December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Hardware RNG's
by John A. Thomas 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Pat Farrell and others have been discussing hardware random-number generators. Since I've built such devices, I thought I'd put in my opinions. I used a reverse-biased transistor junction for the noise source. The noise is amplified by a three-stage op-amp circuit with about 60 dB of voltage gain in the passband and a 3-dB bandwith of 10 Hz - 3 KHz. A spectrum analyzer shows the noise is random, with no frequencies standing out more than others. The analog noise feeds an op-amp comparator wired as a zero-crossing detector. The output is a logic level which switches randomly, but on average, on and off about 50% of the time, respectively. This logic level gates a 5 MHz TTL oscillator, producing bursts of pulses of random length. These pulses are counted by an 8-bit counter, producing random 8-bit numbers. The outputs of the counter are latched and read through a PC bi-directional parallel port. Allowing the slowest changing bit to turn over 10 times between samples suggests a maximum sampling rate of 1000 bytes/sec. The chi-square test and the runs tests on these samples show very good statistical properties. For large samples (> 100,000 bytes), there seems to be a slight predominance of "one" bits (e.g. 0.6% difference). This is probably due to some factor in the sampling process which I haven't figured out yet. Anyway, exclusively-or'ing successive samples together removes this bias. I'd appreciate any ideas about this. I don't know what practical use this device has, except for those who need one-time pads, but it was fun to hack up and test. John A. Thomas b858jt(a)utarlvm1.uta.edu 75236.3536(a)compuserve.com PGP key available on request

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Re: Crypto export legislation defeated in House Intelligence Cmte.
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Brief update: The report is expected tomorrow. Initial > news from Intelligence Committee staffers is that the > crypto provisions of H.R. 3937 were axed with an > unbelievable 13-0 unanimous vote... > Has the official report been placed online, and if so, where? Thanks, Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Re: Re:
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>The cypherpunks mailing list has once again been mysteriously purged. > >I've been receiving mail from cypherpunks all morning. > >-- >Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) >C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:. I've received nothing. Nada. Zero

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Re: Andy Grove on Clipper
by Stuart Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Not if you use Stealth for PGP which I released a few months ago after > > persuading "Henry Hastur" to write it. They can't *tell* it' non-compliant > > crypto. Sophisticated steganography is now needed however, since most noise in > > the digital domain is not white noise, like a Stealth PGP message would be (or > > at least different than normal digital noise). But even more so is needed nice > > Mac and Windows interfaces for the system that you can send to a friend, on a > > floppy. I suggest a voice mail utility. Then a critical mass is not even > > needed (security through obscurity). Remember, "Encryption always wins." They > > can't outlaw noise. > > True, but I think that the <insert name of your favorite spook agency here> > would have it's hands on any method almost as soon as it hits the streets. > I'd be interested in getting a copy to play with, but I'm curious - the methods > to validate that you have a proper message have to be there, anyway, and that > would seem to be your undoing. If you have to validate it, it can be scanned > for -- that's how they find viruses these days, too. Does your method take > that into consideration? I could imagine a future where, like viruses, crypto > used "adaptive crypto" or "adaptive signatures" to hide itself from detection... Well, I've played with stealth briefly, along with a few other interesting utilities, and it does look good. i.e. there is no way to validate proper messages. If you feed noise/junk/whatever into stealth, it will give you a pgp encoded message back. Every picture posted to alt.binaries.pictures.* could be run through stealth and a pgp file would result. Find which ones *really* were pgp files to begin with.. good luck.. What we have to worry about is making sure there is no way to identify the data that pgp puts out itself. That is, the encrypted data and the encrypted IDEA key. If I gave you random samples of noise and told you that one of them was an IDEA key encrypted by an RSA key, you shouldn't be able to pick it out. -- Baba baby mama shaggy papa baba bro baba rock a shaggy baba sister shag saggy hey doc baba baby shaggy hey baba can you dig it baba baba E7 E3 90 7E 16 2E F3 45 * 28 24 2E C6 03 02 37 5C Stuart Smith <stu(a)nemesis.wimsey.com>

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REMAIL: Remailer that only remails to other remailers
by ghio＠cmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One of the problems in convincing people to run remailers is that they don't want to have to deal with complaints. Someone posted awhile ago that they would be willing to run a remailer that would only remail to other remailers. This would enhance the security of remailer chains while not creating too many political problems for sensitive sysadmins. If anyone's still interested, here's how to do it: ftp cs.cmu.edu cd /afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr12/mg5n/public get ghio.cp.remailer.tar.gz This is a copy of the remailer that I run on kaiwan. gunzip and untar it. Modify remailer and sendlatents with the proper directory names for your system. Now, you need to modify a line at the end of block.c. Change if (match==0) printf("%s",argv[1]); to if (match!=0) printf("%s",argv[1]); Now it is a pass-address filter instead of a block-address filter. Now put the addresses that you want the remailer to be able to send to in blocked.addresses (you can rename the file in the remailer csh script.) Now create a PGP key for your remailer, set up a .forward file to 'remailer' and you're all set...

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Majordomo
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Was it my breath, or did Majordomo go down again? ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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No Subject
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How can I check a newly downloaded PGP2.6 to verify that it is tamper-free before use and back-up? John Young

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CYPHERPUNK OPERATIVE
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Okay, somebody needs to fess up. I *know* someone on the Cypherpunks Channel is writing about the Clipper Chip and other crypto-privacy issues for /Expat World/. I thought I was the only one who had even heard of this newsletter for expatriates until I saw some of the crypto articles. Whoever it is, is doing a great job. In the June 15 issue, in the article, "How Big Brother Wants to LIsten, Too," the writer coined the term "Al Gorewellian." Gotta love it. If the writer of these articles is reading this note, please let us know who you are. You deserve the recognition. (If you want to keep a low profile, how 'bout sending me private e-mail? I'd like to discuss some things with you.) S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLgYBPU5ULTXct1IzAQEINgQAhzypoIDVoX5bad9Vd8psttmS5ClRbKqr vNA7L88jallJzrmUL5NZv6SO7NPAFxQzC2bnS2KJv4MpyRFl+ZYIku2cQZfQWShY 3TLUXuqK9HVHED7rCzq3Xq1Kny/fZZ9U74PSLe8fi+L9xsL5Ht0yDEmBYCG3REkv J0npF+9FCHw= =xgFs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Real truth about Cell phone tracking
by rusty＠hodge.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1. Cellular phones "register" (the proper term) themselves whenever they move into a new cell (the coverage area provided by a base or tower - not the proper term. They do this by scanning the control channels when the current one falls below a certian signal strength. If you have cellular monitoring equipment, you will see the registration confirmations transmitted on the control channel, complete with the MIN (mobile identification number, or cellular phone number). The MTSO (mobile telephone switching office) knows what MINs are registered in each cell at a given time. 1a. A cellular phone can be "tracked" if it is turned on. It does not have to be in use. 2. If you are in a fixed position, and your phone is going between service and no service modes, you are at the edge of coverage area, and some of the time the control channel is falling below the scan threshold. It then tries to register with another cell and another until it is successful. It is scanning control channels when the no service lite is on. 3. There is a test mode defined in the NAMPS standard that causes a phone to begin transmitting on a designated frequency. And since the mouthpiece on a cellular phone is not switched off when the phone is on hook, you can easily bug someone's car this way. 4. Many of the cellular-based vehicle tracking systems only use the cellular phone to transmit data back to company headquarters, and do not determine location via triangulation or doppler direction finding techniques. These are not reliable enough for moving targets due to all the RF reflections. Also, my (limited) experience with doppler-based triangulation DFing shows how hard it is to DF a modulated FM signal. And since all cellular phones are transmitting a SAT tone (a 6kHz-ish supervisory audio tone) all the time, I think this would be very hard to do. 5. In major metro areas, individual cells cover extremely small areas... often every mile or two on the freeway, you will see another cell site. So you know exactly where to send a helicopter to. 6. For under $1000, you can buy a box which hooks up to a PC and controls a scanner and decodes the cellular control channels (and reverse channel data too). This includes software for following cellular calls as they hop from cell to cell, paging requests (get a phones attention), and displaying the MINs that register in a given cell (or cells, but you need one receiver for each cell you are monitoring!). 7. From the moment your phone starts ringing, there is an audio path back to the MTSO. When your phone is ringing, it has been assigned a channel and is transmitting. Pressing the send button to answer the phone sends a signal to the MTSO telling the switch to connect the landline to the channel the phone is on. This is especially evident on Ericcison switches (like LA Cellular uses). -- Rusty Hodge <rusty(a)hodge.com>

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Re: Real truth about Cell phone tracking
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: From: Rusty Hodge <rusty(a)hodge.com> : 3. There is a test mode defined in the NAMPS standard that causes a phone : to begin transmitting on a designated frequency. And since the mouthpiece : on a cellular phone is not switched off when the phone is on hook, you can : easily bug someone's car this way. Woo! Built-in infinity-transmitter mode! (Just like ISDN actually) : 6. For under $1000, you can buy a box which hooks up to a PC and controls a : scanner and decodes the cellular control channels (and reverse channel data : too). This includes software for following cellular calls as they hop from : cell to cell, paging requests (get a phones attention), and displaying the : MINs that register in a given cell (or cells, but you need one receiver for : each cell you are monitoring!). These are selling on the black market over here in Britain for 3 or 4 K pounds. People who buy them use them to close phones, then sell time on the cloned phone over a weekend before it's discovered. G

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