery that the new law enforcement methodology will be supported by the courts, especially in the face of complete law enforcement breakdown? The only real practical legal recourse would be a clarification to the courts by the legislature. However, if the current anti-crime atmosphere endures it is highly unlikely that any legislator will go on record as a obstacle to law enforcement by checking the courts back. The Cypherpunks must ask themselves how to address these issues, and recognize the potential political impact of high technology and the losing law enforcement battle to keep up. Would a Cypherpunk victory merely be bypassed by a clever end run? Is this a case of "Even when you win you lose"? - -uni- (Dark) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6ui iQCVAgUBLo96MhibHbaiMfO5AQGiJgP+L9QiTUrtJ7J3YbsQIFR8+ZzB9zgdZm3F erm7bOstN9PzFJ2id5XI1vWeq1zK1/WGsd+r7F0uG0cDrolY1INlKdM+PACfgEfz JAPsJeZRbWLEQolFeNT1Kzmo3EzAWiNRo1OBBfaPdnmEGJDHTWvQlrNF0gftr9WO cTvYC2fGfHM= =K3c4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- 073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est 6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa - wichtig!

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