December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Clipper- Who's Fooling Who
by jp＠jep.pld.ttu.ee 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It simply is not possible for them to have ACCIDENTALLY OVERLOOKED such a thing as 16 bit CRC. Let us assume, that 2 distinct users want to initiate clipper connection. They will have their secret keys generated inside chips and as key distribution is not a part of clipper they can happily use DH or whatever to do it, meaning that they still are the only ones to know them. To be able to intercept these keys clipper chips have ( presumably ) skipjack cipher to make LEAFS. Now cipher must take arguments data and key. But we assume, that Chips have Family key, but not Master key ( such a thing would have been nonsense- you cannot rely on one key for all chips ), meaning that they share no global knowledge except SJ algorithm. So, for other chip to make difference between RIGHT and WRONG LEAF it has shared secret, meaning session key and LEAF. What could have been simpler than using these 2 components and SJ to generate cryptographic checksum? Nothing, execpt that this checksum is of no use to goverment- it does not know shared secrets, so it cannot use this checksum anyway. BUt that is not such a big pr oblem - line noise and checksums can be applied externally. So why not use session key and SJ, generate a 80 BIT checksum and append it to LEAF. I do not believe that it would make SJ useless because of cancellation :-) The proposed scheme would look like this: Sa, LEAFa, Sb, LEAFb the session keys and LEAFs of a and b 1. A and B generate and exchange keys 2. A sends to B SJ(LEAFA,Sb), LEAFA 3. B verifyes it and takes into use Sa. ,the same thing in opposite directions. Rather EASY not to implement it. Now they did not do it. Instead they used only 16 bits. Weird. Unless... OK, SJ has no backdoors, but somehow manages to send the parts of LEAF fields maybe 0.5 bits per one SJ coded user data block. (it is always possible to compress data that much ) That would change the things. We would be happy about our checksum and they would be really happy about (us) US. A little media now and then - it's for advertisment. Just think that This 16 bits did not make SJ weaker, meaning people who would have used it for sequrity will do so anyway. The i-do-not-know class will switch over to it because of if-I-want-I-can-crack-it( or buy device or have it installed or whatever). I'm Looking for a partner Someone who gets things fixed Think about it seriosly do you want to get rich? OK for Pet Shop Boys, but NSA??? JP from TTU

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Applied Cryptography
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Aloha, CP's: Periodically there have been people seeking copies of Schneier's "Applied Cryptography". I've found a source you can order them from electronically if you are so inclined. "Applied Cryptography", by Bruce Schneier 0-471-59756-2 $44.95 Wiley Books Stacey's Bookstore - staceysbks(a)aol.com Softpro - softpro(a)csns.com Reiter's Scientific & Professional Books - bks(a)reiters.com Quantum Books - quanbook(a)world.sto.com Softpro - softpro(a)world.std.com -NetSurfer #include standard.disclaimer >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> == = = |James D. Wilson |V.PGP 2.4: 512/E12FCD 1994/03/17 > " " " |P. O. Box 15432 |finger for key / Viacrypt Reseller > " " /\ " |Honolulu, HI 96830 |====================================> \" "/ \" |Serendipitous Solutions| Also NetSurfer(a)sersol.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

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Clipper LEAF simulator chip???
by jp＠jep.pld.ttu.ee 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > 1. Taking advantage of desing imperfections, people trying to defeat the > > system could repeatedly alter the LEAF until it erroneously passed the > > "checksum" verification, despite an invalid session-key number. > > This sounds like a very simple computation. How much would it cost > to fab up some chips to do this, and solder them into the circuitry > next to the Clipper chip? Or is there an even easier way to do this? As far asi I know there has been no direct info about how the checksum is calculated, only that it is somehow connected to IV. So , the function of the chip for doing IT would look like the following: 1. Intercept original LEAF. Can be done. There should be no problems with such small timeouts, cause phones may sometimes have bad links, also the data transfer rate is of no big deal. 2. Generating Random LEAF and testing it. The only problem here is the time it takes to test these forged LEAFs. Does it have the limit? Maybe chip waits some time before allowing for next testing, 0.1 sec would be enough - you would have to wait almost 2 hours for finding forged LEAF and for law-obeying user 0.1 sec makes no difference. Then maybe Clipper chips will re-initiate key exchange or whatever after some time-out. If that is no question, meaning that other chip will wait for connection then the whole design would consist of RND generator and some logic. This would fit perfectly into XILINX 3010 FPGA. There is another good point in using FPGA- the configuration info could be made public knowledge and then everyone could go out and make themselves one for some hamburgers price. price of 3010 FPGA in Estonia is $5-$8 Oops. add a Coke to these burgers :-) (Xcuse me if I misunderstood smth. Haven't seen a live clipperphone, therefore can give no soldering / other details. ) JP from TTU. > > >

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Help A Novice Understand
by MWayne＠eworld.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greetings all-- I have been reading the list for a couple of months now and have come across the names of two people who seen to stir some very serious passions, David Sternlight, & L. Detweiller. Can someone tell me who they are and why C'punks hold them in such low esteem?? Thanks --Mitch

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PC Techniques June/July 1994 V5 #2
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The above issue's cover page is on "Encryption - Key to a Secure Future" It has several articles re encryption, and included the Wiley Books section (which also had Applied Cryptography on the cover page of its pull-out section) from which I quoted as a source for the book. On the Editor's Notepad (Page 4) there are two paragraphs of note. "If the cyberpunk {sic their spelling} crowd ever created a medal for mad courage in the face of insuperable odds, that medal should go to John Gilmore, who has just filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for _the entire Clipper encryption key database_, now being compiled by the Feds for use in their demented Clipper system. Gilmore and his attorney have studied Clipper and the FOIA in detail and have found no exemptions that would apply to the key database. They've scratched together some donations and are taking the government to court under FOIA for refusing to release the database to them. "The Feds always win, even if they have to break their own laws to do it. Nevertheless, Gilmore & Co. may slow the project down some, and we can all savor the irritation they will doubtless cause the Powers in the process --- Also from the same page: _No Code Overseas_ "Asinine Federal regulations concerning the export of cryptographic tech- nology means that code diskettes for this issue destined for overseas subscribers will not contain any of the encryption-related code. Our First Amendment prevents the Feds from censoring printed material in the magazine, but software on diskette is not protected that way. There's nothing we can do. Vote _against_ your representatives this fall, regardless of party; that's the only thing that gets their attention. On Page 6 Jeff Duntemann KG7JF has another full page re Clipper and gives full and "express permission to freely print and distribute this editorial electron- ically in the cause of defeating the Clipper initiative." On page 12 they list the source as available on Compu$erve GO CLMFORUM and see Lib 16. Also Turbo User Group Library sells the PC Techniques archive listing disks at 206-779-9508. Who knows, they might slip up and have the code available there... On page 24, Bruce Schneier has an article "Secret Sharing" - perhaps if you ask you can get his OK to include it here. Page 35 has an article on "Simple Encryption via XOR" by Mark R. Parker. For those of you feeling the werewolf need to rip something apart in an electronic feeding frenzy, this should keep you sated for a millisecond or two... <hehe> Also, in the June issue of Upside ("The Business Magazine for the Techno- logy Elite" - their title), the Editor-In-Chief, Eric Nee, has a commentary entitled "Keep Big Brother Out." Guess what it is about, kiddies... Over the last few months I've been colleting articles on DSP's from the many trade rags I get. I'd be happy to send one copy to someone who is seriously interested in this and willing to scan them in etc. to share with like-minded CP'sters. Aloha from Paradise {lost} -NetSurfer #include standard.disclaimer >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> == = = |James D. Wilson |V.PGP 2.4: 512/E12FCD 1994/03/17 > " " " |P. O. Box 15432 |finger for key / Viacrypt Reseller > " " /\ " |Honolulu, HI 96830 |====================================> \" "/ \" |Serendipitous Solutions| Also NetSurfer(a)sersol.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

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No Subject
by remail＠desert.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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that is cool
by jp＠jep.pld.ttu.ee 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> According to the NSA talk at MIT last week, the "checksum" is formed > by taking a 16-bit, fixed number (fixed in all chips) and encrypting > it with the session key via some special form of skipjack. > And by doing that add silicon area and new algorithm? Instead of using one that already existed? Concern for Net bandwith ( 16 instead of 80 bits per session ) and stupidity is of cource noteworthy, but i personally think that they have got spy working there, who deliberately disrupts their work to an extent where they just must quit Clipper and say Oh, let us be friends and use DES :) JP from TTU.

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Hints at spoofing given on TCP-IP Listserv...
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 5 Jun 1994 23:46:22 LCL From: William <billw(a)GLARE.CISCO.COM> To: Multiple recipients of list TCP-IP <TCP-IP%PUCC.BITNET(a)cmsa.Berkeley.EDU> Subject: Re: Is IP source routing a bad idea? A correct and bug-free implementation of IP source routing allows any host on the internet to masquerade as any IP address that it would like to, thus breaking any access control based on the source IP address (eg, most of the unix r-utilities.) Exactly how to do this is left as an excercise to the reader, but the fundamental problem is that the source route allows the packet to travel "through" possibly suspect IP entities that have not had the slightest amount of authentication as "trustworthy" routers applied to them. BillW cisco ========================================================================== Tentacle food for thought?

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Re: Why it is legal to export PGP under ITAR
by Vance Cochrane 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

| Nice try, but NEVER confuse a dictionary definition with a legal definition. | | In article <199405280642.XAA05875(a)jobe.shell.portal.com>, | <nobody(a)shell.portal.com> wrote: | >The US ITAR law exempts many things from export restrictions, among them, | >materials availiable in public libraries. It gives no special definition for a | >library. My American Heritage Dictionary defines "library" as, among other | >things, "An orginized collection of recorded data arranged for ease of use." | >IOW, an ftp site. Which means that if a program is available from a public ftp | >site, you're legally allowed to export it. :) I am not a lawyer so don't scorch me... Where does one obtain a legal definition if it is not in Blacks Law Dictionary? Isn't the next source a "regular" dictionary? ...thats what they do on Perry Mason ;-) vec

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Re: 6/6 New Yorker anti-crypto propaganda
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Highlights of "My First Flame", an article by John Seabrook in the 6/6/94 _New Yorker_ which explains why we need a benevolent government to help regulate the internet (a very sophisticated piece of propaganda, IMHO): Would it be a waste of time to emil this buffoon and put him right? Or bypass him and mail the New Dworkin directly? Anyone got the fax no? G

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