December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

new electronic cash card to be tested in UK
by Ian Turton 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An interesting article on the back page of the Guardian today, headlined Banks step up war on cash with card topped up by phone Even Street vendors could take electronic money reports Nicholas Bannister National Westminster Bank [one of the UK's big four banks] has developed an alternative to cash -- a plastic card with a microchip which stores "electronic money" and can be topped up over the phone. Yesterday it revealed plans to for a year long trial of Mondex, its electronic money sytem, starting in Swindon. [more details of trial involving 10,000 people] The system lets customers add money to thier card by using addapted cash dispensers [ATMs] or phones to access thier accounts. Once cahrged with money, the card becomes the equivalent of cash. Payments are made by slipping the card into a retailers terminal. The sum is transfered from the card to the retailer without the need for time consuming authorisations or signatures. Providing there is enough money on the card, the transaction will take place. Payments between individuals are carried out by inserting the card into a pocket sized electronic wallet and making 6 key strokes. Customers and retailers can deposit money into thier bank accounts over the phone. [... bit about how it won't cause bank staff cuts and that 90% of transactions are still cash ...] [....] the system is not designed to replace credit and debit cards. The system was designed for small and large payments. Small traders, for example a newspaper vendor, could have a battery powered terminal. He [Tim Jones, the designer] claimed it was safer, quicker and more convenient to handle electronic money rather than physical money. But if a mondex card was lost or stolen, the money on it would be lost in the same way as it would be in a missing wallet. However, cards could be locked to prevent unauthorised use by tapping in a four digit personal code. Once locked, the money could not be spent without reentering the code. [... discussion on how to modify ATMs and phones to handle cards ..] Other British and forign banks would be invited to join mondex in due course to create a "global payment scheme". [... comment from retailers saying its a good idea ...] The key to the card's security lies in the Japanese developed technology and microchip. Nat West and Midland said that technical advances had made it impossible [sic] to conterfeit cards. But Mr Jones said Mondex would have a research budget "for ever" to keep ahead of the counterfeiters. Ian Turton - School of Geography, Leeds University 0532 -333309

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Legal Aspects of IMP
by jdwilson＠gold.chem.hawaii.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CP's FYI: > Date: Wed, 08 Dec 1993 08:06:11 -0500 (EST) > From: BAUM(a)HULAW1.HARVARD.EDU > To: imp-interest(a)thumper.bellcore.com > Subject: Legal Aspects of IMP > > I have only recently seen a few of the IMP messages that have been > forwarded to me. I have also responded to at least one person individually > concerning the legal aspects of payment for the IMP. In this regard, I > mentioned that about two years ago we began the development of a > > Model Electronic Payments Agreement and Commentary (for credit transfers) > that is intended for electronic commerce purposes. Since the completion of > the document, we understand that it has been adopted by various companies, > including Airborne Express, Texaco, Baxter International, etc. It has also > been reprinted by the Banker's EDI Council in its Guidebook. I recommend that > developers of the IMP take a look at some of the conventions (and assumptions) > that are included in the Agreement. The Model includes extensive commentary > and a tuturial/introduction. > > By the way, one of the challenges to the internet community will be to narrow > the gap between localized/specialized payment approaches, and the "mainstream" > corporate and governmental payment infrastructure that already is in place. > Also, FYI, the American Bar Ass'n has a Financial EDI Committee that is now > developing a debit counterpart for the above-mentioned credit Model. > > Copies of the Model are available at cost as follows: > > Send a request to the ABA requesting: > > Model Electronic Payments Agreement and Commentary > Product Code: 545-0009 > Cost: $ 11.95 (this includes domestic delivery) > > to: > > Order Fulfillment Department > American Bar Association > 750 North Lake Shore Drive > Chicago, IL 60611-4497 > > Check, mastercard or Visa are accepted. Include your phone number. > > > For information about the Financial EDI Committee, you can contact: > Smedinghofft(a)attmail.com (Tom Smedinghoff). > > ***

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CPSR Letter to Clinton
by David Sobel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CPSR Letter to Clinton On December 6, the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group, a "coalition of over 50 communications and computer companies and associations, and consumer and privacy advocates" coordinated by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, sent a letter to President Clinton concerning cryptography policy. The letter states, "In our discussions with Administration officials, we have expressed the Coalition's tentative acceptance of the Clipper Chip's encryption scheme (as announced on April 16, 1993), but only if it is available as a voluntary alternative to widely- available, commercially-accepted, encryption programs and products." The Washington Office of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) has sent the following letter to the President. We believe that the position stated in this letter continues to represent the views of the vast majority of network users, as reflected in the overwhelmingly critical comments submitted to the National Institute of Standards and Technology in response to its recent solicitation of public comments on the Clipper proposal. ================================================================== December 8, 1993 The President The White House Washington, DC 20500 Dear Mr. President, We are writing to you regarding the Clipper cryptography proposal now under consideration by the White House and a letter you may have received about the proposal from a group called the "Digital Privacy and Security Working Group." This group wrote to you recently and expressed their "tentative acceptance" of the Clipper Chip encryption scheme. We disagree with their views. This group has made a grave mistake and does not speak for the many users of computer networks and developers of network services who have vigorously opposed this proposal. We are very much concerned about the Clipper proposal. At its core is the dubious premise that the government should have the authority to design communications networks that facilitate wire surveillance. The plan was developed in secret by the National Security Agency over the objection of U.S. firms, professional associations and public interest organizations. Key details about the proposal remain classified. This proposal must not be endorsed. The development of open, unclassified standards is critical for the future of the nation's communications infrastructure. Progress and innovation depend on the free exchange of scientific and technical information. It is essential to the integrity of the scientific process that standards are openly created and available for public review. There is also a great need to ensure that future networks are designed with the highest levels of privacy and security possible. As our country becomes ever more dependent on the high-speed network, the need for secure systems will only increase. The Clipper proposal purposefully cripples the security of the network and reduces the privacy protection that users could otherwise obtain. There is another still more serious problem with the Clipper proposal. An agency with the authority to conduct wiretaps must not be allowed to impose technical standards to facilitate wire surveillance. The threat to Constitutional democracy is clear. A system of checks and balances is essential to ensure that the powerful investigative tools of government are properly controlled. We have followed the development of this proposal with great concern. We have testified before Congressional committees. We have appeared before agency panels, provided reports on wire surveillance, and debated the former FBI Director on national television. We have also sponsored conferences with full participation from across the federal government. We believe that the best policies will result from an open and unrestricted exchange of views. It is our assessment that you must not permit adoption of the Clipper technical standard, even on a voluntary basis. At a time when the country should be moving toward open standards designed for commercial networks, the Clipper proposal asks future users of the nation's information infrastructure to accept a standard intended for the Cold War era. It is a backward-looking plan that serves neither the interests of the American people nor American business. The adoption of the Clipper proposal would also ratify an unlawful process that has undermined the authority of Congress and weakened the mechanisms of government accountability. The proper authority for the development of this standard never rested with the NSA. Under the Computer Security Act of 1987, it was a civilian agency that was to develop appropriate standards for the nation's commercial networks. Through a series of secret executive orders, the NSA usurped the authority of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, substituted its own proposal for those of NIST, and effectively derailed this important policy process. When the computer user community had the opportunity to voice its position on this proposal, it rejected the plan overwhelmingly. The notice and comment process conducted by the Department of Commerce earlier this year resulted in nearly uniform opposition to the Clipper proposal. It would be hard to find a technical standard more disliked by the potential user community. While we support the relaxation of export controls on cryptography, we are not willing to concede to the NSA the right to develop secret standards. It is only because the National Security Agency also exerts influence on export control policy that the Digital Privacy coalition is prepared to endorse the Clipper standard in exchange for new opportunities to market products. It may be a good deal for the coalition members, but it is a terrible outcome for the rest of the country. We very much appreciate your efforts on behalf of open government, and your work with the Vice President and the Secretary of Commerce to develop the nation's information infrastructure. We believe that these efforts are sending our country in the right direction, helping to develop advanced technologies appropriate for a democratic nation and to preserve open and accountable government. But the Clipper proposal was not a creation of your administration. It is a relic from a period that is now moving rapidly into the history books, a time when secret agencies made secret decisions and when backroom deals with powerful, private interests sustained these arrangements. It is time to end this cynical form of policy making. We ask you to reject the deal put forward by the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group. The Clipper proposal should not go forward. We would be pleased to meet with members of your administration to discuss this matter further. Sincerely yours, Marc Rotenberg, Director David Sobel, Legal Counsel Dave Banisar, Policy Analyst CPSR Washington office cc: The Vice President Secretary Ron Brown, Department of Commerce Anthony Lake, National Security Council Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board

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Provisional Internet Draft: Reputation Servers
by rclark＠nyx10.cs.du.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Provisional Internet Draft Reputation Servers 1. Status of this document: This document has not been submitted to any formal groups and is merely a draft for a future official draft. All comments concerning this draft should be sent to rclark(a)nyx.cs.du.edu (Robert Clark). 2. Background: Many eminent persons have discussed the need for a more methodological process of screening mailing lists and newsgroups through reputation markets. This document attempts to move toward the accomplishment of that goal, by defining it. For a reputation server to have any true worth, it must be a market. To avoid the 'rigging' of the market by means of false purchasing and sale of reputation by numerous pseudonymous entities, all messages to the server must be signed with PGP keys themselves, and those which are questionable shall be themselves counted. Those who choose not to sign their messages will be limited to the informational aspects of the server. A desirable but not strictly necessary aspect of a reputation server would be the ability to rate the initial 'buying power' of any particular key according to degrees of trustworthiness. 3. Recent Developments [This section is empty; if anyone knows of any repserver software which preexists this draft, please alert the author.] 4. Summary of Reputation Server: The author intends within 180 days of the writing of this draft to implement at least a rudimentary reputation server with the following functions: a) Accepts only encrypted and signed 'sales' [*] and 'purchases', with either PGP or other public-key software. b) Gives 'buying' power directly according to the amount of 'reputation stock' bought by others. c) Can mark certain users as being sufficiently lacking in 'reputation capital' to effect 'public opinion.' * d) Can filter a mailing list, public or private. [* indicates features which would be desirable but are not necessary.] The use of a single-quote indicates that the term used is used in an abstract way, and not as it is used in conversation. 'Public opinion' is a gestalt of the 'sales' and 'purchases' made by the participants in the market. Others can use the market for informational purposes, but will not affect the 'market value' of certain personalities. 5. Basis of the Market Each 'personality' which registers with the reputation market, by sending a PGP-signed and encrypted message, using the public key of the server, starts with a fixed sum of 'money' and a fixed price for their 'reputation stock.' Using one's initial allotment of funds, one can choose not to use it, accruing interest (which can be negative or positive, depending on whether the average 'value' of all 'personalities' is decreasing or increasing. Otherwise, one can invest the 'cash' in the reputation of others, deciding at that time how much that 'stock' is worth. The method of implementation allows an early poster with no 'reputation capital' to make a small change in the 'public opinion,' whereas a user with great 'reputation capital' has great influence on the stocks of others. A user of the system can choose to set the asking price of their 'stock' at any value, or can sell only a part of it, or not sell it at all. However, having stock and not transferring it to 'reputation capital,' while safe, is not very 'profitable.' As an example: User X, a new user, begins with a reputation value of 1000. He immediately invests 990 units of 'value' in one 'share' of User Y, with a reputation value of 5000. As Y has sold 99 'shares' for an average of 990, and has set 990 as a minimum asking price for his stock, the 'value' of an individual 'share' of Y 'stock' has remained identical. The result of this is that the 'reputation capital' of Y has increased by 990, Y's shares available to sell are 0. Y is, of course, free to purchase back her own stock; or free to purchase some of X's. [This is an incomplete definition of the market, which is to be improved in later versions of the draft. Those with better suggestions as to the implementation of the market, with less reliance upon the user to figure out 'proper' asking prices for 'shares' of 'reputation stock,' are welcomed to mail the author.] 6. Overview and Summation: A reputation market could server a valuable function, and prove to be another example of how secure crypto can be not only fashionable but functional as well. Not just drug dealers and terrorists need strong crypto, just as not just criminals need the Bill of Rights. The fact that both systems aid members of both groups simply indicates that strong crypto is good for _everyone_. Thank you. ---- rclark(a)nyx.cs.du.edu 6. Summation

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Digital cash announced today by UK bank.
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Apparently the Natwest Bank (or some spoonerism thereof) announced today that they were releasing digital cash in the form of some sort of smartcard. I have no more details - does anyone else? Primarily I'm interested in knowing if it's *anonymous* digital cash - knowing our govt, I suspect it's unlikely to be. Any new opportunities to track the masses are always gratefully received by the powers that be... G

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the clinton chip
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Have we missed an opportunity by not labelling MYK-78 the "Clinton" chip? <ring,ring> Hello Brian Williams, Mr Williams? This is Krochs and brentannos bookstore. The book you ordered "Applied Cryptography," by Bruce Scheinier has arrived. ZOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOM! Hello Mr Williams are you there? Hello?

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Re: NYT article on Mosaic
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

W>Where can you get 'Mosaic'? W>Walter A. Kehowski <wak(a)next0.math.pitt.edu> W> You need a SLIP connection or faster to Internet. For Windows: zaphod.ncsa.uiuc.edu /PC/Mosaic/wmos1_0.zip For Linux there is a slow version which will run under straight dialup: sunsite.unc.edu /pub/Linux/apps/comm/term/term/extras Hunt around those sites for other platforms. DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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dialup Mosaic!!!!??
by ccat＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there anything to prevent a dialup Mosaic for,say,Macs from being written? It would be _very_ popular... -Chris.

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Internet Backbone Traffic
by jdblair＠nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone in the past week asserted that, at $1000 a gig, one could store all of a year's worth of mail headers from the Internet backbone for under ~$8.7 million. (8700 gigs of data, I presume?) Sorry, I don't remember who it was, but I have some questions: 1) Where can I find an estimate of the mail volume on the net? 2) Are there any projections of internet usage (subscribers, mail users, etc.) over the next several years? I plan on holding an educational session on net legal issues, and I would like to point out the $8.7 million/year price tag on a mail header archive (scary potentials, to say the least), but I would like some sources to back me up if I assert it. Can anyone help me out? I'd really appreciate it. -john. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ John Blair <jdblair(a)nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu> phone: (513) 529-4879 Insert cool signature file that makes a trendy, yet bold and original statement about my cyberspace proficiency, then mentions that I'll send you my PGP public key if you want it, and you trust that I'm actually me.

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hey..
by Barbara L Marco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

can ya'll unmsubscribe me?

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