December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
by stig＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It should be noted that although it is illegal for the cops/feds/spooks to tap phone lines without a warrant, only illegally-obtained voice communications are inadmissible in court. This means that fax and modem communications can be illegally intercepted and STILL used in court against you. Stig ;; __________________________________________________________________________ ;; Stig(a)netcom.com netcom.com:/pub/stig/00-PGP-KEY ;; It's hard to be cutting-edge at your own pace... 32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A ;; Bullet-proof code cannot stand up to teflon bugs. A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F

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Re: Challenge: break the MPJ Encryption Algorithm
by Michael Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 28 Sep 1993, Carl Ellison wrote: > Is each of your 160 permutation arrays a self-inverse or do you generate > different arrays for encryption and decryption? No, they are not self inverses. The inverses are computed from the forward arrays to decrypt in electronic codebook mode. Note that in some chaining modes, the reverse mode isn't even needed, and the arrays could literally be filled with random numbers. Mike Johnson Long live the U. S. Constitution!

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Rep. Gejdenson's NET address
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Still the NSA can't stave off the inevitable for long. Gejdenson hopes to >produce legislation by early next year to revamp government policy on high >tech exports. Rep. Gejdensons NET address is: bozrah(a)hr.house.gov for those of you who care to write him. This is a receive address only, he can't as of yet respond. Scott G. Morham ! The First, Vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu ! Second ! and Third ! Levels of ! Information Storage and Retrieval ! DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace

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No Subject
by VACSC0D4＠VAX.CSUN.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A little over a month ago, I called Mykotronx and asked for information about the Clipper chip. Their response was vague: we're working on some ap notes, but they're not ready yet. I called back today. The person who answered the phone put me on hold for a minute, then came back and told me she had spoken to the VP of engineering and that the ap notes would be ready in four weeks. It looks like Clipper has really been put into high gear. When they are ready, I'll try to get them and post the interesting stuff here. -- MikeIngle(a)delphi.com (using my student account; don't reply here - reply to Delphi)

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Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The same is true of e-mail over the Internet--there is no statutory exclusionary rule that would prvent its admissibility in court. It is at least theoretically possible, however, to exclude illegally seized communications of these sorts using a "pure 4th Amendment" (nonstatutory) exclusionary rule. Don't hold your breath, though. Do you really think that? One could argue, fairly strongly, that the rules set forth in the ECPA have created an expectation of privacy, and that a violation of that expectation would be exactly the violation of the 4th Amendment that the Supreme Court addressed in the 1967 decision that led to the original wiretap provisions in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.

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Re: the public key minefield
by baumbach＠atmel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> The question is phrased improperly. Apart from the fact that the > concept (though not the reality) of anti-gravity is prior art, they > didn't patent the concept of public-key cryptography. Rather, they > patented a class of devices fitting a certain description, with one > public key cryptosystem as an example and as a separate set of claims. > To use your analogy, I could patent anti-gravity achieved by interposing > a screen of some substance opaque to gravity, and patent Cavorite as > an instance of that class. If you had another use for Cavorite, you'd > be home free. Or if you found a way to neutralize gravity by beaming > anti-gravitons downward, you'd probably be clear, too. But if you > found another substance besides Cavorite that was opaque to gravity -- > yes, that would be covered by my patent. (Fortunately, H.G. Wells didn't > patent his literary device. But I can't think of another science > fiction author who used that technique....) > > It's certainly possible that all possible cryptosystems that achieve the > same effect would be covered by their description. That, of course, is > the mark of a good patent attorney's work -- that he or she managed to > fashion so broad a claim. But maybe you can find a better way to do what > you really want to do, which is trade keys and authenticate messages. I think you have convinced me. I don't want to be convinced, so maybe I will try again later, when I have learned more about it. ;-) This means to me, that you cannot patent a broad claim, until you have a narrow specific example of it. Anti-gravity had prior art, public key systems did not. If without inventing a public key system, someone had described the concept in general terms, then prior art would exist for this as well. The person who invented the wheel (or sled?) might have been able to have claims broad enough to cover hovercrafts. > And if you do -- well, then, the patent system has succeeded in its goals, > in that the monopoly assigned to someone else has stimulated you to find > another way to do things, and thus furthered the useful arts and sciences. At what expense? Will our government win some battles, it might otherwise lose to the cypherpunks? Would legal access to pgp, now, be a deciding factor to maintaining legal access to non-clipper encryption later? Peter Baumbach baumbach(a)atmel.com

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Re: the public key minefield (fwd)
by Svetlana Borisova 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

svet wrote:

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Re: Clinton UN Speech / Msg to Prez/VP
by plaz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry Metzger states (perhaps incorrectly): >Mike Ingle says: >> In his UN speech this morning, Clinton talked about cracking down on nuke >> and missile proliferation, and he also mentioned eliminating cold-war-era >> restrictions which are harming American business. Let's put together a >> message to president(a)whitehouse.gov and vice-president(a)whitehouse.gov >> (since Gore is the info-highway guru) stating our position. > >Messages sent to president(a)whitehouse.gov are weighed, not read. I >suspect this will have about as much effect on the president as a note >written in a bottle and tossed into the ocean. > >However, on that basis, its perfectly harmless for you to send a >letter saying anything whatsoever other than a threat on the >president's life, so if you and others would like to spend time >writing such a thing, you can feel free. Just remember that there is >no cypherpunks organization, so you can't claim to represent us. Depends how you define harmless. If I recall the original e-mail release correctly, they do archive all messages. No assurances are made that these messages will not be used against you (ie- might end up in some file on you; I doubt that it would be used in court). To reenforce Perry's point: Any threats against the Prez or his clan WILL get forwarded to the secret service, so DON'T pull that one. Death threats are useless (and most likely counter-productive) tactics anyway. But writing letters to that address are probably at least as effective as writing to him via US Snail. Keep the message focused on one idea (remember it will probably be tabulated as for or against an issue) and make sure that the message gets across clearly. Who knows, if a enough messages get through on a subject, Bill or Al might get a one line statement in one of there meetings saying that the online community is "up in arms" about skipjack or the pgp subpoenas. _______________________________________________________________________ Geoff Dale -- insert standard disclaimers here -- plaz(a)netcom.com "Communists! Those bug-brained motherfuckers are even worse than the schmucks who think they run things here." - Norman Spinrad, from his novel "Little Heroes"

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CLIPPER CHIP /NO!
by charliemerritt＠BIX.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Mr. Prisident: I do not like the "Big Brother Inside" Clipper chip. Wire Taps need to be hard to do. I know you and Al are nice guys, but Richard Nixon and his plumbers could come back! A crypto chip with a government trapdoor (key escrow) is an idea fit for a J. Edgar Hoover, not nice people. Please dont make a techno-fool of your administration. A Razorback Fan from Arkansas...Charlie Merritt [charliemerritt(a)bix.com]

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Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
by Mike Godwin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

smb(a)research.att.com writes > The same is true of e-mail over the Internet--there is no > statutory exclusionary rule that would prvent its > admissibility in court. It is at least theoretically possible, > however, to exclude illegally seized communications of these > sorts using a "pure 4th Amendment" (nonstatutory) exclusionary > rule. > > Don't hold your breath, though. > > Do you really think that? One could argue, fairly strongly, that the > rules set forth in the ECPA have created an expectation of privacy, > and that a violation of that expectation would be exactly the violation > of the 4th Amendment that the Supreme Court addressed in the 1967 > decision that led to the original wiretap provisions in the Omnibus > Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. What's your point? One can argue all sorts of things. Are you saying you have reason to believe an argument of this sort is likely to be a winner? Me, I just work from what I know about 4th Amendment caselaw. --Mike

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