December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

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by will.ciaburri＠hofbbs.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

UNSUBSCRIBE CYPHERPUNKS WILL CIABURRI LEAVE CYPHERPUNKS REMOVE WILL CIABURRI

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No Subject
by nobody＠jarthur.claremont.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

checking out the hacktic remailer one cant telnet... a check of DNS A records shows > set type=mx > hacktic.ml hacktic.ml preference = 10, mail exchanger = orstom.orstom.fr orstom.orstom.fr inet address = 192.33.151.1 > A trace route to hacktic.nl shows 4 San-Jose2.CA.Alter.Net (149.20.1.2) 3140 ms 290 ms 290 ms 5 San-Jose1.CA.ALTER.NET (137.39.44.1) 270 ms 260 ms 280 ms 6 San-Jose3.CA.ALTER.NET (137.39.101.97) 270 ms 2570 ms 280 ms 7 Falls-Church1.VA.ALTER.NET (137.39.128.6) 330 ms 360 ms 370 ms 8 Amsterdam.NL.EU.net (134.222.5.1) 510 ms 440 ms 450 ms 9 Amsterdam.NL.NL.net (134.222.24.2) 440 ms 460 ms 460 ms 10 annex01.NL.net (193.78.240.65) 460 ms 450 ms 530 ms 11 * annex.hacktic.nl (193.78.33.99) 4460 ms * 12 193.78.33.41 (193.78.33.41) 4980 ms 2440 ms 2390 ms Note also the nslookup to Non-authoritative answer: Name: hacktic.nl Address: 193.78.33.42 MX Records pointing to a French site for ANONYMOUS REMAILER traffic is about as trustworthy as one in the Singapore Police HQ building traceroute orstom.orstom.fr traceroute to orstom.orstom.fr (192.33.151.1), 30 hops max, 40 byte packets 4 t1-1.San-Francisco-cnss11.t3.ans.net (140.222.11.2) 290 ms 270 ms 280 ms 5 mf-0.San-Francisco-cnss8.t3.ans.net (140.222.8.222) 270 ms 260 ms 280 ms 6 t3-0.Chicago-cnss24.t3.ans.net (140.222.24.1) 320 ms 310 ms 350 ms 7 t3-0.Cleveland-cnss40.t3.ans.net (140.222.40.1) 2440 ms 320 ms 330 ms 8 t3-1.New-York-cnss32.t3.ans.net (140.222.32.2) 330 ms 330 ms 340 ms 9 t3-1.Washington-DC-cnss56.t3.ans.net (140.222.56.2) 340 ms 340 ms 350 ms 10 mf-0.Washington-DC-cnss58.t3.ans.net (140.222.56.194) 2480 ms 350 ms 350 ms 11 t3-0.enss145.t3.ans.net (140.222.145.1) 340 ms 340 ms 340 ms 12 192.203.229.245 (192.203.229.245) 340 ms 350 ms 460 ms 13 icm-dc-1-S13-T1.icp.net (192.157.65.18) 430 ms 2910 ms 360 ms 14 Paris-EBS2.Ebone.NET (192.121.156.201) 440 ms 440 ms 460 ms 15 Renater-RBS1.Ebone.NET (192.121.156.227) 430 ms 440 ms 440 ms 16 192.93.43.122 (192.93.43.122) 440 ms 2860 ms 470 ms 17 192.93.43.18 (192.93.43.18) 430 ms 460 ms 440 ms 18 192.93.43.89 (192.93.43.89) 450 ms 460 ms 500 ms 19 192.93.43.73 (192.93.43.73) 430 ms 470 ms 450 ms 20 193.50.61.241 (193.50.61.241) 460 ms 450 ms 470 ms 21 193.50.61.18 (193.50.61.18) 540 ms 700 ms 480 ms 22 193.48.170.21 (193.48.170.21) 560 ms 470 ms 23 ws62-b.cnusc.fr (131.196.4.62) 450 ms 440 ms 470 ms 24 orstom.orstom.fr (192.33.151.1) 560 ms 560 ms 570 ms ********************* NOW wait just a GODAMN Minute... Anonymous remailer traffic for a Dutch Remailer is being handled in DAMN France.. where the Surete has a history of electronic spying... just WHAT in HELL is going on with the HACKTIC Remailer????? I DONT like the way this smells... anon

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > set type=mx > > hacktic.ml ^^ Perhaps this is the problem? > > hacktic.ml preference = 10, mail exchanger = orstom.orstom.fr > orstom.orstom.fr inet address = 192.33.151.1 An nslookup for hacktic.nl at my site showed: Non-authoritative answer: hacktic.nl preference = 50, mail exchanger = xs4all.hacktic.nl hacktic.nl preference = 100, mail exchanger = sun4nl.nl.net Authoritative answers can be found from: xs4all.hacktic.nl inet address = 193.78.33.42 sun4nl.nl.net inet address = 193.78.240.1 xs4some.hacktic.nl inet address = 193.78.33.33 ns.nl.net inet address = 193.78.240.1 No mention of France there at all. > A trace route to hacktic.nl shows > 4 San-Jose2.CA.Alter.Net (149.20.1.2) 3140 ms 290 ms 290 ms > 5 San-Jose1.CA.ALTER.NET (137.39.44.1) 270 ms 260 ms 280 ms > 6 San-Jose3.CA.ALTER.NET (137.39.101.97) 270 ms 2570 ms 280 ms > 7 Falls-Church1.VA.ALTER.NET (137.39.128.6) 330 ms 360 ms 370 ms > 8 Amsterdam.NL.EU.net (134.222.5.1) 510 ms 440 ms 450 ms > 9 Amsterdam.NL.NL.net (134.222.24.2) 440 ms 460 ms 460 ms > 10 annex01.NL.net (193.78.240.65) 460 ms 450 ms 530 ms > 11 * annex.hacktic.nl (193.78.33.99) 4460 ms * > 12 193.78.33.41 (193.78.33.41) 4980 ms 2440 ms 2390 ms > You'll also note no bit of France in here. > Note also the nslookup to > > Non-authoritative answer: > Name: hacktic.nl > Address: 193.78.33.42 Why is this noteworthy, other than showing the IP number? That number resolves to xs4all.hacktic.nl. > ********************* NOW wait just a GODAMN Minute... > Anonymous remailer traffic for a Dutch Remailer > is being handled in DAMN France.. where > the Surete has a history of electronic spying... just WHAT in HELL is > going on with the HACKTIC Remailer????? > I DONT like the way this smells... I wouldn't like it either, if I was correct. However, as youv'e seen, that's simply not the case.

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by ACSNYDER＠DEPAUW.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Remailer list
by qwerty＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have placed the "Xenon's Full Disclosure Remailer List" up for anonymous ftp to netcom.com in /pub/qwerty. I am willing to maintain it, by only to the extent that people send me updates :-). It's format is free-form, so add your own headers, or whatever. I am no longer on the Cypherpunks mailing list. If someone is willing to maintain this list, they can put their name atop it, but I hope they will mail me new versions as they are made. Thanks. Might you take the remailer discussion to Usenet anyway? My list may end up in some form in each new PGP FAQ version, by my mailing it to Gary Edstrom who isn't on this list either. -=Xenon=- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLWaDRgSzG6zrQn1RAQF9gAP+NRS7WDnnyK2EBo9ULGnGZKEqeYMsgjf4 Qr/ZKaynYG0IhjaaFrBmM75n7HUXg795qefJ7LI9q/7vDa9jPKAkVi1OTn5v4Ivt K6fVD5exx142iT3yHMvx6giTrmJcQ/9ScFUPBff5HViwOPtuOkkXQifsODKxqhZ/ AeN4MVjUAoI= =NyW6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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CERT Funding
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

According to the newsweek article this week, CERT refuses to disclose its operating budget and sources of income. I find this at the very least, irritating. Anyone have any more information about how much CERT spends annually, and where it comes from? Or should we just assume it is the NSA? ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> In the United States, they \/ Finger for PGP 2.3a Public Key <=> first came for us in Colorado... -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 1.0.1) GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++ n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*)

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Updated Remailer List/Helpfile?
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know that an updated remailer list was just posted recently, but I think that even since then a good number of remailers have already bitten the dust. Could we have a current list, and perhaps an updated helpfile posted to cypherpunks? Also, are there any newly listed netmail-to-news gates? I am particularly interested in any outside the US besides Demon.UK. Thanks.

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Blacknet worries
by hal＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim's Blacknet story has gotten a lot of reaction after Detweiler's random posting escapade last week. I think it is a good essay, but there is one point I don't think was stressed enough. > BlackNet is currently building its information inventory. We are interested > in information in the following areas, though any other juicy stuff is > always welcome. "If you think it's valuable, offer it to us first." > > - trade secrets, processes, production methods (esp. in semiconductors) > - nanotechnology and related techniques (esp. the Merkle sleeve bearing) > - chemical manufacturing and rational drug design (esp. fullerines and > protein folding) > - new product plans, from children's toys to cruise missiles (anything on > "3DO"?) > - business intelligence, mergers, buyouts, rumors The glaring omision, mentioned only in passing, is military intelligence. A friend at work tells me that in the Manhattan project, presumably one of the most secret projects ever attempted, the Soviet Union had no fewer than six agents passing on information. Since then, three have been identified. The KGB says there are three more who have never been discovered, and they won't say who they are. (Of course, this could be in part KGB boasting/disinformation, but apparently the three who were discovered are confirmed.) Keeping business secrets and manufacturing techniques secret is one thing. But, from the point of view of the government, the world of Blacknet could be an utter disaster for the protection of military secrets. Despite its consumption of a large fraction of our society's resources, government jobs tend not to be high paying, especially compared to jobs with comparable degrees of responsibility in civilian life. The temptation to sell secrets for cash has got to be present for almost everyone. But it is balanced against the immense practical problems involved: making contacts, arranging deliveries, being caught in a "sting" operation. Blacknet could remove most of this risk. With near-perfect anonymity and digital cash, a tidy side income could be created for anyone with access to classified information. There would be no need for risky physical meetings. The money could be spent on a few nice extras to make life more comfortable, without fear of it being traced. How many people would succumb to such temptation? People do undergo security checks, and presumably those who pass are mostly honest. But they are human, and money is a powerful motivator. Especially if the person figures that if he doesn't sell the info someone else will, the temptation will be all the stronger. There are possible countermeasures: frequent lie-detector tests (as in Snow Crash); "fingerprinting" documents so everybody has a slightly different copy, allowing sting operations to identify the culprits; perhaps even swamping the legitimate offers of cash with bogus ones (a denial-of-service attack, in effect). But none of these are really likely to solve the problem. This is probably the issue which has the government really scared, the issue which turned Barlow's government friends against free encryption, as he describes in his Wired article ("if you knew what I know, you'd oppose it too"). The NSA in particular has for a long time been wildly paranoid about this issue, as detailed in The Puzzle Palace; sometimes it seems that despite its ostensible mission, the NSA is more concerned about protecting its own secrets than discovering others'. I could see any technology which would facilitate sellouts by their people to be considered a mortal threat, something to be fought by any means. And I imagine that the rest of the military intelligence community would feel the same way. Imagine if Blacknet had existed during the Manhattan Project, how much easier it would have been to corrupt those involved. This must be a nightmare for the government, and they appear determind in their fight against it to create a nightmare in turn for proponents of privacy. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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FWD: Chaitin speaks near D.C.
by tburns＠mason1.gmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If anyone wants to go, I doubt that you have to be an official member of WESS to attend. You are required to buy dinner, however. Dave --------- forwarded message follows -------------------- Dear WESSers: The next general dinner meeting is scheduled for March 1, 1994, at Jacques Cafe, 4001 Fairfax Drive in Arlington, VA. The schedule for the evening is as usual: Cocktails at 6:00PM, Dinner at 7:00 PM and the talk at about 8:15 PM. The speaker is Dr. Gregory Chaitin of Watson Research Laboratories of International Business Corporation. Dr. Chaitin is internationally recognized for his work on theories of randomness. ( The tensions between the traditional theories of randomness and the emerging theories of nonlinear deterministic behavior should prove to be stimulating.) The following dinner meeting will be held on March 28th, 1994. The speaker will be Dr. Ben Weems who will discuss "The Evolution of Cognitive Structures". Dr. Koichiro Matsuno (Professor of Biophysics, Nagaoka University) will be visiting the Washington area from March 27, 1994 to March 29, 1994. He is interested in meeting with WESS members during that period. Please drop me a note so that I can arrange a mutually agreeable schedule or contact him directly via Internet at (kmatsuno(a)voscc.nagaokaut.ac.jp) Jerry Abstract ================================================================== THE LIMITS OF MATHEMATICS G. J. Chaitin IBM Research Division P.O. Box 704, Yorktown Heights, NY 10598 chaitin(a)watson.ibm.com One normally thinks that everything that is true is true for a reason. I've found mathematical truths that are true for no reason at all. These mathematical truths are beyond the power of mathematical reasoning because they are accidental and random. ===================== GREGORY CHAITIN is a member of the computer science department at the IBM Watson Research Center in New York. In the mid 1960s, when he was a teenager, he created algorithmic information theory, which combines, among other elements, Shannon's information theory and Turing's theory of computability. In the three decades since then he has been the principal architect of the theory. Among his contributions are the definition of a random sequence via algorithmic incompressibility, and his information-theoretic approach to Godel's incompleteness theorem. His work on Hilbert's 10th problem has shown that in a sense there is randomness in arithmetic, in other words, that God not only plays dice in quantum mechanics and nonlinear dynamics, but even in elementary number theory. He is the author of three books: ALGORITHMIC INFORMATION THEORY published by Cambridge University Press, and INFORMATION, RANDOMNESS & INCOMPLETENESS and INFORMATION-THEORETIC INCOMPLETENESS, both published by World Scientific. = vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv Jerry LR Chandler, Ph.D. Phone: 301-496-1846 Epilepsy Br. National Inst Health Fax 301-496-9916 Bethesda, Maryland 20892 Home 703-790-1651 chandler(a)casa.ninds.nih.gov OR chandler(a)helix.nih.gov vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv

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Re: CERT Funding
by Matthew J Ghio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Brad Huntting <huntting(a)glarp.com> wrote: > > Anyone have any more information about how much CERT spends annually, > > and where it comes from? Or should we just assume it is the NSA? > > The main gripe most people have about CERT is that they are way > slow. Could it be that they systematically inform some parties > before others, and that it just so happens that the public at large > is the last to know and the US intelegence community is the first? >From alt.security: ---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- From: Paul <PAUL(a)TDR.COM> Newsgroups: tdr.general,digex.general,alt.security,comp.security.misc Subject: New List on Computer/Telephone Problems/Bugs/Viruses/Dangers Date: Sun, 20 Feb 1994 01:05:00 -0500 (EST) Organization: Tansin A. Darcos & Company, Silver Spring MD Lines: 72 Message-ID: <9402200105.PAUL(a)TDR.COM> NNTP-Posting-Host: access2.digex.net Followups-To: tdr.general Xref: bb3.andrew.cmu.edu alt.security:5909 comp.security.misc:5565 This is to announce the creation of a list and newsgroup for the public disclosure of bugs, system problems, viruses, and any other conditions in a computer system that people should be aware of so they can fix the problem. It is also appropriate to report security holes, dangerous conditions in PBXs, cellular and wire telephone systems, and other computer-controlled devices. Also reports of things such as default accounts and passwords on systems that should be changed, etc. The focus will be on reporting clear descriptions of problems including how to generate them. The idea being that this will alert people to the nature of certain problems that they might be unaware of. Reproducing these conditions lets others know what is being done, and can allow people to post solutions on how to block them. The purpose in creating this outlet is that currently, the only means currently available for reporting discovered security holes in computer systems and possibly other areas is via the Computer Emergency Research Team (CERT) out of Carnegie Mellon University. The problem with CERT reporting is that the reports generally tend to be done in secrecy, and it fails to let system administrators and others know about what is happening so that these things can be fixed. In short, CERT acts like a black hole and takes too long to publicize problems until lots of places get hit because they didn't know about it. Some people feel that reports should not be publicized because potential reports might become available to "the bad guys." Well, the truth of the matter is that "the bad guys" trade their discoveries around all the time; the current use of secrecy is only hurting "the good guys" who want to protect their systems. There will be two addresses. The general list will be PROBLEMS(a)TDR.COM which is used to post a report to the list. Postings may also be made by facsimile to +1 301 492 7617 to the attention of Paul Robinson, or by telex to USA telex number 6505066432; the answerback is '6505066432MCI UW'. If your site receives all or most newsgroups, the list is echoed to the group tdr.problems. If you do not receive that hierachy (or prefer to receive it as mail), you can subscribe. To subscribe to the list, or to post a report to me that you do not wish to be publicly identified as the sender, use PROBLEMS-REQUEST(a)TDR.COM Currently, both addresses are moderated. This may change as I upgrade the software on my system. Persons wishing to make a report but not be identified should send the message to me at PROBLEMS-REQUEST and state so in the text of their message. Persons wanting to receive this service by facsimile should contact me for details. All messages requesting subscriptions or posting information will be acknowledged. Please pass this announcement around. It is my intent to set this up such that people can publicly report known bugs, viruses and problems in clear detail so everyone knows about them and can encourage much faster response to these problems than is currently available. It may even embarass some manufacturers into making fixes sooner when their errors are glaringly exposed in public. --- Paul Robinson - Paul(a)TDR.COM ----- The following Automatic Fortune Cookie was selected only for this message: Never call a man a fool; borrow from him.

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