December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: chips...
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

an57322, I believe? Bwahahaha. Which adds to my theory that the major use of anonymity and |<00|_ anon handles on the net is posturing and self-grandification. Go sit in the corner with Xenon... Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Tue, 8 Mar 1994 22:53:47 -0800 From: Marc Briceno <mbriceno(a)netcom.com> Subject: Re: chips... Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk X-Anon-Password:legal9road X-Anon-To:cypherpunks@toad.com -=T.A.Z. I'd change that password if I were you, TAZ, if someone else hasn't already done so... And when you get a new account, remember to post to penet.fi instead of the list directly. G

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RE: keeping secrets from myself
by GERSTEIN 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 8-MAR-1994, Cortland D. Starrett (cort(a)ecn.perdue.edu) said... ========== Here is a practical problem that has me frustrated.... Situation: Assume that I am the treasurer at my local church. This implies responsibility to record each Sunday's offering (the money collected) in the church financial books. An account is maintained for each member of the church. Money received from members each Sunday is credited to their respective accounts. Each January, a report is prepared for each parishioner showing a summary of the charitable contributions for the previous year. This information is used for tax purposes. Currently, the treasurer knows EVERYTHING about EVERYONE (regarding charitable giving). As a privacy advocate, this is indeed uncomfortable (for giver and treasurer). Problem: I want to know as little as possible about church member giving. Give and Take: It will be difficult/impossible to prevent the treasurer from seeing each weeks' checks. However, a privacy improvement may be achieved if the running totals are kept hidden. How can I provide a comprehensive year-end statement to each parishioner while maintaining maximum privacy? Does cryptography have anything to offer to this situation? What procedures/protocols could be implemented? What privacy enhancements could be included with the church accounting software? Cort. =========== I would think that the easiest way to take care of this would be to assign each member a randomly generated id (probably alphanumeric, and you can keep it around 6 characters), and then just use that number from then on. When a new member joins, create a new id and once they have a copy of it, put the id in a file that is stored out of your hands (but accessable if need be) in case you need to add someone else or if someone forgets their id. I know that this isn't as secure as some of the other methods suggested, but this (the method above) would seem to make the most sense simply because once it's started, there's not that much upkeep: 1- Member gets an id. 2- Member makes a deposit using just their id and only looking at the check amounts. For this, you would have to trust yourself or get some envelopes that only show the amount through a window. When you are done doing all the checks on the computer, dump them all into a bag or something and then start endorsing them. 3- At the end of the year, all you have to do is print a list of the id's and how much they have in their "account". At no time does anyone but the member know their id (unless they happen to share with someone, and it's up to them). As treasurer, you only know the account numbers. If you really didn't want to take the chance that you might learn some of the numbers (doubtful, as there would probably be 100's [maybe 1000's] of members), you could get someone else in the church (that you trust) to assign the id's and just have them let you know the new id's as they come along. Just my 0.02¢ worth. Adam Gerstein -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Have _you_ said no to Clipper yet? To sign on to the letter, send a message to: Clipper.petition(a)cpsr.org with the message "I oppose Clipper" (no quotes) You will receive a return message confirming your vote.

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on tmp@lamar.acns.colostate.edu
by hughes＠ah.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

No, the Usenet post from that site is not forged. I just corresponded with LD himself there. Eric

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80% of even the *NON*net public oppose Clipper (...when informed)
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 4 1994 EIGHTY PERCENT, folks. You know what that means. This is now the time to spread the word on Clipper, far, fast and wide. If there are 3 local newspapers in your area, send an op-ed or letter to the editor, to ALL of them, and magazines too. If you are a pro writer, time to start writing articles. Redistribute Clipper to the net, and especially to BBSs. The problem here is one, and one only: not enough people know about Clipper yet. When EVERYONE does, even Clinton dares not go against the will of 80% of the populace. Do you run a BBS? Make an anouncement about Clipper (and the 80% opposition rate!) as one of your login screens. Put it in your .signature or your .plan, print up some flyers, put it in your zine, wear it on a t-shirt, whatever it takes to get the message out. Leahy's hearings are going to be something else. The Cantwell bill will help. But nothing will be as effective as mass public outcry. Don't just sit here. Usenet will be here tomorrow, too. Do something to educate someone about Clipper and the threat it poses to our privacy NOW. After that, if you have yet to send in your short letter of support for the Cantwell bill (HR2637), which will reduce export restrictions on non-Clipper cryptography, please do it today. Send to cantwell(a)eff.org. -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 4 1994

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In Memorium
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy Sandfort's [sandfort(a)crl.com] inamorata, Diane Somers, died in a traffic accident on Tuesday afternoon. DCF And Death shall be no more: Death, thou shalt die! --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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please remove me from cypherpunks-announce list
by Matt_Kelly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please remove me from ALL (including cypherpunks-announce) lists. Thanks.

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Wanted Sun DIN to audio adapter
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm looking for someone in the DC area who can lend me a Sun audio adaptor plug for this weekend's meeting. One end has mini-DIN that plugs into the Sun, and the other has standard microphone and headphone/speaker jacks. I've got one located on the net, but that will cost FedEx money to get from and back to its owner. I'd rather spend the money on pizza and beer. Please get back to me, or Dan Brown (brown(a)eff.org) if you can help. Thanks. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Re: Improvement of remailer security
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Even the current pgp encryption scheme offered by some remailers >doesn't help much, once the incoming and outgoing messages are known: >just take the outgoing message from the remailer, encrypt it with the >remailer's public key, compare this to the incoming messages and you >know who sent this message (repeat if a chain of remailers was used). This is incorrect. The message is not encrypted with the public key. It is encrypted with an IDEA key which is encrypted with the remailers public key. Since the remailer does not forward that key (obviously), this attack is not possible. -------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.3 key available by finger or server. "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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REMAIL: [Finally, I hope] The easy to install cypherpunks remailer
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hopefully it will work this time. I've stripped it down a little, and i've added some flexibility. It doesn't try to compile pgp for you, or find perl. You have to do that yourself. That was where most of my problems lay previously. Now it *should* work even if you're using your .forward file-- the functionality of your .forward file should not be lost, I hope. I *sure* hope this can be an actual release this time. (It's been *way* too long. [interesting how my cypherpunk coding increases in the days before a meeting. ;-]) Here's the readme. Available in soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/remailer/remail-install.tar.gz The Cypherpunks Anonymous Remailer Installation Version 1.0 Installer: Sameer <sameer(a)soda.berkeley.edu> Remailer: Eric Hughes & Hal Finney, with minor modifications by Sameer ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- This is the Cypherpunks Anonymous Remailer Installation Suite Version 1.0. By simply running the script "install_remail" included in the archive, you can very easily install a cypherpunks anonymous remailer service in almost any UNIX account. The anonymous remailer uses the .forward file to pipe all mail to the remailer system. If mail to the remailer account is not acted upon by the remailer software, it goes to wherever mail should go based on what the .forward file said before the remailer was installed. (Hopefully.. no guarantees.) % gunzip RemailInstall.tar.gz % mkdir install % cd install % tar xfv ../RemailInstall.tar You might have to edit the remail_install program slightly if your system's "test" does not support the -x flag.. Try the following once you've untarred the remailer: % test -x bounce If that returns an error, you have to edit the -x and replace it with a -f in the beginning of the script "install_remail": EXECTEST=-x should be changed to: EXECTEST=-f Execute the installer program: % install_remail Answer all the questions. You need a perl and a pgp binary on your system already compiled. (You don't need pgp if you don't want PGP functionality, of course.) The program self-tests, and mails me that the remailer is running, if you want it to. I will forward that notice to the cypherpunks list and the person maintaining the list of active remailers. Remember that running a remailer is a sensitive issue on the net. If you choose to run a remailer, keep in mind that some powerful net-personalities object to anonymous remailers, possibly endangering your access to the internet. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. Running "remailer_remove" *should* clear up any problems that my script might create in your account, but I will guarantee nothing. There are so many strange versions of UNIX out there.. If it doesn't work, however, please tell me and a later release of this installer will hopefully fix that problem. Later releases will hopefully also incorporate a remailer with delays, mixing, and other nice features. Stay free, Sameer sameer(a)soda.berkeley.edu

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Re: chips...
by an57322＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Today I ran into a situation that made me completely nausiated and >> feel like my privacy had been completely invaded... It involves a >> chip which is implanted in animals and used for identification... > >> [....] "Well, if their doing this to animals, how soon will it be >> before they implant the same sort of thing in us?" She said, "Oh, >> I hadn't thought about it like that."... > >Several years ago (like mid or early 80's if I recall), there was >just such a program for marking children. It involved implanting >a "microchip" on the surface of a tooth. > Routine implants of transponder devices into humans are not a question of if, but only of when. I predict that they will become routine before the end of the decade. First they will be voluntary, used primarily in children to facilitate identification in case of abduction, some years later they will become mandatory for all drivers, to combat the use of fake driver licenses, and soon thereafter transponders will become the primary, if not sole accepted form of ID for all business transactions. A generation from now transponders will be mandatory used not only for identification, but for routine tracking of the movements of every citizen. If you think this sounds crazy, go to Germany, where you will find a camera on every major intersection, tracking your every move. -=T.A.Z. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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