December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Help! New Remailer?
by Halvor Kise jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello all Cypherpunks! I want to set up an anonymous remailer in Norway. I once had one, but after formating my hard disk - it's no longer there. Why you ask? There are so many remailers as it is? Well, I think that it is important to have remailers in different countries. It's a little harder for the american FBI/NSA/CIA/whatever to shut down a foreign remailer. But now there is so many to choose from... What is the diffrence between Hal's, Sameer's, Nates' and hh's remailer?? I have seen that hh's? remailer at soda.berkeley.edu can post to newsgroups. Do I need a SMTP-NNTP gateway to use this remailer WITH the option to post to newsgroups? Can all of these remailers use PGP-encryption? I'm sorry if this is newbe questions for some of you, but there are surely others who also wants to know. Thanks for helping me out! Yours, Halvor Kise jr. -- * MEMENTO MORI * _____________________________________________________ | Halvor Kise jr. * halvork(a)sofus.dhhalden.no | | * halvork(a)gyda.dhhalden.no | | Ostfold * halvork(a)frodo.dhhalden.no | | Regional College * Student at | | N-1757 Halden * Computer Science | | * | | | | Finger halvork@sofus for PGP-key | -----------------------------------------------------

2 1

Re: Soldier of Fortune
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

M > M >This seems counterproductive. PGP should not be portrayed as a tool M >for those that most Americans consider antisocial. M > M >M Carling M > A quote from pgpdoc1.doc: "If privacy is outlawed, only outlaws will have privacy. Intelligence agencies have access to good cryptographic technology. So do the big arms and drug traffickers. So do defense contractors, oil companies, and other corporate giants. But ordinary people and grassroots political organizations mostly have not had access to affordable "military grade" public-key cryptographic technology. Until now." Now Phil wrote PGP in part so that "grassroots" political organizations could have strong crypto. SOF is a "grassroots political organization." It happens that some people don't like SOF. It happens that some other people think that the organizations that Phil was thinking of when he wrote PGP are unamerican communist front organizations who should be on the Attorney General's List (if we still had an Attorney General's List)(if we still had an Attorney General). Tastes differ. The point of cypherpunks is that everyone (even FBI agents) should have strong crypto if they want it. I know that Phil feels a personal sense of embarrassment at being adopted by all sorts of nut groups (including ourselves) and he has pleaded for stories of "worthy PGP use." Standards of worthiness will vary. DCF Who, as it happens, *is* a member of an organization on the Attorney General's list. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

2 1

uses for PGP
by Ed Carp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's the text of a message I sent to Phil. Thought I'd share it with y'all... ----------

1 0

Re: fake pgp messages
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What about a chron task that creates a new PGP key every x hours and encrypts random Usenet posts, according to traffic patterns (if there it tons of real activity, don't do much, if little, do more. just a thought. -j

1 0

Re: Need info re Clipper/encryptions
by PAPAMICHAIL 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm writing a script, need someone to advise me on technical points re encryption, cracking computers and other things I probably shouldn't know. If there's anyone out there that can help please contact me via CompuServe 72133,1415 P.S. I'm no computer wiz. Thanks - ERB

1 0

Re: Another reason for anonymity
by Jim Sewell - KD4CKQ 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Preface: I inadvertently sent this via regular mail to Tim directly instead of on the list. He noted, correctly, that it should have been put to the list so I'm copying it there. Jim <My computer told me that Timothy C. May said:> > > (You should carry these discussions on the main list, so I can justify > putting more time into the replies.) > > > <My computer told me that Timothy C. May said:> > > > [ discussion of anonymity and defamation of character omitted since it's been posted before. - JCS] > > > > But what about the credit checking systems now or the "Data Hiway" (I'm > > growing very weary of the I.S. catchphrase) of the near future? What if > > I can type, anonymously, that Tim May is a pedophile and every newspaper, > > and thus every home, in the world sees it? Do you think you'd get a job > > as a elementary school teacher? Not likely. People always remember the > > accusation but rarely the retraction. Do you think Michael Jackson will > > ever shrug off the child molestation charges? Not fully. Even now, if > > I have a business and I tell XYZ Credit Check Company that you didn't > > pay your bill and owe me $1,000,000.00 then you're ruined! Oh, that's > > right, for me to report it I have to say who I am and then you can sue > > me for ruining your life. > > False or frivolous accusations are often made, and people take into > account the source. This is what free speech entails. Once again, though, if someone is granted anonymity then people can not take into account the source unless reputations are attached to the pseudonym, as you mention: > Look into how "reputations" work. > > As to the Michael Jackson case, people believed it because his > behavior supported the charges, there were corroborating witnesses, etc. > But we are guaranteed the right to face our accusor in legal cases which would go away with complete anonymity. > > > (What about shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater? Let those who see > > > there's no fire beat the shit out of the twerp who shouted "Fire!" > > > Seems fair to me.) > > > > > > > Oops, tactical error, Tim. Under your statements a guy can shout "Fire!" > > anonymously so who do you "beat the shit out of" then? Neither argument > > (for or against anonymity) is water proof. > > No, if its anonymous, then it can't be punished anyway. I'm in favor > of "screenable anonymity": set your e-mail filters to ignore any > messages except from those names or pseuodonyms you place faith in. > Simple. Ok, so it is not just blind anonymity but rather one with some degree of responsibility and reputation, thus your psuedonym becomes known as a distinct entity that is not tied to you. Perhaps... > (My point about the "Fire!" example is that a rare, and solvable, > problem has been used inappropriately for decades to place legal > limits on free speech.) And a valid point it is. It seems that in 50 years we could have come up with a better example of limiting freedom than this. -- Tantalus Inc. Bringing people together Jim Sewell-KD4CKQ 2407 N. Roosevelt Blvd. to have a little fun. Internet: jims(a)mpgn.com Key West, FL 33041 CIS: 71061,1027 (305) 293-8100 "We keep coding and coding and coding..."

1 0

cypherpunks and politics (Re: USWA)
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:21 AM 04/14/94 -0500, Adam Lake wrote: >Did anyone ever think of involving the USWA (no, not the United States >Wrestling Association) United We Stand America in the Clipper fight? >Sounds to me like this would be a mass appeal if it appeared in their >newsletter. This is something I have been meaning to write to the list for several weeks, and this post is the perfect lead in. When I joined this list, I saw thought it was going to be much different. I had assumed 1) that people on this list would have much different politics and 2) that that wouldn't really matter, 'cause everyone here is concerned with one issue, which we could all agree on. 2) seems to have partially true, sometimes. Without expounding at lengths, my reaction was to unsubscribe on short order when I saw some of the first posts flying around. I didn't, because I try to keep an open mind and do change opinions sometimes. But not everyone who is a potential crypto supporter is gonna bother, and by tying (seemingly or not- impressions count here) the issue to a particular set of other beliefs, there is a huge chance that others are going to be alienated. I know *I* don't want to be associated with libertarianism or (even worse) Perot... The point is that even if you think anyone with a viewpoint opposing yours is automatically stupid and not worth your time (and I don't think that too many of you are that bad off ;), aren't they at least worth using to further something you believe strongly in? It might do well to be careful in alienating potential allys by flip political jokes and comments. -j

2 1

re:My public key
by SGT=DARREN=S.=HARLOW%ISB%MCTSSA＠nwsfallbrook3.nwac.sea06.navy.mil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Enclosed is my public key. I am new to the list and have a lot of catching up to do. Please excuse my ignorance. Sgt Darren Harlow - Computer Security MCTSSA, Camp Pendleton, USMC Internet: harlow%isb%mctssa(a)nwsfallbrook3.nwac.sea06.navy.mil Voice: Comm: (619) 725-2970 DSN (Autovon): 365-2970 Fax: Comm: (619) 725-9512 DSN (Autovon): 365-9512 "The views expressed are my own, and always will be..." -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAi2pYOoAAAEEAJ0Fdc1HDwlww3Wz8JPeQDZT2Gk/q1gh0J+4njtUC66HXngN DNyxzoGnZVcA0bbkirsCdjvvZlsP84QVgxdijzgW4pNOJKowJgrQWFftGEqJKH5b I2NxJrk0kmKt/jli5kV/wDs9Rr4PxXQjGN4B+uJOCSlyWX+fnWNyHMOkIY2tAAUR tENEYXJyZW4gSGFybG93IDxoYXJsb3claXNiJW1jdHNzYUBud3NmYWxsYnJvb2sz Lm53YWMuc2VhMDYubmF2eS5taWw+ =v34V -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

1 0

PGP encryption
by marssaxman＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Are there any shareware/freeware/PD PGP-like encryption systems for the Macintosh? Or is there a Mac version of PGP and I just haven't heard about it? -Mars

1 0

Re: Remailer reply addresses
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ah! I'm glad conversation on this thread has picked up - I was afraid no-one was interested. :Graham's suggestion about automatic remailer reply chains reminded me of :a simpler system which I would like to see. :Suppose one site, somewhere, would create new mail addresses upon request, :and map them to encrypted remailer chain blocks. (These are nested remailer :requests, where the outer layer is encrypted for the first remailer and tells :it where to send the message, the next layer is encrypted for the 2nd remailer :and tells it where to send, and so on. No remailer sees anything more than :where it is sending the message and where it received it from.) A new account :is created which maps, say, to a file which has one of these "anonymous return :addresses" in it. Any mail incoming for that address simply gets sent to the :remailer in the file, with the ARA stuck in front of it. That's pretty much what I was thinking of, except you don't need the pseudonym server. I find this stuff easier to talk about with examples than in general, so here's what I'm thinking about: I mail to first remailer (R1). The remailer inserts my reply address into the mail, encrypted, and either mails it to the recipient if I gave one, or to the next remailer if I specified a remailer chain - or to another remailer at random on it's own whim if it feels like doing so. Let's assume it's going to another remailer then. This next remailer (R2) takes the header block with my reply address in it, and prepends what *it* sees as the reply address, ie remailer R1. It then encodes this into an identically-structured reply block, and inserts *that* in the mail instead of the original reply block, before passing it on. This can be repeated as often as desired - the mail will always have only two parts where-ever it turns up - an encrypted reply-block and the text. Let's say it ends up on the n'th remailer, Rn. When the real recipient gets the mail and replies to it, the reply goes to remailer Rn, and Rn can decode the header block. The decoded header block contains an address, and extra text which happens to be a fully-formatted header block itself. This extracted, smaller, header block is put back into the mail instead of the one which was just decoded, and the mail is sent back to the address that was extracted. eventually it goes through umpteen remailers, and R2 passes it back to R1. R1 decodes the header block, finds *only* the address - no nested header block, and passes the mail back to the user at that address. So the whole thing is really a trivial protocol - just <start of header block marker, for remailer to locate it> email address djhfkjsdhfdshf (opaque text from previous encryptions) kjfhkdhfkdhfkd dfkdfkjdfkhdf (possibly on multiple lines) jhldkjodkfdjfljdlfkjldjdl <end of header block marker> Sure, this could be extended to put all sorts of neat features in the encrypted area, but I rather like the simplicity of just keeping it to a plain username@site on a single line. :With this software I could do something which cannot be done today. I could :send mail to which someone could hit "r" to reply, and receive that reply, :without any one person knowing my pseudonym. This is not that much to ask :for! I'd say it is the bare minimum for the use of pseudonyms on the net, :yet we don't have it, after all this time. And look how close we are to :being able to do it. Absolutely! That's what I want too. :With this basic system in place, some of Graham's ideas about time-limited :or use-limited pseudonyms could be applied as well. Other extensions people :have suggested would have the pseudonym server hold messages in inboxes until :people trigger a dump to a freshly created anonymous address. A lot of things :are possible. I agree entirely except I don't see the need for a pseudonym server - just the normal remailer reply address should be enough (so that people who can't create aliases can run this stuff on remailers out their personal accounts) which is why I think the blinded reply addresses should be in the *body* of the mails. (Smart mail software would scan the text for these and handle stuff like indentation etc. It doesn't seem too difficult - I already use procmail for something like this where I scan for PGP blocks in mail and decrypt them on receipt where possible) :But we should walk before we run. Right now I don't feel that we are even :crawling yet. hh@soda seems to have shown us how to walk :-) G

1 0