December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

MISC; reminder
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Punkster's Just a reminder, tonight on Nova "Codebreakers" stories of the world war II effort, check local listings. Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot Cryptocosmology: "sufficently advanced comunication is indistinguishable from noise." Chicago Current temp -19 wind chill -63 4pm CST -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLTxaZNCcBnAsu2t1AQFOdgP+NgsenZ1otjdCLK2aUKnhGW1Nwdr2Rk5+ V76MAqVWn+Iys190Hj3HTHBd6/aI7rhP9mRYWo8097pgYhMRmR35URa+hKRNLzP0 Iucwe9cWTLlbNnTPh+N04JJbwVhlDG3xXGykKeY0y9+IkUIeS0acu8nL01oGIurX hkqqkgmzxvE= =X6Ol -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Mr. Squish
by consensus＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I explained to a list manager about our problems regarding the source of SQUISH and the system administrator that does not respond to requests to deal with the problem. >Return-Path: <rburns(a)cap.gwu.edu> >Received: from cap.gwu.edu by mail.netcom.com (8.6.4/SMI-4.1/Netcom) > id MAA05785; Tue, 18 Jan 1994 12:47:43 -0800 >Received: by cap.gwu.edu (4.1/SMI-4.1) > id AA18334; Tue, 18 Jan 94 15:47:25 EST >Date: Tue, 18 Jan 1994 15:42:14 -0500 (EST) >From: Roger Burns <rburns(a)cap.gwu.edu> >Subject: Mr. Squish >To: Christopher Allen <consensus(a)netcom.com> >Message-Id: <Pine.3.07.9401181514.C17300-b100000(a)cap.gwu.edu> >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII > > >> Do you mind if I forward the above message to the cyperpunks list? Or would >> you be willing to do so yourself? > >Sure. I don't have ready access to Usenet, so feel free to post my comments. >BTW, I found two typos in my original message, so below I copy a revised >version. > >-- Roger rburns(a)cap.gwu.edu > >---------- Forwarded message ---------- > >Thank you for response. If I may give some unsolicited advice, I would >take a "Margaret Thatcher" approach to the postmaster who is allowing this >problem to fester. > >I would (1) trace down his office phone number (through nic whois or >nslookup or whatever) and ring him up and explain that allowing abuse of >the Internet is an abrogation of his company's contract for obtaining an >Internet connection, and that if he doesn't consent to handling this problem >appropriately, you will seek to have his company disconnected from >Internet based on that abrogation. > >If he doesn't succumb to that threat, I would then (2) phone thru his >company's main switchboard and ask to be connected to the postmaster's >boss, and explain to the boss that you will be seeking to have his >company's Internet connection ended due to the postmaster's >irresponsibility in allowing an unstable person to wreak havoc on the >worldwide computer network community. > >Now while it might be a pain to actually follow through on this threat, if >you put enough of a poker face on what you say, the bluff might very well >be enough at either step 1 or step 2. > >Good luck! And I hope I don't have to deal with this problem! (But if I >do, I've outlined how I will proceed.) > >-- Roger Burns rburns(a)cap.gwu.edu ..Christopher Allen ..Consensus Develoment Corporation ..4104-24th Street #419 ..San Francisco, CA 94114-3615 ..(415) 647-6384 Fax ..(415) 647-6383 Voice ..email: consensus(a)netcom.com ..mosaic frontpage: .."ftp://netcom.com/pub/consensus/www/ConsensusFrontDoor.html"

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BOF @Usenix?
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where/when is the Cypherpunks BOF @ Usenix? It's Wednesday right? (What's the hotel?) Thanks, Sameer

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Re: RSA Questions
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:54 1/18/94 +0000, SuperDupont wrote: >Hi Cypherpunks ! > >I've got a few questions about the RSA encoding (if they're answered somewhere >in litterature, just give directions, thanks) > > If the public encryption key is e (the exponent) and n=p*q (the modulus), > then the encryption scheme is: > > cypher= (plain^e) mod n. > > Number theory tells us that the reverse operation (taking the e-th root) > can be performed, as long as we know p and q: we know how to compute d > such that for any plain<n, (plain^e)^d=plain. > > Now my questions are: > > 1. Is there a way to determine ALL the possible values of d verifying: > (plain^e)^d=plain for any plain<n (or at least have an evaluation for > their number) ? > > In other words, is there a way to know the number of keys that unlock > what your public key locks ? > > 2. Is there a way to determine ALL the possible values of d verifying: > (plain^e)^d=plain for *a given plain* ? > > In other words, is there a way to know the number of keys that unlock > *a given message* ? > >Here's an example that's quite worrying (maybe because I chose p and q >to be random primes, and they have bad properties): > >e=17 # Exponent >p=967 # Prime p >q=1031 # Prime q >n=p*q=996977 # Public modulus > >phi=(p-1)*(q-1)=994980 >g=gcd(p-1,q-1)=2 >f=phi/g=497490 >d=(1/e) mod f=234113 # A possible value of d given by number theory > >Here's the result of the exhaustive search for the answer to question No. 2: > >plain=12345 >cipher=(plain^e) mod n >decipher=(cipher^d) mod n > >The possible values for d (138 of them) are: > >3393 10603 17813 25023 32233 39443 46653 53863 61073 68283 75493 82703 89913 >97123 104333 111543 118753 125963 133173 140383 147593 154803 162013 169223 >176433 183643 190853 198063 205273 212483 219693 226903 234113 241323 248533 >255743 262953 270163 277373 284583 291793 299003 306213 313423 320633 327843 >335053 342263 349473 356683 363893 371103 378313 385523 392733 399943 407153 >414363 421573 428783 435993 443203 450413 457623 464833 472043 479253 486463 >493673 500883 508093 515303 522513 529723 536933 544143 551353 558563 565773 >572983 580193 587403 594613 601823 609033 616243 623453 630663 637873 645083 >652293 659503 666713 673923 681133 688343 695553 702763 709973 717183 724393 >731603 738813 746023 753233 760443 767653 774863 782073 789283 796493 803703 >810913 818123 825333 832543 839753 846963 854173 861383 868593 875803 883013 >890223 897433 904643 911853 919063 926273 933483 940693 947903 955113 962323 >969533 976743 983953 991163 > >That makes a probability of 0.013% >Looks to me like it's a LOT. Maybe I'm wrong. > >-zap > >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. >Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, >and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. >Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi. Laudable Paranoia! In short the numbers: cipher, decipher, plain, d and e must all be relatively prime to p and q for all of this stuff to work. In practice, since p and q are very large, the probability of the cryptanalyst finding another value d that deciphers your message is about the same as him finding p or q. That is the same probability of him factoring pq by guessing. In your example 138 out of 996980 is about the probability of being divisible by either p or q. You might check to make sure that the message that you are enciphering is relatively prime to p and q. You could better spend your, however, verifying that your hardware had not made a mistake, which is more likely, unless, however you are sending one of your factors so that a friend can share your secret key. In that case, however, anyone with your public key can compute your secret key,

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unsubscribe
by Yaoshiang Ho 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

UNSUBSCRIBE

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Remailer Technology
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello darlings! I was playing with your remailers recently, yesterday in particular, and was a bit disappointed in them for a variety of reasons. I got a list of the current ones from K.Barrus some time ago but even this supposedly up-to-date list had a lot that appeared not to work. Out of ~20 on the list, ~8 sent back a ping message. One kept sending me some strange error. In another test, I sent out an informative posting to a whole bunch of mailing lists recently through some of the remailers. The remailers seem to be very fragile and can be overcome by a huge onslaught of postings. It appears that every new message spawns a new process, and the machines get overloaded and don't have memory left to do anything. Kind of a serious flaw! One could mess them up doing this. Good thing that no one has any malicious feelings toward the cypherpunks or their remailers, or this might have already happened. As a solution to the `spawning' problem, here is a possibility: I am just guessing, but I bet the perl script is grabbing in the message from the incoming socket at the beginning, and then closing the socket, and then going about its business to send the message out. But during this period, new messages can be sent to the now `clear' socket, hence spawning a new process. A solution would be to keep the socket `busy' for the duration of the execution of the perl code. Another solution is to have the messages sent into a buffering script, and something else continuously running in the background to go through the queue to send messages. Finally, I was wondering if anyone else was doing Ping tests on the remailers for run times and whether they post them. If there is interest I would be willing to write a script to automate this process and post the results say every week, so that people can keep abreast of what remailers are active and responsive. If we want a strong infrastructure for all our evil deeds, we have to make sure that it is resilient! Thanks, and please don't flame me for trying *earnestly* to contribute!

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Examples of Digital cash in use
by Aviel David Rubin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am compiling a list of places that are actually using digital cash. If anyone knows of current implementations, or of any plans that will probably be implemented, can you please send me the info.? Thanks a lot.

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SunFed protests NSA procurement in High Performance Workstations 2
by gnu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Florida SunFlash SunNews: SunFed Protest, Sun Foundation Grants SunFLASH Vol 61 #17 January 1994 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 61.17.A Subject: SunFed Files Protest with GAO If you have questions regarding this announcement, please contact John Leahy at (703) 204-4818. SUN FEDERAL FILES AGENCY PROTEST WITH THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE Company Challenges "Round Two" of the NSA-HPW2 Workstation Procurement VIENNA, Virg. -- January 12, 1994 -- On Jan. 7, Sun Microsystems Federal, Inc., the original awardee of the National Security Agency (NSA) HPW2 (High Performance Workstation) contract, filed a formal protest with the Government Accounting Office (GAO) challenging the rebid of the procurement. It is Sun Federal's contention that the Maryland Procurement Office (MPO) has violated Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) by substantially changing the requirements of the original solicitation. The company is asking the GAO to direct the MPO to cancel this solicitation and issue a new specification based on current requirements. Sun Microsystems Federal, Inc., is the leading vendor of open client-server computing solutions to the government. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sun Microsystems, Inc., with headquarters in Milpitas, Calif.

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Re: The Packwood Memorial Diary Server
by drzaphod＠brewmeister.xstablu.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Need it be any more secure than the crypto system you would use on your > own harddisk (which could get confiscated)? > > Jim_Miller(a)suite.com Both crypto systems should be as secure as possible; however, if your documents are spinning somewhere in v-space then you've lost one piece of security: The Physical Lock. If any organization DOES find a way to break the code, then they can easily go thru the public archive and read EVERYTHING. -- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- - DrZaphod #Don't Come Any Closer Or I'll Encrypt! - - [AC/DC] / [DnA][HP] #Xcitement thru Technology and Creativity - - [drzaphod(a)brewmeister.xstablu.com] [MindPolice Censored This Bit] - - 50 19 1C F3 5F 34 53 B7 B9 BB 7A 40 37 67 09 5B - -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

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Re: Randomness of a bit string
by m5＠vail.tivoli.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Thompson writes: > its a joke, you didn't get it, or Ray's bought into > the biggest joke of 2 years hence. No, it was a joke, and I'm just ignorant. Duhh. Thanks to everybody who sent mail and didn't call me an idiot. -- | GOOD TIME FOR MOVIE - GOING ||| Mike McNally <m5(a)tivoli.com> | | TAKE TWA TO CAIRO. ||| Tivoli Systems, Austin, TX: | | (actual fortune cookie) ||| "Like A Little Bit of Semi-Heaven" |

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