December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Curve Encrypt 1.0 Release Announcement
by edgar＠spectrx.saigon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Will Kenney posted: Curve Encrypt 1.0, IDEA encryption for the Macintosh is now available for ftp from ripem.msu.edu, directory: ... Distribution: Curve Encrypt (c)1994 Curve Software. Permission granted for distribution within the United States only. It's fine with me if you make the software available by giving it to your friends, putting it on _local_ BBS's, taping floppies to stalls in the men's room, things like that. But don't export the software, and don't make it available on places like international anonymous ftp sites. And please make sure that the people you give the software to understand the export restrictions. This applies the application and the source and anything that _contains_ Curve Software copyrighted source. Is this sufficiently clear to keep me from getting Swanked? You need have no concern about Swank himself since he is not interested in Macintosh software. It should protect you from being "Swanked" (thank you for making a verb out of my name; a rare honor) by others -if- you independently wrote all the code. But if you copied, for example, the IDEA code from a copylefted product like PGP or SecureDrive then the copyleft applies to your entire product; at least that's my understanding. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLUWy3N4nNf3ah8DHAQGBvwP/XMRhqOr8OSOj5IHWMdRD0k8yi9bXDU+T 3oI3sSmshLSl3VRj9FRX4c6ZqUGFt6T10PWxN5Hc2/prkdx6Cvn2XnY9rejZ7F+2 aEJ2lUtXnAASm07BS7mCPzSZyyYR2THVLQVZapj5YSY+mybhYX5fRpOrOcUxwNH5 ZS7MB1gLOcU= =inso -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

1 0

unsubscribe
by smm＠engr.uark.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

please remove me from the list. There is still TOO much traffic to read. thanx, steve

1 0

Examples of Digital cash in use
by Aviel David Rubin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am compiling a list of places that are actually using digital cash. If anyone knows of current implementations, or of any plans that will probably be implemented, can you please send me the info.? Thanks a lot.

1 0

Re: Randomness of a bit string
by m5＠vail.tivoli.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Thompson writes: > its a joke, you didn't get it, or Ray's bought into > the biggest joke of 2 years hence. No, it was a joke, and I'm just ignorant. Duhh. Thanks to everybody who sent mail and didn't call me an idiot. -- | GOOD TIME FOR MOVIE - GOING ||| Mike McNally <m5(a)tivoli.com> | | TAKE TWA TO CAIRO. ||| Tivoli Systems, Austin, TX: | | (actual fortune cookie) ||| "Like A Little Bit of Semi-Heaven" |

2 1

Re: Randomness of a bit string
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I remember one of those MENSA-type tests where your were supposed to >find the pattern in a set of numbers. One of the strings were the >stops of a NY City subway line! ...thereby demonstrating that Stephen Hawking, for instance, is probably not qualified to join the ranks of Mensa. I wish people would learn to distinguish "intelligence" from "high tolerance for retaining massive amounts of pointless trivia". Sorry, just a peeve of mine. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

2 1

Remailer Noise Traffic
by W. Kinney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Is there some reason why lots of 'punks _aren't_ running a simple script that will, say, fire a message to one's self through a chain of remailers every time you log on or at random intervals or something? This may be an imerfect solution to the problem of traffic analysis, but it's so uncomplicated that there seems no reason not to do it. And if there were fifty or a hundred people or so making a practice of this, it seems to be agreed that the remailers would be a great deal more secure than they are now. This is a nice little opportunity for everybody to help out the remailer operators. God knows, this list seems to be capable of generating sufficient noise -- all we have to do is harness it :-). The question is, how much traffic is _too_ much? Recommendations from remailer people? -- Will -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLUZCnffv4TpIg2PxAQFYLgP8DihQb+OXI8kqYcjmt/KI/1XZ39CzSa/r 8Af74o33GUPjGLjtayWTqWFRZbjHMMhr9xH6bgtjUz2AxhrANoeZRHm9J7pkJchN oKwDryooOexlyO88quriQsMv8trlh7UEtWf1Ig4shSgVpJUMPDkad6LHVYk3fnFn 7Un2p6cYUKU= =e6+8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

4 3

SunFed protests NSA procurement in High Performance Workstations 2
by gnu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Florida SunFlash SunNews: SunFed Protest, Sun Foundation Grants SunFLASH Vol 61 #17 January 1994 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 61.17.A Subject: SunFed Files Protest with GAO If you have questions regarding this announcement, please contact John Leahy at (703) 204-4818. SUN FEDERAL FILES AGENCY PROTEST WITH THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE Company Challenges "Round Two" of the NSA-HPW2 Workstation Procurement VIENNA, Virg. -- January 12, 1994 -- On Jan. 7, Sun Microsystems Federal, Inc., the original awardee of the National Security Agency (NSA) HPW2 (High Performance Workstation) contract, filed a formal protest with the Government Accounting Office (GAO) challenging the rebid of the procurement. It is Sun Federal's contention that the Maryland Procurement Office (MPO) has violated Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) by substantially changing the requirements of the original solicitation. The company is asking the GAO to direct the MPO to cancel this solicitation and issue a new specification based on current requirements. Sun Microsystems Federal, Inc., is the leading vendor of open client-server computing solutions to the government. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sun Microsystems, Inc., with headquarters in Milpitas, Calif.

1 0

Re: The Packwood Memorial Diary Server
by drzaphod＠brewmeister.xstablu.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Need it be any more secure than the crypto system you would use on your > own harddisk (which could get confiscated)? > > Jim_Miller(a)suite.com Both crypto systems should be as secure as possible; however, if your documents are spinning somewhere in v-space then you've lost one piece of security: The Physical Lock. If any organization DOES find a way to break the code, then they can easily go thru the public archive and read EVERYTHING. -- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- - DrZaphod #Don't Come Any Closer Or I'll Encrypt! - - [AC/DC] / [DnA][HP] #Xcitement thru Technology and Creativity - - [drzaphod(a)brewmeister.xstablu.com] [MindPolice Censored This Bit] - - 50 19 1C F3 5F 34 53 B7 B9 BB 7A 40 37 67 09 5B - -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

1 0

Re: 4th ammendment and Cryptography
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Phil Karn <karn(a)qualcomm.com> >Two recommendations: >"In Our Defense - The Bill of Rights in Action", Ellen Alderman and >Caroline Kennedy [yes, *that* Caroline Kennedy], Morrow, ISBN 0-688-07801-X. With all due respect, I find it difficult to reconcile Ms. Kennedys assertion that "the people" refers collectively to state organized militia in the second amendment, without carrying this inference elsewhere. Her book is extremely fast reading, and well, light.

4 6

Re: clipper pin-compatible chip
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: m5(a)vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) >I don't think the idea proposed is to reverse-engineer the Clipper. >Rather, the idea is that once you know the pin-out you can make an >electrically-compatible (and, in important ways, software-compatible) >replacement. While the clipper chip and its CCEP brethern have chip specifications that imply that key is supplied as long as a read flag is in a certain state. The key for the clipper chip is 10 bytes of actual key plus 3 bytes of cryptographic check word (CCW), for a total of 13 bytes. Operating in a system expecting a clipper chip potentially restricts the keyspace. Non-centrally selected keys use the clipper chip to 'fish' for the CCW, where it is re-fed. The host system (to the clipper chip) is going to try and feed 10 bytes plush 3 bytes of a constant. Utilizing IDEA, the key is supposed to be 16 Bytes. The point being that dropping an IDEA chip in is not 'plug and play'.

7 6