December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Is pgp 2.5 insecure?
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi, I was looking for a pgp public key and got a message of a key server. It will be down until pgp 2.5 is available and then it will not accept any keys generated by a pgp lower than 2.4. What is the reason for this? I thought the only difference was the use of the rsaref code. There should not any difference in the key structure. Is this the way to introduce a clipper-pgp and make people use it? pgp 2.5 will not be available outside USA. Where can I get a description of the diffs of the logical functions? Perhaps I will write a copy of this program using our local toolbox, and make it available outside the USA. Hadmut -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLdvwa2c1jG5vDiNxAQGuZQP7B1FH6SQAfpQ+7h3pHJOAhgV2z3bE3a8A AQNdWPnNhDeky2eQEOuqi22+xFfqc2l3fGAmQnwydRtK89LvQDoFvQngWpeLIbpz Lj54PVLGjiZesJ7NV7BYGgG8rlIWSxhH22R9W4f/xWrgpLrUQ25IsomXaCsU7B+j j9+mrxBm0D0= =n4JA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Sternlight's attack on 2.3a
by Brian Beker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mr. Sternlight continues: -------------BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE----------------------------------

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.privacy From: schneier(a)chinet.chinet.com (Bruce Schneier) Subject: "Interesting Stuff" Checkers at the NSA Message-ID: <Cq2934.q0(a)chinet.chinet.com> Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX Date: Thu, 19 May 1994 17:40:15 GMT This is from a flyer that NSA people have been distributing: NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY -- TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER Information Sorting and Retrieval by Language or Topic Description: This technique is an extremely simple, fast, completely general mathod of sorting and retrieving machine- readable text according to language and/or topic. The method is totally independent of the particular languages or topics of interest, and relies for guidance solely upon exemplars (e.g., existing documents, fragments, etc.) provided by the user. It employs no dictionaries keywords, stoplists, stemmings, syntax, semantics, or grammar; nevertheless, it is capable of distinguishing among closely related toopics (previously considered inseparable) in any language, and it can do so even in text containing a great many errors (typically 10 - 15% of all characters). The technique can be quickly implemented in software on any computer system, from microprocessor to supercomputer, and can easily be implemented in inexpensive hardware as well. It is directly scalable to very large data sets (millions of documents). Commercial Application: Language and topic-independent sorting and retieval of documents satisfying dynamic criteria defined only by existing documents. Clustering of topically related documents, with no prior knowledge of the languages or topics that may be present. It desired, this activity can automatically generate document selectors. Specializing sorting tasks, such as identification of duuplicate or near-duplicate documents in a large set. National Security Agency Research and Technology Group - R Office of Research and Technology Applications (ORTA) 9800 Savage Road Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 (301) 688-0606 If this is the stuff they're giving out to the public, I can only imagine what they're keeping for themselves. Bruce ************************************************************************** * Bruce Schneier * Counterpane Systems For a good prime, call 391581 * 2^216193 - 1 * schneier(a)chinet.com **************************************************************************

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Mosaic to support digital money in September
by jamesd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric Hughes writes > > It seems that you have information that is not in the press release > you include, which talks (as far as I can tell) about catalog > purchases with credit cards. Only what is in the news and stuff. In the cover story of May 11 Computer currents, page 40 Box, Malone and Davidow say that the money enabled Mosaic will be available in the fall (press release says September - I do not believe either of them) and that what we would call a server program (accounting and ordering package) will cost around 10 000 dollars. Obviously their model is the TV shopping channer, whereas the model we want to see implemented is the middle eastern bazaar, with giving and receiving money equally convenient for both parties. My comments were my interpretation of the press release. My interpretation may be misleading or inaccurate. The press release is probably misleading and inaccurate. If someone would get the real info from EIT, I would be interested to hear it. In particular, now that PGP is US legal, are they going to support PGP in mosaic? (They were not going to at the time of the press release) > > Enterprise Integration Technologies and friends will > enable digital money transactions in Mosaic in September > > Is this announced? Read the press release "EIT will make Secure NCSA Mosaic software available at no charge to CommerceNet members in September and NCSA will incorporate these securefeatures in future NCSA Mosaic releases. Enterprise Integration Technologies Corp., of Palo Alto, (EIT), is an R&D and consulting organization, developing software and services that help companies do business on the Internet. EIT is also project manager of CommerceNet. " > The transaction model has a crippled mode for people > outside the US and Canada > > Crippled? Read the press release "Cryptosystem and signature system interoperation is particularly useful between U.S. residents and non-U.S. residents, where the non-U.S. residents may have to use weaker 40-bit keys in conjunction with RSA's RC2 and RC4 variable keysize ciphers. EIT intends to publish Secure-HTTP as an Internet standard, and work with others in the WWW community to create a standard that will encourage using the Web for a wide variety of commercial transactions. " The biggest crippling is that they do not mention supporting PGP. If Mosaic supports PEM, then PEM will win. But PEM is useless. An evil NSA plot? Naw, they have not got the brains. More likely coorporate stupidity. > > They intend that you will be able to write contracts and > internet checks on participating banks. > > Will the recipient of the check be required to be at a participating > bank? I have no idea, but that would seem to be the only way that it could work, but since I screwed up big in my comments on magic money, other folk may well be more imaginative than I am. > And you can already write contracts with existing digital > signatures. A contract is just an agreement between two parties; > intermediation is not required. Quite so. But your typical businessman will not use PGP because it is user hostile, whereas Mosaic is not. The objective is to bring encryptation to the massess. Obviously I would vastly prefer to see PGP integrated into mosaic, I have considered doing this myself, but it is a substantial job with legal hazards, and I am bone lazy and vulnerable to court judgments > For this reason I think decentralized account based > digital money is the best hope. > > Account based money is identity based money, even if the identity is a > pseudo-identity. The whole point of cryptocash protocols is to > separate the link between two account by mediating the transaction > with some instrument. Quite so, as I have been reminded. But regrettably it seems likely that identity based money represents less of a jump from the existing system, therefore is likely be considerably more acceptable to the great unwashed masses. Crypto cash - money based on digital tokens - is rather subtle for the masses. Even I screw up. How do you expect the chairman of the board to comprehend it? To successfully push crypto cash, we would need to make it a lot more convenient. Hint. PGP is *not* convenient. A utility that would make crypto cash acceptable, would probably have to simulate account based money, and would need a relational database built into it. Microsoft visual basic, professional edition, allows one to make products that employ and create a relational database, and give those products away. The database built into the freely redistributable Visual Basic run time modules supports SQL. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves and our James A. Donald | property, because of the kind of animals that we | are. True law derives from this right, not from jamesd(a)netcom.com | the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.

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Re: D-H key exchange - how does it work?
by nelson＠bolyard.wpd.sgi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry E. Metzger wrote, describing Diffie_Hellman key exchange: > Suppose we have a field Z_p, where p is a prime. > Suppose g is a generator of the field. > Alice generates a random number a. > Bob generates a random number b. > Bob tells alice g^b, Alice tells Bob g^a. > Alice knows a and g^b, and thus generates g^(ab) trivially. > Similarly, Bob knows g^a and b, and trivially generates g^(ab). > An interceptor only knows g^a and g^b, and because the discrete log > problem is hard cannot get a or b easily, and thus cannot generate g^(ab). > > g^(ab) is now a shared secret of Alice and Bob. Some of us may not have seen an explanation of DH before. Perry's explanation was good. For the sake of completeness for those who're new to DH, I'd like to offer some additional information and considerations, here. The prime p wants to be chosen with a little care, and the "random" numbers a and b may want to be "selected" to eliminate certain undesirable values. I'll explain below. Within the field Z_p (the set of integers 0..p-1) where p is prime, there are elements whose successive powers make up all the elements of the field Z_p. These numbers are called "primitive" elements or "generators" of the field Z_p. That is, if g is a generator of the field Z_p, then the successive powers g, g^2, g^3, ... g^(p-2), g^(p-1) mod p include all the p-1 non-zero elements of Z_p. The set of unique numbers produced by taking succesive powers mod p of an element m of Z_p is a group, the "multiplicative span" of m, which is a subgroup of Z_p. The number of elements in the group generated by m is called the "order" of m. Primitive elements of Z_p have order p-1. Not all of the elements of Z_p are primitive. Some elements of Z_p have very small orders. At least one element will have order 2. Given that p is prime, the orders of the elements of Z_p will all have values that are products of some or all of the prime factors of p-1. Since p is prime (and p=2 is not interesting ;-), p-1 will contain the factor 2. An small example may make this point clear. Let p == 11. The prime factors of p-1 are 2 and 5. Hence we expect the orders of the elements of Z_11 to be 2, 5, or 10. By enumerating the groups of the elements of Z_11 we see this is so (for Z_11). E.g. Element Ring Order ------ ----------------------------- ----- 1 1 1 2 2, 4, 8, 5, 10, 9, 7, 3, 6, 1 10 3 3, 9, 5, 4, 1 5 4 4, 5, 9, 3, 1 5 5 5, 3, 4, 9, 1 5 6 6, 3, 7, 9, 10, 5, 8, 4, 2, 1 10 7 7, 5, 2, 3, 10, 4, 6, 9, 8, 1 10 8 8, 9, 6, 4, 10, 3, 2, 5, 7, 1 10 9 9, 4, 3, 5, 1 5 10 10, 1 2 There are 4 primitive elements in Z_11, 2, 6, 7, & 8. The orders of all the elements are as predicted by Euler. Now, let us imagine that Alice and Bob have chosen 11 as their prime and 7 as "g", their generator. Following the steps outlined above: > Alice generates a random number a. say 3 > Bob generates a random number b. say 5. > Bob tells alice g^b, Alice tells Bob g^a. 10 2 > Alice knows a and g^b, and thus generates g^(ab) trivially. 10 > Similarly, Bob knows g^a and b, and trivially generates g^(ab). also 10. > An interceptor only knows g^a and g^b, and because the discrete log > problem is hard cannot get a or b easily, and thus cannot generate g^(ab). Except that the interceptor, evil Eve, took g^a and g^b and tested them for short order, and found that one of them, g^b, had a very short order indeed. So, without knowing a or b, Eve knows that g^(ab) is one of a very few numbers, the elements of the group of g^b. She can now try the elements of that group until, by exhaustion, she finds the value that reveals the key g^(ab). > g^(ab) is now a shared secret of Alice and Bob. And Eve, too. Some primes produce lots and lots of elements with small orders. For example, Z_37 has 12 primitives, 6 elements of order 18, and all the rest have order 9 or less. So, is DH all wet (insecure)? No. There are some simple steps to prevent this problem. First, pick p to minimize the number of elements with small order. This means that we need to know the factorization of p-1. Of course, factoring large numbers is a hard problem, but there are several ways to pick p with known factorization of p-1. The simplest seems to be to pick p such that (p-1)/2 is prime; that is, such that p-1 has two factors, 2 and (p-1)/2. Now, all the elements of Z_p will have orders of either 2, or (p-1)/2, or p-1. There are other methods, that permit other small orders, but we won't explore them here. Second, after "randomly" choosing a, and computing g^a, Alice takes the additional step of making sure that the order of g^a is not small (i.e. is more than 2). If g^a is of small order, she picks another random a, and repeats the process. This is trivial indeed. Bob does likewise for his numbers b and g^b. Since Alice and Bob have eliminated the small groups, Eve will never encounter a g^a or g^b number whose order is less than (p-1)/2, and given that (p-1)/2 is a _very_ large prime number, Eve won't live long enough to try all of the elements of groups of that order. I haven't checked to see if the RSAREF code takes these precautions. > Ed Carp asked: > > If I understand D-H right, both sides generate public keys from their > > private keys, then just exchange public keys. Is that right? Or is there > > something I'm missing? Well, there are published descriptions of D-H that refer to the publicly exchanged values, g^a and g^b, as "public keys", and by that definition, yes, both sides exchange "public keys." But as you can see, these aren't public keys in the same sense that RSA public keys are. -- Nelson Bolyard Multimedia Server Division Silicon Graphics, Inc. nelson(a)sgi.COM Phone: 415-390-1919 Fax: 415-967-8496 Disclaimer: I do not speak for Silicon Graphics. --

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cpunks quiz
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can anyone tell me where the quote "suitably incentivised" came from? I need a name. :) thanks, mt Matt Thomlinson University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. phone: (206) 548-9804 Check my home page -- ftp://ftp.u.washington.edu/public/phantom/home.html Get PGP 2.2 or 2.5 key via email or finger phantom(a)hardy.u.washington.edu

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Sternlight's attack on 2.3a
by Randy Antler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Begin forwarded message: Date: Thu, 19 May 1994 16:09:10 -0700 (PDT) From: Brian Beker <beker(a)netcom.com> Reply-To: Brian Beker <beker(a)netcom.com> Subject: Sternlight's attack on 2.3a To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Cc: unicorn(a)access.digex.net Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Mr. Sternlight continues: -------------BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE---------------------------------- >From netcom.com!strnlght Thu May 19 15:17:42 1994 Xref: netcom.com alt.fan.david-sternlight:1078 alt.security.pgp:13821 Newsgroups: alt.fan.david-sternlight,alt.security.pgp Path: netcom.com!strnlght From: strnlght(a)netcom.com (David Sternlight) Subject: Re: David Sternlight's Slurs About Folks With "2.3a" Keys Message-ID: <strnlghtCq2Eqs.2xB(a)netcom.com> Reply-To: david(a)sternlight.com (David Sternlight) Organization: DSI/USCRPAC References: <199405191106.FAA01087(a)spot.colorado.edu> Date: Thu, 19 May 1994 19:42:28 GMT Lines: 29 By publishing a private e-mail, both beker and Johnson are in violation of my copyright in that message, since it was a private communication and no permission was given to republish. Thus beker has now committed a new violation of his netcom agreement, and Johnson shows he has bad judgement. What's more, by trying to make what should be a private matter, to be decided by netcom based on their own rules, into a public cause celebre, and by writing to netcom as Johnson did to intervene in a private matter, he has made the situation worse for beker, not better. Netcom is perfectly capable of telling me to go peddle my papers if I'm wrong. David Sternlight writes: > [...] > Complaining against another user to netcom is with netcom's rules. > > I am, of course, content to rely on netcom's decision in these two matters. > The behavior of officious intermeddlers like Johnson speaks for itself. Talk about the pot calling the kettle black!!! I wish this man would overdose on whatever medication he must be taking. Or...perhaps he already has! P.S. Sternlight breaks down into a rather amusing number of combinations if you take it as "stern" and "light." For example: stern -> rump light -> intense Make up your own using the definitions below! =============================================================================== 1stern \'stern\ adj [ME sterne, fr. OE styrne; akin to OE starian to stare] (bef. 12c) 1a: having a definite hardness or severity of nature or manner: AUSTERE b: expressive of severe dispeasure: HARSH 2: forbidding or gloomy in appearance 3: INEXORABLE ástern necessityñ 4: STURDY, STOUT áa stern resolveñ syn see SEVERE Ð stern·ly adv Ð stern·ness \'stern-nes\ n 2stern n [ME, rudder, prob. of Scand origin; akin to ON stjoÅrn act of steering; akin to OE stõÅeran to steer Ð more at STEER] (14c) 1: the rear end of a boat 2: a hinder or rear part: the last or latter part § Biographical Names: Stern \'stern\ Isaac 1920- Am. (Russ.-born) violinist Stern Otto 1888-1969 Am. (Ger.-born) physicist § Thesaurus: stern adj syn SEVERE 1, ascetic, astringent, austere, mortified rel grim, implacable, unrelenting; inexorable, inflexible ant lenient, soft ||stern n syn BUTTOCKS, backside, beam, behind, bottom, ||butt, ||can, derriere, rump, tail ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1light \'lõÅt\ n [ME, fr. OE leÅoht; akin to OHG lioht light, L luc-, lux light, luceÅre to shine, Gk leukos white] (bef. 12c) 1a: something that makes vision possible b: the sensation aroused by stimulation of the visual receptors: BRIGHTNESS c: an electromagnetic radiation in the wavelength range including infrared, visible, ultraviolet, and X rays and traveling in a vacuum with a speed of about 186,281 miles per second; specif: the part of this range that is visible to the human eye 2a: DAYLIGHT b: DAWN 3: a source of light: as a: a celestial body b: CANDLE c: an electric light 4 archaic: SIGHT 4a 5a: spiritual illumination b: INNER LIGHT c: ENLIGHTENMENT d: TRUTH 6a: public knowledge áfacts brought to lightñ b: a particular aspect or appearance presented to view ánow saw the matter in a different lightñ 7: a particular illumination 8: something that enlightens or informs áhe shed some light on the problemñ 9: a medium (as a window or windowpane) through which light is admitted 10 pl: a set of principles, standards, or opinions áworship according to one's lights ÐAdrienne Kochñ 11: a noteworthy person in a particular place or field: LUMINARY 12: a particular expression of the eye 13a: LIGHTHOUSE, BEACON b (1): TRAFFIC SIGNAL (2): a green traffic light 14: the representation of light in art 15: a flame for lighting something Ð in the light of 1: from the point of view of 2 or in light of: in view of 2light adj (bef. 12c) 1: having light: BRIGHT áa light airy roomñ 2a: not dark, intense, or swarthy in color or coloring: PALE b of colors: medium in saturation and high in lightness álight blueñ 3 of coffee: served with extra milk or cream 3light vb light·ed or lit \'lit\; light·ing vi (bef. 12c) 1: to become light: BRIGHTEN Ð usu. used with up áher face lit upñ 2: to take fire 3: to ignite something (as a cigarette) Ð often used with up ~ vt 1: to set fire to 2a: to conduct with a light: GUIDE b: ILLUMINATE árockets light up the skyñ c: ANIMATE, BRIGHTEN áa smile lit up her faceñ 4light adj [ME, fr. OE leÅoht; akin to OHG lõÅhti light, L levi, Gk elachys small] (bef. 12c) 1a: having little weight: not heavy b: designed to carry a comparatively small load áa light truckñ c: having relatively little weight in proportion to bulk áaluminum is a light metalñ d: containing less than the legal, standard, or usual weight áa light coinñ 2a: of little importance: TRIVIAL b: not abundant: SCANTY álight rainñ 3a: easily disturbed áa light sleeperñ b: exerting a minimum of force or pressure: GENTLE áa light touchñ c: resulting from a very slight pressure: FAINT álight printñ 4a: easily endurable áa light illnessñ b: requiring little effort álight workñ 5: capable of moving swiftly or nimbly álight on his feetñ 6a: FRIVOLOUS álight conductñ b: lacking in stability: CHANGEABLE álight opinionsñ c: sexually promiscuous 7: free from care: CHEERFUL 8: intended chiefly to entertain álight verseñ álight comedyñ 9a: having a comparatively low alcoholic content álight winesñ b: having a relatively mild flavor 10a: easily digested áa light soupñ b: well leavened áa light crustñ 11: lightly armed or equipped álight cavalryñ 12: coarse and sandy or easily pulverized álight soilñ 13: DIZZY, GIDDY áfelt light in the headñ 14a: carrying little or no cargo áthe ship returned lightñ b: producing goods for direct consumption by the consumer álight industryñ 15: not bearing a stress or accent áa light syllableñ 16: having a clear soft quality áa light voiceñ 17: being in debt to the pot in a poker game áthree chips lightñ syn see EASY Ð light·ish \-ish\ adj 5light adv (bef. 12c) 1: LIGHTLY 2: with little baggage átravel lightñ 6light vi light·ed or lit \'lit\; light·ing [ME lighten, fr. OE lõÅhtan; akin to OE leÅoht light in weight] (bef. 12c) 1: DISMOUNT 2: SETTLE, ALIGHT áa bird lit on the lawnñ 3: to fall unexpectedly 4: to arrive by chance: HAPPEN álit upon a solutionñ Ð light into: to attack forcefully áI lit into that food until I'd finished off the heel of the loaf ÐHelen Eustisñ § Thesaurus: light n syn DAWN 1, aurora, cockcrow, cockcrowing, dawning, daybreak, daylight, morn, morning, sunrise light adj syn FAIR 3, blond light vb 1 to cause something to start burning álighted the fuse on the dynamiteñ syn enkindle, fire, ignite, inflame, kindle con douse, ||dout, put out, quench, snuff; damp (down), smother, stamp (out) ant extinguish 2 syn ILLUMINATE 1, illume, illumine, lighten light adj 1 having little weight áthe package was lightñ syn featherlight, featherweight, imponderous, lightweight, unheavy, weightless rel inconsequential, trifling, trivial; little, petty, small; flimsy, meager, slender, slight idiom light as a feather con bulky, burdensome, cumbersome, huge, massive, overweight, ponderous, portl, unwieldy, weighty ant heavy 2 syn EASY 1, effortless, facie, royal, simple, smooth, untroublesome ant arduous 3 syn FAST 7, easy, loose, ||riggish, unchaste, wanton, whorish 4 syn GIDDY 1, bird-witted, dizzy, empty-headed, featherbrained, flighty, frivolous, harebrained, rattlebrained, skittish 5 syn LITTLE 3, casual, inconsiderable, insignificant, minor, petty, shoestring, small-beer, trivial, unimportant 6 syn DIZZY 2, giddy, light-headed, swimming, swimmy, vertiginous light vb 1 syn ALIGHT, land, perch, roost, set down, settle, sit down, touch down 2 syn HAPPEN 2, bump, chance, hit, luck, meet, stumble, tumble -- randy(a)pilot.com (home address) NeXTMAIL randy(a)nacm.com (work address) Welcome! ________________________________________________________________________ GCS(GAT): d--(---/-d+) p-@ c+++@ l u++@ e* m+/++ s/+ n+(---) h(--) f* g+ w++/+++ t++ r(-) y+(*) ________________________________________________________________________ DOLLAR HAS SPIRITUAL VALUE! JERUSALEM - Israel's chief rabbi, Mordechai Eliahu, says people should keep U.S. dollars in their pockets when in a restroom or an unclean place. His office said Wednesday that an American Jew raised the question because the bills say: "In God We Trust." The rabbi's religious ruling said that because of the motto, dollars must be treated the same way as holy documents and not be exposed to filth. --Reuters

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How trustworthy is *Skipjack*?
by grendel＠netaxs.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It seems to me, that with the NSA being the devious bastards that they are, might not just make the key escrow scheme the only weak point in the Clipper encryption system. The escrow scheme (supposedly) allows only legal wiretaps, as you need a warrant or wiretap order in able to obtain the escrowed key parts. HOWEVER: The NSA known to be damn secretive about what exactly it is doing and investigating. If they were snooping on something, especially something they're not supposed to be involved in (domestic surveillance, for instance), they wouldn't want to go to the trouble of legally obtaining a wiretap order. They take so long, and there's always the trouble of that potentially incriminating paperwork... In short, is it possible that the NSA built in a backdoor to Skipjack so they can stay ahead of the game like they used to in the pre-Clipper days? Also, at the risk of starting a "computing power increases vs. difficulty of factoring vs. potential cost" flamewar: Is it possible that the NSA can brute force Skipjack? _Applied Crypto_ says that Skipjack only has an 80-bit key. How easily could the NSA break an 80-bit key? -- ========================================================================== | Michael Brandt Handler | Philadelphia, PA | <grendel(a)netaxs.com> | | PGP 2.3a public key available via server / mail / finger | ==========================================================================

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--who is doing the stego faq?--
by rarachel＠prism.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi guys, I'm an idiot. :-) A few days ago, I saw a message by someone on sci.crypt about a stego faq he was doing. I contacted him and told him about a program I'm working on, but lost his address and the news daemon already purged his message. :-( So if you're the one, or know who is, please email me. The next message will be some info on WNSTORM which is the program I'm writing...

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Re: cpunks quiz
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It came from one of the documents that John Gilmore received as a result of one of his FOIA requests. Here the relevant section from John's post... From: gnu(a)toad.com (John Gilmore) Return-Path: <gnu> Received: from localhost by toad.com id AA19157; Thu, 30 Dec 93 02:21:27 PST Message-Id: <9312301021.AA19157(a)toad.com> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Revised Clipper FOIA results from Asst Secretary of Defense Date: Thu, 30 Dec 93 02:21:27 -0800 We sent in an administrative appeal on June 17th, 1993, of various things that were withheld in the response to our FOIA request. The Office of the Secretary of Defense responded on December 21, 1993 -- six months later. (By law, agencies have twenty business days to respond to an administrative appeal. However, agencies regularly violate all FOIA time limits because the courts have largely refused to censure agencies for breaking the law, and have refused to force agencies to follow the law. I will point this out each time it happens, largely to educate you -- the general public -- about how pervasive a problem this is.) We did an administrative appeal of the parts they withheld and other documents they did not provide. The result is that one more doc came out (a cover sheet for a review copy of the President's actual directive, which is still classified and has been referred back to the National Security Council for processing), and the previously withheld paragraph of the last two memos below is now only blacked out for a sentence or two. The newly released text is highlighted with XXXX's and explanation. John Gilmore [first few letters deteled -jm] [This page originally XXXXXXXX SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED] OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC 20301-3040 COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE 30 APR 1993 (stamped) MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I) Subject: PRD/NSC-27 Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption (U) [first six paragraphs deleted -jm] (U) Despite these concerns, the President has directed that the Attorney General request that manufacturers of communications hardware use the trapdoor chip, and at least AT&T has been reported willing to do so (having been suitably incentivised by promises of Government purchases). The Attorney General has also been directed to create a system for escrow of key material. The Secretary of Commerce has been directed to produce standards based on the use of the trapdoor chip. [remainder of letter deleted] (signed) Ray Pollari Acting DASD (CI & SCM)

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