December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Clipper vs. PGP
by Aron Freed 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since I consider myself new to this whole topic, even though I have read several articles about PGP and CLIPPER, I wanted to get some more info and understanding for my senior seminar next May.... Does anyone have any opinions on what would happen if the Clipper Chip and its associates were all implemented and the general public swallowed on it?? Would we as knowledgeable computer people become outlaws??? Would be it like 1984?? Would our computer illiterate neighbors try and catch us??? And going the complete opposite direction (a full 180). If the public was able to obtain PGP as easily as we are and they would use it for everything, would that lead to the overthrowing of the government and therefore cause anarchy, due to the fact the governmnet would be helpless in knowing what everyone is doing contrary to the CIA, FBI, etc. being able to read everything we write and say through their current illegal wiretaps??? I'm just looking to get a complete picture. At this moment I would go with PGP, but I still see a lot of problems with being on either side. They seem so extreme... Aaron -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- -=- YABBS - telnet phred.pc.cc.cmu.edu 8888 -=- -=- -=- =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=

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Request for some C'punx write code.
by usura＠vox.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi C'punks, Some one intressted in improving my remailer ? [the author of remailer 2.00 is currently unavailable] I have some options I want to have added: _01 -> support for Anon-To: _02 -> support for ## header pasting tokens _03 -> support for Anon-passwords _04 -> support for Anon-Alternate-ID's (Nobody) -> (Random H0Z3R) _05 -> support for Memory Swapping _06 -> support for a "fuzzy" header pasting token search _07 -> support for Cutmarks: The current source is in C/C++, the system runs on MSDos, and the program has to accept Waffle file in/out put, since it is a Waffle based remailer. Send applications and information request to: usura(a)vox.hacktic.nl Thanx. -- Exit! Stage Left. Alex de Joode <usura(a)vox.hacktic.nl>

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remailer@remba.mn.org offline.
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where does one find a list of actively running remailers coupled with what runes each one needs if non-standard? (I don't use these things often enough to have kept up with any pointers I'm afraid, sorry. Been watching for a couple of days but haven't seen any recently) G From MAILER-DAEMON Mon Jul 11 19:59:48 1994 Date: Mon, 11 Jul 94 13:53 CDT From: <MAILER-DAEMON(a)kksys.com> To: <@demon-du.an-teallach.com:gtoal@an-teallach.com> Cc: postmaster(a)kksys.com Subject: mail failed, returning to sender Reference: <m0qNQOJ-0006anC(a)kksys.skypoint.net> |------------------------- Message log follows: -------------------------| no valid recipients were found for this message |------------------------- Failed addresses follow: ---------------------| <remailer(a)remba.mn.org> ... unknown host |------------------------- Message text follows: ------------------------| Received: from uum1.mn.org by kksys.skypoint.net with bsmtp (Smail3.1.28.1 #15) id m0qNQOJ-0006anC; Mon, 11 Jul 94 13:47 CDT Received: from gate.demon.co.uk by uum1.mn.org with smtp (Smail3.1.28.1 #3) id m0qNQ81-0000FdC; Mon, 11 Jul 94 13:30 CDT Received: from demon-du.an-teallach.com by gate.demon.co.uk id aa29094; 11 Jul 94 19:30 GMT-60:00 Received: from an-teallach.com by demon-du.an-teallach.com with SMTP id AA129436 ; Mon, 11 Jul 94 19:25:43 GMT Received: from gtoal@localhost by an-teallach.com (8.6.4/1.37) id TAA28615; Mon, 11 Jul 1994 19:26:11 +0100 Date: Mon, 11 Jul 1994 19:26:11 +0100 From: Graham Toal <gtoal(a)an-teallach.com> Message-Id: <199407111826.TAA28615(a)an-teallach.com> To: remailer(a)remba.mn.org X-Phone: +44 31 662 0366 X-Fax: +44 31 662 4678 X-Organisation: An Teallach Limited :: Request-Remailing-To: ... deleted ...

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The Detweiler Files
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jamiel(a)sybase.com (Jamie Lawrence): > I have a writing assignment coming up (nothing to do > with much that is talked about on this list), and some > example posts by Detweiler could be really handy as > references. I have one from a long time ago, but could > use some others- anybody save any for posterity? If so, > could you forward me a couple of juicy ones? I have about 580k of 'Detweiler files'. These are sorted by mail from his presumed identities, mail to them and relevant mail about him. Separately stored are some of his gems, including his roman torture piece and S Boxx's poetry. You can't ftp _in_ to my SLIP node, but I can ftp it to some place convenient. Compressed, it should be about 200k (ZIP). ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Re: Whew! The dangers of posting to Usenet
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>That may not have been a legit post. That group is currently >under attack by the alt.syntax.tactical morons. Ha ha big laugh :-( > >(They don't even have detweiler's intelligence as a redeeming grace) No, I've encountered Ms. Yamada before. She posts occasional non sequiturs to the Buddhist Studies list. The, for-lack-of-a-better-word, contribution quoted by Tim is entirely consistent with previous emanations from that direction. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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USACM report, Ch 4
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone read the USACM report on crypto ftp://Info.acm.org/reports/acm_crypto_study especially Chapter 4? Could it be that I missed the discussion of it?

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Re: using RSA-the-cryptosystem to secure RSA-the-company's patent?
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article Jef Poskanzer <jef(a)ee.lbl.gov> writes: >Subject: using RSA-the-cryptosystem to secure RSA-the-company's patent? >Date: Sun, 10 Jul 94 20:07:58 PDT >From: Jef Poskanzer <jef(a)ee.lbl.gov> >Apropos the recent thread on tamper-proof programs... >Can anyone think of a way that RSA-the-company could include some sort >of RSA-cryptosystem-secured check in a release of PGP so that it would >only interoperate with other versions that have the same check? I don't >see how it could be done, but it's sure an intriguing idea. >--- Why in the world would we want to give them any kind of solution to something like that - particularly on an 'open line' like this? :-) Dave Merriman

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Why to Care about Others' Security
by fnerd＠smds.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May says- > Personally, my main interests is in ensuring the Feds don't tell me I > can't have as much security as I want to buy. I don't share the > concern quoted above that we have to find ways to give other people > security. I can think of a couple reasons to want other people to be more secure. 1) The more people protect their privacy, the less profit there is in privacy invasion, so that there will be fewer people doing it and the techniques and infrastructure of spying might develop more slowly. 2) The more people protect their privacy, the less privacy afficionados will stand out from the crowd. 3) The more people buy privacy, the more developed the market for privacy techniques and services, and the more private ways of doing things will be available and easy to use. -fnerd - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - spam is in the eye of the beholder (splat) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvt3niQCVAgUBLMs3K ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2tPEot1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz 3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hSnC1R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG sRjLQs4iVVM= =9wqs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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NIST and Micali settle Clipper patent dispute
by Jim Gillogly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

NIST has agreed to license Micali's key escrow patents. I posted their press release in talk.politics.crypto and alt.privacy.clipper. The settlement is evidently open-ended; there's an article in Cyberwire Dispatch (whatever that is -- a copy was forwarded to me) that discusses the ramifications in some detail. Jim Gillogly Mersday, 19 Afterlithe S.R. 1994, 00:00

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Idle question...
by Ian Farquhar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was compiling a list of crypto algorithms the other night, trying to produce a library of description documents for the algorithms, and an interesting but idle question hit me: what ever happened to RC1, RC3, MD1, MD3, A1, A2, A4, A6, and A7? Just wondering if anyone knows... Ian.

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