December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Welcome to the foia-keys announcement list; request update
by gnu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You expressed interest in my FOIA request for the Clipper key database. Here's a minor update on the request. We send all our FOIA requests by registered mail, return reciept requested. According to the Post Office, NIST received our request on 28 Feb 94. This means that their response is due ten or twenty business days after that day. Based on experience, we believe that an actual timely response is unlikely; the government doesn't feel an obligation to follow the law. However, I encourage you to call or write NIST's FOIA officer (Karl Bell, Deputy Director of Administration, NIST, Building 101, Gaithersburg, Maryland) to indicate your interest in both the content and the timeliness of his response. John Gilmore gnu(a)toad.com

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Re: clipper & corp. espionage
by dmandl＠lehman.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Hi, I'm new to the list. I was wondering > if the clipper chip passed. what's stopping > corrupt government people from selling access > to the encryption to the highest bidders to spy > on competitors communications. > just curious. > > Emanuel(eman(a)netcom.com) Nothing. --Dave.

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Re: Mondex card
by Patrick Breitenbach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Recent articles on Mondex: The Economist, 1/29/94 NewsBytes, "The Cashless Card: UK Banks Introduce Mondex", 1/6/94 >From what I can tell: Mondex appears to be a rather agressive attempt at an open system for digital cash. The three major players are NatWest, Midland Bank and British Telecom. Unlike many other efforts, they are using a completely anonymous method rather than auditing all transactions. The cards are smart (IC chips embedded on a credit card sized card. I am not sure of the security specifics. They will be capable of representing 5 core currencies and many more temporarily. The "Mondex" name has been reserved in 30 countries and market research has been done in Japan, the US, Germany and France as well as the UK. They are piloting in the British town of Swindon (not sure of the size). Other interesting moves along these lines: Electronic Payment Services/MAC Network are piloting prepay Lufthansa/German Post/2 German Banks looking at multi-app card patrick breitenbach patrickb(a)panix.com

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Re: Screen and secure sessions
by markh＠wimsey.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On a related note. There's a program called term which is popular in the Linux community. from the latest term version announcement: (For those that don't know: Term is a user level slip replacement. It ISN'T slip, but achieves much of the functionality. Error correction, compression, and multiplexing across a serial line are all supported, enabling X windows across a serial line and such.. } Now, term already allows compression across the line (yes it has features for dealing with lines which can't handle certain characters). You can have several sessions going, file transfers and even X clients. I believe that it wouldn't take too much work to add DH key exchange and IDEA or triple DES? (GNU GMP might be a good place to look for the multiple precision math, but there are lots of choices). Am I going to do it? Well, not this week. If anyone has time to work on this, the term source is available by anon ftp from ftp tartarus.uwa.edu.au in /pub/oreillym/term. Last time I looked term would run on many popular Unix (or Unix-like) systems. Mark -- Mark Henderson markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca (personal account) RIPEM MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433 ViaCrypt PGP Key Fingerprint: 21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 cryptography archive maintainer -- anon ftp -- wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto

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Re: clipper & corp. espionage
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Hi, I'm new to the list. I was wondering >if the clipper chip passed. what's stopping >corrupt government people from selling access >to the encryption to the highest bidders to spy >on competitors communications. > >just curious. Um, the goodwill and general trustworthiness of our elected officials and their duly-designated appointees? Just a guess, mind you. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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New Remailer
by ub075＠freenet.victoria.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

With a fair number of remailers down lately, I thought that I'd announce my remailer. It's been running for a long time now, and I still haven't got PGP to work. The remailer is rperkins(a)nyx.cs.du.edu. No logs are kept by me of this service. Aburt, the operator does not know about the remailer, but if he asks me to remove it, I will. -- Ryan Perkins - 1:340/13 | I feel that suicide jumpers see a glimpse of ub075(a)freenet.victoria.bc.ca | sanity as they throw themselves from the ledge. Ask for PGP 2.3 public key | That's why they scream all the way down. 8C5357 : 9F FF BA 93 54 D5 18 78 4B 1E DA GC E3 4E

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Re: New Remailer
by ub075＠freenet.victoria.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>With a fair number of remailers down lately, I thought that I'd announce >my remailer. It's been running for a long time now, and I still haven't >got PGP to work. The remailer is rperkins(a)nyx.cs.du.edu. Couple other things. Mail to rperkins(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu and rperkins(a)nox.cs.du.edu will work too. It supports the "##" paste header, and will strip all lines after a "." on the first column of a line. -- Ryan Perkins - 1:340/13 | I feel that suicide jumpers see a glimpse of ub075(a)freenet.victoria.bc.ca | sanity as they throw themselves from the ledge. Ask for PGP 2.3 public key | That's why they scream all the way down. 8C5357 : 9F FF BA 93 54 D5 18 78 4B 1E DA GC E3 4E

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Leahy to hold hearings on Clipper Chip!
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: From: jberman(a)eff.org Jerry Berman Date: Mon, 7 Mar 1994 19:09:22 -0500 Subject: Leahy to hold hearings on Clipper Chip! Dear Friends on the Electronic Frontier: I have some good news to share with you. Senator Leahy just sent me a letter indicating that he *will* be scheduling hearings on the Administration's Clipper Chip proposal. I would like to thank all of you who sent us messages to forward to him urging hearings. I'm sure that stack of messages we printed out made a significant impact on the Senator -- the stack was over seven inches tall! (We look forward to the day when no trees will have to be sacrificed in the furtherance of democracy!) And if you haven't written a message to Rep. Cantwell yet about her proposed amendment to the Export Control Act, please do so and forward it to cantwell(a)eff.org. This is an address we set up to enable us to collect messages in support of her bill. We have been printing out messages and delivering them each week -- so far we've received over 4500 letters of support. For more information on the Cantwell bill, send a message to cantwell-info(a)eff.org. Thanks again. We'll let you know as soon as the Clipper hearing gets scheduled. Sincerely, Jerry Berman EFF Executive Director -.-.-.-.-.-.-. forward from Sen. Leahy -.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-. United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Washington, DC 20510 March 1, 1994 Mr. Jerry Berman Executive Director Electronic Frontier Foundation 1001 G Street, Suite 950 East Washington, DC 20001 Dear Jerry, Thank you for forwarding to me the many thoughtful and informative messages you received over the Internet regarding the Administration's recent approval of an escrowed encryption standard, known as the Clipper Chip. Many of the messages urge Congress to hold hearings to review the Administration's Clipper Chip standard. In fact, I intend to hold a hearing before the Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology and the Law, which I chair, to consider the important issues raised by the Clipper Chip. I will let you know when a date for the hearing is scheduled. Thank you again. Sincerely, /s/ PATRICK J. LEAHY United States Senator PJL/jud -.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-. JOIN EFF!! ========== EFF's work as a civil liberties organization in Washington has been very successful, but the realization of our goals of freedom and privacy online can only come with the active and vocal participation of the entire online community. Now that you have personally experienced both the threat of the loss of your privacy and the power having won the first battle, won't you take that next step and become a member of EFF? By joining EFF, you will help us to expand our reach to educate and involve an even greater number of people in the shaping of these critical issues. Your tax-deductible donation will tie you into the EFF information network and support our public policy and legal work. As a member, you will be guaranteed timely the timely information and mechanism you need to respond on these issues. Our voices in unity *do* make a difference. -------- 8< ------- cut here ------- 8< -------- MEMBERSHIP IN THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION ================================================ Print out in monospaced (non-proportional) font and mail to: Membership Coordinator Electronic Frontier Foundation 1001 G Street, NW, Suite 950 East, Washington, DC 20001 SIGN ME UP! ----------- I wish to become a member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. I enclose: ___ Regular membership -- $40 ___ Student membership -- $20 * Special Contribution I wish to make an additional tax-deductible donation in the amount of $__________ to further support the activities of EFF and to broaden participation in the organization. PAYMENT METHOD: --------------- ___ Enclosed is a check or money order payable to the Electronic Frontier Foundation. ___ Please charge my: ___ MasterCard ___ Visa ___ American Express Card Number: _____________________________________________ Expiration Date: _________________________________________ Signature: _______________________________________________ NOTE: We do not recommend sending credit card information via email! YOUR CONTACT INFORMATION: ------------------------- Name: __________________________________________________________ Organization: __________________________________________________ Address: _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ Phone: _____________________ FAX: _____________________ BBS: _____________________ BBS Name: ____________________ E-mail addresses: ______________________________________________ ______________________________________________ PREFERRED CONTACT ___ Electronic: Please contact me via the Internet address listed above. I would like to receive the following at that address: ___ EFFector Online - EFF's biweekly electronic newsletter (back issues available from ftp.eff.org, pub/EFF/Newsletters/EFFector). ___ Online Bulletins - bulletins on key developments affecting online communications. NOTE: Traffic may be high. You may wish to browse these publications in the Usenet newsgroup comp.org.eff.news (also available in FidoNet, as EFF-NEWS). ___ Paper: Please contact EFF through the US Mail at the street address listed above. NOTE: Paper documents available upon request. "Networks & Policy" Newsletter automatically sent via US Mail. PRIVACY POLICY -------------- EFF occasionally shares our mailing list with other organizations promoting similar goals. However, we respect an individual's right to privacy and will not distribute your name without explicit permission. ___ I grant permission for the EFF to distribute my name and contact information to organizations sharing similar goals. [This form from eff.org 3/7/94 Cantwell--please leave this line on the form!] The Electronic Frontier Foundation is a nonprofit, 501(c)(3) organization supported by contributions from individual members, corporations and private foundations. Donations are tax-deductible.

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Decoding the Electronic Future
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

US News & World Report Copyright, 1994, U.S. News & World Report All rights reserved. U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, MARCH 14, 1994 DECODING THE ELECTRONIC FUTURE By Vic Sussman WILL ENCRYPTION SECURE OR DENY PRIVACY RIGHTS? Would you hand over a spare set of house keys to your local police to help them fight crime, trusting that they would never enter your home without good reason? According to opponents of the so-called Clipper chip, a powerful new telecommunications encoding device, that is an apt metaphor for what the White House, the FBI and the supersecret National Security Agency are asking of a gullible American public. Clipper backers insist the innovation will not only help in an increasingly desperate fight against crime but actually give Americans more privacy than ever. The Clipper controversy--which has sparked frenzied debate and angry protests in recent weeks--swirls around a small sliver of silicon that can be built into telephones. Ordinary phones can be tapped with anything from cheap scanners to quaint-tech alligator clips. But Clipper phones use encryption technology to scramble voice, fax, electronic mail and other data transmissions into digital gibberish. Only other Clipper phones can unscramble the information, which makes the Clipper an untappable system. Well, almost. A phone that can't be tapped is every cop's nightmare, because anyone from drug traffickers to terrorists would be able to scheme and plot with impunity. So under a plan hatched by the NSA and backed by the White House, government agents would be able to unscramble Clipper's secret code by using two mathematical keys. To guard against abuse, the keys would be held by two government agencies. Authorities would first have to get a warrant--standard wiretap procedure--before obtaining the decoders. Key escrow, as it's called, may sound good on paper, but critics maintain it will be both invasive and ineffectual. In addition, Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont maintains that Clipper is a ``misstep in export policy.'' U.S. companies would have a tough time selling compromised telecommunications products overseas and consequently would have to manufacture both domestic and foreign versions, an expensive proposition. IBM, Apple, Microsoft and the Software Publishers Association, among many others, oppose Clipper. Leahy's Technology and the Law Subcommittee is planning March hearings on these issues. HISTORY'S SHADOW. Critics are also doubtful that Clipper's decoding keys will be sufficient to deter government recklessness, pointing to past abuses by the FBI, NSA and CIA. But Georgetown University computer scientist Dorothy Denning contends that much more stringent controls against illegal eavesdropping exist today. ``The greater danger,'' she insists, ``is losing the ability to wiretap, giving organized crime and terrorism the advantage.'' Law enforcement authorities also say they are looking for no more authority than they already have--to make lawful requests to have the telecommunications industry cooperate in crime prevention. But Marc Rotenberg, Washington director of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, a public-interest group that has collected more than 50,000 signatures on an anti-Clipper petition, doesn't buy that argument. In fact, he says, the government has admitted the system could be easily breached by the NSA, which wouldn't need a warrant if it made its demand under the rubric of national security. Many valid concerns about Clipper, says Rotenberg, ``are similarly dismissed with the claim of national security, a dangerous way to design our civilian communications infrastructure.'' The Clipper chip has been proposed as a voluntary standard. But once the Internal Revenue Service, the Pentagon and other agencies order tens of thousands of Clipper phones, it will be impossible to do government business using any other equipment. Indeed, the biggest fear raised by Clipper is that it is the digital camel's nose under the electronic tent. Another White House proposal, for instance, would require that all future telecommunications systems--everything from phones to online services--be ``wiretap friendly,'' says Jerry Berman, executive director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Even the most vociferous Clipper opponents concede a legitimate need for electronic surveillance, but many would like to see Congress rather than agencies like the NSA determine the proper balance of government needs and individual rights. Cliff Stoll, whose book THE CUCKOO'S EGG focused attention on computer espionage, thinks the Clipper controversy is overblown by both sides. In fact, he contends, the typical telephone or computer user doesn't need any encryption more powerful than pig Latin. Erhaps-pay.

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stego
by Loren Fleckenstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm a newspaper reporter researching a how-to story on crypto. 1) Besides RIPEM, PGP and ViaCrypt PGP, any suggestions for capsule reviews of other public-key products? I'm interested only in public-key implementations. 2) Are there stego programs out there that will weave cipherdata into digital pictures or audio? 3) Has anyone reviewed the AT&T secure phones & modems? Your thoughts? Please reply by e-mail as I am not a list subscriber. I also am a big believer in encrypting all traffic, so here is my public key. I am not looking to quote anyone -- all I need are ideas. However, if you say something temptingly quotable, I'll email you back for permission. Short of your grant of permission, I consider your material for background purposes, i.e., I'm free to use it without attributing where I got it. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.4 mQCNAi16V84AAAEEAMNVRFU+CqFRhaOnnZ5hdY8D0o/3tdwzV08D1p/gLP9l8fYZ LKVFsuIQKzna4PSMoJyeUVWUcBftLQCNX0K+phzqTdpMPEnH82ToH8JGgRg873Fq WaQkzj3M+K3ExYVC2EVFfAvOa1iCyRCSrEr2hfQOP99XYMFS7w8UUf0SamE5AAUR tAVsZGZqcg== =nH+6 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -- Loren Fleckenstein 37211.3713(a)cserve.com reporter, The Press-Enterprise office tel. (909) 654-0564

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