December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Thanks for RFC-822 help!
by Philippe Nave 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Many thanks to the dozen or more people who helped me locate RFC-822; I now have a copy of it, along with RFC-821 and a multitude of pointers to sites that keep RFCs available for anonymous FTP. I greatly appreciate your time and effort. [Flames and rants aside, the 'coffee house' crowd still comes through in a pinch... :) ] - -- ........................................................................ Philippe D. Nave, Jr. | The person who does not use message encryption pdn(a)dwroll.dw.att.com | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO... Denver, Colorado USA | PGP public key: by arrangement. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLUQ1dgvlW1K2YdE1AQEzlgQAtiJoyKQOXNIYKSHVG7wF1uI2BH3jDfXi JMFkTk23m//2xWuG2LLRVQrZveXG81QL2YTwVS0OeQFEM1lL9NKpZNm3d9i8AGxq TDz0QNCNV1sHT7ctjHIMx0vA43/lgRej0aDPt1HlKZD97oIg3FS/T+H0YTRSu1sP ry/15jfV4qY= =vY1A -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Offshore gets Wired
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From the Washington Post - 24 January 1994 INFORMATION HIGHWAY CROSSES THE SEA The Information Highway arrives at ... 14 Caribbean islands. Cable & Wireless (West Indies), AT&T and France Telecom announced a deal last week to build a fiber-optic network across the seabed. Scheduled to be commissioned in early 1995, it will run 1,100 miles from the British Virgin Islands in the north to Trinidad in the south. The cost will be about $60 million. It will be the largest system in the world that employs no "repeaters," units that sit on the ocean bottom and amplify the signal every so often. If ones goes bad, you've got to raise the whole cable and fix it. The cable will have capacity for at least 30,000 simultaneous phone calls, or the equivalent in data, video, you name it. Many islands in the region are trying to upgrade their telecom systems to attract service jobs. Notice that the clerk answering that toll-free vacation reservations number has a Jamaican accent? It might be because your call has rung straight through to Jamaica. One other reason to go with undersea fiber in this region: Hurricanes tend to take out earth stations every few years. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

1 0

NBC Drug War poll.
by Nikolaos Daniel Willmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I forward this from Usenet. Seems drugs are the latest excuse to scare people into the need to trample the Bill of Rights and Constitution. alt.drugs #42770 (32 more) [1] Newsgroups: alt.drugs,talk.politics.drugs,alt.hemp From: trohan(a)eskimo.com (Tom Rohan) [1] CALL, FAX, AND E-MAIL NBC!!! TODAY!!! Organization: Eskimo North (206) For-Ever Distribution: usa Date: Mon Jan 24 08:52:48 EST 1994 Lines: 30 NBC is asking the question, "Will Legalization End The Violence?" They have a phone number to call if you think the answer is "YES". The call will cost you 55cents. The number is: 1-900-230-6221 You can also fax them any comments you have about the legalization/violence issue. I faxed them a 3 page letter. The fax number is: 1-212-664-5818 You can E-Mail them any comments at the following address: violence(a)NBC.GE.COM You can also call and leave them a Voice Mail comment. They have a 3 minute limit on this Voice Mail call and it costs 95 cents a minute. The number is: 1-900-678-6221 They said the phone lines would be open most of the day (whatever that means). Today is Monday, January 24, 1994. -- ** The Drug War is the Vietnam of the 90's. ** ===================== *** It is a guerrilla war waged by our *** | END THE DRUG WAR! ** government against its own people. ** ===================== Finally a USE for all those extra identities, voting twice ;-). -Nik

1 0

Crypto Experts Oppose Clipp
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Crypto Experts Oppose Clipper More than three dozen of the nation's leading cryptographers, computer security specialists and privacy experts today urged President Clinton to abandon the controversial Clipper encryption proposal. The letter was coordinated by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR), which has long sought to open the issue of cryptography policy to public debate The group cited the secrecy surrounding the proposal, widespread public opposition to the plan and privacy concerns as reasons why the initiative should not go forward. The letter comes at a crucial point in the debate on cryptography policy. An internal Administration review of the issue is nearing completion and the National Security Agency (NSA) is moving forward with efforts to deploy Clipper technology in civilian agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service. CPSR has sponsored several public conferences on cryptography and privacy and has litigated Freedom of Informa- tion Act cases seeking the disclosure of relevant government documents. In one pending FOIA case, CPSR is challenging the secrecy of the Skipjack algorithm which underlies the Clipper proposal. For additional information, contact Dave Banisar, CPSR Washington, DC, (202) 544-9240, <banisar(a)washofc.cpsr.org>. ================================================================= January 24, 1994 The President The White House Washington, DC 20500 Dear Mr. President, We are writing to you regarding the "Clipper" escrowed encryption proposal now under consideration by the White House. We wish to express our concern about this plan and similar technical standards that may be proposed for the nation's communications infrastructure. The current proposal was developed in secret by federal agencies primarily concerned about electronic surveillance, not privacy protection. Critical aspects of the plan remain classified and thus beyond public review. The private sector and the public have expressed nearly unanimous opposition to Clipper. In the formal request for comments conducted by the Department of Commerce last year, less than a handful of respondents supported the plan. Several hundred opposed it. If the plan goes forward, commercial firms that hope to develop new products will face extensive government obstacles. Cryptographers who wish to develop new privacy enhancing technologies will be discouraged. Citizens who anticipate that the progress of technology will enhance personal privacy will find their expectations unfulfilled. Some have proposed that Clipper be adopted on a voluntary basis and suggest that other technical approaches will remain viable. The government, however, exerts enormous influence in the marketplace, and the likelihood that competing standards would survive is small. Few in the user community believe that the proposal would be truly voluntary. The Clipper proposal should not be adopted. We believe that if this proposal and the associated standards go forward, even on a voluntary basis, privacy protection will be diminished, innovation will be slowed, government accountability will be lessened, and the openness necessary to ensure the successful development of the nation's communications infrastructure will be threatened. We respectfully ask the White House to withdraw the Clipper proposal. Sincerely, Public Interest and Civil Liberties Organizations Marc Rotenberg, CPSR Conrad Martin, Fund for Constitutional Government William Caming, privacy consultant Simon Davies, Privacy International Evan Hendricks, US Privacy Council Simona Nass, Society for Electronic Access Robert Ellis Smith, Privacy Journal Jerry Berman, Electronic Frontier Foundation Cryptographers and Security Experts Bob Bales, National Computer Security Association Jim Bidzos, RSA Data Security Inc. G. Robert Blakley, Texas A&M University Stephen Bryen, Secured Communications Technologies, Inc. David Chaum, Digicash George Davida, University of Wisconsin Whitfield Diffie, Sun Microsystems Martin Hellman, Stanford University Ingemar Ingemarsson, Universitetet i Linkvping Ralph C. Merkle, Xerox PARC William Hugh Murray, security consultant Peter G. Neumann, SRI International Bart Preneel, Katolieke Universiteit Ronald Rivest, MIT Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography (1993) Richard Schroeppel, University of Arizona Stephen Walker, Trusted Information Systems Philip Zimmermann, Boulder Software Engineering Industry and Academia Andrew Scott Beals, Telebit International Mikki Barry, InterCon Systems Corporation David Bellin, North Carolina A&T University Margaret Chon, Syracuse University College of Law Laura Fillmore, Online BookStore Scott Fritchie, Twin-Cities Free Net Gary Marx, University of Colorado Ronald B. Natalie, Jr, Sensor Systems Inc. Harold Joseph Highland, Computers & Security Doug Humphrey, Digital Express Group, Inc Carl Pomerance, University of Georgia Eric Roberts, Stanford University Jonathan Rosenoer, CyberLaw & CyberLex Alexis Rosen, Public Access Networks Corp. Steven Zorn, Pace University Law School (affiliations are for identification purposes only)

1 0

Re: NSA museum now open, if you can find it
by jim＠Tadpole.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey, they finally turned the "No-Tell Motel" into something fun!

1 0

Ha Ha. I beat the Klippa.
by schulz＠omcron.uleth.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

O.k. This clipper chip the NSA proposes would have it's keys kep by a separate agency ( yeah, right ). So, until they took you to court, they couldn't really reveal that they knew what all those encrypted transmissions were. So, encrypt with PGP or some other strong crypto, then use the clipper chip. The only way they 'could' know what you were transmitting would be by getting a subpoena and stuff, and then you could say , well, shucks. I forgot the damn number. Warm up the Cray , homes.......... schulz(a)alpha.uleth.ca

1 0

REMAIL: Cover traffic
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Several people have suggested that the remailers could send bogus messages amongst themselves in order to allow more "confusion and diffusion" of the other messages passing through the remailer network. The remailers could then batch up incoming messages fairly frequently and still have many messages in a batch. The problem with this that I see is that, looking at the remailer network as a whole, you still may have one message in and one message out a short while later. The fact that it was temporarily mixed up with a bunch of other messages doesn't help much if this message is the only one to leave the network. If the Opponent has the ability to monitor all traffic into and out of all nodes of the network (as he would have to do anyway to defeat remailers even without this cover traffic) then he will easily be able to find the messages which are not aimed at other remailers. For cover traffic to be useful, it would have to be indistinguishable from real traffic as it enters and leaves the network. So messages aimed at known "bit bucket" addresses, or at a few cooperating individuals who accept and discard incoming addresses (the same thing, really) will not help. Hal

2 1

Re: mailing list software
by consensus＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:19 AM 1/24/94 +0000, Ray wrote: > If you really want to block posters and trap unsubscribe messages, >cypherpunks is welcome to use the extropian's list software (by the >end of next week it should be complete enough for someone else to run >it without my help) Here's what it can do: Can you tell me about extropian's list software, what platforms it is for, and the Extropy Institute? I have a commercial interest in list software, but as possibly information provider, as well as interest as a publisher. ..Christopher Allen ..Consensus Develoment Corporation ..4104-24th Street #419 ..San Francisco, CA 94114-3615 ..(415) 647-6384 Fax ..(415) 647-6383 Voice ..email: consensus(a)netcom.com ..mosaic frontpage: .."ftp://netcom.com/pub/consensus/www/ConsensusFrontDoor.html"

1 0

Re: archiving on inet
by consensus＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:08 AM 1/24/94 -0600, Jim choate wrote: > Each user who calls my system will >need agree to a statement of something like the following: I don't think you necessarily need this agreement. First off, I think you don't understand fair use -- it is not a right the author grants, EVERYONE has the right to fair-use of ANY copyrighted document. For instance, the Supreme Court recently said that recording material off cable for personal use only was fair-use--giving it to another was not. Secondly, I think there is an implied contract between you and the person that provides the content that you will make it available to others--they would not have any reason to give it to you otherwise. If others that you pass it to abuse it by going beyond fair-use, that is not your liability, but is theirs. I'm not an attorney, but you may want to find someone on the net that is. Try the cni-copyright(a)cni.org list, or misc.legal newsgroup. ..Christopher Allen ..Consensus Develoment Corporation ..4104-24th Street #419 ..San Francisco, CA 94114-3615 ..(415) 647-6384 Fax ..(415) 647-6383 Voice ..email: consensus(a)netcom.com ..mosaic frontpage: .."ftp://netcom.com/pub/consensus/www/ConsensusFrontDoor.html"

1 0

Re: REMAIL: Cover traffic
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal writes: > Several people have suggested that the remailers could send bogus > messages amongst themselves in order to allow more "confusion and > diffusion" of the other messages passing through the remailer network. > The remailers could then batch up incoming messages fairly frequently > and still have many messages in a batch. > > The problem with this that I see is that, looking at the remailer > network as a whole, you still may have one message in and one message > out a short while later. The fact that it was temporarily mixed up > with a bunch of other messages doesn't help much if this message is the > only one to leave the network. If the Opponent has the ability to > monitor all traffic into and out of all nodes of the network (as he > would have to do anyway to defeat remailers even without this cover > traffic) then he will easily be able to find the messages which are not > aimed at other remailers. > How about extending the "send bogus messages" idea all the way out to the users of the remailer system? Part of the price of using the remailer system is that you will occasionally receive a bogus message. How might this work? Assume remailers know the addresses of all (or most) of the other remailers. In other words, assume a given remailers knows if an inbound message came from another remailer, or came from a non-remailer address. All inbound messages to a remailer from a non-remailer address would be considered a "use" of that remailer. A remailer would maintain a list of the addresses of "users" and would occasionally send bogus messages to a randomly selected entry from its user list. Inclusion into the list would be automatic. The list would be a large, but fixed sized FIFO, with old entries dropping off the end automatically. If the remailer system uses Digital Postage, then perhaps the bogus message could be a token for a free Digital Stamp, good for one message. I'm sure many will object to tracking the users of a remailer, but I don't see how tracking can be prevented, other than by mutual agreement. Can we use tracking to *increase* privacy? Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

2 1