December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Knights who say NII (was Crypto(A), govt & NII)
by fnerd＠smds.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May writes (1): > Having read the three main "position papers" on NII (the White House > paper, the CPSR analysis, and the EFF "Open Platform" piece), I'm as > convinced as ever that the Data Highway is largely about regaining > control of the currently anarchic network system. Mike Godwin replies (2): > For what it's worth, I don't think this interpretation can be read into > EFF's Open Platform paper. A rotated view on each of these. 1) NII is not "about" anything in particular. You can look at what each person talking about it means in each instance, or you can look at what effect the ideas will have when they become incarnated in government organizations and rules, and take on lives of their own. Or you can look at the process that keeps the topic alive as a popular issue. I'm not sure what kind of "about" Tim was talking. 2) It doesn't matter so much what interpretations can be read into EFF's, or anyone's papers. What matters is the effect they'll have. Giving the government savvy advice, telling them they should do whatever will promote, say, competition or open forums...what effects will these have? They may provide justifications, expertise and targeting info for interventions, for instance. New ways to get involved... There's a dynamic to things like this involving momentum and snowballs and chaos theory; government; media; punks; the public; policy orgs, tanks and wonks; and regulated industries. I can't think of one positive thing (as opposed to the negative thing, disengagement) government can contribute to the goals of EFF. I wonder if the EFF folks are sure there are some. Mitch Kapor talks of "decentralists" who want to use government to promote decentralization-- thwart centralization effects that happen in capitalism, I suppose. (You may have missed Mitch's post as it was forwarded by Ell Dee.) The government can stop all the things it does that produce centralization (it produces centralized capitalists, for instance), but the most centralized organization in the world as the decentralist's tool or ally doesn't seem workable to me. The means clashes against the ends. Telling a bull that he should make whatever positive contributions he can to the china shop...is worse than just not mentioning that there are none. To the bull it suggests, well, a fact-finding tour at least... "But we didn't say that." Of course not. The good guys just tag along and advise against what's *specifically* happening, while gesturing in a forward direction. I'm sure anyone in CPSR or EFF who's even heard the word libertarian has weighed similar arguments. I've seen Mitch and Mike (for instance) talk. Both energetic yet eminently rational and calm. The perfect people to talk someone down from a contemplated harmful act. I hope that's what they end up spending their time doing, in this NII business, (although it's not a positive- or creative-sounding or pleasant thing to wish on someone). And sure, of course I hope sane heads prevail everywhere, that everything everyone says is taken in the right spirit by everyone involved and no terrible travesty of "Open Platform" comes to pass, unlike the rest of the history of such things. Times are changing... I just don't like the whole country waiting for the government to "do better this time, we promise," when it's not helpful for the government to do anything except put down the blunderbus and come out. -fnerd(a)smds.com quote me -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvtoxiQCVAgUBLMs3K ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2toust1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz 3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hanC0R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG sRjLQs4iVVM= =9wqs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Cryptosplit 2.0
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>If I remember coorectly it's KerberosV uses an MD5 hash of /dev/mem. I'm pretty familiar with the most recent iteration of Kerberos V (pre-release beta 3). There is no mention of /dev/mem in any of the Kerberos V source code files. As best as I can tell, all DES keys and random numbers used by Kerberos are ultimately derived from pass-phrases. The random DES keys produced by the Kerberos administration utilities are derived from the KDC master key and some other info (not /dev/mem). The KDC master key is derived from a pass-phrase. All random numbers used inside the Kerberos runtime library are derived from the user's or server's secret DES key. A user's secret key is derived from the user's pass-phase. A server's secret key is derived from a pass-phrase or generated automagically by the Kerberos administration utilities mention above. (all this is assuming you are using the DES encryption option) Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Crypto-dongle protocols?
by fnerd＠smds.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know there was talk of making little crypto boxes that attach to the back of bigger computers. "Crypto-dongles," they were called. Did anyone go and build one? Did anyone think up a protocol for talking to one? It occurs to me that pocket computers like the Psion might make nice crypto-dongles, especially for people who use Unix for mail. The little computer could show you the text you were signing or that it had decrypted. All safe from Unix hacks--but is there a good protocol? Integration with PGP functions would be nice and might even ease the implementation. So, once again, Has anyone got a crypto-dongle protocol? -fnerd(a)smds.com quote me -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvtoxiQCVAgUBLMs3K ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2toust1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz 3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hanC0R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG sRjLQs4iVVM= =9wqs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Signing Keys for Nyms and Digibank Users
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

X-Note: This isn't a Detweiler-flame, it's a mostly technical discussion A While Back, L. Detweiler asked: > Suppose that a real person signed someone else's imaginary identity for > a key in a key server, or for their own. Can someone explain to me why > this is not dishonest? > > I guess the argument will be, the signor is only guaranteeing that some > key is associated with some email address. But that seems to me to > abuse the whole idea of trust in people. Has anyone asked PRZ what he > thinks of the practice of real people signing imaginary identities? There's a couple of issues here, some of which we haven't beaten to death: - what you're claiming to be the truth by signing the key - can you be sure you're signing a key for the *real* imaginary identity, or whether you're signing a key for somebody *impersonating* the imaginary entity? - if the pseudonym is one of yours, are you giving away its identity (and hence usefulness or safety) by signing it? The purpose of signing keys, in my opinion, is to verify that, if you're using a given key to talk to a given person or entity, does that key really belong to that entity, or is it a key the KGB/NSA/Mafia/Wiretaps-R-Us substituted for the real key. You're not necessarily claiming that the name on the key is the person's Government-Approved True Name, though government ID is one way you could help verify that the person you meet at a conference claiming to be "Tim May" is the real "Tim May" you've been sending email to all these years, and not some NSA guy or Eric Hughes in disguise. The government already supports government-approved fictional people with government-approved names - corporations. The quality of the introduction you're providing to other people may be affected by how well you verify that you're talking to the person you think you are, and by how well you know them, and ought to indicate this. If you're giving away PGP at, say, a trade show or conference or rave, you probably should create a separate public key for doing those signatures, e.g. (1993 Anarchist's Gathering PGP Demo <wcs(a)foobar.com>) so people know this isn't the usual high quality intro you normally provide. Verifying that you're talking to the right person for a pseudonym is tough. If you're having a conversation by email, it's really hard, unless you and the nym share some private knowledge that the Wiretaps-R-Us folks wouldn't have access to and that isn't on the Usenet CD-ROM collection, which is unlikely unless you know the pseudonym-user personally and are sure they've been using that name. I know a couple of people who use the names "Hobbit" and "Wookie", in real life as well as on the net (though that's probably not what their mothers call them :-), and I'd have no problems signing keys for them as long as the keys indicated *which* Hobbit and Wookie they are. Similarly, I've got a number of relatives who've changed their names (show biz, Anglicizing, personal weirdness, etc.), and I'd have no problems signing keys for them under either their government-approved names, birth names, work-use names, family-use names, or whatever. On the other hand, I'd have real trouble signing keys for Wonderer, Dark Unicorn, or strnlght(a)netcom.com because I haven't met them personally, and only have the consistency of their email addresses to verify who they are - and I haven't tried checking their articles to know what to look for to check whether an email request claiming to be from one of them looks unforged. If I remember right, none of these people puts a PGP Key ID or fingerprint in their posting signatures, so I don't have that clue available - that would increase my confidence a lot. But I still couldn't be sure. I once got a phone call from someone claiming to be Bob Morris (Sr.), about some computer security problems I was having, who pointed out that I couldn't really verify it was *him* I was talking to. (If I'd called him back, I'd at most know it was someone at his desk or someone hacking the phone system.) If I wanted to sign his key, I'd create a special "Unix Hacker who claimed to be Bob Morris" key to sign it with, if he told me the key words from that conversation, and you could decide how much to trust that introduction. ~~~ There are a couple of of my own nyms I've signed keys for (using other nyms), when I was demonstrating how the signature stuff worked to somebody who uses an anonymous remailer (and had already figured out that I was the person who used one of those nyms due to the anon.penet.fi remailer behavior; I knew his address because he'd included a signature in one of his anonymous postings.) On the other hand, if I really cared about preserving the anonymity of the nym-user, and it was somebody I knew in person, or myself, I probably wouldn't sign it with my real key - it may be relatively obvious that "Bill The Dragon-Basher" whose key was signed by "Bill Stewart" was me, but I'd rather not have to deal with a court subpoena or Mafia equivalent trying to find the users of the keys for "Crypto International, Ltd." or "Coalition Against the U.S. Invasion of Cuba" or "Some Unapproved Religion" or "Bear's Custom Chemicals" or an anonymous Panamanian bank account that's mine. But if the keys are only signed by other nyms, how trustable are they? If I ran a digibank, I'd be real hesitant about accepting changes of address or public-key unless I had some physical verification or other securely shared secret to avoid eavesdropper and interloper attacks, but one of the goals of digital banking is that you're not supposed to need physical transactions. I suppose an initial account set up by sending the bank a message with a Secret and a public key and a bunch of digibucks might do the job, with some cut&choose protocols to decrypt the digibucks if the account is approved? Bill The Dragon-Basher (oops! ^X^C:wq!/exit~.\b\b\b\b\b\b) # Bill Stewart Old address: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com AT&T Bell Labs, Holmdel, NJ # After 10/15, NCR, 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566 # Voice/Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone 510-484-6204, email bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com

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anti-cypherpunk propaganda
by Timothy Newsham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

strike another one up for L.D. and the NSA. Original readings of some of L.D.'s articles have lead me to believe that he was truely in a state of delusion but now I know better. His description of the great medusa was infact true, but the people he was describing where no the 'leadership of cypherpunks' but rather his own actions and tactics. It is amazing that this hasn't occured to me before, the cleverness of his rants draw attention away from him and make it seem implausible that he could be involved in such activity. His attacks are well coordinated, well thought out, obviously written with much care and taking up much of his time. He was reached out to many forums and undoubtadly affected the thinking of many people. It is going to take much information to reverse the damage he has done to the reputation of the list. Here is a recent article from CuD: ----------------------- Subject: File 3--A Psychopunk's Manifesto From: nagap(a)MINDVOX.PHANTOM.COM(Michael Roberts) Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 22:20:11 EST A Psychopunk's Manifesto by T.C. Hughes Honesty is necessary for an open society in the electronic age. Pseudospoofing is dishonesty. A pseudonym is something one doesn't want the whole world to know, and anonymity is something one doesn't want anybody to know. Pseudoanonymity is the power to selectively reveal oneself to the world. If two thieves have some sort of dealings, then each has a memory of their interaction. Each criminal can confess about their own memory of this; how could anyone prevent it? One could criticize laws against it, but the freedom of collusion, even more than pseudospoofing, is fundamental to a criminal; we seek not to restrict any criminality at all. If many criminals speak together in the same forum, each can speak to all the others and aggregate together knowledge about individuals and other parties. The holes in the Internet have enabled such group collusions, and it will not go away merely because we might want it to. Since we desire black markets, we must ensure that each party to a transaction have knowledge only of that which is directly necessary for that transaction. Since any information can be spoken of, we must ensure that we reveal as little as possible. In most cases personal identity is not salient. When I purchase a magazine at a store and hand cash to the clerk, there is no need to know who I am. When I ask my electronic mail provider to send and receive messages, my provider need not know to whom I am speaking or what I am saying or what others are saying to me; my provider only need know how to get the message there and how much I owe them in fees. When my identity is revealed by the underlying mechanism of the transaction, I have no secrecy. I cannot here selectively reveal myself; I must _always_ reveal myself. Therefore, pseudospoofing in an open society requires pseudoanonymous transaction systems. Until now, cash has been the primary such system. A pseudoanonymous transaction system is not an honest transaction system. A pseudoanonymous system empowers individuals to reveal their identity when desired and only when desired; this is the essence of criminality. Honesty in an open society also requires identification. If I say something, I want it heard only by those for whom I intend it. If the content of my speech is available to the world, I have no privacy. To speak is to indicate the desire for privacy, and to speak on the Internet is to indicate not too much desire for privacy. Furthermore, to conceal one's identity with assurance when the default is True Names requires the Internet. We cannot expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless organizations to grant us embezzlement out of their beneficence. It is to their advantage to repress us, and we should expect that they will try. To try to prevent their restrictions is to fight against the realities of cyberspace. Evil does not just want to be free, it longs to be free. Criminality expands to fill the available storage space. Criminality is Conspiracy's younger, stronger cousin; Criminality is fleeter of foot, has more eyes, knows more, and understands less than Conspiracy. We must defend our own conspiracy if we expect to have any. We must come together and create systems which allow pseudoanonymous transactions to take place. People have been defending their own conspiracies for centuries with whispers, darkness, envelopes, closed doors, secret handshakes, and couriers. The technologies of the past did not allow for strong conspiracies, but electronic technologies do. We the psychopunks are dedicated to building pseudoanonymous systems. We are defending our criminality with cryptography, with anonymous mail forwarding systems, with digital signatures, and with electronic money. Psychopunks write code. We know that someone has to write software to defend criminality, and since we can't get perverted unless we all do, we're going to write it. We publish our code so that our fellow psychopunks may practice and play with it. Our code is barred for all to use, worldwide. We don't much care if you don't approve of the software we write. We know that software can't be destroyed and that a widely dispersed system can't be shut down. Criminals deplore regulations on criminality, for criminality is fundamentally a private act. The act of corruption, in fact, removes information from the public realm. Even laws against conspiracies reach only so far as a nation's border and the arm of its enforcement. Criminality will ineluctably spread over the whole globe, and with it the dishonest transactions systems that it makes possible. For a conspiracy to be widespread it must be part of a social contract. People must come and together deploy these systems for the common evil. Secrecy only extends so far as the collusions of one's accomplices in private. We the psychopunks ignore your questions and your concerns and hope we may deceive you so that we do not get caught ourselves. We will not, however, be moved out of our course because some may disagree with our goals. The psychopunks are actively engaged in making the networks safer for criminality. Let us proceed together apace. Onward. T.C. Hughes <satan(a)soda.berkeley.edu> 16 Nov 1993 ------------------------------

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Censorship, privacy, copyright...
by Alexander Chislenko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There seem to be repeating debates about what constitutes censorship, privacy, and various other rights and freedoms regarding distribution of information. I would start with separating the parties involved into a number of functional agencies (I don't believe in classification of entities - just functions). The list would include [possibly multiple instances of] : - author - reader - owner - distributor - owner of the media - party mentioned in the message -- legal guardians of each of the above. - the law (one person or group can play the role of any subset of the above agencies). These all fit into a simple graph, where we can mark areas where different terms would apply, and who may establish what. A number of things that cause repeated arguments, seem to be evident regardless of one's political affiliation, such as: - an author is the original owner, and can lose ownership only voluntarily. - nobody may be forced to read anything - the owner has a right to share - or not! - the information with a reader. the concept of censorship applies to control of the third party ('the law' in the above list) - not the owner! - the distributor and media owner have nothing to do with the contents of the message (i.e. in their pure functional form - of course, their impersonators may combine these functions with others). Other parts may be arguable, but at least the terminology should be clear. - copyright refers to the owner - privacy refers to the parties functionally involved with the *contents* of the message. And so on. I would expect that there should be lots of good books on the functional relationships of various parties around information, strict definitions of terminology and descriptions of different positions on what various agencies should have the freedom for, and what gives you rights of such an agency. Are there such books? A FAQ on the topic would probably be useful, too. [ Or maybe, there is nothing of that sort? There are examples of endless debates on undefined topics - such as 'human identity', where the seemingly fundamental concepts are language-specific and, even in English, extremely vaguely defined. ] -- sasha(a)cs.umb.edu

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time to acknowledge, move on
by jdblair＠nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

OK, so the reputation of the list has been screwed up. So what? It is all just information, and we're here to explore how the metaphores the information represents evolve in cyberspace. As cheesy as that word has become, if memory serves right, one possible definition for cyberspace is a "consensually agreed upon metaphore for certain aspects of reality." I'm sure I will get corrected for that, and that is good- that's why I said it: to test my hypothesis. I think the coffee house metaphore makes sense, but we have to deal with the fact that this coffee house isn't exactly like normal coffee houses. You can't spoof a person, in person, in reality, short of incredible acting ability and plastic surgery. Real James Bond stuff. I think most of us believe that cyberspace can serve as a useful addition to reality, and some of us probably see it as a possible replacement for reality. One simply needs to know one MOO addict to believe that (an acquaintence of mine once spent 18 hours straight on-line.) So we're working out the kinks in the metaphore, and learning where the metaphore breaks down. So sometimes we get burned. So what!! By the way, some of us have built a metaphorical workshop onto the back of this metaphorical coffee house. Discussion is going reallly slowly right now, I think because most of use are really more software people than hardware people. Myself definately included. I laid the foundation for the workshop because I thought there was still a lot of hard information I could learn from the Cypherpunks, like how following this list turned my understanding of cryptography from virtually zilch to getting into an argument with someone from the NSA that I led into the mountains in one of my real-world personalities, a summer backpacking guide. He was freaked out to find that this outdoorsy guy understood public key cryptography, and had an opinion about the clipper chip. There's the main purpose of the list, right? To educate. It educated me, and it threw a real-world NSA employee for a loop. So, we've all been educated about spoofing, and the dangers inherent in the privacy we advocate. If I wasn't ready to have my views challenged, I wouldn't follow the list, and I certainly wouldn't post. Of anybody, we should understand that a name on the net is just a label. We have a certain assumed level of trust that label = real person. We're the ones that have been emphasizing that a public key can only be trusted if you trust a real person somewhere in the web of trust you build to verify it. We all knew that its elementary to spoof someone (or pseudospoof, I mean). We just assumed that no one would break our trust, do more than just a few harmless pranks. Oh my god, I here people shout, label != person? We deserve it. So, y'all, chill out. I think L.D. taught us all a BIG lesson that we can all take through the rest of our cyperspace lives (or metaverse lives, depending on one's jargon persuasion). The net isn't the real world. Stop pretending it is, and treat it as the net. -john <jdblair(a)nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Insert cool signature file that makes a trendy, yet bold and original statement about my cyberspace proficiency, then mentions that I'll send you my public key if you want it, and you trust that I'm me.

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Eric Hughes
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, I've been thinking that the GWELST (Guess Which Eminent Leader Said This) may be in poor taste and violate the privacy of a co-conspirator, the latter the #1 psychopunk crime. So, regarding the `There is no movement. Get this delusion out of your head. There is only software' quote, I won't say which Eminent Leader is the originator of this. I just wanted to share this inspirational message with everyone, hopefully no harm done. I had some other ideas for the GWELSTing game. As I said, I didn't have a whole lot of material for this, mostly due to the amazing rock-hard wall the Eminent Leaders have erected around certain topics, such as their own involvement in pseudospoofing conspiracies or quasi-criminal activities. Again, I wouldn't want to violate the privacy of a criminal, so I will just list this new inspirational quote without attribution, and let everyone here speculate on its author. The background behind this was that I had been concerned by leaks or `crossings' by tentacles of very personal knowledge of my personal habits and financial transactions -- something that likely could only have come from stealing my credit card report transactions. I was also concerned about an Eminent Leader's ties to credit organizations and credit databases. So, I asked in a message entitled `dirty secrets' -- `Have you ever poked around in a credit database?' The background on the other question was that I had heard references to a Secret Mailing list by both identified Medusa's Snakes and Medusa Sisters. The mailing list was supposedly for `project development' free of `paranoid ranters'! Well, if there was any overlap in `paranoid ranters' an tentacles, I would certainly like to sign up! I have been trying to find a single place on the Internet dedicated to project development and free of Cryptoanarchists, psychopunks, Medusa's snakes and sisters for many weeks now! Actually, I always thought that *this* list was dedicated to serious project development, but boy do I know better! It's a testing ground for Cryptoanarchist brainwashing and refining tentacle software of course. Anyway, the second question was -- `is there a secret mailing list?' * * * The $64K answer from the Eminent leader was rather terse and cryptic (ha, ha!), as he usually is. ``Your questions do not allow other than an incriminating answer.'' I asked him what he meant by that, I think, but he didn't elaborate. It's strange how none of the Eminent Leaders answers specifically any of my questions on various subjects like Pseudospoofing, Conspiracies, and Deception. The same leader, in response to a long list of my queries on the subjects, said `I deny it all'. Oh well. Maybe the list moderator and Cypherpunk movement founder E.Hughes (hughes(a)ah.com) would be the person to ask about infiltrating credit databases, a secret mailing list, pseudospoofing, conspiracies, and deception. Again, though, I won't reveal the Eminent Cypherpunk Leader who I quote to Protect Privacy. Just consider me a patriotic Cypherpunk to the end!

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The REAL Conspiracy
by cman＠caffeine.io.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We at Illuminati Online have finally gotten to the bottom of l'affaire Detweiler. It began with the simple statement, "This moron is *everywhere*, no one person could be churning out all this fantastic babble of..." And then it hit us. Of course! The REAL Medusa is L.Detweiler and S.Boxx and The Executioner and The Pervert, a pseudopool with STRINGENT stylistic REQUIREMENTS about how to disrupt, discourage and defame cypherpunks. We're onto you now... even now, agents are converging on your secret headquarters... -- ---------------- /\ Douglas Barnes cman(a)illuminati.io.com / \ Chief Wizard (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v) / () \ Illuminati Online metaverse.io.com 7777 /______\

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NSA Insecure Remailers?
by analyst＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was thinking about remailer traffic analysis this evening and realized that everybody who has come into contact (i.e. received or sent email to a remailer) with a remailer is probably on an NSA list. Given the low volume of information on the Internet backbone, only 45 Mbits/sec, it is not hard to imagine that they at least perform routine traffic analysis looking for things like packets going to and from remailers (unless I'm missing something--please correct me). Encryption doesn't help here because the header info isn't encrypted. Given that most remailers are not randomly changing the sizes and delay times of incoming and outgoing traffic, this probably also allows someone like the NSA to correlate incoming and outgoing traffic and follow messages end-to-end (until they leave the NSA surveyed portions of the network, anyway). Given the magnitude of the traffic analysis problem (I estimate about 24 gigabytes/day of addressing info saved: 45 Mbits/sec,86400 sec, 5% of data is addressing), probably only the NSA and some defense agency we haven't yet heard of are actually performing this analysis right now. But given the declining price of storgae media, even saving everything on magnetic media and paying $1000/gig, it only costs about US$8.7 million to keep a year's worth of traffic headers around (media cost). So what? Well if Blacknet exists, it either means they are using something trickier than the anonymous remailers that I know about or they are going to be quickly washed up--at least if they do anything to run afoul of the big guys (or maybe they're just a trot line for unsuspecting cypherpunks?). I also don't know how much information you can get out of just header analysis--for example, would this allow tracing anonymous posters into Usenet newsgroups? I suppose there are still things that you can do in the presence of such surveillance to avoid detection: multiple remailer chains off of the main backbones for example--which I may not currently know about. I hope I have made some obvious errors that list readers can correct, but my assessment of the security provided by using anonymous remailers just dropped an order of magnitude. It sounds like I need to learn about mixes and DC-nets about now, which I presume are part of the solution to this dilemma? I have the dining cryptographers paper, could someone point me towards more info? Thanks. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- Benjamin McLemore analyst(a)netcom.com

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