December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: SCHEME for FULL-SPEC RETURN PATH
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+(a)andrew.cmu.edu> > > > From: "Jon 'Iain' Boone" <boone(a)psc.edu> > > > > To: anon3+"(anon2+"(anon1+"(boone(a)psc.edu)Ka"@a.edu)Kb"@b.com)Kc"@c.org > > From: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com > > Message-Id: <99234.AA23492383(a)anchor.ho.att.com> > > > > C.ORG: > > > > To: anon2+"(anon1+"(boone(a)psc.edu)Ka"@a.edu)Kb"@b.com > > From: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com > > Message-Id: <2342349324.AA2343242(a)c.org> > ... > > Well, I guess great minds think alike. I'm already working on this. > I've been hacking on in my spare time for about a month now. My program > is about 75-80% done. Here's how it will work: > > You send mail to remail+getid(a)x.edu. Is this some kind of RFC822 hack? It doesn't work on my system. Mail to hfinney+xyz(a)shell.portal.com bounces. Are you assuming some special mail address processing has been installed by the administrators of the machines to handle this "+" hack, or is my machine broken in not respecting it? Hal

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RE: REAL WORLD ENCRYPTION
by Pierre Uszynski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy writes: > I want to know what the > people on this list intend to do with cryptography in the "real > world." I want to move many of the transactions I do today via snail mail, credit cards, and cash, to electronic medium. Receive bills in email (authenticated and encrypted), pay them in email (e-checks) on a digital bank. Receive statements from the bank in email (authenticated and encrypted). Track the complete transaction in the same medium, mostly automatically, via my email agent. In what can be done now, the systems are disparate, ad-hoc, non-integrated, insecure, expensive, incompatible, etc... in short: junk. And none of the existing systems apply to transactions between individuals. I want transactions between individuals to become practical. I want a complete and usable electronic commerce setup usable not only between me and utilities (phone, electricity, internet), but between me and most other entities (employer pay and expense refunds, rent, other individuals), including across borders, of course. Not only do I want it "integrated" and "open" so I can use it with whoever I damn well please, but I want it light-weight, so payments in pennies become routinely feasible. Efficient payments in pennies allow stuff like routine digital postage, and routine remuneration of authors "as I read", as in shareware books, magazines, and newsgroup postings. I strongly disagree with people who lightly dismiss what they call "digital postage". I think that allowing for digital pennies as part of a general digital payment system would open the door to many useful applications in, yes, pay-per-use ftp, and generally individual pay-per-use access to databases. But both PGP and e-momey won't work until people's mailers and newsreaders allow them to use them easily (that is, until people quit getting stuck with Microsoft's stuff). Even the Unix mailers and newsreaders are not getting updated anywhere quickly enough. That means the first commercial crypto-applications may have to provide the hooks themselves, or rely on what others like General Magic are doing. A pointer to how far we are is that many people still get spooked by 50 messages a day list traffic, and desperatly try to unsubscribe quickly. This means they don't even have a mail preprocessor (procmail, deliver, etc...) A pointer to how close we are is that 3 years ago, this discussion would not even take place, and these pre-processors did not exist yet. Also that people are now opening commercial MUDs. BTW, none of the applications I'm interested in would require IP-level transactions, all would work fine with email-level transactions. That's good, because little of the windows market is going to get IP connectivity anytime soon, whereas most will get email and fax connectivity. The stuff that is being done now is in the right direction, but frankly, it's still too fragmented and impractical to see much use (and that's why I'm not bothering to sign this message). Anonymous posting is the only "application" that sees much use, and even then, I guess it's not fully understood by many users (na vs an, "identity leak", etc...) Pierre Uszynski, pierre(a)shell.portal.com

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Hardware Random Numbers
by arif＠stat.fsu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am looking for a source for Harware Random Numbers for a PC. I would like it to be a simple plug-in, but need it to be fast (at least 100K, preferrable 1 Meg bytes/sec), and good (in randomness properties). Any FAQ, pointers, adresses, phone-numbers, e-mail addresses, etc... would be apreciated.

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Re: Detweiler abuse again
by dmandl＠lehman.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Derek Atkins <warlord(a)mit.edu> > > tcmay said: > > > I support Hal's proposal that as many remailer operators as possible > > attempt to filter Detweiler's postings. All it will take for Detweiler > > to get through is one who doesn't filter, and who supports encryption, > > but this will still make it harder for folks like Detweiler to abuse > > the system. > > I disagree. While I can honestly say that I don't like most Detweiler > posts, I feel that he is showing us the possibility of how remailers > can (and are) being abused. I think censorship is the wrong answer. > I think there needs to be some accountability, even if it is anonymous > accountability. I disagree that this is censorship. This is an issue that comes up again and again in anarchist circles. Censorship is understandably a thorny issue, especially among anti-authoritarians. However, I'm certain that this isn't it. Anarchy is all about decentralization (I'm trying to give a definition that all the different types of @'s on this list can agree with). When some central authority like the state tells you you can't publish something or say something in public, that's censorship. When I as a small publisher say "You're a Nazi, and I'm not going to publish your stuff" (something like this came up with a book I recently edited), that's me telling you that I'm not going to let you use my resources to print your shit. In a free, decentralized "economy" people get to decide how they want to make use of their own facilities. We are not obligated to let any lunatic in the world use the network that we've painstakingly set up and nurtured to trash that network or smear our names. We can argue among ourselves about policies, etc., but I don't think we need to show how anti-authoritarian we are by putting out a welcome mat for saboteurs, provocateurs, or whoever. All in all, I think people have been pretty tolerant of LD. --Dave.

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Stealth PGP
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Several people have talked about the possibility of doing a stealth PGP by writing a filter to strip off the headers and another one to restore them. It's an obvious approach, but depending on how good a job you want to do, doing this independently of PGP is non-trivial. Several issues: - Doing a halfway job is pretty easy, but won't fool much of anyone rich and serious enough to de-steg every GIF or JPEG floating across the net, especially in countries that most need it, where telecommunications is narrowly controlled and legal procedures are irrelevant. On the other hand, deleting the PGP-ENCRYPTED-STUFF headers is enough to get you through a No-Encryption-Permitted BBS mailnet. - Each block of stuff starts with a Crypto Block Type byte and length info. For some blocks, including the first one or two, you know the block type (at least for the interesting cases), and could force the length to some standard length by assuming a maximum and doing a fixed format. Applying this to the multiple-recipients case is harder. - The public key block includes a 64-bit Key ID to tell PGP which key to use and whether to bother decrypting (if it's not for you.) You could omit this information, and on receipt put your own key in, but that does lose the ability to tell whether it's for you. I'd have to look at the PGP code a lot more to see if it would really mind. The right way to solve this problem would be to include a string easily recognized if you have the right public key and meaningless otherwise, such as a 64-bit random number repeated twice, encrypted with the recipient's public key, but at that point you need to involve the PGP code itself, since the sender needs to know the recipient's public key and how to encrypt with it, and the receiver needs to scrounge the private key out of the secret-key-ring with the passphrase. - The other block-types have similar problems, but once you've incorporated the new format with PGP, you could include any needed masking info in the first block. Hiding the block type and length is probably enough. - The formats are of course all different for non-encrypted messages with signatures, etc., ascii-armored or not, and other problems. - At one time somebody had said there was work going on about a new version of PGP somewhere outside the US patentspace, and had said that they were thinking about solving this problem as well as integration with MIME. That make this a Somebody Else's Problem, and, uhh, I forget what the rest of the problem was... :-) Bill # Bill Stewart AT&T Global Information Solutions, aka NCR Corp # 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566 Phone 1-510-484-6204 fax-6399 # email bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart(a)attmail.com # ViaCrypt PGP Key IDs 384/C2AFCD 1024/9D6465

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Simplified Digital Postage--Proposal
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the aftermath of the "Valentine's Day Massacre," the need for some form of digital postage is more apparent than ever. In this note, I propose an extremely simple system, based on the selling of numbers as "coupons," redeemable for "passage" through a remailer. A more sophisticated system based on true digital cash, perhaps based on Magic Money," is more desirable, but almost anything is better that the current system. (Well, not _anything_.) Seeing the huge list of newsgroups that Detweiler attempted to post to, I conclude that some form of "rate-limiting" function is needed. In general, not just for Detweiler in particular. Not posting quotas, not even source-level blocking (though in Det's case, this is justified as a stop-gap measure), and not even "outgoing moderation" (in which someone like Hal would scan the plaintext of outgoing messages, briefly, to see if the text was malicious, dangerous, etc.--not a great idea, for many reasons). I propose remailers immediately adopt some form of digital money/postage, even if current instantiations are not fully debugged or optimized. "Magic Money" may be ready for such a trial use. Advantages: - causes those who wish to "flood" (cf. Hal's huge list) to at least pay for the flooding - is an immmediate use for a crude form of digtial money, a test bed for ideas and a stimulus for new features, improvements - is "voluntary": those remailers who don't wish to bother with this digital postage can then get the heavy volume of flooders! - subtle flaws in digital money protocols (and I doubt "Magic Money" is completely free of subtle or not-so-subtle flaws...everything needs debugging and evolutionary learning) will not be so serious when only "postage" is involved. As opposed to "real money" situations, where finding a way to break or spoof the protocol could result in large amounts of money being lost. At least with digital postage, about the worst that could happen is someone gets free remailing--the current situation. - the experimental use would take place with "remailer-savvy" users, which is better than trying to educate the outside world at this time - and of course, a charge of, say, $2.00 in real money (send in $20, get bact 10 remailer "stamps" of some form, suitably anonymized through a blinding procedure a la Chaum) would mean that posting to 20 newsgroups would be a nontrivial expense for a would-be flooder. (Actual rates would vary, as determined by the market and by the willingness of a remailer operator to put up with the kinds of hassles Hal is now seeing. I won't presume to speculate on the likely price of a stamp. It would depend on the destination. I know, for example, that I'd be willing--if I ran a remailer--to remail small items to single destinations for a lower fee, perhaps for free, than I would to mail large items to mail-to-Usenet gateways!) How ready is Magic Money for a test-bed use like this? How willing are remailers to try this? Both Hal Finney and Karl Barrus have code for remailers (Karl's is more recent, Hal's is in wide use). Could their code be modified easily to accomodate a primitive form of stamps? Could such stamps be sold in a reasonable way? Simple-minded approach to digital postage stamps: In my simplistic view, which I proposed a while back, stamps are merely 20- or 30-digit numbers. Imagine someone going to a Cypherpunks meeting with a box of these numbers, printed on slips of paper. For $10, say, one can reach in to this box and take out, say, 20 stamps. The seller doesn't know who got what stamps, so long as enough are sold, and he "honors" a stamp when the appropriate number is included in a message. For example: ::Stamp 29038571037489236478380016283 ::Request-Remailing-To: foo.bar etc. The stamp selling process could be computerized, but more sophisticated means of ensuring tracking is not done would have to be use (e.g., blinding, or multiple resellers). Can random guesses be made? Not feasible, with 20- or 30-digit numbers. Can the stamp seller repudiate or not honor a number so as to cheat the purchaser? Sure, but that's not a viable long term business. And word would get out. Some folks might report regularly on "remailer reliability," a la the "ping" reports several folks have issued. Reputations matter. Can the same number be used twice? Not if the remailer removes the number from his list of "sold" numbers. (This assumes each number or stamp is specific to some remailer, the easiest case to handle. Having "global" stamps complicates things greatly and introduces the expected issues of database synchronization, clearinghouses, fraud, etc. This is why "coupons" are easier to make than "currency." What do you folks think? Seems to me we could deploy a fairly simple digital postage system quickly. This could begin to immediately cut down on flooding attacks on the remailers. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power:2**859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.

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For those biting at the bit (or byting at the bit)
by Matthew J Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Glad to see cpunks back to crypto talk. Anyways, to those of you who are anxious to see crypto applied in a larger arena, your opportunity might be coming soon. A few months back I announced that I will be starting a Data Security Corporation which will apply and develop crypto protocals. To all those who have been inundating me with questions, they will be answered very soon. I have been *very* busy, but the work is coming along fine. So, if you are interested in getting involved, or if you would no longer like to be contacted about it, let me know. A general message will go out by the end of the week. Personal replies and requests closely following. To all those who have already responded I am sorry that it has taken this long. I want to do this right. I appreciate your enthusiasm. Now lets make it pay off. Cypherpunks form Corporations! --Matt ______________________________________________________________________________ In defense of liberty, encrypt for all purposes, civil and professional. In defense of privacy, encrypt all correspondence, personal and professional. In defense of sanity, do not encrypt your dry cleaning invoice! ++++++++--------mjmiski(a)macc.wisc.edu (c)1993

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Re: Detweiler remailer abuse
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Xenon, who shows a surprising depth of introspection in styling hirself after an element which is both gaseous and inert, writes: > >I can't take life seriously enough to censor old Larry. I suggest a short chat with Mr. Dictionary to determine the actual definition of the word "censorship". In the immortal words of Inigo Montoya, "You keep saying that, but I don't think it means what you seem to believe it does." >I can't take the IDEAL of the First Amendment lightly >enough to do so either. OK, I see we can add the First Amendment to the list of subjects on which you are essentially totally ignorant. When you finish with Mr. Dictionary, you might try puzzling out Mr. Bill of Rights. _It_ doesn't say what you apparently think it does, either. >And afterall, he wasn't the one who wrote that "Blacknet" blurb. Was there a point to this statement? Other than the one athwart your knotty little cranium, I mean. If so, it utterly eludes me. Do you believe that drunk drivers should not be held responsible for their actions because they don't build their own cars? >I find it amusing to see uptight fuck-wads from specialized narrow minded >Usenet groups yelling about someone sending something to >their precious little group that upset them. Not nearly as amusing as _I_ find it to see know-nothing children attempting to impress the big kids with their general level of uninformedness. >Abuse away Larry. Show us that we really DO need dumb optical fibers >between laptops instead of this tight-assed RFC standardized >World Wide Wiretap we call our playground. We need a new >net guys. Please feel entirely free to avoid using the old one while you wait patiently for the new and perfect one to show up. I suggest you avoid posting any further until you have _real_ _encryption_ running in your laptop and _optical_ _fiber_ connecting you to all the places with which you might consider communicating. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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Re: Clipper and Traffic Analysis
by Peter Wayner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I believe the LEAF field is useful, but not too useful. Here are my points: *) It helps in unauthorized taps. I would presume that the police won't have access to the phone company's calling records if they're just using a pair of alligator clips. *) On the other hand, the system really isn't anywhere near as useful as the phone number of the person calling. There will be no map between LEAF id numbers and people. Such a map would quickly get out of date as people traded phones etc... *) It might be slightly better than the phone number in strange cases because it identifies the handset not the number. Who knows? Phone calls from the garage extension mean one thing but phones from the kitchen extension mean another. This might be significantly more important if businesses private exchanges don't release the internal extension making the call.

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DOS Stego?
by Bruce C. Dovala 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know of a steganography program for DOS? Thanks, Bruce

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