December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

article: DES strength against attacks
by baum＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"The Data Encryption Standard (DES)and its strength against attacks" by D. Coppersmith in IBM J. or R&D, v38#3, May 1994 pp243-250 ..in this paper, we examine one such attempt [to break DES], the method of differential cryptanalysis.... we show some of the safeguards against differential cryptanalysis that were built into the system from the beginning. Disclaimer: The present author participated in the design and test of DES, particularly in the design of the S-boxes and in strengthening them against differential cryptonalysis. Naturally , this author has strong opinions about DES and its history. Any opinions in this paper are those of the author and are not necessarily shared by IBM ************************************************** * Allen J. Baum tel. (408)974-3385 * * Apple Computer, MS/305-3B * * 1 Infinite Loop * * Cupertino, CA 95014 baum(a)apple.com * **************************************************

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Re: article: DES strength against attacks
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"The Data Encryption Standard (DES)and its strength against attacks" by D. Coppersmith in IBM J. or R&D, v38#3, May 1994 pp243-250 ..in this paper, we examine one such attempt [to break DES], the method of differential cryptanalysis.... we show some of the safeguards against differential cryptanalysis that were built into the system from the beginning. Disclaimer: The present author participated in the design and test of DES, particularly in the design of the S-boxes and in strengthening them against differential cryptonalysis. Naturally , this author has strong opinions about DES and its history. Any opinions in this paper are those of the author and are not necessarily shared by IBM Let me strongly recommed this paper. It shows, quite graphically, just how tightly coupled some parts of DES are. You don't make up a good cipher by random bit-twiddling! (By contrast, I heard a presentation last week on the cryptanalysis of another cipher. It wasn't that strong a cipher -- 2^18 ciphertexts, 2^27 operations to crack it -- but it would have been far weaker had it not been for chance. The cipher had a right shift operation; originally, it was left unspecified if an arithmetic or logical right shift should be used. When different C compilers started producing different results, the inventor arbitrarily decided to standardize on arithmetic right shifts. It turns out that the other choice was far weaker -- but he didn't know that.)

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Handling subscription requests
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rishab asked earlier if there isn't some way that Majordomo could automatically filter the requests that go this list instead of to the Majordom agent. Pretty unlikely, for various reasons: - The requests would be poorly formed, such as "Can anyone tell me how to subscribe?" and I can't imagine anything short of a CPU-intensive natural language processor able to deduce the actions needed. Certainly I don't want to get added again, or be sent a message, every time "Pretty Good Autosubscriber" sees the word "subscribe" in one of my messages! (Yes, I can imagine an algorithm--"if not already a subscriber and mentions subscribe, then...") - In any case, this is very far from what Majordomo now does. In fact, Majordomo is very picky about the command syntax it expects to see. - And the CPUi-intensive filtering to look for the right magic words would be unwelcome. Especially if every message to cypherpunks(a)toad.com had to be examined! (Again, I can imagine way to reduce this, such as only looking closely at nonsubscriber messages. But not in Majordomo's current feature set.) So what to do? Frnakly, I don't think it's too big a problem. Only a couple of these hit the list per week, even after the list has gotten some publicity someplace like "Wired." Here's what I try to do, when I remember. When I see one of these requests I reply and attach this message: How to Subscribe to the Cypherpunks List This message is just an informal tip sheet on how to get on and off the Cypherpunks list, sent manually by me to people who ask how they can join the list. The Cypherpunks list is managed automatically by the "Majordomo" program, which is commonly used for mailing lists. Command syntax may be familiar to you from other lists. To subscribe: * Send a message to: majordomo(a)toad.com * No subject is needed, or is used * In the *body* section, include only the following: subscribe cypherpunks * This will subscribe you with the address from which you sent the message. If you wish to subscribe with a different address, for some odd reason, send a "help cypherpunks" message instead. * Unsubscribe by sending the message: unsubscribe cypherpunks * A list of current subscribers can be gotten by sending the message "who cypherpunks" to the same address. Be forewarned--your membership on the list will be known to others. (Hal Finney and others have talked about providing secondary mailing list, which can even be encrypted.) Comments: - Write the above information down somewhere. Do not send unsubscribe messages to the main list (cypherpunks(a)toad.com) And the address "cypherpunks-request(a)toad.com" probably will not work either. Use majordomo(a)toad.com. - The list is a high volume one. Fifty messages a day is common. If you can't handle this, unsubscribe. Or read your mail several times a day and make liberal use of the "delete" function. - The list was started in 1992 and has roughly 600 subscribers. - If you are new to the list, read for a while before posting. Be especially polite by not asking "dumb" questions like "Why is Clipper a bad idea?" and "Can anybody break this code?" (It is sometimes said there are no dumb questions. I disagree.) - You will also receive a longer welcome message after your subscription has been successfully processed. - The subscriber list has gotten corrupted several times, due to disk space problems. If you receive no traffic for several hours or more, do a "who cypherpunks" to see if this has happened again. Either resubscribe in the usual way, or wait for the list to (maybe) be restored. - If you find yourself getting two copies of every message, see if you are subscribed under two different mailing addresses. (The mail headers should tell you.) Then unsubscribe the address you don't want to use. This should answer the most obvious questions. Feel free to pass this message on to folks who ask about subscribing. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: PROTOCOLS: Re: Hashed Hash
by Ben.Goren＠asu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:54 PM 7/17/94, wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510 wrote: >> I'm planning on implementing the "cryptographic protection of databases" >> on page 61 of Schneier, to create a directory of a professional >> organization that would be useless to telemarketers. >> [hash last name to get DES key and location of encrypted data in list.] Not quite; the last name would at least be the foundation of the key--otherwise, just use the first field to decrypt the second. Location is either 132 or 160 bytes from the start of the hash; all else is obscurity that wouldn't be all that effective. Remeber, anybody can do individual lookups, or else I'd just use some secure method to get it into people's hands. If you can do individual lookups, you can do a lot (all) of them; the best I can hope for is to slow that down, preferably in a cryptographically secure way. >> [ problems of brute-force and popular-last-names attacks ] > >If you're only concerned about telemarketers, this amount of obscurity >may be enough - anybody competent enough to hash a list of, say, >10000 last names x 1000 first names into your database is at >least an *interesting* telemarketer :-) All it takes is some ambitious employee with connections to somebody with a medium-sized workstation with a fair amount of idle time, like overnight. A cheapie Alpha would do very nicely. Let it work--at no cost other than initial setup and electricity--for a month or three, and you've got an awful lot of names, even if you don't have the whole database. There's not much obscurity here. Just write a minimal wrapper to the existing (supplied) decryption code, unless my "security" relies on non-cryptographic stalling, like counting to a million before doing anything. I sure don't want to rely on that. And a company such as Microsoft wouldn't even notice the effort. Think about it: a database of musicians (the group I'm doing this for is the Phi Mu Alpha Sinfonia, the men's professional fraternity in music) known to be technically inclined--after all, their database is cryptographically protected. Who better to target for their musical instrument CD? >If you're concerned about telemarkers from the NSA/FBI/KGB, >then the algorithm isn't enough anyway [. . .] If any TLA wants the unencrypted database, they can have it from me for the price of a warrant--and that's just to be sure that they're not imposters. Our membership rolls are alerady public. >An intermediate variant is to use a password as part of the hash; >if everybody has their own password, the table size is N**2, or you can >give everyone the same password without increasing the table size, >and still be able to distribute the list on FTP. >[. . .] Nice idea. If there is demand for a program such as this after I've written the basic version for Sinfonia, I'll code that, as well. >On the question of whether there are functions I(m) = H(H(m)) for popular >hashes, by definition there are, since H(H(m)) is one. Well, by that definition, DES is a group.... >For most of >the cryptographically useful functions, though, there aren't any that >are faster than running the hash function twice. Some exceptions are >hashes like a**x mod p, x**a mod p, and obviously (a*x+c) mod p. >But DES is known not to be a group, and MD5 is ugly enough it probably >isn't group-like either. Any chance you (or anybody else) can point me in the direction of sources that would state this definitively? I'd much rather do multiple hashes than use some sort of kludge with multiple DES encryptions, but I won't unless I can find something in the literature. "A job worth doing...." > Bill Thanks for your help. b& -- Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music net.proselytizing (write for info): Protect your privacy; oppose Clipper. Voice concern over proposed Internet pricing schemes. Stamp out spamming. Finger ben(a)tux.music.asu.edu for PGP 2.3a public key.

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JUST GO AWAY Sue D nym!
by kelly＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey detweiler... I am not as gentle as perry is... just go away... you DONT have any votes here... p.s. I WIll be notifying netcom management again of your activities...

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Big Brother comes to Campus
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wanted to forward this to everyone to show ya what the school is trying to spring on us over the summer when nobody is around. --------------------------- Acting for: XXXXX XXXXX Mankato State's new ID card is fast becoming a reality. We are calling the new ID the MavCard and have begun taking pictures of the summer orientation students. Attached is a brief summary of the features of the MavCard we have given to parents and students who were here for orientation. Soon we will be taking pictures of other students, faculty and staff. I will inform you of the time and location. If you have any questions or concerns about Mankato State's MavCard, please let me know. Mankato State University MavCard As part of our mission to improve campus services, Mankato State University is introducing the new MavCard, a more efficient identification card (ID) that can also act like cash to pay for many on-campus services. The MavCard is more efficient because it will become the only ID card you need for access to university facilities, services and events including the Memorial Library, athletic and student activities. The MavCard will also eliminate the hassle of carrying cash. It can be used like cash for library charges, vending machine products, photocopying, laundry services and more! Mankato State University's goal is to provide one convenient card that does it all! It all begins with your new MavCard for the 1994-95 academic year. Where to Get Your MavCard The Office of Business Affairs will start processing MavCards during Freshman Orientation, the first two weeks of Fall Quarter, and until the entire campus community has been issued new ID cards. Hours and convenient processing locations will be posted at the Office of Business Affairs, Administration Building. It's Quick and Easy Getting a MavCard is quick and easy. A new photo imaging process will use a video camera and computer to create and store all of your card information in seconds. Your picture, along with all other card information, will be directly transferred to one durable plastic card (the same size as a credit card). One process, one card does it all! The First Phase Beginning Fall Quarter 1994, you will be able to use your MavCard in the Memorial Library, food and vending machines, laundry machines, photocopying services, the University Bookstore and Residence Hall meal plans. How the MavCard Works The MavCard will carry three primary information identifiers, along with your name and picture. The first identifier is your library and Residence Hall meal plan Barcode on the front of the card. The second identifier is a small black magnetic Cash Stripe on the back of the card. This Cash Stripe will retain information on the amount of funds you apply to the card through one of the many CASH-TO-CARD or $10, or $20 on your Cash Stripe, you will activate your the card through one of the many CASH-TO-CARD or ACCOUNT-TO-CARD machines on campus. By placing $1, $5, $10, or $20 on your Cash Stripe, you will activate your new MavCard. For safety purposes, there will be a $20 limit on the funds that can be placed on the Cash Stripe at any time. Once your Cash Stripe is activated, you can use your MavCard like cash to pay for campus services such as photocopying, vending and laundry. The third identifier is a large magnetic Bank Stripe on the back of the card, similar to the bank stripe on a credit card. The Bank Stripe is like an electronic check! Once money is deposited to your MavCard account, the card can be used instead of a check to purchase goods and services. The amount of the purchase is deducted directly from your on-line bank account so there is no possibility of overdrawing your account. This Bank Stripe is also used to obtain cash from the automatic teller machines which will be available on campus. A Personal Identification Number (PIN) is used with this stripe so that your account is protected in the event the card is lost or stolen. The Bank Stripe will save you time, reduce the need to carry cash, and help eliminate the hassle of writing checks. Calling Card Option The MavCard can be used as a personal long distance calling card. Information on this feature will be available from MCI during Welcome Week. Future Phases In the future the MavCard will expand to include building access, voting, campus food services and direct deposit of financial aid, refunds and student payroll. Questions & Answers Will I have to get a MavCard or can I just use my old ID? Your old ID will still be valid when classes start in the Fall of 1994 and until all students can get their new ID. The process to get your new MavCard is quick and easy. What will the benefits of using the MavCard really be to non-campus residents? The MavCard will do much more than just consolidate your ID with meal plan information. Even if you do not those offered through the library, vending machines, your ID with meal plan information. Even if you do not use a meal plan on campus, other services including those offered through the library, vending machines, photocopiers, food services...will be easier to use than ever before. What if I lose my MavCard? Contact the Office of Business Affairs at XXX-XXXX. Since your information, including your photo, is stored in the computer, replacement cards can be processed immediately. Who do I contact with any questions about the MavCard? The Office of Business Affairs at XXX-XXXX, with any questions or suggestions on how to make the MavCard work... and save...for you! ===================================================== Basically, they can now track you whenover you enter a building, get financial aid, or even purchase a soda or make a photocopy. I feel used. -- ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)vorlon.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> I do not necessarily speak for the \/ Finger for PGP Public Key <=> City of Mankato or anyone else, dammit -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 2.1) GJ/CM d- H-- s-:++>s-:+ g+ p? au+ a- w++ v* C++(++++) UL++++$ P+>++ L++$ 3- E---- N+++ K+++ W M+ V-- -po+(---)>$ Y++ t+ 5+++ j R+++$ G- tv+ b+ D+ B--- e+>++(*) u** h* f r-->+++ !n y++**

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Re: Detweiler
by Matthew Ghio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

|ghio said that Detweiller must have forged that Big Collision message |sent to his remailer, because the person it was attributed to hadn't |logged in. I wonder if "rsh" shows up in that type of login?? maybe |he "rsh"ed to the account to send from there?!?! and didn't log in |to have a cover story?? The messages appear to be being forged via port 25. He's sent several dozen of them, and they all have different from addresses. |btw, I haven't seen anything from Detweiller at tmp(a)netcom.com. I assume |he still has the account?!?! maybe if someone calls netcom and complains |they will do something?? Well, I complained... Haven't heard anything from them yet tho. |i'm glad ghio caught that message in his mailbox through careful screening |so that it wouldn't go out to the newsgroups. I always thought the |remailers were automated, but I guess in most case the operators are |screening all the stuff. this is good, because we don't need any more |Detweiller junk out there (amazing how peaceful things are without him!!!) |too bad if the message was forged, because it would be LOTS of fun to |EXPOSE THE BASTARD!!! (insert evil smirk here) No. The remailer is automated. I don't normally screen messages before they are sent out or otherwise censor them. The message he sent went out to the newsgroups. After I saw the anonymous messages appearing, I started having the remailer save copies of all messages. He seems to have an automated process set up to spew these things out. I have now temporarily disabled my remailer until this crud stops. |BTW, here is something I was wondering. on the Detweiller message he has |an "errors-to: /dev/null" field. what does that do? why did he put that |in there, anyway? i've never seen any documentation reference it. do |the remailers handle it? It doesn't do anything that I'm aware of. My remailer does support "Request-Remailing-To: null" which will just delete the message. The more recent messages just have a blank Errors-To: header. I keep getting messages from him every few minutes. blah...

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Tracing port 25 mail forgery
by Matthew Ghio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While looking over some of the detcrud I noticed something interesting... >From colton(a)netcom.com Mon Jul 18 15:48:30 1994 >Received: from virginia.edu (uvaarpa.Virginia.EDU [128.143.2.7]) by >kaiwan.kaiwan.com (8.6.9/8.6.5) with SMTP > id PAA27245 for <ghio(a)kaiwan.com>; Mon, 18 Jul 1994 15:48:24 -0700 > *** KAIWAN Internet Access *** >From: colton(a)netcom.com >Received: from fulton.seas.virginia.edu by uvaarpa.virginia.edu id aa05968; > 18 Jul 94 18:48 EDT >Received: from <netcom12.netcom.com> (nym(a)netcom14.netcom.com > [192.100.81.126]) by fulton.seas.Virginia.EDU (8.6.8/8.6.6) with SMTP id > SAA67017 for <ghio(a)kaiwan.com >; Mon, 18 Jul 1994 18:48:20 -0400 >Date: Mon, 18 Jul 1994 18:48:20 -0400 >Message-Id: <199407182248.SAA67017(a)fulton.seas.Virginia.EDU> >To: ghio(a)kaiwan.com >Request-Remailing-To: alt.59.79.99(a)comlab.ox.ac.uk > >## >Followups-To: news.admin.policy >Reply-To: <support(a)netcom.com> >Subject: Netcom is being SCAPEGOATED > ...drivel removed... In the Received: header, fulton.seas.Virginia.EDU identifies the message as coming from nym(a)netcom14.netcom.com My question is, How did it do this??? Did it use identd? I tried making a fake mail thru that site and it did not show my username...but neither kaiwan nor andrew have identd installed. nova.unix.portal.com did the same thing: >Received: from <netcom12.netcom.com> (nym(a)netcom2.netcom.com [192.100.81.108]) >by nova.unix.portal.com (8.6.7/8.6.5) with SMTP id SAA22450 for ><ghio(a)kaiwan.com >; Mon, 18 Jul 1994 18:09:22 -0700 Comments?

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Life & Times LA TV prog on LLL Porn
by kentborg＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A local public TV program in LA just ended. One of their closing mini- items was on the spy porn at Lawrence Livermore (sic). One host gave a short version of the hysterical take, including that LLL was going to do Star Wars, and how terrible their security must be. Host #2 kicked in with a claim that he knows nothing about computers. Host #3 did the best thing I can imagine: said it was also part of the JFK coverup... FYA. -kb, the Kent who has been caught watching TVF -- Kent Borg +1 (617) 776-6899 kentborg(a)world.std.com kentborg(a)aol.com Proud to claim 35:30 hours of TV viewing so far in 1994!

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Re: Card Playing Protocol?
by kentborg＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>There's no need for a central server per game I am presuming this is true--I am just trying to phrase things carefully. I don't yet understand all I need to know (I think I need to read crypto someone said). I like distributed stuff...I am just too ignorant to know how purely it can be adhered to. -kb, the Kent who is trying not to get too far ahead of himself -- Kent Borg +1 (617) 776-6899 kentborg(a)world.std.com kentborg(a)aol.com Proud to claim 35:30 hours of TV viewing so far in 1994!

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