December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Applicability of ITAR
by an52436＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, A quick, and quite possibly stupid, question: As an American living overseas, how applicable is ITAR to me? Since I'm already in a foreign country, does this also mean that I shouldn't be able to receive any cryptographic software/books? Does this, in a strict interpretation, mean that if I show my books on cryptography to my friends here that I am breaking the law -- even though these books are publicly available in the states? I imagine that the answer is that the law applies to me just as much here as it would were I living in the US still, but I'm curious.... Mephisto ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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I will be a remailer.
by qwerty＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone e-mail me intructions on exactly how to compile the damn pgp23A.tar.Z in my Netcom account? I get, make: Fatal error: Don't know how to make target `suncc' and such when I follow the instructions. I did get the unproto utility as it said, but what do I do with it? I tried following the directions, but they are, as PGP, cryptic. Thanks. -Xenon

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Bugs Reported in SecureDrive 1.3
by edgar＠spectrx.saigon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following bugs have been reported in SecureDrive 1.3. I have already fixed these here, but I want to wait a short time before releasing 1.3A to allow any more bugs which may be present to show up. Please be aware of the following problems and try to work around them as suggested until 1.3A is released. Please report any further problems with 1.2 or 1.3 to edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) ====================================================================== Bugs Reported in SecureDrive 1.3 The Version 1.3 key hashing mode that is supposed to be compatible with version 1.1 isn't, the key is compatible, but the check bytes are not. This means you can't decrypt disks encrypted with 1.1 with 1.3. This will not affect you if you don't already have any disks encrypted with 1.1 and you want to stay compatible with 1.0 and 1.2. Go ahead and install 1.3 and set environment variable SET SD10CMP=X If you already have disks encrypted with 1.1, wait for 1.3A. If you can't wait, decrypt with no TSR installed and CRYPTDSK 1.1. Then Re-encrypt with 1.3 using either compatibility mode as you choose. Note the 1.3 mode supposed to be compatible with 1.1 offers essentially the same added security as 1.1. There will be code in 1.3A to change any "orphan" 1.3 check bytes to those compatible with 1.1 and 1.3A If you have multiple encrypted Hard Disk partitions, and one is active and you use CRYPTDSK to decrypt a different partition. Then the active one stays active but is no longer being correctly decrypted by SECTSR, leaving it in an UNSAFE condition until the next boot. Fixed in 1.3A Version 1.3 SECTSR is supposed to have a check so it doesn't get installed more than once, but this doesn't work. If you install 1.3, make sure you don't install SECTSR twice in the same boot session. Best to make your -only- call to SECTSR from AUTOEXEC.BAT and never install it from the keyboard. Cosmetic: Several msgs in LOGIN/CRYPTDSK refer to "V 1.3" passphrases. These references should more correctly be "V 1.1" since that was the version that defined the new standard. This would be even more confusing now since V 1.3 is not completely compatible with V 1.1. If LOGIN d: /PGP is specified, but PGPPASS is set to incorrect passphrase, the correct hard disk passphrase not prompted for. -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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Re: Anonymous Remailers
by nobody＠cicada.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May wrote, "The commercial providers, like Netcom, Portal, and Panix, cannot be counted on to stand and fight should pressures mount...." Idea: make a Netcom remailer fake mail, so the recipient will have no idea where the remailer is. If it doesn't say catalyst(a)netcom.com on the from line Netcom wont ever hear about it ;-). -Xenon

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FORWARD: Lecture re Internet Commercialization
by edgar＠spectrx.saigon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: The Internet Advantage Date: Wed, 26 Jan 1994 21:08:11 -0800 (PST) Reply-To: eventinfo_ca(a)clbooks.com To: edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com *Edgar* X-Mailer: fastmail [version 2.4 PL21] From: cherrie(a)clbooks.com (Cherrie Chiu -- Computer Literacy Bookshops) Message-ID: <9401262108.aa25193(a)clb_hq.clbooks.com> AN EVENT AT COMPUTER LITERACY BOOKSHOPS ---------------------------------------------------------------------- FINDING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE ON THE INTERNET: Resources and Strategies ---------------------------------------------------------------------- a free presentation by: Dr. Mary Cronin Commercial use of the Internet can offer companies new opportunities for improving products and services, reaching new markets, and gaining competitive advantage. But it takes more than just establishing a network connection. Mary Cronin will discuss examples of innovative uses of the Internet, drawn from her book "Doing Business on the Internet", and present some of the latest business resources available on the network. DR. MARY J. CRONIN has more than 20 years of experience in information management and technology. She is on the staff of Boston College, and teaches information management at the college's School of Management. Dr. Cronin has written articles about business and the Internet for Computer World, Internet World and Database magazines. She is also the author of "Doing Business on the Internet: How the Electronic Highway is Transforming American Companies", a book that addresses the Internet's impacts on and opportunities for customer support, product research and development, and marketing. Date: Thursday, February 3rd, 1994 Time: 6:30 - 8:00 p.m. Location: Computer Literacy Bookshops 2590 North First Street (At Trimble) San Jose (408) 435-1118 Stay tuned. There are more events to come. Events at our stores are always free. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ If you would like to receive e-mail announcements for upcoming store events, simply write to: events_ca-request(a)clbooks.com (for events held at our California stores) events_va-request(a)clbooks.com (for events held at our Virginia store) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ If you have signed up for email announcements but have not received any, or wish to be removed from this list, please contact us. We add names by request only. **************************************************** Computer Literacy Bookshops, Inc. Cherrie C. Chiu eventinfo_ca(a)clbooks.com (408) 435-5015 x116 -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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PGP Public Key Server Commands HTML Document
by Jon 'Iain' Boone 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Although I can access this document and read its contents, I am unable to select the options for submitting or extracting a key. I am using XMosaic to access it -- is this a problem? Jon Boone | PSC Networking | boone(a)psc.edu | (412) 268-6959 finger boone(a)psc.edu for PGP public key block

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >I have a question for all the 'punks who are running remailers. >I've noticed that most of you run the remailers from your accounts at >various colleges & universities. I want to know what kinds of reactions >you got from the system administrators. Did they ask lots of questions, Well, I run three remailers, and as far as I know, the system administrators don't know about them. Actually, for the two on rosebud.ee.uh.edu, I don't think the admin would care since it doesn't take up much cpu time. The remailers run on previous accounts I had when I was a student at UH. As far as Rice, the usage policy states: :Sending electronic mail directly to an unofficial automatic mail :handling program is not allowed. Unofficial means something that is :not a standard part of the system and has not been installed by the :Owlnet system management. Using an automated method to direct any :incoming mail to an unofficial program is not allowed. so the chances of me running one here are zero, since I can't really risk the hassle with my only account. >Also, if I was to try running a remailer, would I need my own >machine, or is there some way I could get the school's computers to >run the remailer for me? Well, running it from a school account is probably the least expensive option :-) If you have your own machine then that's the way to go! Karl Barrus klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLU01KYOA7OpLWtYzAQEoSwP/byCQamg1NgbK/cv8gqJZLliqMF8lhBZm /i6+Q9KryvdLsMcc/Kg1XAIYPMGO+PDttCqpzqJoFC2kL2FkzkkXI4vB/RtdQScT flA7CRcpIWfYfOoCkuou4GMAAbZnkKCrOpDu3Ea8j6geQN6HZn5sGP0stF/9w/Y+ VxwkbePp4C8= =yrzM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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An easy-to-create pay-for-use remailer service
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I might set one of these up sometime this fall when I get a better net connection for my computer.. meanwhile, here's the idea: A payforuse anonymous id system. Someone would snail mail to me a money order, an login/aliasname, and a pgp SASE, encrypted with the public key of the remailer of their choice. (And the address of the remailer of course.) I would set up a mail alias which would take incoming mail, and send it off to the anonymous remailer defined by the user, with the SASE block thrown in the beginning of the message, and the To: From:, etc. lines added to the message using the "##" header pasting mechanism. Accounts would be debited according to the amount of traffic going through. Once all credit is used up, it would take another money order with the login/aliasname attached to refill the account with credit. In this way an anonymous persona can have a much more normal-looking email address, and the operator of the remailer is still ignorant of the anon-id<=>real-address mapping, to protect against subpeonas. This is just as weak as the remailer-chain used in the SASE block. The privacy of that will improve as the remailers improve.

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Re: Remailer Tearline Conventions
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Unfortunately, no, there isn't an accepted convention for tear-lines that cut off the bottom of a message. The top is handled adequately. Julf's anon.penet.fi remailer cuts off anything resembling a signature, using the convention that a -- line (or maybe an all-dash line?) is a signature, since some of the common mail and news programs use that, but the regular cypherpunks remailers didn't the last time I checked. It would be nice if there were an official syntax, either something formal and mimeish, or a simpler '--truncate here--' sort of line that gets retained across remailing so additional junk doesn't accrete. Bill # Bill Stewart AT&T Global Information Systems, aka NCR Corp # 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566 Phone 1-510-484-6204 # email bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart(a)attmail.com # ViaCrypt PGP Key IDs 384/C2AFCD 1024/9D6465

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Properties of hash functions
by Aviel David Rubin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know the following, or can someone point me to the proper references? What properties are preserved by hash functions? For example, take x = MD5(Y). Now, say that Y is a quadradic residue mod N, is it the case that x is also a quadradic residue mod N? Are there any interesting properties that are preserved by frequently used hash functions? Thanks a lot for any help, Avi Rubin

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