December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: REMAIL: Cover traffic
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hal <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> writes: (lots of neato diagrams...) Your diagrams do ignore the idea that the noise sources and bit-buckets can be the same addresses, so that real traffic between the noise sources is completely masked. The value of this depends on the number of noise sources. >So, since the eavesdropper must monitor the whole network in order to >follow messages even without cover traffic, I think it is fair to >point out that adding cover traffic doesn't help much against an >eavesdropper who can monitor the whole network. Not to put too fine a point on it, but what about the possibility of unscrupulous remailer operators with incomplete knowledge? You want to be protected on that all-important first hop. My guess is that most messages sent thru remailers end up *posted* someplace, like here or Usenet (or every mailing list in the country :). With low traffic volumes, a mailer operator can see a rant show up on CPs, check his mail logs, and say "hmm, <screwball(a)undergrad.frat> just used me for his first hop", and actually have a reasonable probability that the two are connected. However, a bunch of people with gongs and whistles making noise in the operator's ear will make this nearly impossible. >The real solution, as suggested by the diagrams, is to have a large >volume of true remailed messages in the network - messages which go to >a wide variety of people. Individual users can protect themselves to >some extent by serving as cover-traffic generators and bit-bucket >receivers; but this does not protect other users who are not able to >perform these functions. Right! People who want more security will generate lots of noise. People who don't use remailers at all can generate lots of noise. The bottom line being that generating noise increases your security as an individual a great deal and helps everybody else to boot. In theory you're completely right Hal, but in practice I think there's more to it. faust's dog -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQBpAgUBLUkzRop26HwU0zr9AQG0qQKaAqyH8v1j5g9wEbkBA8zNHThwtjAeQz57 VmnwC0+8cgB8K6Uol7FmkcFIU+lEwtXHb9FXXWOaxpNA2BTYKfzvDHxCt+fEFoCl T5aQ3oyvltuSqAL8 =dZTy -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Eliminating userids from a pgp key
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How would I remove a specific "key ID" from my public key? (I.e. -- My key has a bunch of IDs associated with it, but a few of them are not valid anymore..) Thanks, Sameer

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hh@cicada.berkeley.edu is back.
by nobody＠soda.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well... Still no answer about which remailers to use, so I'm inadvertantly testing them myself. I'm not sure if I had anything to do with it but hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu stopped responding last night but is back this morning. I finally got back the mail at least (a good thing). Here is the error. So I'd rate hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu to be a MacPlus after all? Tread lightly on this remailer? >From MAILER-DAEMON(a)cicada.berkeley.edu [date] Received: from cicada.Berkeley.EDU by [mysite] Received: from [mysite] by cicada.berkeley.edu From: MAILER-DAEMON(a)cicada.berkeley.edu (Mail Delivery Subsystem) Subject: Returned mail: Unknown mailer error -1 Message-Id: <[number](a)cicada.berkeley.edu> To: <[Myaddress> Status: R --- The transcript of the session follows --- 451 sendmail: 0832-054 Cannot create a process: There is not enough memory available now. 554 "|//home/hh/remail/slocal.pl"... Unknown mailer error -1 --- The unsent message follows --- From: [me] Message-Id: <[number]@[mysite]> To: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu Subject: Test hh@cicada :: Request-Remailing-To:[myaddress] Ping! -----Begin Test----- Test -----End Test----- -Xenon

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Re: Quantum cryptography
by jito＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm taking the liberty of forwarding this note here because email to jdblair(a)rogue.cas.muohio.EDU bounces so I couldn't thank John or ask for permission. It was the only reply I got, but I think it is really interesting so... - Joi >From: jdblair(a)rogue.cas.muohio.EDU (John Blair) >Message-Id: <9401280824.AA08537@ rogue > >Subject: Re: Quantum cryptography >To: jito(a)netcom.com (Joichi Ito) >Date: Fri, 28 Jan 1994 03:24:41 -0500 (EST) >In-Reply-To: <9401280501.AA02095(a)iikk.inter.net> from "Joichi Ito" at Jan 28, >94 02:00:22 pm >X-Comment: The enlightened man is one with the subject. -Mumon >X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL21] >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >Content-Length: 3259 > >> >> Does anyone know how quantum cryptography works? >> >> - Joi >> >> >> -- >> true name: <Joichi Ito> >> closest email address: <jito(a)netcom.com> >> closest fax number: <+81-3-5454-7218> >> current physical location: <Tokyo> >> travel path: <.> >> mosaic home page: http://iikk.inter.net/ >> -- >> finger jito(a)netcom.com for PGP Public Key, RIPEM Public Key >> -- >> > >Joi, > >Chances are you're recieving a lot of answers to this, but here's one anyways. > >This comes from: Schneier, Bruce, _Applied Cryptography_, pp 408-410, >John Wiley & Sons, Inc, New York. pp 408-410 > >Quantum cryptography relies on the property that one cannot know the >position and the velocity of a particle at the same time to prevent >evesdropping. Any evesdropper will neccessarily disturb the message in a >detectable way. Experimental quatum cryptography relies on polarized light. > >If a pulse of horizontally polarized photons is sent through a >horizontally polarized filter, 100% of the light gets through. Pass it >through a filter 45 degrees off, and each partical has a 50% chance of >making it through, and no chance of making it through a filter 90 degrees off. > >1) Alice sends Bob a string of photon pulses. Each of the pulses is >randomly polarized in one of four directions: horizontal, vertical, >left-diagonal, and right-diagonal. > >For example, Alice sends Bob: ||/--\-|-/ > >2) Bob has a polarization detector. He can set his detector to measure >horizontal and vertical polarization, or he can set his detector to >measure diagonal polarization. He can't do both; quantum mechanics won't >let him. Measuring one destroys any possibility of measuring the other. >So, he sets his detectosr at random, for example: x++xxx+x++ > >When Bob sets the detector correctly, he records the correct answer. The >rest of the time, he gets a random result. Say he gets: ||/--\-|-/ > >3) Bob, over an insecure channel, tells Alice what settings he used. > >4) Alice tells Bob which settings were correct. In this example, 2,6,7,9. > >5) Alice and Bob keep only those settings that were correct. In this >example, they keep: *|***\-*-* > >According to a pre-arranged code, such as 1 = horizontal and >left-diagonal, and 0 = vertical and right-diagonal, they have sent the >bits: 0011 > >Alice will need to send 2n pulses for every bit transmitted, since Bob >will be correct 50% of the time, on the average. These bits can be taken >as the key to a conventional algorithm, or enough can be sent to generate >a one-time pad. > >6) Alice and Bob compare a few bits in their strings. If there are >discrepancies, they know they are being bugged. If there are none, they >discard the bits they used for comparison and use the rest. > > >For a good overview (according to Schneier) see: > >C. H. Bennet, G. Brassard, and N. D. Mermin, "Quantum Cryptography," >Scientific American, v. 68, n. 5, 3 Feb 1992, pp. 557-559 > >C. Zimmer, "Perfect Gibberish," Discover, v. 13, n. 12, Dec 1992, pp. 92-99. > > >Schneier says British Telecom has used this system to send bits over a 10km >fiber-optic link. > >see: >W. Brown, "A Quantum Leap in Secret Communications," New Scientist, n. >1585, 30 Jan 1993, p. 21. > > >Hope this made sense. Its really quite amazing to think about. >-john. > > -- true name: <Joichi Ito> closest email address: <jito(a)netcom.com> closest fax number: <+81-3-5454-7218> current physical location: <Tokyo> travel path: <.> mosaic home page: http://iikk.inter.net/ -- finger jito(a)netcom.com for PGP Public Key, RIPEM Public Key --

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META: request
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hm... I have a request: (There was a security incident here at Rice; owlnet has been disconnected from internet for about 2 weeks and I think quite of bit of mail has spilled. Email has supposedly been restored, but that's it so far, and given the number of "fork: no more processes" errors I'm getting I think it'll be a bit longer...) Can anybody send me the original "Remailer Noise Traffic" or "REMAIL: Noise Cover" messages? I'd like to read them and include them at the gopher site (when I can actually telnet/ftp over there :-). I only have 20 messages from the list since the 23rd. Thanks! -- Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5 3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 "One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories

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Re: Quantum cryptography
by walter kehowski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> jito(a)netcom.com > Does anyone know how quantum cryptography works? > > - Joi Joi, NO. :-) I know there's been a Scientific American article on it within the past few years that might have more technically-detailed references. Naively, the idea is that any interference with the message can be detected because of the subtleties of QM measurement theory. It's theoretically possible but it's not something anybody'll be implementing anytime soon. Stick with PGP for now. See ya, Walter A. Kehowski <wak(a)next0.math.pitt.edu>

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No Subject
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,comp.org.eff.talk Subject: Re: NSA'S TESSERA PLAN (NYT/MARKOFF) Summary: Expires: References: <145309Z26011994(a)anon.penet.fi> <2i6g3n$ct4(a)crchh327.bnr.ca> <nagleCKBv5y.34s(a)netcom.com> Sender: Followup-To: Distribution: Organization: Loral Rolm Computer Systems Keywords: >From: nagle(a)netcom.com (John Nagle) > I'm not too worried. Clipper has been a total bomb in the marketplace. >Communications Week reports that no real Clipper products have actually been >announced. AT&T has announced non-Clipper crypto products since the >Clipper announcement. Supposedly, AT&T is going to have a Clipper product, >because NSA/DOJ ordered some, but that's just a Government procurement. 28 Jan 94, 11:55 PST I just talked to someone at AT&T Surety Systems. The TSD-3600c (the one with the clipper chip) will be available next week. The person I talked to would not elaborate as to the present backlog, but said it "wasn't just one or two". I asked if the backlog was related to orders for the Department of Justice (DOJ), and was told that availability next week was in addition to those "set aside" for delivery to DOJ. (I didn't think to ask about a DOJ delivery schedule.) If I hadn't just spent the money on fencing for corrals and paddocks, I'd order a couple to play with. Maybe I have room on a credit card...

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Re: MacPGP BAD on soda.berkeley.edu!
by nobody＠soda.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Chris Knight wrote, "How about if I send you a Valium?" Why would you want to send me a muscle relaxant? Hmmm.... -Xenon

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Today's remailer races.
by nobody＠rosebud.ee.uh.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

And they're off! Five ~45K messages each, five seconds apart. And the winners are, 1) elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 2) hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu 3) and 4) tied, ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu, hfinney(a)shell.portal.com. And hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu has tripped and DIED. Yesterday hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu died and got back up again today. Looks like either CA has fallen into the Ocean or cicada and soda aren't contenders. Comments anyone? Bets? -Xenon

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Re: 4th ammendment and Cryptography
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Phil Karn <karn(a)qualcomm.com> >Once again, I would like to say that tying cryptography to the Second >Amendment is exceptionally bad strategy for the Cypherpunks. I agree with this. I don't agree personally with liberal democrat interpetations of the 2nd Amendment. The first 10 amendments are the 'Bill of Rights' and are individual rights. >Worst of all are the complete loonies (some apparently on this list) >who assert that guns are an essential protection against a tyrannical >US Federal Government. >I am a strong believer in the right to protect one's personal privacy >through strong cryptography and other purely peaceful means. I'm not >trying to violently overthrow the government, and I'd rather not be >associated with gun fetishists who give the strong impression that >they are -- it can only hurt the cause I believe in. I'm not a democrat, republican, socialist or facist. Please don't give my rights away to support your point of view for some other imagined or real right. I am not now nor have I in the past advocated the violent overthrow of the United States. Resolved: The 2nd Amendment has nothing to do with the right to Privacy, with or without respect to cryptography as a means to insure privacy from others or the State. -------- Life Time member of the NRA, who believes Pierre comes on rabid. Libertarian. Gun owner who receives no vicarious pleasure from guns. (They don't qualify as fetish items) -------- A Country that can have a McCarthy era has no business giving more power to its government.

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