December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Ride to either Cypherpunks meeting or to Kindness
by crunch＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is anyone living in Marin or SF planning to go down to the Cypherpunks meeting this afternoon. If so, I would like a ride. Please Email me or phone me at 415-381-5847. If not, then is anyone planning to go to "Kindness" this evening. I would at least like to go to that... John D.

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Heavy remailer traffic source?
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For the last day or two I have been getting several dozen messages (67 today, a similar number yesterday) similar to the following: > From remail(a)infinity.hip.berkeley.edu Sat Mar 12 00:10:07 1994 > Date: Sat, 12 Mar 94 00:05 PST > To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > From: nobody(a)infinity.hip.berkeley.edu > Remailed-By: Remailer <remail(a)infinity.hip.berkeley.edu> > Complaints-To: Sameer <sameer(a)soda.berkeley.edu> > Anon-To: remailer(a)entropy.linet.org > Anon-To: remailer(a)entropy.linet.org > Anon-To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > Anon-To: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu > Anon-To: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu > Anon-To: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu > Anon-To: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu > Anon-To: remailer(a)entropy.linet.org > Anon-To: remailer(a)utter.dis.org > Anon-To: remailer(a)rebma.mn.org > Anon-To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > Anon-To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > Anon-To: remailer(a)utter.dis.org > Anon-To: remail(a)infinity.hip.berkeley.edu > Status: R > > ## > Do-Inject: Yes > > -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- > Version: 2.3a > > rQeAYgVzdGRpbgAAAADCSE/UHZnlLco5W9yVWyw5M8XSD7rLnZFAd9IlwX5W2zkM > [...] > MEBR2/p7L6XuKfGQG38t4K4o7J8YbWNPDQ8qP4YeMBAg3Tvzl5tyTWN9/NN7NfCJ > fR3k > =ypSB > -----END PGP MESSAGE----- The "PGP" message appears to be just an ascii-armoring of random bytes. Is this an attempt by someone to provide the "masking" remailer traffic we have been discussing for some time? This is OK, but I think the volume is too high. What is the Do-Inject: header intended to accomplish? The message apparently is intended to provide multiple remailing addresses per message. However, my remailer only does one remail address per message. Also, my remailer does not accept "Anon-To" but only "Request-Remailing-To". So all these messages are ending up in my mail box. Anyone want to explain these? Hal

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Re: MAIL and Coming Police State
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Karl Barrus writes: >> I mention this because I have asked and been told repeatedly by an >> attorney friend of mine that running a remailer on a system where you >> don't have authorization to do so is a violation of the ECPA. (i.e. >> access beyond what the system administration intends for you to have). >I would be interested in what legal research your attorney friend >engaged in in order to come to this conclusion. Possibly it would be a Sure. The attorney is Ed Cavazos (polekat(a)well.sf.ca.us) - I met him first as a user on his BBS (Bamboo Gardens, WWIVnet, now in Houston after years in Austin) where he runs Modem/BBSLaw net, and then in person a few times at EFH (Electronic Frontiers Houston) meetings or events. He was involved in the Steve Jackson vs. Secret Service case, not as lead attorney, but as an assistant. Since this is the only case involving the ECPA to hit the courts and he was in on it, I'm going to have to go with his judgement, unless somebody can argue super persuasively (and preferably convince him too!) As a side note at the last EFH event, we had about 50 people in a room talking about the Clipper Chip and its cons - people that stayed after his talk on legal issues in cyberspace. Anyway, I've asked him several times about the legality of remailers, and during his last talk he addressed them, again ;). Like a fool, I didn't take notes, but from what I remember, the ECPA: * forbids others reading private communications * makes it a crime to attempt unauthorized access on a system with private communication facilities (i.e. email) * forbids you from access above/beyond what the system intended for you I think there is one more thing that goes along with the ECPA, but I can't remember. I will email polekat and ask again, hopefully in a few days or so he'll be able to get back to me. Again, this is all from memory. Anyway, the last one is the key. It says the even if you are a legit user, the following are still illegal: * you find a way to defeat security * you read files that you aren't supposed to, even if the permissions let you * you run programs or use the system in any way that the system administration didn't intend for you (i.e. you run crack all the time or you run a remailer) Now, I was careful to make a distinction: running a remailer on a current account, and running one on an old account. (Because the four remailers I used to run were on old account of mine when I was a student at UH. Now I am at Rice, and Ed said it is DEFINITELY a violation to run a remailer on an account you aren't even supposed to have anymore) But, he said that even running one on a current account is a violation unless you have permission. I mean, I don't mean to scare anybody or spread FUD - for example I am not out of the remailer business ;) it's just the next one I set up will be with the approval/blessing/whatever of the system administration! > violation if running a remailer was specifically prohibited by the > operator (though this sounds more like a contract problem than an ECPA Well, the way it is prohibited here at Rice is by a policy which forbids sending mail to any unauthorized or nonstandard program. Stuff like filter, procmail, slocal (if MH were on owlnet ;) would be allowed, but definitely not a remailer. > Holding this to be a violation is also particularly silly since it > would make unlawful the doing of something by instrumentality of > software an act which can easily be done (and was done, before the > current era of software remailers) by hand. One would solicit for Yeah, but by this logic why is it illegal to export cryptographic software when you can print it and mail it anywhere you please? Silly, yet illegal. Karl Barrus <klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLYH9GoOA7OpLWtYzAQE1cQP+MvYFldT0fkfMa66vz8bdj3eqwleuKohb VJzmBZolS2ki0D/Wz01BkCxyhUj4ENLCT1zr6C+mWw7cFhyx+MuTnKKOWPWyiTp7 9NgkyjYhqw66jCIXvP/s828sY831OhcBe7iZTjcuvGTPuPzbuV04J7Exj1DYPfp5 WeGl0kZ5+dE= =i4en -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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New member
by Gordon Joly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Me, that is... just in from the cold. Gordon Joly Phone +44 71 380 7934 FAX +44 71 387 1397 Email: G.Joly(a)cs.ucl.ac.uk UUCP: ...!{uunet,uknet}!ucl-cs!G.Joly Comp Sci, University College, London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT & mice-nsc(a)cs.ucl.ac.uk & http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/mice/gjoly.html &

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WARES - "Terminate Clipper" t-shirt (fwd)
by Arthur Chandler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Got this from another group. I haven't ordered the shirt, so can't say yea or nay about it, but thought folks here might be interested. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 11 Mar 1994 09:41:24 -0500 From: CountMind0 <mgardbe(a)ANDY.BGSU.EDU> To: Multiple recipients of list FUTUREC <FUTUREC(a)UAFSYSB.UARK.EDU> Subject: WARES - "Terminate Clipper" t-shirt (fwd) ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 09 Mar 94 22:29:15 EST From: FringeWare Inc <fringeware(a)IO.COM> To: mgardbe(a)andy.bgsu.edu Subject: WARES - "Terminate Clipper" t-shirt Sent from: sethross(a)aol.com i just got this really cool t-shirt from this place in Seattle... It's black and it says don't give BIG BROTHER THE MASTER KEY <image> TERMINATE CLIPPER NOW It has a pretty cool multi-colored image of a skeleton key on a chip..,,.. and some other stuff here's the rest of the info.... "...Snail mail orders to: Paul Clark PO Box 59152 Renton, WA 98058 Email COD orders at iplus1hope(a)aol.com $10 by check, $12 COD, black, XL only, 100% cotton heavyweight" ----- It's pretty a cool shirt; the guy is a pretty wild artist on the outskirts of Seattle. I sent him my address on email and he shipped it c.o.d. about a week after i I ordered it i wore it around today...it's pretty sad how many people don't know wha t's going on sethross(a)aol.com

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PowerMacPGP
by fhalper＠pilot.njin.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know if Mr. Zimmerman or anyone else will be writing a Power Macint -osh PGP porgram. What about the other popular encryption programs. Thanks, Reuben Halper -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3 mQCPAi16KosAAAEEAMUwRni4a9+GbuAhHDLcBWK60hCJUYxhr2hYokpELAhx0ejp 2fq61Tu9Hjn051CN8Xy5nu6sv2ODfG/t59l4DJSb5pirQaII3zaX0rMX0ydwGDoW YakL4ow1lNY+d/k14KpIuUW404+fNuNhIGSkdVLQIfbOgh0preK7/P44AKvdABEB AAG0JlJldWJlbiBIYWxwZXIgPGZoYWxwZXJAcGlsb3Qubmppbi5uZXQ+iQCVAgUQ LXorceK7/P44AKvdAQEUxwQAoffTibRlwE5tNQVGvrulh1OQgXNhTRec9vUaUwPy U64FIZ+KnmdfYgiJYXtcItA90EB9MDexazKeqJzMOPShVNOfyiwy2yUlnQs425f8 DxBvM//zuvj6s4/mXDTPUZtG9PP0HVaEGTJY15JdfRqtj/w+HHnsHlgCnj0NnIhX TW8= =D9UX -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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add cypherpunks
by an62213＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Clipper Cracks Appear
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Seeing as it is politics week here at cpunks, I have found some interesting comments from our friends at whitehouse.gov. Commentary by John Carey in BusinessWeek Magazine (Big Brother Could Hobble High Tech, 3/24/94 pg. 37) states that: So why is the Whitehouse pushing the retrograde notions? One reason is the Clintonites fear of appearing soft on crime and terrorism. "No one wants the head of the FBI walking around saying: 'I don't have the tools to do my job'" says Bellsouth's Markey. Things aren't entirely bleak. The administration, taken aback by vehement opposition from industry, congress and civil libertarians, is suggesting it may back off. "People are willing to work things out" says White House Staff secretary John D. Podesta, who is involved in technology issues. FBI director Freeh says he's willing to accept higher hurdles to get court appointed surveilence. And there are tantalizing hints that the white house is reconsidering its hard line on the clipper chip. <end> Seems that we are having an effect and cracks are starting to leak compromise from the Gov't. This is, however, just the beginning. A ploy used successfully by many groups (New York city's transit authority are masters at this) is to put forth an outrageous proposal, such as clipper etc. Then they soften the demands so that the opponent becomes disarmed, allowing that which the Gov't had intended to pass all along to go through as a compromise. This cannot be allowed. Time to step up the attack a notch. Write the whitehouse and ask them if they want to go down in history as the presidency that ushered in the era of Big Brother. I know Bill won't read it but someone has to. Keep on your congresscritters (I like that word) and put stuff in your local paper. Arm the populace. Lastly, I think many of you are giving this countries people less credit than they deserve. Many simple men and women founded this country. Try not to be so pompous. Scott G. Morham !The First, Vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu ! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLYJyUz2paOMjHHAhAQEbCgP/XobypXWta9OBbOAXePNWY7zznS6HHnxS 4fb7MWKlSjRxe283D2oWV0PnNttMLfAcEOknWT8l9/Z8Ef/RUNMo2vRENToE65If oVoUh/lne+PgVpiyT8+oXc8QSFe+8qWJBNL6L1T5YMpghDYYX7bpCn07dCsUQSIb gFItcKbPp8o= =4HsY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Voice encryption
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like someone with enough technical background to design and build a prototype IDEA/DES/RSA device suitable for voice encryption using modular phone jacks and plugs. The prototype and what is learned in the process of designing and manfacturing it, will be used to conduct a feasibility study on the manufacture and marketing of such devices. -uni- (Dark)

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No Subject
by qjones＠infi.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why not beam a time-delayed virus into one of NSA's arrays, destruct code armed and ready to go?? wayne -- **************************************************************************** * Qjones(a)infi.net So I'm a dog...what else is new? * * Qjones(a)larry.wyvern.com Quote from life and times of a man * ****************************************************************************

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