December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

ANON: mail concerns
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hm.. there have been some concerns over anonymous mail recently... both Alan and Thomas have noted that it is easy to match up sender and destination for a remailer which processes each message as it arrives. Solution: cache all messages and process them later (once a day, once a week, etc.). For example, the remailer at elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu caches all incoming requests, and processes them (randomly) at midnight. I didn't even have to modify the remailer scripts to do this; rather, I wrote some extra ones. The process seems stable. The trickiest part is scheduling the remailing: I have to use the 'at' command since I can't have my own crontab. Also, Thomas mentioned what seems to be 'random remailing'. As I mentioned in a previous message ("ANON: anonymous mail"), forcing mail to progress through a network randomly also forces the final destination to be known to everybody, where before only one site knows the final destination. Also, instead of building the necessay headers to hop mail you may be able to use one of several scripts and programs available at soda.berkeley.edu Karl Barrus <klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLNbQEoOA7OpLWtYzAQEe0QP+KaDWOyep8+wSfEMtUjBOj8OGJMrdSCkO jAfS3zW/uASpOfZ8zgaGBhl8kFPzF9ZyEJyKV/tydIHJdQUEI9K3FU0AE4vB2Fei xcGcM16dZlSSOW/E+CkRR/3UstlRwUuHCccFACTh5SIPIG3mSSVvNMEp7Cz+SIss j5Mkq9KqJc0= =tWzv -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

ANON: random remailing...
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >if every single site knows the final address, so what? >how is this going to help them track down the original sender?? >anyone at the final destination who wants to track down the original sender >would need to hop-scotch backwards through the numerous sites and try to >track down the path the message took. this is of course, IF someone really Yes, this is true, but the key point in the anonymous remailers is they can be used for two-way communication. Presumably, both you and your friend intend to email each other. If mail proceeds randomly throughout the network, then the final destination must be available to every remailer. This may be fine if A only sends to B (announces to every remailer B's address), but when B responds to A, A's address is similarly announced to every remailer. Now it is simple to figure out A and B are communicating. If all you want is one-way communication (i.e. you just want to send and don't expect any replies), you may be better off faking mail with telnet, or using a newsgroup. Karl Barrus <klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLNk0qoOA7OpLWtYzAQF17wP/eittrsJRkRuKSXH0V1bSiEEc1+ZAYGj9 4+aTctisX0QG2LholGDHqxti02SyEH+iQO8qjAkY5vyHNDVM6pH4tr2xzF2W9prx 1A91KNXHdiZPAvsUWgv32+B5IJYZqarRVmLjuI7PnydTiKX9/24bffl8TUtoidln syJ3O/cVoyA= =iz1j -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

anonymous remailing/posting software
by khijol!erc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ah, yes. Once again, it's time to upgrade the APS software here at khijol. For those who don't know, I run an anonymous posting site which posts to only a select set of newsgroups (to prevent abuse). Now that the machine is sitting on the Internet, it's time to revamp the software, and I have thought that it might be easier to hack someone else's than to redo my own (which was one of those all-day hack sessions). Double blind remailing and unique ID services are essential, with the 'nice to have' services like automatic pinging of posts, checksum verifications of posts, automatic encryption/decryption of posts, etc. would be ideal. Any ideas on where I could obtain such software? Shell scripts are OK, C is better. Perl is not desirable unless I really have to. :( Thanks! -- Ed Carp, N7EKG erc(a)apple.com 510/659-9560 an38299(a)anon.penet.fi, anon-1157(a)twwells.com If you want magic, let go of your armor. Magic is so much stronger than steel! -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"

1 0

trivia question
by Alan Ruttenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A friend, (who wished to remain anonymous :) asks: Perhaps you can forward for me a trivia question I've been trying to get answered. I'm pretty sure the phreak magazine "2600" is named after 2.6KHz, which I think was a tone used for some phone billing system that got cracked (perhaps Cap'n Crunch's whistle frequency?) The trivia question is this: can anyone point me to a definitive reference for what 2600 really was? An ACM article or the particular phone system or the cracker who exploited it would suffice. thanks!

1 0

Nazis/probability of their mention and/or use to discredit
by Dark 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Message 53: - From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Mon Nov 1 10:35:58 1993 From: James Still <still(a)kailua.colorado.edu> To: 'Cypherpunks List' <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> Subject: RE: Nazis/Privacy/Cypherpunks Date: Mon, 01 Nov 93 09:08:00 PST >Personally, I don't rule out examination of Nazi tactics as a >worst case scenario model. Let's face it, as ugly and dark as >Nazi rule was, they did some things quite efficiently indeed. [Stuff Deleted] If I understand your basic point to be: "consider the worst possible scenario in order to better prepare for it" then I agree completely. However I have serious reservations with emulating or (gadzooks!) *admiring* those Nazi tactics that seemed to "work" because I would disagree that, first they actually did work, and more importantly, that their ends justified the means. Which brings me to your second point: - -> Let me make clear that I do not (gadzooks appropiate here) condone any Nazi security measures. My point was more to provoke thought about how Nazi security techniques would pan out in the information age. Again, the question, did they work, is debateable. <- >[Note 2] >No one writes code from "the bottom up" in the manner that you >suggest. If that were the case we'd see the wheel invented time >and time again. I disagree. (Semantics check: I'm not talking about a mouse driver or a basic windowing interface here. Obviously, there's no need to hammer out that wheel again.) I am talking about what I see as a basic cypherpunk mission, that being, "the constant reevaluation of the approach towards privacy." We have the ability to constantly rip apart our own ideas, like children's ABC blocks, and see if they fit back together again in a better way. I would prefer to see constant rewrite's of a "given" (like PGP for instance) than to stagnate and rely on the one idea, concept, or proof just because we've always done it that way. Our code should be like our ethics: constantly re- evaluated, questioned, and tested for validity. - -> I interpreted your ground up analogy incorrectly. I do believe that ideas should be examined and reassembled. I just think it's silly to rule out anything that might have merit. (I guess I'm just determined to be flamed here on the merit of anything Nazi) <- - -uni- (Dark) --- still(a)kailua.colorado.edu -------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLNc0/BibHbaiMfO5AQFrXwQAoxfek4YivmYGsAc21mS6LrRLqTkDXrB1 62o+te0Fge3k2drHiC9oKPEXGa3Aid6/Td3HjDb7IjFsXvAlyD6P/x4IXtVw1W2J Tb2CnwoNl0mz171iLIjHIHAWcfDqwzU5mYgPb1T5XyntgFJTJ966tvEIYhhfkvcH nU5EVDMsdyo= =nSBc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: trivia question
by Alan Ruttenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This topic is inappropriate for cypherpunks. At the least next time please acknowledge this and ask for replies in private email. Eric My apologies. I've only joined the list recently and was just passing on a question which someone else thought might be answered in this forum. Please direct any further responses to my email address. Thanks -alan

1 0

My PGP key
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I finally got linux/a secure place for PGP set up-- here's my key. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAiyGsCgAAAEEAKrK7SMIBaiBzQRigdhA5BlztMpiCrs4ooWeMEZYpCl8/FPf bz3LHri5dYRNBMLnpv7c8Ezn/nUTbcIPs0zVXpj/8t/4lP1AHHg6QDky1KwBYFaW 9LLAye4EBD3kKq3UvctmdIK225ouMKn6X5+PgNT+dbhwV5LPeXi7eNFdXppdAAUR tCpTYW1lZXIgUGFyZWtoIChzdHJvbmcpIDxzYW1lZXJAbmV0Y29tLmNvbT6JAJUC BRAsiAJ+C/JrSKEuC60BAaFuA/0cu/WBeLvnc1dIEIep/oI4JHqx96QwpC2TOJAp LK/IkVXF9fUUnNHYK6JtxnWj4iowoxYmsuVqJR3bfPND4wYk0Amgu9SQAHu1IDiz cFbXVJ9YwY1u/yZ1+CEQGnUD+ZcXSkIZh3UXu1ubW3iHcAIZ+AbVfuXd082tJo5E QWqzPLQvU2FtZWVyIFBhcmVraCA8Y3M2MGEtcXVAY29yeS5FRUNTLkJlcmtlbGV5 LkVEVT60JlNhbWVlciBQYXJla2ggPHNhbWVlckBnZW5lc2lzLm1jcy5jb20+tChT YW1lZXIgUGFyZWtoIDxzYW1lZXJAc29kYS5iZXJrZWxleS5lZHU+tCdTYW1lZXIg UGFyZWtoIDxzYW1lZXJAb2NmLmJlcmtlbGV5LmVkdT60KlNhbWVlciBQYXJla2gg PHNhbWVlckB1Y2xpbmsuYmVya2VsZXkuZWR1Pg== =Rgag -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

1 0

Procmail update.
by J. Michael Diehl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all! Just a quick update on my procmail mail processor rc file. I have most of the functionality implemented. I'm working on speeding up mail delivery and making sure I don't have a file locking problem. So far, my system will: 1 Accept incoming mail and determine if it contains a pgp message, key, or signature. 2 If it contains a message, it determines who can read it. 3 If it contains a key, it is added to your pubring.pgp 4 If it contains a signed message, the signature is validated. 5 An informative subset of pgp's output is tacked onto the head of the message, surrounded by user-defined lines to prevent spoofing of the validation info. 6 Finally, the subject of the mail is prefixed with either (key), (sig), (prv) to indicate that the message contains a key, signed message, or encrypted (private) message. I also have the capability to use procmail as a pgp-info server. You could send me mail with the subject: send pgp-help and my machine would send you a file which contains help for pgp. This could lead to lots of uses.... Any comments are welcome. I should be releasing my procmailrc file within the week. Take care, all Lagers, J. Michael Diehl ;^) |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the mdiehl(a)triton.unm.edu | Government forgets about the 1st! <RL> Mike.Diehl(a)f29.n301.z1 |*God is a good Physicist, and an even .fidonet.org | better Mathematician. <Me> al945(a)cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politicly Incorrect! <Me> Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1 12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D

1 0

MORE Z
by thomas.hughes＠chrysalis.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

some seriously moronic dribling idiot wrote: >> o i suggest adding an "ignore list" of sites. fine. it was late. i wasn't thinking clearly. shut up. i don't wanna hear it. this idea would work fine if you happen to have a clue where the hell the abusive/annoying messages are comming from ... how about just switching that around to be a "lock out these sites" list and ignore all messages that ask to be remailed to those sites. and be sure to stick "willy(a)whitehouse.gov" on the top of the list.

1 0

RE-RE-RE-RE: ZEE
by thomas.hughes＠chrysalis.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>Random mailing routes actually make it easier to track down the >>original sender. >>Perhaps you missed an earlier message I sent to the list ("Anonymous >>Mail"). If the message proceeds randomly through the remailers, then >>every single site must somehow be told the final address. Therefore, >>instead of just one site knowing the final destination, every site >>must know the final destination. if every single site knows the final address, so what? how is this going to help them track down the original sender?? anyone at the final destination who wants to track down the original sender would need to hop-scotch backwards through the numerous sites and try to track down the path the message took. this is of course, IF someone really wants to go to this much trouble and if they think they can talk a slew of administrators into helping them with the witchhunt. 1 out of 5 odds that a "special processing script" is executed on the message and it is forwarded through a remailer or two using encryption. just set up 20 different scripts that route the message in encrypted form through various/random/secret/obscure remailer-paths.

1 0