December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: cfp '94 transcript
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Also note that the Fifth Circuit recently discarded the "exculpatory no" >defense to Sec. 1001. See _United States v. Rodriguez-Rios_, No. 92- >8257 (5th Cir. 2/11/94) (Smith, J.). Reported at 54 CrimLRptr 1528. > >Now, in the Fifth Circuit, you can't even say "No, I never did/say/thought >that" without committing a crime! I think this needs more explanation. I am not sure I understand what you are saying. What exactly is it illegal for you to say? -------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.3 key available by finger or server. "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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test
by Foetus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

im verrry soorry to waste this message but I have reason to suspect some recent system changes have bungled my mail kinda harsh, so I'm testing this list.

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Unrelated
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry that this isn't on topic, but I figure with all the net surfers here, it couldn't hurt to ask. Anyone happen to know of a site where I can get the most recent Jargon file in either postscript or dvi formats? I know I could a2ps the text version, but if there is already a nicely formatted version, I'd hate to duplicate efforts. thanks. ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Political Correctness is \/ Finger for PGP 2.3a Public Key <=> P.C. for "Thought Police" -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 1.0.1) GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++ n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*)

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Re: cfp '94 transcript
by ag588＠cleveland.Freenet.Edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > >SINCLAIR DOUGLAS writes: > >> I'm not sure what the NSA policy is on this. However, at >> that same conference Jim Settle from the FBI told us >> plainly that he is allowed to lie, and that the courts have >> confirmed this right. I doubt Baker would have confessed >> to a back door even if one existed and the question was >> complete. > But wait! How do we know he's telling us the truth when he says he's allowed to lie? I mean, if he's telling the truth, then he might be lying, and if he's lying then either he's not allowed to lie or the courts have not confirmed this "right." On the other hand, if he's lying, then he might be telling the truth --- Aw, shit. You can't even trust the FBI anymore! ;) -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- I am an attorney, seeking a position in the area of Computer Law. If you know of such a position available, or of someone who may know of such a position, please send e-mail! Thanks.

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Re: Very funny, Polyanna [this one's deliberately encrypted]
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: cfp '94 transcript
by Jack King 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi, it is now a federal crime to state orally or in writing to any federal administrative or law enforcement officer, during the course of an official investigation that you don't know what they are talking about if in fact you do. So if, for instance, you are a user on an anonymous bulletin board and you are asked if you are "X" when in fact you *are* X and you deny it, you can get a couple of years for that, even if you are not the subject of the investigation or guilty of any criminal activity--in theory, at least. This also pertains to any other kind of investigation: tax, environmental, drugs, antitrust, armed carjacking, international weapons trafficking, or anything else coming under federal jurisdiction. Mike Godwin stated that the FBI agent said something like " "we can lie to you, but you can't lie to us." That has always been true under 18 U.S.C. 1001. But now you can't even answer one of their questions with a "no" if the truthful answer would be "yes." You should read up on this, it's scarier than Clipper and the digital telephony proposal combined.

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Re: cfp '94 transcript
by werner＠mc.ab.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Tue, 29 Mar 1994 05:52:22 -0800 >From: Jack King <gjk(a)well.sf.ca.us> > >In Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi, it is now a federal crime to state >orally or in writing to any federal administrative or law enforcement >officer, during the course of an official investigation that you don't know >what they are talking about if in fact you do. How can something be a federal crime in only 3 states?

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Re: federal crime
by moormajb＠vuse.vanderbilt.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>Date: Tue, 29 Mar 1994 05:52:22 -0800 >>From: Jack King <gjk(a)well.sf.ca.us> >> >>In Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi, it is now a federal crime to state >>orally or in writing to any federal administrative or law enforcement >>officer, during the course of an official investigation that you don't know >>what they are talking about if in fact you do. >How can something be a federal crime in only 3 states? I think he probably meant "felony" not "federal crime."

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questions for review committee.
by sommerfeld＠orchard.medford.ma.us 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Question: How many bits of true "hardware randomness" go into the generation of each set of unit keys? Question: Exactly how are these random numbers generated? Which entity or entities provide the hardware and/or software to generate them? Are they generated inside the "vault" at the time of programming or "off-line"? Question: Are any of the random inputs to the key generation algorithm held constant during the generation of a "batch" of chips? If so, what is the justification for this practice? Question: What is the current batch size? What will the batch size be if production reaches ~1 million units per year, or ~4000 per work day? Question: What assurances are there that the key generation algorithm documented and examined by the review committee is the one actually used in production? Question: What assurances are there that the encryption algorithm studied by the review committee is the same as the one implemented by the chip? More specifically, have several members of the review committee each coded their own SKIPJACK implementations, including the escrow protocols, "from scratch" on computer systems not owned or provided by the U.S. government, and compared their outputs to that of the chips under study? If this is not feasible, please explain why. Question: What assurances are there that the actual physical chip(s) implementing the EES implements exactly and only the skipjack algorithm, the documented escrow procedures, and other publicly documented features? Are there any VLSI experts on the review committee? If so, what chips have they designed, and what chips have they "reverse engineered"? ---- By "assurances" I mean that there is an active process in place for validating compliance to a particular requirement such that no single *organization*, or single model of hardware can "fail" in a way such that violation of the requirement goes undetected. I consider the set of current and former employees of the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government to be a single organization for purposes of assurance. Addendum to all of these: If this information is classified, please justify this classification etc., etc., Steve, I hope you don't consider any of these "have you stopped beating your spouse".. - Bill

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Very funny, Polyanna :-( [namespace pollution]
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Grrr. I use a mailer here (that I'm developing) that automatically encrypts outgoing mail for user X if "<X>" can be found in my pgp keyring. Unfortunately some comedian has published the key below... Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 384/99CBA7 1992/11/15 Polyanna, c/o <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> 1 key(s) examined. so if I use this mailer when posting to cypherpunks, it gets encrypted for this idiot. I guess this is something we mailer writers will just have to allow for. Looks like I'm about to add a stop-list... (removing it from the keyring won't be good enough, because next feature planned for my mailer is to look up the fingerable key-server if it isn't found locally...) G

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