December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Where the lonely wind blows next
by Brian Beker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here's something funny from an12070 that popped up in comp.org.eff.talk. I won't bother to forward it all, especially in view of all the recent talk of filtering this singular voice. The rest of it is in the news. Brian [Header's here for those of you who enjoy that kind of thing....] - From netcom.com!csus.edu!wupost!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi Fri Nov 26 23:49:21 1993 Xref: netcom.com talk.politics.crypto:1348 alt.privacy:9824 alt.privacy.anon-server:345 news.admin.policy:7982 comp.org.eff.talk:22312 comp.admin.policy:4449 alt.conspiracy:37431 Message-ID: <071303Z27111993(a)anon.penet.fi> Path: netcom.com!csus.edu!wupost!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy From: an12070(a)anon.penet.fi (The Executioner) X-Anonymously-To: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy Organization: Anonymous contact service Reply-To: an12070(a)anon.penet.fi Date: Sat, 27 Nov 1993 07:06:26 UTC Subject: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT Lines: 61 ATTENTION ALL INTERNET PERSONNEL THE INTERNET OUTLET szabo(a)netcom.com HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A CRYPTOANARCHIST CYBERSPACE INFILTRATION SITE TO A 93.67% DEGREE CERTAINTY VIA PSEUDOSPOOFING DETECTION SOFTWARE. MAIL, POSTS, AND OTHER EMANATIONS FROM THIS OUTLET ARE CONSIDERED LIKELY TO BE HIGHLY SUBVERSIVE AND DANGEROUS CRYPTOANARCHIST DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA FROM ONE OR MORE CRYPTOANARCHIST CO-CONSPIRATORS. MULTIPLE SENSITIVE INTERNET MAILING LISTS, FAQS, AND FORUMS HAVE BEEN CONTAMINATED. [Many more caps deleted.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLPcI6SJejrfgN5yJAQF+RgP9F6cAs0B/Ors7uu2e9m+BP4Elmq0dkkcb VHoEMRwQJx8xHFE+iKlgf0M0Hrme65cYjK31+hj7C41DJNgY7eymYBCjtcEL8X1y ZNLnwMFGTIVXtMUUAd/XwbfqURyGCDihzwos08mHLh/NzBOgsyHzC0Vqkp5uYjmZ Q92oCyENEJk= =xwos -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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ANOTHER FAVORABLE ARTICLE
by Sandy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Punksters, Strong encryption got another boost from the hard money crowd. The newsletter, /Strategic Investment/ featured an article called, "Escape to Cypherspace [sic]: The Information Revolution and the demise of the income tax." It was written by James Bennett who is the "Technology Editor of /Strategic Investment/ and is writing a book on nanotechnology for the M.I.T. Press. Here is the first paragraph: Readers of /Strategic Investment/ are already aware of the crucial role of the microchip in eroding the power of governments over their citizens. Recent developments herald an expansion of this role that promises to dwarf the effects seen to date. Just as atomic theory was seen as an arcane interest in 1939, so this development, known as public-key encryption, is now familiar only to a handful of academics. Yet in the coming decade, it may create consequences which change the life of everyone on the planet even more than the atomic bomb. Following this was some history and theory of public key. He had several nice paragraphs about PGP, the Clipper chip and the united front put up by "hackers and mainstream communications and computer companies" in opposing the Clipper. He explicitly mentions (and approves of) the threat offshore banks using encryption technology pose to taxing authorities. At one point he writes: This development [cypherspace commerce] will accelerate rapidly existing trends towards breakdown of large institutions and hierarchical structures. Governments will have much of their revenue base undercut--and any attempt to tighten the screws on taxpayers will just increase the escape to Cypherspace. But he later opines: Some observers of this trend predict a coming "crypto- anarchy" where governments fall apart entirely under the pressure of anonymous communication. This is not likely. Governments have shown an amazing adaptability over the millennia as they adjust to developments such as large-scale slavery, feudalism, gunpowder and industrialization. Quite a favorable article, over all. S a n d y >>>>>> Please send e-mail to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com <<<<<< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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The latest lunatic rant
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Newsgroups: >talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server, >news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy >From: an12070(a)anon.penet.fi (The Executioner) >Subject: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT As you can see, this one was pretty widely distributed. While I agree that it would be nice if he stopped bugging us, at least everyone here knows he's nuts. The same cannot be said for all of these newsgroups. Several people (especially szabo) should post replies and explain that he has been flooding our list with similar ravings and death threats for months. Those who have received death threats from the an12070 address could also send mail to Julf about him. Death threats would certainly be considered "improper use."

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cryptoanarchists?
by wknotten＠cs.uct.ac.za 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[start posting]

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THE DETWEILER PLEDGE
by Sandy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Punksters, I hereby take the following Pledge. Will you take it too? WHEREAS, Larry Detweiler has posted long and numerous messages to Cypherpunks under his own name and several pseudonyms, AND WHEREAS, over time, such messages have became more and more unintelligible, repetitive and/or threatening, AND WHEREAS, attempts to respond to such messages have resulted in ever increasing psychotic reactions from Detweiler, I, therefore, pledge never to read, nor respond to, posts written by Larry Detweiler, or his pseudonyms. Further, I pledge never to read, nor respond to, posts written in response to posts by Larry Detweiler, or to subjects raised by Larry Detweiler. I offer the above pledge in the hopes that such action, especially in concert with others on the Cypherpunks list, will deprive Larry Detweiler of an audience and thus result in his voluntarily withdrawal from this forum. S a n d y S a n d f o r t >>>>>> Please send e-mail to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com <<<<<< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Telnet specs.
by Jeremy Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know this might not be the most appropriate list to post this to, but I need to know what ports Telnet uses for standard use. Mainly, I implemented the Telnet bouncer program that was posted here a while back, and when trying to connect to hosts that don't require a port number it still asks me for one. i.e., when I try to connect to archie.sura.net through the bouncer, it asks me for a port number. When I use my standard Telnet program it will connect with just archie.sura.net as the address. Does anybody know a site where I can find this info? Thanx in advance and my apologies for any waste of bandwidth! ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jeremy Smith -*jersmit(a)eis.calstate.edu*- My views are my own and nobody else can have them! -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Spreading Technology - Ooops
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Sorry, that comment about David Bohm was not meant for this list. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Request For Comments (Cypherpunks write code!)
by Brian J. Harvey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

/****************************************************************************/ /* */ /* "Almost Truly Random Bits" - a proposed standard for */ /* */ /* generating crypto-grade random seeds and keys */ /* */ /* using AT compatible hardware and MS-DOS */ /* */ /* by */ /* */ /* Brian J. Harvey <bjh(a)northshore.ecosoft.com> */ /* */ /* Copyright (C) 1993, Tea Party Software */ /* */ /* ---- */ /* */ /* MD5 Message-Digest Copyright (C) 1991, RSA Data Security, Inc. */ /* */ /****************************************************************************/ /* ATRB is inspired by the as-yet-unimplemented hardware strategy that appears in PGP v2.3a. ATRB does not suggest a standard usage (API), but rather demonstrates a hardware-specific method for capturing keyboard latency intervals. This method requires an AT (all) or XT (some) BIOS that supports interrupt 15h, func 4Fh, keyboard intercept. Note that this implementation traps key _releases_, not presses. This avoids needless problems and complexity. MS-DOS extentions are not standardized amongst C compilers, however, it should be relativly easy to adapt this Turbo C implementation for other compilers. Finally, a note concerning the MD5 Message-Digest... Ron Rivest, in Request for Comments 1321, says: "The MD5 algorithm has been carefully scrutinized for weaknesses. It is, however, a relatively new algorithm and further security analysis is of course justified, as is the case with any new proposal of this sort." With respect to this statement, I am concerned about the non-standard usage of the MD5 in PGP's randstir() function. (I'm not an expert, nor do I pretend to be.) Please direct questions, comments and job offers to the above address. "Yet is was for me - not you - I came to write this song." - Neil Peart */ #include <stdio.h> #include <conio.h> #include <dos.h> #include <time.h> #define PROTOTYPES 1 #include "global.h" #include "md5.h" #pragma options -r- -N- /* Defines */ #define MES_VEC 0x15 /* Misc. Extended Services */ #define MES_FUNC 0x4F00 /* Keyboard Intercept (XT,AT only) */ #define SP_UP 0xB9 /* Spacebar release (scan code) */ #define ESC 27 /* Escape (ascii) */ #define MAX_RAW 20 /* Actual number of raw bytes to get */ #define TIMER0 0x40 /* Timer constants */ #define TIMERCTRL 0x43 #define LATCHTIMER 0 /* Prototypes */ void reset_kbd_trap(void); /* Auto-cleanup */ #pragma exit reset_kbd_trap void near futz(void); /* Wait for Timer ports to settle */ void interrupt new_kbd_trap(void); /* This will latch the timer */ /* Globals */ void interrupt (*old_kbd_trap)(void); /* Save the original vector */ MD5_CTX MD5context; /* defined in MD5.h */ time_t time_seed; /* record the time */ unsigned char raw_buffer[MAX_RAW]; /* collect the latency values */ unsigned char MD5digest[16]; /* Hash output */ int raw_index,MD5_index; /* bookkeeping */ /* Functions */ void reset_kbd_trap(void){ /* Auto-cleanup */ setvect(MES_VEC,*old_kbd_trap); } void near futz(void){} /* Wait for Timer ports to settle */ void interrupt new_kbd_trap(void){ /* This will latch the timer */ unsigned int local_ax = _AX; /* Better safe 'n sorry... */ if(local_ax == MES_FUNC + SP_UP && raw_index < MAX_RAW){ /* Latch and accumulate */ outportb(TIMERCTRL,LATCHTIMER); futz(); raw_buffer[raw_index++] = inportb(TIMER0) ^ inportb(TIMER0); cprintf("\b± "); /* Advance the pinwheel */ } (*old_kbd_trap)(); /* Give others a chance... */ } void main(){ unsigned int pindex = 0; char pinwheel[5] = "/-\\|"; /* Set the "trap" */ old_kbd_trap = *(void interrupt (* far *)(void))MK_FP(0,MES_VEC * 4); setvect(MES_VEC,new_kbd_trap); MD5_index = raw_index = 0; time(&time_seed); /* Start message digest w/time */ MD5Init(&MD5context); MD5Update(&MD5context,(unsigned char *)&time_seed,sizeof(time_t)); cprintf("\nATRB - \"Almost Truly Random Bits\"\r\n"); cprintf("Copyright (C) 1993, Tea Party Software\r\n"); cprintf("\nPlease press the SPACEBAR %d times (ESC aborts...)\r\n",MAX_RAW); cprintf("%.*s\r",MAX_RAW,"°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°"); while(MD5_index < MAX_RAW && (!kbhit() || getch() != ESC)){ if(MD5_index < raw_index) MD5Update(&MD5context,raw_buffer + MD5_index++,1); if(raw_index < MAX_RAW){ cprintf("\b%c",pinwheel[pindex++ % 4]); delay(50); } } while(kbhit()) /* flush keyboard */ getch(); if(MD5_index == MAX_RAW){ cprintf("\r%-*s\r\n\n",MAX_RAW,"Okay, thanks..."); MD5Final(MD5digest,&MD5context); cputs("Timeseed, Raw bytes:\r\n"); cprintf("%08lX ",time_seed); for(pindex=0;pindex<MAX_RAW;pindex++) cprintf("%02X ",raw_buffer[pindex]); cputs("\r\n\nMessage Digest:\r\n"); for(pindex=0;pindex<16;pindex++) cprintf("%02X ",MD5digest[pindex]); cputs("\r\n"); } else cprintf("\r%-*s\r\nAborted!\r\n",MAX_RAW," "); }

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HELP! Unnerving MacPGP Glitch!
by W. Kinney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hmm. Seems the Curve Software public key I sent out has a "bad signature" attached... namely my personal PGP key, with which I signed the new key. Here's what happened -- perhaps someone can explain why: I generated a new key for Curve Software, and signed it with my other key, while it was in my secret key ring (should be ok, right?). I then extracted the new key to an ascii file. When this new key and signature are added to my public keyring, it tells me that the signature is bad. I then select removal of the bad signature, and MacPGP gives me a dialog that says "File pubring.$01 already exists. Overwrite? (y/n)" If I select "yes", I get the dialog back over and over. If I select no, the dialog goes away and the Curve Encrypt key ends up in my public key ring, _with the signature still attached_. Now when I verify the signature of the key while it's on the ring, it is flagged as valid. What the hell? It must have something to do with having signed a key on my secret ring, which was kind of a weird thing to do, I guess. And now I'm all worried that somehow I've compromised the security of one or both of these keys. The second problem I have is how to correct the bad signature in all the copies of the Curve Software public key that are out there? Should I leave the bad sig in there and sign it again? Should I remove the bad sig and re-sign it? Should I just issue revocation certificates for everything and start over? Seems like it ought to be all right to remove the bad sig, re-sign the key, and post the same key with the new signature to the list, signed with itself so that people who already have it in their pubring can verify its veracity. Still, this will be good fuel for paranoia -- "here's the public key for verifying this encryption software... OOPS! screwed it up, here's a NEW key!" Advice appreciated. I don't want to release the code to the Beta testers until this security issue is resolved. -- Will -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLP8JZPfv4TpIg2PxAQGaIQP9GW5D5c695lys23opUDogxlIEvFuCDnKS GK9F5zsAWSwcXLxvRg05Wr59+/xtLPAxWat+wsdg5hdVCXFMECPCALwgC75H0Vpw 2wql24ZobSwJFLY+AXDSxscMUwZwLr5j9PtN6GL/EUubRihH7JXs2tzsupvdlde8 j5p0J5ZvwhM= =1aLJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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