December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mr. Detweiler, I would claim that you have the brain of a cabbage, but obviously you've expended a fair quntity of intellect figuring out this tremendous conspiracy of cryptoanarchists and their devious leaders attempting to sink you (if they're anarchists, how can they have leaders anyhow?) Dozens of people have stated that they have met all the people you think are the same. You are living in a self-consistant delusion -- there is no way to demonstrate to your satisfaction that your claims are false, because you won't accept testimonial evidence and you wont go through any effort to check out the evidence you have been given that you can check out yourself. There is no amount of effort that will convince you of the truth. Meanwhile, you continue to post huge disruptive messages about topics 99% of the net doesn't care about both under your name and under "an12070(a)anon.penet.fi" to dozens of newsgroups. I'd say if anyone around here is a problem its YOU. Nick Szabo is a real human being, last I checked. He was a computer science major at U.W. and later worked at JPL in Pasadena. He shared a basement apartment with a Tibetan holy man. While he was about as odd as any other hardcore C-Sci guy I know of, he's a lousy candidate to be a leader, a tentacle, or any other part of a massive cryptoanarchist conspiracy. This won't dissuade you (obviously, I'm just another member of the conspiracy. My tenous link with Nick proves it for a fact. In fact, Jeremy Anderson is just an alias! I picked up the driver's license, credit cards, passport, and personality dossier 8 years ago in Tiajuana from a shadowy man known only as "rodriguez, with two lower case r's".) Let's try a different tact. Yes Detweiler. You have sucessfully exposed the international cryptoanarchist conspiracy. Unfortunately, our vast experience with media manipulation and our connections with the highest levels of government will hamper your ability to make further progress. We are proud to count as members of our conspiracy such luminaries as Socks Clinton, Bobby Inman, Connie Chung Yu-Hwa (who while mascarading as a mild-mannered TV anchor is our connection with the Chinese Kuomintang's massive intelligence apparatus), and the 23 secret leaders of the Masons. We've been monitoring your actions for years with bugs, wiretaps, and secret agents. One night, while you slept, a crack surgical terrorist team entered your domicile, sedated you heavily, and planted radio-controlled electrodes in your head. Should you ever get a positive identification on any of the leaders of our cabal, a radio signal will be sent causing you to go into a massive seizure, whereupon the elctrodes will disintegrate, leaving no trace of our work for the forensics experts to sift through. The situation really is hopless Detweiler. We can wipe your existence off the face of the planet any time. While we figure you're too driven and fanatical to co-opt, we're happy to fight to a draw. Congratulate yourself. Your superior intellect has exposed more about the inner workings of our organization (and I use the term loosely) than we expected any mere mortal to be able to manage. We consider our protection mechanisms to be strong enough that you won't be able to cause much damage to our command and control structure. Relax, take the day to go hiking in the mountains, enjoy life, and know that your personal desires and plans are safe from interference for now. Regards, Jeremy Anderson Assistant Secretary of Propaganda United Thought Patrol P.S. Don't try to archive this message, it's wired with virtual explosives. -- Jeremy Anderson Freelance programmer and Chinese translator jeremy(a)cyberspace.com PGP public key available on request Good cheer and smiles dispensed freely

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Export request (CJR) filed for Kerberos Bones
by gnu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a Commodity Jurisdiction Request for the bones of the Kerberos distribution. This "Bones" distribution has the encryption stripped out to make it exportable (we hope). A CJR is a formal request to the State Department for them to determine what kind of export license is required for this item. This request has been asigned case # 012-94. The State Department has 15 working days to tell us whether the Bones are officially exportable or not, and under what rules. I'll post the results when they come in. One of the games that the State Dept. and NSA play is to not reveal exactly what is exportable, so that people will err on the side of safety (and export fewer things with crypto in them). By sharing information among ourselves, we can find out what the real rules are. This CJR was made using Lee Tien's CJR kit, available for FTP on cygnus.com:/pub/export.cjr.kit. John Gilmore Cygnus Support John Gilmore Generalist Cygnus Support 1937 Landings Drive Mt. View, CA 94043 +1 415 903 1418 +1 415 903 0122 fax ATTN: Maj Gary Oncale - 15 Day CJ Request U.S. Department of State Office of Defense Trade Controls PM/DTC SA-6 Room 200 1701 N. Fort Myer Drive Arlington, VA 22209-3113 Fax +1 703 875 5845 ATTN: 15 Day CJ Request Coordinator National Security Agency P.O. Box 246 Annapolis Junction, MD 20701 Subject: Mass Market Software with Encryption - 15 Day Expedited Review Requested Subject: Commodity Jurisdiction Request for "Kerberos 900104 bones.tar.Z patchlevel 6" INTRODUCTION This is a Commodity Jurisdiction Request for mass market software with encryption capabilities. The name of the software product is "Kerberos 900104 bones.tar.Z patchlevel 6". We have no DTC registration code. We have reviewed and determined that the software, which is the subject of the CJ request, meets paragraph 1 of the "Criteria for Determining the Eligibility of A Mass Market Software Product for Expedited Handling." A duplicate copy of this CJR has been sent to the 15 Day CJ Request Coordinator. DESCRIPTION The software is an authentication system for networked computers. It is a component of the MIT Athena project, which built various software for automating the administration and operation of large networks of computers. The Kerberos software is undoubtedly familiar to your agency. We believe that previous CJR's have been made on it, including at least one from Digital Equipment Corporation. The Kerberos system authenticates individual users in a network environment. It bases security on a `secret' which is shared between a central Kerberos server and the user. This secret is a cryptographic key based on the user's password, with which the user can prove who they are by being able to decrypt sealed messages from the server. After the user has authenticated herself to Kerberos, she can use familiar Berkeley Unix network utilities such as rlogin, rcp, and rsh, without having to present passwords to remote hosts and without having to rely on insecure ``.rhosts'' files. These utilities will work without passwords only if the remote machine supports the Kerberos protocols. If not, the normal facilities will be used. Kerberos provides the following benefits: * Security against outside attackers. * Security against inside attackers. * Convenience in a distributed workstation environment. * Augmentation of an existing security organization. * Standardized access control mechanisms. I have enclosed a technical paper, "Kerberos: An Authentication Service for Open Network Systems", from the 1988 Winter USENIX Conference Proceedings. This "Bones" version of the Kerberos software has been specially prepared for export by removing the encryption routines and the calls to the encryption routines. We are submitting this CJ to confirm the the official opinion of the Department of State on whether we require a State Department and/or Commerce Department license to export this software. ORIGIN OF COMMODITY The item was originally designed for its current use. It was created as part of MIT's Project Athena in the 1980's. It was designed for commercial use without concern for military use. An example of its commercial use is in authenticating students who work from various workstations on a campus, connected via local-area and wide-area networks. The item was developed with private funding. The item is currently publicly available on the Internet via FTP (file transfer protocol) from the machine athena-dist.mit.edu (18.71.0.38) in directory /pub/kerberos/dist/900104/bones.tar.Z. Its documentation is available as /pub/kerberos/dist/900104/doc.tar.Z.aa and doc.tar.Z.ab. We obtained the item and documentation from that location. CURRENT USE The current use of this item is to provide user authentication for computer users in a network. The software provides: * a server which runs on a physically secured computer and which stores the password of each user * library routines which establish communication between the server and other programs * utility programs for administering the authentication system klist, kinit, kdestroy, ksu, ksrvtgt, kadmin, kprop * modified versions of readily available networking programs, which use the library routines for authentication, including: tftp - trivial file transfer protocol sample - a sample application knetd - user authentication daemon rsh and rshd - remote shell rlogin and rlogind - remote login rcp - remote file copy The uses of the item have not changed significantly over time. Most of the product market is commercial. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS There are no military standards or specifications that the item is designed to meet. There are no special characteristics of the item, including no radiation-hardening, no ballistic protection, no hard points, no TEMPEST capability, no thermal and no infrared signature reduction capability, no surveillance, and no intelligence gathering capability. The item does not use image intensification tubes. The item originally used encryption algorithms for authentication, using the DES (Data Encryption Standard), however these algorithms and the calls to them have been removed to facilitate export approval. OTHER INFORMATION We recommend that this item and its technical documentation be determined to be in the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department. We believe that it qualifies for the general license GTDA for General Technical Data to All Destinations, because it qualifies as "publicly available" and contains no encryption routines or hooks for encryption. ATTACHMENTS I have enclosed a technical paper, "Kerberos: An Authentication Service for Open Network Systems", from the 1988 Winter USENIX Conference Proceedings. I have also enclosed the README file from the MIT directory where we obtained the software, which describes what was done to the software to make it more suitable for export. If there are any technical questions, NSA has direct access to the full source code and online documentation via the Internet. The item is currently publicly available on the Internet via FTP (file transfer protocol) from the machine athena-dist.mit.edu (18.71.0.38) in directory /pub/kerberos/dist/900104/bones.tar.Z. Its documentation is available as /pub/kerberos/dist/900104/doc.tar.Z.aa and doc.tar.Z.ab. We obtained the item and documentation from that location. Sincerely, John Gilmore Generalist Cygnus Support -- John Gilmore gnu(a)toad.com -- gnu(a)cygnus.com -- gnu(a)eff.org ``This committee has not tried to determine whether the National Security Agency tendency to advance exaggerated claims of authority ... stems from conscious policy or the actions of individual NSA employees.'' The Government's Classification of Private Ideas, House Report 96-1540, p. 67

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SoundBlaster clone for voice encryption
by edgar＠spectrx.saigon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I bought a Sound Blaster Clone card a couple of days ago for $65, including a nice integrated stereo headset and hands-free microphone. The Brand name is "Sound Sparc Mecer Multimedia Sound System". It claims to be compatible with Sound Blaster V2.0. I purchased it at the Campbell Domino Computer store; probably other members of the chain also have it. The reason I mention it here is that this unit might work well along with a 9600bps or higher modem & appropriate software (to be developed) to implement an encrypted phone system for real-time (or close) voice. Anyone working on a similar project please contact me via E-mail so we can compare notes. -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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Re: Welcome to IIA (fwd)
by Graham Toal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Here's the IIA info message that has caused all the furor: What furor? - what group is this being discussed in? (I've been netless for three weeks catching up onlost time with my wife) All this free! Wow! Hmmm... cynical old me says if I look at this closely enough I'll find a request for credit card numbers... > If you do not use the 800 number you will never receive a charge. > If you find the 800 number more economical than direct dial than > you will be billed in 10 dollar increments. A charge will be > rolled over until all time has been exhausted. Without receiving > a Credit Card Number, the IIA cannot provision an account. > (We apologize for this inconvenience to our users planning on > direct dial. Shortly we plan to rectify this through programming, > but until that time we must adhere to the policy of our > long-distance provider.) Yep, there it is. Be careful folks, be VERY careful... G

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Announcing SecureDrive Version 1.2
by edgar＠spectrx.saigon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is to announce the availability of Version 1.2 of SecureDrive. This release of Secure Drive is based on release 1.0, mostly written by Mike Ingle <mikeingle(a)delphi.com> The code which we wrote is not copyrighted, but the program contains GNU Copylefted code, and therefore may be freely distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence. Version 1.2 adds significant new function. As of Version 1.2, you may use an operand /PGP with LOGIN, either by itself, or with other operands. By itself, LOGIN /PGP will prompt for a passphrase and set the PGPPASS environment variable with whatever is entered. If PGPPASS is already set then LOGIN D: /PGP or LOGIN /F /PGP will use whatever PGPPASS is set to as the passphrase. For the hard disk partition, LOGIN will test the PGPPASS passphrase. If it is incorrect, then it will prompt you for another passphrase. If PGPPASS is NOT set when these forms of LOGIN are used, than a passphrase is prompted for AND PGPPASS is set to this passphrase. This is more secure than using the SET command since LOGIN only echoes "*"'s when entering the passphrase. As of Version 1.2, typing LOGIN /C /PGP will clear the SecureDrive crypto keys from memory AND clear the PGPPASS environment variable. This is done in a manner less likely to leave your passphrase in memory than just using the DOS SET command. In addition, Version 1.2 clears all the free memory it can find, which is likely to include some plaintext. However, if you want to be absolutely sure all traces of sensitive data are erased from memory then turning off the computer is still recommended. As of version 1.2, if PGPPASS is set before you run CRYPTDSK, CRYPTDSK will ask to use the value of PGPPASS for the passphrase before prompting you (for encryption), or try PGPPASS (for decryption). Obviously, if you encrypt or decrypt a lot of diskettes at once, this feature can save you a lot of typing. The purpose of these changes is to allow you to enter a single passphrase only once per boot IF you choose to use the same passphrase for your PGP secret key, your SecureDrive encrypted hard disk partition, and SecureDrive encrypted floppies. Mike Ingle and I have different opinions on the distribution of SecureDrive. Under the GNU General License (copyleft) I do not need Mike's permission to distribute version 1.2 and I have not asked for same. My policy on distribution is in the version 1.2 doc: Exporting this program. Cryptography is export controlled, and sending this program outside the country may be illegal. Don't do it. The "author" of version 1.2, Edgar Swank, says that the export ban should not prevent you from placing this program on public BBS's and anonymous FTP sites in the US and Canada. If individuals outside the US/Canada use the internet or international long distance to obtain copies of the program, THEY may be breaking US law. Any such foreign individuals should be aware that US law enforcement may legally (under US law) apprehend individuals who break US laws even if such individuals are not on or even have never been on US soil. Such apprehension may remove such individuals directly to US jurisdiction without benefit of extradition proceedings in such individuals' home country(ies). This has actually happened in at least two cases, Mexico -- suspect in murder of US drug agent, Panama -- Noriega -- indicted in absencia for drug smuggling. As is well known, after a small war with Panama, Noriega was brought to the USA, tried and convicted. He is now a guest of the US Government in a Florida prison. SecureDrive Version 1.2 is already available for download on the following public BBS's as SECDRV12.ZIP: Eagle's Nest (408)223-9821 Flying Dutchman (408)294-3065 I will send a copy via E-mail to any person with a US/Canada net address who requests a copy and will upload it to a public BBS or anonymous FTP site. (I don't have access to FTP from my account here). Here is the contents of SECDRV12.ZIP: Searching ZIP: E:/TLXD/ZIP/SECDRV12.ZIP Length Method Size Ratio Date Time CRC-32 Attr Name ------ ------ ----- ----- ---- ---- -------- ---- ---- 1632 DeflatX 1260 23% 12-04-93 00:43 980125ec --w- KEY.ASC 19664 DeflatX 4183 79% 11-19-93 21:42 22c2502c --w- CRYPT2.ASM 8027 DeflatX 2244 73% 01-06-94 21:42 801b1439 --w- CRYPTDSK.C 152 Stored 152 0% 01-09-94 00:38 96da6ef2 --w- SECTSR.SIG 152 Stored 152 0% 01-09-94 00:39 61d155dc --w- LOGIN.SIG 1632 DeflatX 1082 34% 01-09-94 00:15 90d6bca6 --w- SECTSR.COM 152 Stored 152 0% 01-09-94 00:39 8e8cc6c4 --w- CRYPTDSK.SIG 6320 DeflatX 1990 69% 01-07-94 11:44 a7faa9a8 --w- LOGIN.C 29800 DeflatX 14644 51% 01-09-94 00:14 e4b79fe7 --w- CRYPTDSK.EXE 33 Stored 33 0% 07-16-93 06:09 aa6151a5 --w- M.BAT 1252 DeflatX 502 60% 01-09-94 00:07 24a04819 --w- MAKEFILE 11557 DeflatX 3277 72% 05-09-93 19:38 e71f3eea --w- MD5.C 3407 DeflatX 1097 68% 05-11-93 12:49 f1f58517 --w- MD5.H 6190 DeflatX 2081 67% 01-04-94 16:21 38e843f7 --w- SDCOMMON.C 18346 DeflatN 6680 64% 01-13-94 15:17 94491e3e --w- SECDRV.DOC 2019 DeflatX 664 68% 01-04-94 17:03 cc63f413 --w- SECDRV.H 28336 DeflatX 7336 75% 11-19-93 20:45 790c6e41 --w- SECTSR.ASM 7507 DeflatX 2581 66% 12-29-93 21:15 ceda9b20 --w- SETENV.ASM 1254 DeflatX 541 57% 05-09-93 19:39 182978aa --w- USUALS.H 29482 DeflatX 14440 52% 01-09-94 00:15 2e2202bb --w- LOGIN.EXE ------ ------ --- ------- 176914 65091 64% 20 Also note that the ZIP file contains PGP detached signatures (*.SIG) for the executable files. Finally here is my public key, also available on many public keyservers; note who has signed it. Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 1024/87C0C7 1992/10/17 Edgar W. Swank <edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com> - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAirfypkAAAEEAKe2jziPeFw6hY19clR2GtQ4gtGCSSVOTgPKEJzHfuC74Scf 9PEuu1kebLhHk43A9wo1vr52o4jpH/P/tnFmRtBQOMzLUzAt5rMucswtSVviMQS2 hBuc9yGJKWHVcyfA79EARKEYTdhx+2qKI+hFJcPE+rmD8wVoF94nNf3ah8DHAAUR tClFZGdhciBXLiBTd2FuayA8ZWRnYXJAc3BlY3RyeC5zYWlnb24uY29tPokAlQIF ECwAALo04ip/MkW/XQEBmNQD/0jUVqT0LMoVvw7Zz2FXyWrdBn6bRlyGxeqQWhig DXRipZ824/fHbA2vkbAczEayw8ZpwRVmhWNsxxWhjYFIi92KYJbAP/XIbr+rEuTI hPKKKKhuuGLUWhfXhCFluHjs3CA6ZQwnT4jnu1NlCkcnWLbL4ktqub2zLwrHCPUe 31L1iQCUAgUQK9Y50xgzoWUItwfFAQHPrAPzBbf6lQyzwbUwdxayzLDoh3Hygnun Looi+yzziEVQchOgSt3sLe2I108DLxTgp+26lJYTAZB+Gg8HGyB+Nz6263D0XlVU XQi9/7CSRyd8bhYFeuFPwFzHPWZlyLDAIsuaEfBsmp2DBLgffvhUCqiiWYmP9oa+ rOA+5IHS+xN8tIkAVQIFECu5dYOzvL/Jh3qmYQEBYDICAI5KdaTiPr2Y1OtRCTi6 xMG6hnRNalvK9C5d/bxrKnUYqsfSpKayX+Ts9psmq6a6doOrX3AAtgcZuTCYUfQk d22JAJUCBRArlzITocE4X0qvAOUBAahdA/4rRoSVp3G+Ki0wvkcAvpnwt7vSEYpH XSkyoC8LdAqs9bft5NDTOykgw5H1qFG1Doqk6oR0yxY0k91eVoBVclLWDb94sNO3 JjHJKO/QdODik5DpmXEnQhBfLlujuYkCtJjoBv1+QdImnnv9aNidGuLAneNvZ+UN NqfE3IRShzNw3IkAlQIFECtj5iw2VpfGMt2Y2QEBDEYD/2iMMml65eFaNWrNP7ab Yh8QW3+Mnjyl5CNpAjGkxejmIm4nZKqUHN5DuGzpJDnstRwbz6daXK15XcoM1m8g uhu6UzIwHs9+hbKE6inTCz4C0mE55PSmvF/ejjexnGzsiFpuFnjN/sRrSHc57flO IUWBCZD8Hizz3aYBxmvwJ863iQCVAgUQKxEXHOJ13g7/Z/cLAQGyYgP/apcv9V2M bHFgU0hl0D4MLqGjBReUfDroxQCsgsTb/0nr1W9yltBMqYPgD7ThLAf2rxIPNbGy D7VUA27LTwQTS6n2mbtkHOvGQVw7J2GwTA6319Gf0Qne0M1h7VJWjFX0Vzjuh/nk 6btxM2uTLSF2nUsDXe5/9N5XeesFhrbXNrM= =4fGE - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLTXdxN4nNf3ah8DHAQFFMwP/Uv1qYwds9Yl7dmMYchKdHMKaHbztog66 x2bf9kTnfCOiRPnIjMmMPOlbnFe7mm/v214iMkRE1WGuQcMS34P/zGuWG0zsBbjG EbJg6bL/8F3QPx8HapX2JAi8dF7xrVgL9fGvmRjmv6TSOI/PnLGpXYx9L8wRPhwh y/uQA1bGyT8= =pfy8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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Re: Public key encryption, in
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- uunet!qualcomm.com!karn (Phil Karn) writes: > This got me thinking about the impossibility of regulating and taxing > the international transmission of information. At the time I was > thinking more in terms of the impossibility of enforcing US import > duties; who's to say what a particular magtape is worth? If this guy > is still in business I suspect he has long since replaced physical > magtape shipments with electronic transfers, which bypasses Customs > completely. Last summer I needed to send a magtape with custom-written software to Oman, and needed to declare a value for customs; neither the State Department nor Customs nor Federal Express nor DHL had any idea whether I was supposed to declare the value of the software or the value of the tape carrying the software. I settled on the value of the tape if it was blank, based on the notion that a copy of the software wasn't worth much; it was the legal right to use the software which was valuable, and that wasn't being shipped. (Electronic transfer wasn't possible as the Omanis were very particular about which modems could be used with their telephone system, and it took longer to find an approved modem than it did to ship the magtape.) As far as I could tell, the thing the Omanis were most concerned with was preventing the import of pornography or other forbidden data; I don't think many of the people involved in processing the shipment understood that the tape could easily have contained those forbidden images. - -- Greg Broiles "Sometimes you're the windshield, greg(a)goldenbear.com sometimes you're the bug." -- Mark Knopfler -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQCVAgUBLTcLZH3YhjZY3fMNAQHOfAP+I9+gSLfv8gSyMgZhwg7bJga/mA8MVFX1 GsUR+y4av3QLgz+gbWSnbymo77tvpcTjzmGn6gZemlaifgEQMFFByMdooK9wSMgX 72lFSGnko12lX44StWI6VCIbg3uQvCpE05cK9Cs0b2aJ/bnmoaghUIClKf/YovZy c/mKDHNu/HY= =BGBS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: why govt's get bigger
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 0:05 1/14/94 -0500, gregguy(a)aol.com wrote: >frode(a)toaster.SFSU.EDU (Frode Odegard) asked the rather sweeping question of >why governments get bigger. > >Actually, this is one of the great (but often unsung) libertarian proofs. >Governments act as any rational being acts -- in their own self interest. As >the distillers of laws and collectors of taxes, however, they just have a >better shot at self-interest nirvanna than the rest of us. > >//greg brooks (gregguy(a)aol.com PGP key available on keyservers) Any sucessful biological entity acts in its own self interest. It need not be logical or concious. The libertarian would call the governement a parasite. The book Bionomics by Rothchild examines this anology in detail.

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TV appearance you might want to record.
by crunch＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To who it may concern, yours truly will be interviewed on FOX Television due to air nationwide. Locally, it will be aired at 10:30 PM on Channel 2 on the 22nd of Jan. During which time, my obedient VCR will be taping it while I'm enjoying myself at "Industrial Strength" rave. The topic of discussion will be Phone Hackers, and cryptography. so if there is anything I should say in relation or on behalf of Cypherpunks, please let me know. Taping will be done at my place in Marin on Tuesday. The name of the program is "On the Money", so for those not in the Bay Area, check your TV listing for times and channels.

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ANNOUNCE: Secure Drive 1.1
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

INTRODUCING S E C U R E D R I V E 1 . 1 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ AVAILABLE NOW Secure Drive 1.0 users: Secure Drive 1.1 has three improvements over V1.0: * Two-drives bug fixed. Secure Drive 1.0 could get the drive letters out of order if you had two physical hard drives. V1.1 fixes this problem. * Enhanced passphrase security: Secure Drive 1.0 used a simple MD5 of the passphrase as the IDEA key. This allowed a fast passphrase search. V1.1 iterates the passphrase hash 2048 times to slow down an attacker. * One-step passphrase change. CRYPTDSK allows you to easily change your passphrase, without a separate encrypt/decrypt cycle. This also enhances security: there is no "window of opportunity" during which the data is in clear on the disk, and no magnetic traces of the plaintext. There is a Secure Drive version 1.2 going around. I was not aware of it until I saw an announcement on the Cypherpunks. This version contains some enhancements to interact with the PGPPASS variable, enabling you to easily use the same passphrase with PGP and Secure Drive. ***HOWEVER - it does not include either the bug fix or the security enhancements of version 1.1. While I would like to see these PGP-compatible features included in Secure Drive, the bugs need to be fixed. For now, please use V1.1. You will need to decrypt and re-encrypt your hard drive, because the new hashing algorithm generates a different IDEA key for the same passphrase. I will talk to the author of V1.2 about adding his improvements to V1.1 to create a version 1.3 soon. Secure Drive 1.1 is available within the U.S. and Canada ONLY, due to US export laws. FTP to csn.org, cd /mpj, and read README.MPJ. This is an export-controlled FTP site which also carries RIPEM and other cryptographic software. The file README.MPJ will explain how to access the cryptographic code from within the U.S. and Canada. You will be able to download immediately; there is no sign-up-and-wait procedure. (Ad continues) Do you have confidential or sensitive information on your DOS/Windows PC or laptop? Imagine what could happen if that data were to fall into the wrong hands through theft or unauthorized access. Protect your privacy with SecureDrive. SecureDrive allows you to create an encrypted hard drive partition and encrypted floppy disks. All of your sensitive data is automatically encrypted with the state-of-the-art IDEA cipher. You simply log in with your passphrase, and the program is completely transparent to your applications. The TSR uses only 2K RAM, and encrypts at the sector level. An intruder gets nothing - not even your directory listing. You can decrypt your disks at any time. The program automatically switches on and off as you access encrypted and unencrypted floppies. Invalid passwords will cause a Drive Not Ready error, locking out writes and protecting your data from damage. The program is Copylefted under the GNU General Public License, and source code in C and assembly language is included. This program is free and always will be. This program may be freely distributed within the U.S. and Canada; do not export it. Cypherpunks Write Code!

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Electronic tax filing
by remail＠tamsun.tamu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This raises some interesting security issues. Elsewhere is was reported that no encryption is used between the home PC and the central transmission site. --------------------------- forwarded from alt.internet.services: I`ve gotten many request for further info so I`ll just repost the details here. Dave Hi, I've been involved with electronic tax filing (EFT) for six years now. I develope and sell a tax filing package which allows you to basically enter the data from a completed return and transfer directly to the IRS or to one of our transmission sites. This is a tax filing not a tax prep program. Our main market is tax preparers who buy the program and transmitt direct to the IRS, tax preparers who register with us and transmitt returns to us to transmitt to the IRS and tax preparers who fax us returns and we enter the data and transmitt. The IRS has several transmission sites all over the country which processes everybody`s returns. And they have a set schedule of when a refund is sent. Basically returns are processed every Tuesday night. What this means is that if your return has been sent and passed the IRS acceptanced tests by Monday night the IRS will process it Tuesday and if you do direct deposit it will be in your bank account in 10 days, if you have it mailed it will be mailed in 12 days. If your interested in doing EFT from your home IBM or clone let me know. We also work with non tax preparers who have registered with the IRS to do electronic filing and have a electronic filing indentification number (EFIN). The IRS can give you these rather quickly, they do a background check to see if you do not owe back taxes or have been convicted of any felonies and if that works you get a EFIN. Once you have an EFIN we can work with you to set you up for EFT. Basically if you transmitt to us we give you the software and charge you per return. What you do is find your clients ( and they are your clients you must see then personally and have them sign a EFT form which gets sent with their W2s to the IRS by you ) enter there returns with our software and send to one of our transmission sites. If your interested in filing taxes electronicaly ( not preparing ) you need to contact the IRS to get your EFIN number. There is no fee to get a EFIN number, you must file a form with the IRS and pass their background check. If you do this and would like to work with us you need to register which is $20. After that we will send you the data entry program and the charge will be $3 per return with a minimun charge of $5 for each data file of returns you send us. This simple means that you send us a data file over modem of 1 return we will charge $5. If it has 2 returns it would be $6 which is $3 per return. After you file 100 returns through us the price will drop to $2 per return but there will still be the $5 minimun per data file ( a data file can have up to 500 returns ). What you charge the taxpayer for filing his taxes is your decision. Charges vary from around $15 to $75 for filing. If you want to register call 614-676-1333 or 614-676-5666 but contact the IRS first to get your EFIN. Electronic filing runs from Jan 11 to Aug 15. Thanks Dave ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about this anonymous remail service, send mail to remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu with the word "remail help" as the only words in the subject field.

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