December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Wide Spread use of PGP
by Matthew Bernardini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I find Bob Cain's comments that PGP should not be used on a netcom account disturbing. I think the priority that should be set is to get people using PGP, "in the habit" and then make sure they are using it on a local PC or Mac. Some people, believe it or not, might only have acess to a multi-user systems. These people should not be denied acess to PGP. On a side note, to those the are interested, Rutgers just added PGP to its track library. Any machine running 4.x or Solaris now has access to track the binaries for PGP. I plan to install this on my Sparc, and I think quite a few other people will as well. Encryption must be marketed like a product. Thatis, the concept as a whole, not just specific programs. If anyone has any ideas, I'd personally like to hear them. Matthew Bernardini

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Illegal Gun Texts
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS Uu> From: hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu ("Robert A. Hayden") Uu> Actually, with the gun paranoia in the US today, this law could very Uu> well be upheld, dispite 1st amendments ramifications. I think that when one observes the blatantly unconstitutional USSC decisions regarding Amendments Two, Four, Five and Ten, there's no reason to believe that they will respect the First, either. As Snyder pointed out in his "A Nation of Cowards" article, we are a society ruled, and a culture led, by persons who overestimate the power of the word. Everything else that would enhance physical empowerment of the individual is suspect. The collision is when the "word" is about physical empowerment. Michigan (like socialist Canada) has outlawed these texts. The BATF is straining to stretch "aiding and abetting" to cover sales of printed information. I have no doubt the USSC would uphold bans on "dangerous, terrorist" texts. I know that the Second Amendment advocates who take the constitutional concept of the General Militia very seriously are heavily investigating encryption and electronic security. ["One armed man controls one hundred unarmed men." - V.I. Lenin]

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The Difficulty of Source Level Blocking
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- uunet!netcom.com!tcmay (Timothy C. May) writes: > Thus, so long as at least *one* remailer is not doing source > screening, and that at least some encryption is used (not all nodes > have to do it, obviously), then source-level screening will not work. It'd also be possible for two parties to collude; Alice agrees to pass Mallet's traffic, but tells the other remailers in the co-op that she'll filter Mallet's traffic. Digital signatures will allow her to pass only approved unapproved traffic (e.g., forged test-posts from Mallet won't be remailed by Alice). Where message tracing isn't possible, remailer operators will need to know and trust one another. > Very long term, when message costs are borne by the sender, this > problem goes away. (Others remain, such as death threats, extortion, > markets for murder, etc., but they're in a different category.) If you mean digital postage when you say "message costs", I don't see how charging Detweiler $.25 or so to send his messages is going to stop him; it might put a dent in the sheer volume, but probably not in the variety of inappropriate groups he chooses to annoy. If message costs are high enough to deter Detweiler, they're going to be high enough to deter legitimate and useful posts, too. The sender-of-record of inappropriate posts is still going to get heat from the net, whether or not they collected their digital postage. The best deal I've found so far for (bulk) mail delivery is UUPSI's $50/month flat-rate UUCP (local dialups many places) - is anyone aware of a cheaper alternative? Perhaps it's time to test the net's response to a remailer site whose response to complaints is "Sorry. People are rude. Nothing to be done about it." Have the owners of private remailers (rebma.mn.org, utter.dis.org, extropia.wimsey.com, according to Karl's list) taken flak from their service providers for remailing? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQCVAgUBLWFFlH3YhjZY3fMNAQH4WgP9FkWg2b0UXXLTiAYTJKVgCkOyOAaBc4Le b/JZ2DlFPTQQrKRQm4wYVxjZiOlnrVPlBu+uHYAIeAl5nKiNQBd82b/frYyFxHpt WD3zIlBLtfjdW8eOK+DZCswKPnpGPn5/i3EsxRzKYwKTTCPQwxL5ZwELBvFde+ER cebT75h4sgc= =Awkb -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Greg Broiles ".. has bizarre Cyberanarchist theories relating greg(a)goldenbear.com to human punishment." -- L. Detweiler

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CPSR Alert 3.04 (Clipper Update)
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================== @@@@ @@@@ @@@ @@@@ @ @ @@@@ @@@@ @@@@@@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @@@ @ @@@ @@@@@ @ @@@ @@@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @@@@ @ @@@ @ @ @ @ @@@@ @@@@ @ @ @ ============================================================= Volume 3.04 February 15, 1994 ------------------------------------------------------------- Published by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility Washington Office (Alert(a)washofc.cpsr.org) SPECIAL EDITION --- CLIPPER UPDATE ------------------------------------------------------------- Contents [1] Clipper Petition Tops 10,000 Mark [2] Safire Slams Clipper [3] A Tough Question [4] Clipper Facts: Definition of "Tesserea" [5] Sign the Clipper Petition! [6] New Files at the CPSR Internet Library ------------------------------------------------------------- [1] Clipper Petition Tops 10,000 Mark The electronic petition begun by CPSR to oppose Clipper has generated well over 10,000 responses in two weeks. The daily signature totals continue to increase, currently running at almost 2,000 per day! The number of people who have opposed Clipper already exceeds the current estimated government orders for Clipper chips. Other upcoming milestones: 12,000 Number of computer networks connected to the Internet 15,000 Estimated number of total lawful wiretaps, 1968-1994 70,000 Anticipated number of Clipper purchases this year More details on the petition are re-printed below, just in case you haven't already forwarded a copy to every person and mailing list you know. ------------------------------------------------------------- [2] Safire Slams Clipper For those of you who might have missed it, William Safire published a very good essay on the Clipper proposal yesterday (February 14). We're providing some excerpts here and recommend the piece in its entirety. Let's hope Safire can do for Clipper what he did for Bobby Inman. Well-meaning law and intelligence officials, vainly seeking to maintain their vanishing ability to eavesdrop, have come up with a scheme that endangers the personal freedom of every American. * * * The "clipper chip" --- aptly named, as it clips the wings of individual liberty --- would encode, for Federal perusal whenever a judge rubber-stamped a warrant, everything we say on a phone, everything we write on a computer, every order we give to a shopping network or bank or 800 or 900 number, every electronic note we leave our spouses or dictate to our personal-digit-assistant genies. Add to that stack of intimate data the medical information derived from the national "health security card" Mr. Clinton proposes we all carry. Combine it with the travel, shopping and credit data available from all our plastic cards, along with psychological and student test scores. Throw in the confidential tax returns, sealed divorce proceedings, welfare records, field investigations for job applications, raw files and C.I.A. dossiers available to the Feds, and you have the individual citizen standing naked to the nosy bureaucrat. * * * The only people tap-able by American agents would be honest Americans --- or those crooked Americans dopey enough to buy American equipment with the pre-compromised American code. Subsequent laws to mandate the F.B.I. bug in every transmitter would be as effective as today's laws banning radar detectors. * * * Cash in your clipper chips, wiretappers: you can't detect the crime wave of the future with those old earphones on. --------------------------------------------------------------- [3] A Tough Question During the briefing on February 4 at which the formal adoption of the Escrowed Encryption Standard (aka Clipper) was announced, Mark Richards, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, was asked the following hypothetical question: Suppose NSA goes to the key escrow agents and says, "We intercepted a Clipper-encrypted communication overseas. No U.S. persons were parties, so the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act does not apply and we don't need a warrant." How do the escrow agents determine whether or not to provide the keys? Doesn't this create a huge loophole in the system? Richards' response was that there would be "some" mechanism developed to ensure that there would be no abuse of the key escrow system, but added that any such procedures "might not be made public." The response was less than assuring. The development of secret procedures for foreign intelligence use of escrowed keys does nothing to assure the public of the system's integrity. It creates a very real possibility that the key escrow system will be based upon nothing more than NSA's unilateral representations concerning the circumstances of a particular interception. It was not at all apparent why these procedures couldn't be made public. Like so much of the Clipper proposal, valid concerns are met with the claim that "national security" precludes the disclosure of relevant information. This is why many of us believe this is a dangerous and ill-advised way to design our civilian communications infrastructure. --------------------------------------------------------------- [4] Clipper Facts: Definition of "Tesserea" The Defense Department reportedly plans to employ the Clipper technology in a device known as a "Tessera Card." We checked the dictionary and found the results to be kind of frightening: Terrerea n. Lat. (pl. tessereae). Literally, "four-cornered". Used to refer to four-legged tables, chairs, stools, etc. Also, a single piece of mosaic tile; a single piece of a mosaic. _Pol._: An identity chit or marker. Tessereae were forced on conquered peoples and domestic slaves by their Roman occupiers or owners. Slaves or Gauls who refused to accept a tesserea were branded or maimed as a form of identification. >From Starr's History of the Classical World and the Oxford Unabridged. (thanks to Clark Matthews) ---------------------------------------------------------------- [5] Sign the Clipper Petition! Electronic Petition to Oppose Clipper *Please Distribute Widely* On January 24, many of the nation's leading experts in cryptography and computer security wrote President Clinton and asked him to withdraw the Clipper proposal. The public response to the letter has been extremely favorable, including coverage in the New York Times and numerous computer and security trade magazines. Many people have expressed interest in adding their names to the letter. In response to these requests, CPSR is organizing an Internet petition drive to oppose the Clipper proposal. We will deliver the signed petition to the White House, complete with the names of all the people who oppose Clipper. To sign on to the letter, send a message to: Clipper.petition(a)cpsr.org with the message "I oppose Clipper" (no quotes) You will receive a return message confirming your vote. Please distribute this announcement so that others may also express their opposition to the Clipper proposal. ------------------------------------------------------------- [6] New Files at the CPSR Internet Library The following Clipper-related files are now available at the CPSR Internet Library: NIST Announcement of FIPS-185 (Escrowed Encryption Standard) /cpsr/privacy/crypto/clipper/fips_185_clipper_feb_1994.txt "Big Brother Inside" Postscript file parody of Intel's logo. Perfect for stickers, posters. Designed by Matt Thomlinson. /cpsr/privacy/crypto/clipper/big_brother_inside_sticker.ps All February 4 White House releases on Clipper are available at /cpsr/privacy/crypto/clipper An analysis of US cryptography policy by Professor Lance Hoffman commissioned by NIST /cpsr/privacy/crypto/hoffman_crypto_policy_1994 The CPSR Internet Library is a free service available via FTP/WAIS/Gopher/listserv from cpsr.org:/cpsr. Materials from Privacy International, the Taxpayers Assets Project and the Cypherpunks are also archived. For more information, contact ftp-admin(a)cpsr.org. ======================================================================= To subscribe to the Alert, send the message: "subscribe cpsr-announce <your name>" (without quotes or brackets) to listserv(a)cpsr.org. Back issues of the Alert are available at the CPSR Internet Library FTP/WAIS/Gopher cpsr.org /cpsr/alert Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility is a national, non-partisan, public-interest organization dedicated to understanding and directing the impact of computers on society. Founded in 1981, CPSR has 2000 members from all over the world and 22 chapters across the country. Our National Advisory Board includes a Nobel laureate and three winners of the Turing Award, the highest honor in computer science. Membership is open to everyone. For more information, please contact: cpsr(a)cpsr.org or visit the CPSR discussion conferences on The Well (well.sf.ca.us) or Mindvox (phantom.com) ------------------------ END CPSR Alert 3.04 -----------------------

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REMAIL: Changes to chaos and bsu-cs remailers
by Chael Hall 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today I installed an updated version of the anonymous remailer on the following remailers: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu Recent changes: "Refuse" addresses now apply to From: lines as well as To: lines When sending from an address that is refused, you will receive a bounce message (only from chaos remailer) stating that remailer access is denied. When sending to an address that is refused, you will receive a bounce message (only from chaos remailer) stating that remailer recipient is illegal. When you forget the recipient address, you will receive a bounce message (only from chaos remailer) stating that a recipient is required. Please note that all bounces will only occur when using the chaos remailer. -- Chael Hall, nowhere(a)chaos.bsu.edu

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unsubscribe
by katz＠spectrum.cs.bucknell.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsubscribe katz(a)bucknell.edu

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Detweiler abuse again
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I got a lot of complaints today about copies of Tim's old "Blacknet" posting being sent to inappropriate groups: > From paw(a)coos.dartmouth.edu Mon Feb 14 09:34:13 1994 > Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 12:31:44 -0500 > From: paw(a)coos.dartmouth.edu (Pat Wilson) > To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com, root(a)portal.com, postmaster(a)portal.com > Subject: Re: Introduction to Blacknet > Newsgroups: comp.sys.sun.admin > References: <199402120837.AAA22008(a)jobe.shell.portal.com> > Status: R > > In comp.sys.sun.admin you write: > > >Introduction to BlackNet > > [etc] > > I believe that this is an illegal and unethical use of the Net > for commercial purposes (to say nothing of bounds of decency). > This posting lends credence to all sorts of (US) gov't paranoia. > Please cease and desist immediately. > > Non-anonymously, > > -- > Pat Wilson > Maanger, Academic Unix Systems Group > Dartmouth College > paw(a)northstar.dartmouth.edu > > From mcr(a)unison.com Mon Feb 14 10:11:51 1994 > Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 10:11:22 -0800 > To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > From: mcr(a)unison.com (Michael Riehle) > X-Sender: mcr(a)hal822.unison.com > Subject: Introduction to Blacknet > Status: R > > This message appears to be from someone who is offering an illegal service > and is certainly not welcome. I can't tell if this person is serious or if > this is just a sick joke. It certainly isn't appropriate regardless. > > >Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 00:50:01 +0000 > >Reply-To: HP-3000 Systems Discussion <HP3000-L(a)UTCVM.UTC.EDU> > >Sender: HP-3000 Systems Discussion <HP3000-L(a)UTCVM.UTC.EDU> > >Comments: This message is NOT from the person listed in the From line. It > >is from an automated software remailing service operating at that address. > >Please report problem mail to <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com>. > >Comments: Warning -- original Sender: tag was NETNEWS(a)AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU > >From: nobody <nobody(a)SHELL.PORTAL.COM> > >Subject: Introduction to Blacknet > >To: Multiple recipients of list HP3000-L <HP3000-L(a)UTCVM.UTC.EDU> > > > >Introduction to BlackNet > > > > [...] > > From kwthomas(a)nsslsun.nssl.uoknor.edu Mon Feb 14 12:38:27 1994 > Date: Mon, 14 Feb 94 14:37:01 CST > From: kwthomas(a)nsslsun.nssl.uoknor.edu (Kevin W. Thomas) > To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > Subject: Re: Introduction to Blacknet > Newsgroups: comp.sys.sun.admin > In-Reply-To: <199402120837.AAA22008(a)jobe.shell.portal.com> > Organization: National Severe Storms Laboratory > Cc: root(a)shell.portal.com, root(a)jobe.shell.portal.com > Status: R > > In article <199402120837.AAA22008(a)jobe.shell.portal.com> you write: > >Introduction to BlackNet > > > >BlackNet is currently building its information inventory. We are interested > >in information in the following areas, though any other juicy stuff is > >always welcome. "If you think it's valuable, offer it to us first." > > > >- trade secrets, processes, production methods (esp. in semiconductors) > > > >BlackNet can make anonymous deposits to the bank account of your choice, > >where local banking laws permit, can mail cash directly (you assume the > >risk of theft or seizure), or can credit you in "CryptoCredits," the > >internal currency of BlackNet (which you then might use to buy _other_ > >information and have it encrypted to your special public key and posted in > >public place). > > This doesn't belong in "comp.sys.sun.admin", or any other Usenet group. It's > postings like this that give Usenet a bad name. > > Kevin W. Thomas > National Severe Storms Laboratory > Norman, Oklahoma > > From lab(a)biostat.mc.duke.edu Mon Feb 14 14:05:15 1994 > To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > Subject: Re: Introduction to Blacknet > In-reply-to: nobody(a)shell.portal.com's message of Mon, 14 Feb 1994 11:32:23 -0800 > Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:04:09 -0500 > From: "Lance A. Brown" <lab(a)biostat.mc.duke.edu> > Status: R > > What _IS_ this doing in misc.health.diabetes? > > Thanks, > Lance > > > nobody <nobody(a)shell.portal.com> writes: > > Introduction to BlackNet > > > > Your name has come to our attention. We have reason to believe you may be > > interested in the products and services our new organization, BlackNet, has > > to offer. > > [...] > > From appel(a)cea.Berkeley.EDU Mon Feb 14 14:24:03 1994 > To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com, root(a)shell.portal.com > Subject: Re: Introduction to Blacknet > In-reply-to: nobody(a)shell.portal.com's message of Sat, 12 Feb 1994 03:49:18 -0800 > Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 14:23:06 -0800 > From: Shannon Appel <appel(a)cea.Berkeley.EDU> > Status: R > > Please be aware that your anonymous remailer is being abused. The > following inappropriate post was recently sent to a rec.games.frp > group. Please see that this type of thing does not happen again. > > Shannon > -- > > Introduction to BlackNet > > > > > > [...] I set up a log file for "blacknet" postings, and got this: > From hal(a)alumni.cco.caltech.edu Mon Feb 14 17:46:41 1994 > Received: from nova.unix.portal.com (nova.unix.portal.com [156.151.1.101]) by jobe.shell.portal.com (8.6.4/8.6.4) with ESMTP id RAA11362 for <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com>; Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:46:41 -0800 > Received: from punisher.caltech.edu (punisher.cco.caltech.edu [131.215.48.151]) by nova.unix.portal.com (8.6.4/8.6.4-1.13) with ESMTP id RAA03081 for <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com>; Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:46:41 -0800 > Received: from alumni.cco.caltech.edu by punisher.caltech.edu with ESMTP > (8.6.4/DEI:4.41) id RAA14916; Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:45:46 -0800 > Received: from localhost by alumni.cco.caltech.edu > (8.6.4/DEI:4.41) id RAA23534; Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:45:42 -0800 > Received: from handel.cs.colostate.edu by alumni.cco.caltech.edu with SMTP > (8.6.4/DEI:4.41) id RAA23522; Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:45:34 -0800 > Message-Id: <199402150145.RAA23522(a)alumni.cco.caltech.edu> > Received: by handel.cs.colostate.edu > (1.37.109.4/16.2) id AA28603; Mon, 14 Feb 94 18:45:32 -0700 > Date: Mon, 14 Feb 94 18:45:32 -0700 > From: lawrence detweiler <detweile(a)CS.ColoState.EDU> > To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > request-remailing-to: comp.sys.ti.explorer(a)news.cs.indiana.edu > subject: Introduction to Blacknet > > Introduction to BlackNet > > > Your name has come to our attention. We have reason to believe you may be > interested in the products and services our new organization, BlackNet, has > to offer. > [...] It seems Larry is sending this posting to lots of inappropriate groups using several different mail-to-news gateways. This is a good way to get remailers shut down, which may be his ultimate goal. I call upon remailer operators to block incoming messages from Detweiler's known aliases. Thos using the slocal-based "cypherpunks" remailer perl scripts can add the following lines near the front of their maildelivery files. # Filter Detweiler >From ld231782(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu file ? /dev/null >From an12070(a)anon.penet.fi file ? /dev/null >From detweile file ? /dev/null Unless his access to the remailer network is blocked, he will be able to continue to abuse the system until it gets shut down. The alternative would be to block my remailer's access to all known mail-to-news gateways, but I am reluctant to take that step because of the loss of this ability for those who legitimately need it. If his abuse keeps up, though, that may be the only choice left. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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Another clipper editorial
by Jonathan Corbet 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following appeared as an unsigned editorial in the 2/14 Christian Science Monitor. It lacks the fire of Safire's piece, but it's nice to see anyway. CLIPPING PRIVACY With the rise of electronic mail, public data networks, and cordless and cellular phones has come a rise in devices to encode data to protect the users' privacy. But law enforcement officials worry that these advances will undercut their ability to secretly gather evidence through wiretaps and other surveillance methods. To respond to law enforcement's need, the Clinton administration reportedly is seeking a bill that would require phone and cable companies to use software designed to allow law enforcement agencies to monitor phone and data transmissions. Earlier this month, the administration decided to push federal agencies to include so-called Clipper Chips in computers and phones they use. If that extends to vendors and contractors, the chip may become a de facto industry standard. The chips were designed in conjunction with the National Security Agency to permit unscrambling of coded data transmissions. These moves represent potential dangers to privacy; they take on added urgency with the imminent marriage of computers, phones, and cable services in ways that reduce the diversity of people's means of communication even as they use those means for more activities. No one doubts the need for effective law enforcement. The government, however, should not be in the business of asking manufacturers to build secret backdoors into their equipment, particularly when government holds the keys. The proposals also raise questions as to how appealing United States technology exports will be overseas if such backdoor access is built in. Congress should take a hard look at any bill that tries to expand the government's ability to peer through the electronic blinds, no matter how well-meaning the motive.

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Re: LEAF, SS7
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

With the mail flood here, I've seen pieces of the answer, but no summary. While Clipper and SS7 both give the Wiretappers part of the traffic analysis, Clipper would be much more effective (if it were widely used by Wiretappees.) SS7 is hard to tap, unless you have the phone company's cooperation, somewhat hard even with it, and Async Transfer Mode will be harder. Also, SS7 can only tell you what phone line is being used; Clipper tells you what *phone* is being used, and one of the major wiretap targets for Clipper are cellular phones, which people normally carry around with them - so Clipper traffic analysis can tell you *who* is talking, once a phone's serial number has been identified, not just what pay phone the conversation is from. The two can be used together, if the Wiretappers are both lucky and persistent. One presumes that if ClipperCellPhones are widely used, they'll start keeping records of which cellphone numbers correspond to which ClipperIDs, by wiretapping (or radiotapping) and listening for Clipper. For instance, if they're tapping SS7, and see a phone call from a well known activist's phone number to a recognizeable cellphone company, they can correlate the phone number to find the ClipperID, which makes tapping easier and puts that cellphone on the fun-to-watch list. Paranoidly :-), Bill

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Re: Detweiler abuse again
by W. Kinney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- hughes(a)ah.com (Eric Hughes): > The automatic broadcast property of Usenet is profoundly broken for > the long run, since there is no upper bound on the amount of resources > required. More immediately, this property also requires a 100% One can only reach the conclusion that Usenet is broken if one assumes that the remailers _aren't_. The automatic broadcast property if Usenet is not a problem if you can always determine the source of a message. This isn't an argument against anonymity, but just saying it's a little backwards to say that Usenet has to be redesigned because it doesn't work with the remailers. Why not use technology to solve a technological problem? The difficulty here is that it is impossible for any one remailer operator to prevent someone, say LD, from using the remailer system. The best he can do is stop LD from using his site as an entry point. So why not introduce a little cooperation among operators? This can be accomplished without collusion of the sort that would break anonymity. Pretty much all the remailer operators are 'punks, right? If a critical mass of operators get together and agree to block a standardized set of sources and destinations, then that group of operators will have enough pull to force the other operators to toe the line. The trick is to block messages from remailer _operators_ who refuse to agree to behave as part of the community, effectively isolating the wildcats. An isolated remailer is useless. Should be easy enough to work out -- a posted alert PGP signed by any two remailer operators is immediately implemented, no questions asked. Remailer scripts should include blocking by source, destination, or _content_, as in posts on a certain subject to a certain newsgroup. This would allow blocking of a nutcase using encrypted hops to post to Usenet without having to collude and blow his anonymity. Just say "Sorry, due to abuse of the remailers, we're not going to forward messages about the creatures from Uranus using microwave mind-control any more". This is a complicated idea in a general case, but scanning for subject lines, for instance, could be implemented as easily as scanning for destinations. What we have now is a bunch of single remailers. It's a very small step to create a cooperative group of remailers, and it would provide avenues for solutions to a lot of the potential problems. This is not perfect, but it's better. tytso(a)ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o): > Lance is, unfortunately, pointing out some huge, gaping holes in the > current architecture of the Cypherpunks remailers. It would be good if LD is smart enough to know that you _chain_ remailers for anonymity. I think he wanted us to know it was him, and wanted to see whether or not Hal would blow his anonymity when it came down to it. -- Will -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLWCOLPfv4TpIg2PxAQHOCgP9E2Q4R6ngHIeIv/IPePhcFqJgDaA8B4OO CDS0akeyVXZXMB5b5nCGY2Q0b52LcSHnzUlJ0N/o1COjVNLADNOlcF2k9BcBYUuC cqSWy1fJlx4lwd3P2kMgtk8v+pLHlVLJ4riopp2RXgLVfsesw8aJWOdSBf3bA7ft cBxNJhcI9t8= =BycG -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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