December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Just say NYET to kneejerking
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199407291601.JAA28808(a)sleepy.retix.com> joshua geller writes: > > The Internet is a wild and exciting place. You want your children to > > get to know it. But you would also like a way to build little fences > > between them and some things that they are just too young to deal with. > > How do you do it? > > I don't guess I rightly care how you raise your kids as long as you > don't to interfere with what I want to do in the process. if you don't > have sufficient authority over your children to prevent them from doing > that which you do not want them to do, sorry, this is not my problem. My little fences are on my land. If you cross over my little fences, so are you. I think that what I was trying to politely suggest is that the proper place for the proposed access restrictions is not out there on every system on the Internet, but instead on your own system. Politeness rarely does any harm. -- Jim Dixon

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No Subject
by xentrac＠enzu.unm.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Path: lynx.unm.edu!jobone!newsxfer.itd.umich.edu!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!howland.reston.ans.net!usc!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!decwrl!waikato!auckland.ac.nz!news From: pgut1(a)cs.aukuni.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) Newsgroups: alt.security,comp.security.misc Subject: SFS 1.08 beta released Date: 18 Jul 1994 13:41:41 GMT Organization: University of Auckland Lines: 76 Sender: pgut1(a)cs.aukuni.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) Message-ID: <30e0ql$743(a)ccu2.auckland.ac.nz> NNTP-Posting-Host: cs13.cs.aukuni.ac.nz X-Newsreader: NN version 6.5.0 #7 (NOV) Xref: lynx.unm.edu alt.security:17535 comp.security.misc:10445 I've just released the latest beta of my encrypting filesystem software. Hopefully this will be the final beta before the full release. It's available from: ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (134.100.4.42) as: /pub/virus/crypt/disk/sfs_108.zip Version 1.08 fixes a number of minor problems which cropped up in the 1.07 beta. The SFS release announcement follows. Peter. SFS (Secure FileSystem) is a set of programs which create and manage a number of encrypted disk volumes, and runs under both DOS and Windows. Each volume appears as a normal DOS drive, but all data stored on it is encryped at the individual-sector level. Encrypted volumes can be loaded and unloaded as required, and can be quickly unloaded with a user-defined hotkey, or automatically unloaded after a period of inactivity. They can also be converted back to normal DOS volumes, or have their contents destroyed. The documentation includes an in-depth analysis of various security aspects of the software, as well as fairly complete design and programming details. SFS has the following features: - The current implementation runs as a standard DOS device driver, and therefore works with both plain MSDOS or DRDOS as well as other software such as Windows, QEMM, Share, disk cacheing software, Stacker, JAM, and so on. - Up to five encrypted volumes can be accessed at any one time, chosen from a selection of as many volumes as there is storage for. - Volumes can be quickly unmounted with a user-defined hotkey, or automatically unmounted after a certain amount of time. They can also be converted back to unencrypted volumes or have their contents destroyed if required. - The software contains various stealth features to minimise the possibility of other programs monitoring or altering its operation. - The encryption algorithms used have been selected to be free from any patent restrictions, and the software itself is not covered by US export restrictions as it was developed entirely outside the US (although once a copy is sent into the US it can't be re-exported). - SFS complies with a number of national and international data encryption standards, among them ANSI X3.106, Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 180, Australian Standard 2805.5.2, ISO 10116:1991 and ISO 10126-2:1991, and is on nodding terms with several other relevant standards. - The documentation includes fairly in-depth analyses of various security aspects of the software, as well as complete design and programming details necessary to both create SFS-compatible software and to verify the algorithms used in SFS. - Reasonable throughput and size. One beta-tester has reported a throughput of 250 K/s for the basic version and 260 K/s for the 486+ version on his 486 system when copying a file with the DOS copy command from one location on an SFS volume to another (I get about 160 K/s on my vanilla 386 box). The resident portion requires 6.5K of memory, and can be loaded high if desired. - Direct access to IDE and SCSI drives is available for better performance and for drives which aren't normally accessible to DOS (for example systems with more than 2 hard drives). SFS 1.1 is a maintenance release which fixes a few minor problems in 1.0, and adds a number of features suggested by users (the current release is a the 1.08 beta). More details on changes are given in in the README file.

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Re: FW: No SKE in Daytona and other goodies
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Paul Robichaux ...... the road to key escrow is paved with good intentions. IMHO the developers who might actually be working on implementations of this scheme either a) don't know that it _could easily_ "become part of a nationally-mandated open avenue to spying," b) know but don't think such developments are likely, or c) know and don't care. Clearly education is a powerful antidote to cases a) and b) ...................................................................... ................................... You're right: How would you make clear the connection between key escrow (per se), the large context of liberty to pursue software strategies to solve customer problems, the and the individuals who find themselves in the middle? What would you say is the critical, key focal point between the existence of a system of operation, and the way it is intended to be used? And how would you get the educational message out to those involved? Blanc [Job-related Disclaimer: Microsoft won't let me make "official" statements, but they will allow for Superior Arguments.]

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Re: AA BBS sysops found guilty
by Pierre Uszynski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I said: > I remember that the charges were actually more subtle (though just as > silly) and numerous. To discuss it further we need to know the detail > of which charges brought a guilty verdict, and which were thrown out. Well, talk about subtle: (From the netnews threads) "The Thomases were convicted on 11 criminal counts, each carrying maximum sentences of five years in prison and $250,000 in fines. Thomas was acquitted on a charge of accepting child pornography mailed to him by an undercover postal inspector." The thread is currently in comp.org.eff.talk,misc.legal,alt.sex, alt.bbs,alt.slack In none of the thread did I see a mention that the difference between "shipping material" and "Making material available for net access" was even considered to matter. The judge also seems to have disallowed the jury from interpreting "community standards" to include what we call "electronic communities" (not that I would expect a bunch of random jurors to even consider this distinction). Interesting quotes from the thread: : "If the jury feels the law is unjust, we recognize the undisputed : power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the : law as given by a judge, and contrary to the evidence ... and the : courts must abide by that decision." : - US v Moylan, 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, 1969, 417 F.2d at 1006 and : In the list of grievances in the July 4, 1776, declaration of : independence, one was "transporting us beyond seas to be tried for : pretended offences." Pierre. pierre(a)shell.portal.com

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Q: Chaum style blind signatures?
by Jacob.Levy＠Eng.Sun.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone please explain what is a "Chaum style blind signature" and how it can be used? I looked in all the FAQs on rtfm.mit.edu and could not find anything about this. Any help appreciated, --JYL P.S. I've seen the term used in a document claiming these can be used for untraceable e-cash

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Re: FW: No SKE in Daytona and other goodies
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Timothy C. May But what is the reason of the involvement of "law enforcement" and the "intelligence community" in this matter? I refer you all to the upcoming conference agenda, the involvement of NIST/NSA, TIS, Denning, and FBI Director Louis Freeh. Look at the papers being presented at the conference. Any questions? ............................................. If a system contains "protocols especially suited for eventual mandatory use", like SKE, does this of necessity mean that the developers intended that it should become part of a nationally-mandated open avenue to spying on anyone who uses it? Blanc

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Penet
by fhalper＠pilot.njin.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was away for a while, could someone fill me in on exactly what happened invo -olving penet? Thanks, Reuben Halper

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Re: "Just say 'No' to key escrow."
by Graham Toal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: From: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)netcom.com> : Paul Robichaux writes: : > No doubt. But what does the OS provider gain from including encryption : > in the OS? At present, customers aren't demanding it. Why add SKE at : > all when no one's asking for it? : Ah, the exact question for us to be asking! "Why add SKE at all when : no one's asking for it?" Indeed. : Why the upcoming conference on key escrow? Why the representatives : from Germany, Netherlands, France, etc.? Because, as I mentioned before but I don't think people understood the significance, Bill Gates is attempting to create a worldwide network of about a hundred satellites. You don't get to do that without political assistance, and no way is the USG going to let Bill put those birds up unless they control the technology to snoop on the entire net. Putting SKE in all microsoft products is doubtless one (though unlikely all) of the quid pro quos of getting a licence to put up the sky-based comms network. G

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New remailer up at: usura@hacktic.nl
by usura＠vox.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi C'punx, There is another remailer operational in The Netherlands. It operates from my usura(a)hacktic.nl account, and it is an 'on-line' remailer as oposed to my UUCP remailers at vox.hacktic.nl . For more information send some email To: usura(a)hacktic.nl Subject: remailer-help Or finger usura(a)hacktic.nl for the remailers PGPkey. UsE Wisely .. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 for VoX Labz. iQCVAgUBLjpxS1nfdBSNVpE9AQHdwgP/YEMVzaPmgSK5/neizS+XxAtG8//Hbpmw G3b0WJ3JLCSmlbsP4eyS70vOn7V0kdLEoht5yJL4VnMF0J6L8elxLfU8wDxMofKj z7tRCdfVZru2Xcao5FbIEm8L+nFrDF3CPv+Wo3YrHeJEh4kghw0fCsPdlSqilWDz uCF0JDGMhnk= =3UmU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- EnJoY .. -- Exit! Stage Left. Alex de Joode <usura(a)vox.hacktic.nl>

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Re: FW: No SKE in Daytona and other goodies
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Paul Robichaux The same way companies have been made to commit not to kill dolphins, or test products on animals, or give to Planned Parenthood: organized public pressure, combined with threatened or actual negative publicity. .......................................... You could also, like the Luddites, pressure the inventors of computers not to make any more of these new-fangled, fearsome things. Because you just *know* what they'll be used for, once they develop some database "features" and make it possible to send messages anonymously. Blanc (And, for clarity, I'm reminded that I ought to put a disclaimer in my signature about my address: I don't any express any "official" opinions from Microsoft; I just like to argue on cypherpunks.)

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