December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Where to find RIPEM/SIG (an exportable version of RIPEM)
by Christopher Allen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:06 AM 3/22/94 -0800, Michael P. Reilly wrote: >Hi, > >How does one obtain permission to ftp the ripem-1.2a-0.tar.Z file? > >Thanks, > >mike The file GETTING_ACCESS on ripem.msu.edu describes how to get permission to ftp RIPEM. It is at: ftp://guest.mu5k2d55:@ripem.msu.edu//pub/crypt/GETTING_ACCESS I've enclosed their file here: >Dear FTP user, > >To access the RIPEM cryptographic software archive at ripem.msu.edu, >you must have an "account" on my custom FTP server. Traditional >anonymous FTP login is allowed, but anonymous users are prevented >from doing GETs on files containing cryptographic software. >Anonymous access is allowed so that you can get README-type files >like this one, and files containing descriptions of software >licensing terms. > >This FTP server is not an official service at all. Although >accounts have no specific expiration dates, your account (or >more likely, the service as a whole) could be discontinued at >any time without any advance notice (even to me). > >To apply for FTP access to rpub.cl.msu.edu, send an email message >to ripem(a)ripem.msu.edu. State the following: > >1. Your citizenship (must be USA or Canadian) >2. Your willingness to comply with relevant export laws. >3. Your willingness to comply with relevant software license terms. > (You should get and read the file "rsaref-license.txt" on this host, > so you know what you are agreeing to if you get RIPEM.) >4. The "canonical" Internet domain name of your host. > (If you are not sure of the primary name of your host, FTP to > ripem.msu.edu under user anonymous. The FTP server will inform > you of your hostname.) Also state the country in which your host > resides. > >***** >***** NOTE: It is very important that you get the hostname correct. >***** As odd as it may seem, many requestors have >***** not correctly specified their host address. This >***** causes extra effort for both of us. Please check >***** (via anonymous FTP) unless you are certain of your >***** hostname as known by domain name servers. Your >***** hostname does *** NOT *** have an "@" in it, and >***** in general cannot be derived from your email address. >***** > >Here's a sample email message you might send to ripem(a)ripem.msu.edu: > >To: ripem(a)ripem.msu.edu >Subject: Access to ripem.msu.edu > > Dear Mark, > > Please give me access to ripem.msu.edu. I am an American > citizen, and I agree to comply with crypto export laws and > RSAREF license terms. My hostname is hobbit.egr.bigu.edu; > this host is located in the United States. > > Thank you. > >When I receive your message, with luck I'll promptly issue you >a special FTP username and password by return email. This username >will work only from the hostname you specify in your message. > >In the case of RIPEM, you may redistribute the code, but only >to others in the USA and Canada, and only under the terms of >the RSAREF license agreement mentioned above. > >Thank you. > >This method of distribution is due to local site requirements >and is not required by RSAREF license terms, FYI. > >Mark Riordan mrr(a)scss3.cl.msu.edu > >P.S. I realize that going through this account application process >is not your idea of a good time. It doesn't take much imagination >to figure that it isn't my idea of a good time, either. Please >help this process go smoothly by giving me all the informative >requested above, so I can issue your account on the first try. >I receive hundreds of these requests and many are lacking information. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ..Christopher Allen Consensus Development Corporation.. ..<consensus(a)netcom.com> 4104-24th Street #419.. .. San Francisco, CA 94114-3615.. .. o415/647-6383 f415/647-6384.. ..Mosaic/World-Wide-Web Front Door: .. ..ftp://netcom7.netcom.com/pub/consensus/www/ConsensusFrontDoor.html ..

1 0

Re: CLIPPER CHIP ON LIMBAUGH
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: From: Sandy Sandfort <sandfort(a)crl.com> : Time for us to target Rush's show with anti-Clipper calls? His contact : information is: >From what I understand of the loud-mouthed ass's psychology, you'll get more out of him if you target him with *pro* clipper calls :-) G

2 1

Re: (fwd) FBI Wiretaps. Old news....
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

->> I forgot to add, EFF's recent FOIA act asking for equipment > interference with court ordered wiretaps showed NO problems. > > Where the 91 figure comes from is a mystery. > > Actually that was a series of CPSR FOIA requests dating back to 1992. EFF (except for some done by Bd. Member John Gilmore) does not do FOIA. <- I stand corrected. Now that you bring it up, I do remember CPSR being attributed at the hearing. Thanks for the correction. -uni- (Dark)

1 0

Stay focused on the big picture
by nobody＠soda.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There has been hostility expressed on this list towards Limbaugh, 700 Club, UWSA, NRA, etc., and the 10's of millions of politically active supporters who could be allies in the anti-Clipper fight. In the interest of focusing attention on the big picture, I offer the following eloquent letter: > Mr. [Recipient]: > > I'm writing to express my agreement with you > concerning the dangerous, and in fact, tyrannous nature of > the Clipper chip. However, I find your reasoning > anachronistic - more typical of Cold War rhetoric than the > new "paradigm" we find ourselves in now. In particular, > I find it fascinating that many people, like yourself, are > now beginning to see Liberalism for what it really is - an > effort to cram government down our throats in order to > protect us from ourselves. Thus the arrogant "if you knew > what I know" attitude you mention in your article. > > And simultaneously, those of you who were most hostile to > conservatism are belatedly understanding what it is about - > the virtue of LIMITED GOVERNMENT and INDIVIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY. > > It seems, since the end of the Cold War, that new > "battle-lines" have been drawn, and that you have discovered > that those who you considered enemies are now in your camp, > and that several old friends are now opponents. > > Even now, you refuse to recognize the logical conclusion of > Liberalism - government dominance of all facets of life, > eclipsing individual rights. Instead, you remarkably tell > yourself that BILL & AL are being hoodwinked by "spooks" in > the NSA, but that they are really on your side. I have > news for you, they are not. > > After all, who is most likely to agree with you? Reagan, > who says that "government is the problem" or Bill & AL who > believe that government is the answer to all our problems - > from the health care "crisis" to the dangers of vitamins. > Clearly you can see now who is the champion of individual > rights and who is the champion of bureaucracies that > claim to know what we don't. > > I invite you to the real new paradigm, in which old concepts > of liberal and conservative are increasingly meaningless. > It is a new world in which I - a conservative - find common > cause with you - a liberal - in our fight for individual > freedom. It is really debilitating and self-deceptive to > cling to the old definitions. > > I offer this in the spirit of cooperation, since I believe > that if we hope to win the war, we should at least know who > we are fighting! > > Sincerely, > > Robert J. Bork > >

3 2

DT'94 and Clipper: effect on manufactures (FWD)
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I thought I would forward this as it seemed to relate. Also 'cause I'm the author. :) -> Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy.clipper,talk.politics.crypto Subject: Re: Janet Reno on Clipper Summary: Expires: References: <strnlghtCMxE5n.5qw(a)netcom.com> <2mi265$4a6(a)access3.digex.net> <strnlghtCMzA43.E93(a)netcom.com> <6woWZxj024n(a)sktb.demon.co.uk> Sender: Followup-To: Distribution: inet Organization: Express Access Online Communications, Greenbelt, MD USA Keywords: Cc: In article <6woWZxj024n(a)sktb.demon.co.uk>, Paul L. Allen <pla(a)sktb.demon.co.uk> wrote: >In article <strnlghtCMzA43.E93(a)netcom.com> > strnlght(a)netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: > >> Then Brad's fear is unfounded since those equipment manufacturers who aren't >> common carriers can sell crypto without a back door. > >If this is the case then such equipment will no doubt end up with a sticker >saying that it is illegal to use it on a line supplied by a common carrier >and that doing so may result in a fine or imprisonment. No. The bill in its draft from provides that common carriers who do not provide the encryption device are exempt. The meaning on its face is that common carriers are gaining some immunity to sanctions if they did not provide the customer with the encryption he or she is using and instead provide a means for the government to compell the common carrier to produce in the clear that which they caused to be encrypted. This is a simplification, look at the bill for the full details. The practical effect the bills has is to impose on common carriers that manufacture encryption devices, a duty to provide to the government those conversations which are made with said devices over their lines. For example: If AT&T manufactures some encryption device, and I use it over AT&T lines, one reading of the bill would suggest that AT&T is now RESPONSIBLE for decrypting this if the government should request it. The definition is not limited to common carriers either. PCS manufactures are also covered. This definition argueably includes: Motorola Apple (If they provide cellular support for Newton) Cannon and perhaps anyone who manufactures cellular phones. If this is the case, all these companies are bound by the terms of DT'94 and subject to its fines and sancations as well. The net result is to discourage and make very DANGEROUS the manufacutre of encryption devices if you fall into this category. HEREIN LIES THE IMPORTANT POINT: THE CONNECTION TO THE CLIPPER PROPOSAL AND THE ASSERTION WHICH MR. STERNLIGHT WILL JUMP UPON WITH VIGOR. The real target of this legislation is the large telecomunications MANUFACTURES like AT&T. It is now very dangerous to manufacture encryption devices and still remain a common carrier. Most of the large companies that would like to jump into the market for encryption devices are also probably going to fall into the common carrier definition or the PCS manufacture definition. If you subscribe to Mr. Sternlight's views, you would argue that this is really voluntary and that no one is forcing the companies not to manufacture these products, indeed they are free to manufacture them and pay the crippling $10,000/day non-compliance sanction and endure service injunctions. After you remove the large companies from contention, all that is left is the small companies that don't fall into common carrier definitions and are not PCS manufactures. So the government introduces an exception. If you manufacture an encryption device with Clipper, the government (Mytronics) has manufactured the chips, and provided the keys. Since they provided the keys, the 3rd party manufacturer is exempt from the DT'94 regulations for decryption duty. The only companies left manufacturing non-clipper devices are the small fries that cannot hope to compete in a government subsidized and flooded market. If this does not fit the definition of regulation, I simply refuse to argue the point with my opponents any longer as they are clearly resorting to arguement by symantics. Even now the subtle cleverness with which the parts come together and form a powerful whole scares me. The fact that this legislation does not appear to be regulation on its face deserves a great deal of credit. Too nicely integrated to be accidental in my view. Very cunning Janet et al, very cunning. > >At least that's how this sort of thing is handled in the UK - connecting >a modem which doesn't carry BABT approval to a BT line is a *criminal* >offence. That's just a modem - imagine what they would do with an unapproved >crypto device. I'm waiting for encryption devices to be included in the definition of personal communications system and covered outright by DT'94 >Your stance on Clipper has long since lost all semblance of credibility. Why >not admit it and stop cluttering up the group? > >--Paul > Mr. Sternlight serves an important function on the net. I rarely agree with him, or his style of arguement, but he has never resorted to personal attack in his discussions with me and for this he deserves at least some respect. I cannot speak for others he might have offended. -uni- (Dark)

1 0

stupid MacPGP question
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I seem to be unable to get Mac PGP to strip old IDs off my key. I never get the option to do so, just add new ones. What's the trick? -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994

1 0

Breaking RSA
by fhalper＠pilot.njin.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I read an article in the New York Times business section today, and it talked a out how RSa may be close to being broken, thanks to the help of the Internet. I have two questions: A) If it is broken will PGP no longer be safe. B) Does the gov't have any involvement, since they have an awfully large stake? Thanks, Reuben Halper -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3 mQCPAi16KosAAAEEAMUwRni4a9+GbuAhHDLcBWK60hCJUYxhr2hYokpELAhx0ejp 2fq61Tu9Hjn051CN8Xy5nu6sv2ODfG/t59l4DJSb5pirQaII3zaX0rMX0ydwGDoW YakL4ow1lNY+d/k14KpIuUW404+fNuNhIGSkdVLQIfbOgh0preK7/P44AKvdABEB AAG0JlJldWJlbiBIYWxwZXIgPGZoYWxwZXJAcGlsb3Qubmppbi5uZXQ+iQCVAgUQ LXorceK7/P44AKvdAQEUxwQAoffTibRlwE5tNQVGvrulh1OQgXNhTRec9vUaUwPy U64FIZ+KnmdfYgiJYXtcItA90EB9MDexazKeqJzMOPShVNOfyiwy2yUlnQs425f8 DxBvM//zuvj6s4/mXDTPUZtG9PP0HVaEGTJY15JdfRqtj/w+HHnsHlgCnj0NnIhX TW8= =D9UX -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

2 1

PGP for OS/2
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just got word there's a 32-bit OS/2 version of PGP in Compu$erve's OS/2 forum library. I'll leave it to the PGP archiving folks to go snag it. -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994

2 1

Parker on Clipper PAGE 20?
by fnerd＠smds.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> In the 21-Mar-94 issue of Computerworld p.4 the following statment is > attributed to Donn Parker of SRI, "We have to make strong, nonescrow > encryption a crime"... In my copy it's on page 20, in the article, "Users blast government encryption plan," by Gary H. Anthes. Maybe I've got an east coast edition or something, it doesn't say so as far as I can tell. -fnerd - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - blue pill, Pharm. a pill of blue mass, used as an alterative... alterative, adj. tending to alter... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvt3niQCVAgUBLMs3K ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2tPEot1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz 3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hSnC1R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG sRjLQs4iVVM= =9wqs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: CLIPPER CHIP ON LIMBAUGH
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: You obviously don't understand much of the "loud-mouthed ass's psychology." : Limbaugh is very anti-statist and if he had a position on the issue : there's a good change it would be anti-clipper. Last time I checked, : the clipper's biggest supporters were Clinton and Gore, who aren't exactly : Rush's favorite people. Oh, I just meant that by all reports he seems to be driven to disagree with anyone who tries to get him to espouse their favourite pet cause, and that perhaps some kindergarten reverse psychology might be more effective... G

1 0