December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Anonymous WWW proxies
by Laurent Demailly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm halfway in the coding of a simple anonymous WWW proxy, but before going any furter, I'd like to know: + If this has not been done before and is available ? (and where) + If there is any interest + Chaining would be a imo good idea (ie cli <-> anonproxy1 <-> anonproxy2 <-> ... <-> server) but how would you manage to tell your favorite web browser to add in its header something like Http-Proxy-List: anonproxy2, ... An alternative would be to have a database of avaibale (running) proxies and that the proxy itself randomly choose a next route ? + A way to solve previous pb and to add in encryption (but would it be fast enough for web browsing ?) would be that each user runs a local proxy (that could be optionnaly used by other folks) that would do pgp encryption/decryption, 'routing' selection,etc... Would ppl with mail remailers and/or W3 experience comment ? (or tell me the pointer toward the already solved, already implemented beast that would do the above) - -- Laurent Demailly * http://hplyot.obspm.fr/~dl/ * Linux|PGP|Gnu|Tcl|... Freedom Prime#1: cent cinq mille cent cinq milliards cent cinq mille cent soixante sept -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.3, an Emacs/PGP interface iQCVAgUBMFtiGXk52/beodHxAQETVgP/avWKpD/AUiRPM0ljX0BH0e7q10KYEOdA Hu+/Bsr7PWANdfhefs/ASrJn/kiOIQwo+RGV1K3UKWu7IyYdHHrINZkp0OcFlIR5 8TIfW6/FqBaUwAzuCV0/acUhXW6ah7xpPkgiHJ04Nlu8BKh72QGawJLJDoT2JmIi o67LVdD5ajg= =/kSM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: "alt.cypherpunks" Newsgroup vs. Mailing List?
by droelke＠rdxsunhost.aud.alcatel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Although Tim is quite happy with Eudora's (or whatever it is) email handeling techniques, I would also prefer a way in which to use my Usenet tools on the cypherpunks list. BUT I think that making it a newgroup opens up the volume to a level far beyond what it is now. It will also result in a far larger level of "noise" due mostly to cross-posts. My plan is to gate cypherpunks to a local newsgroup (local to my machine only) and read it that way. Is it more work for me that way? - yes, but I'ld prefer to do the extra work required than loose what this group has as a mailing list. Now - if someone wants to start a seperate alt.cypherpunks group, but *NOT* gateway this list to it - be my guest. People can then vote with their feet which is the better "medium" or transport method. Dan ------------------------------------------------------------------ Dan Oelke Alcatel Network Systems droelke(a)aud.alcatel.com Richardson, TX

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Re: CYPHERPUNK considered harmful
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

David Lambert <dcl(a)panix.com> writes: > > Peter Trei <trei(a)process.com> wrote: > > > Terms like 'cypherpunk' and 'cryptoanarchy' tend to pigeonhole us as > > nutcases for many people, and are a barrier to getting our ideas > > across. I'm not saying this pigeonholing is correct - in fact I despise > > people who judge a book by it's cover, but so many people DO make such > > snap judgements that we need to take this into account when talking to > > the general public. > > Two of the responses to the "An opportunity..." post unapologetically > admitted that they refused to read the text of the message due to the > presence of the word "cypherpunk" in the first sentence. > > Shows you what we're up against. > > BTW, I'm not for changing the name of the list, but I do see the logic > in a more establishment-friendly name to use when lobbying the public. There is likely some truth to the cypherpunk turning some people off before they listen, but also as has already been said 'cypherpunks' has it advantages too: catchy, gets the media imagination, and has an established reputation, and set of accomplishmensts. One thing I have been thinking would be nice would be a USENET newsgroup, as mailing lists are a step away from easy access which some people never make. It makes it less easy to browse and see what it's about, interacting with majordomo software might seem very intuitive to most members, but not all will be so comfortable signing up their mailbox (which they possibly pay for per K), and may indeed lack the expertise required to do the job. There are serveral archives of cpunks, but these don't tend to be as well known as newsgroups. More people might come across cypherpunks ideas, and the technology for remailers, disk encryptors, discussions of nym servers, steganorgraphy, IPSEC, etc if they were in a newsgroup, perhaps even within the comp, soc, or sci hierarchies. One thing I have discovered in myself is a reluctance to subscribe to too many mailing lists, as the volume, and management of the resulting traffic piped your way can be overwelming (yes I know there are various filters to split off traffic into separate mbox files). I think it is a shame that things like the nym server discussion which sounded very interesting to me got split off into a separate group, I'd just as soon see the discussion here, for reluctance to subscribe to yet more groups reasons, and because it sounded like it wasn't very high volume anyway. Same for the stego group discussions. If it's all in one place at least I can skim that for interesting things. Both of those discussions I think would contribute to the signal ratio here. But, Peter's stated aims sound useful, of promulgating cypherpunks technolgy, and ideas to as large an audience as possible. Definately a very important aim, and one that lots of people already devote some time and thought to. Might I suggest that a newsgroup would be a way to go? There are already a number of security, privacy, and crypto related groups, but they tend to have their own pattern of flow, you know penet.fi problems on alt.privacy.anon-server, alt.privacy (dunno not read much), alt.security.pgp pgp usage, David Sterlight fueled discussions, some ITAR stuff, talk.politics.crypto, crypto politics, comp.org.eff.talk, there must be a few others. Peter's FAQ like document was very nicely worded for avoidance of any connotations of conspiracy or 'punkery' which might put off the less adventurous souls, the more conservative. How about it? Reckon cypherpunks as a group has enough readers to hmm, push through a vote for group creation, if the majority thought it was a useful exercise. A group soley for what? cypherpunks technology, social impacts and education, a place where someone would go with security questions, and to learn about the future of personal and corporate security on the net. If a few people frequented it, with the sort of diligence that a number of people spend time contributing to the alt.security.pgp group, and a useful set of pointers, and FAQs posted frequently, it might become a useful resource. One URL which I haven't seen pushed all that much which impressed me a lot for a very comprehensive list of cypherpunks technology, what it is and where to get it was Tatu Ylonen's pages on crypto, and crypto apps: http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh/crypto/ A resource that would look good with a support newsgroup for discussion of just such technology. I would have thought that if anyone was interested to set up such a group (Peter? - your initiative?), that you could tone down the 'cypherpunks' name if you felt it would further the cause of giving the newsgroup wider appeal. I mean perhaps you would mention 'cypherpunks', 'the mailing list', near the end of the FAQ as further resources, and a forum for active discussion, explaining the name first, so that people don't get put off, after they've got that far (read all through your FAQ), presumably they'll be less inclinded to let a label bother them. Adam

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Re: Mixmaster status changing
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:04 PM 9/14/95 -0700, Lance Cottrell wrote: >There has been an offer to purchase and commercially develop Mixmaster. >This will hasten the development of Mixmaster for other platforms (e.g. >Dos, Windows Macintosh), and bring significant improvements to the >interface, but I will not compromise on the level of security provided by >Mixmaster. Free client software will continue to be available. This is great, but of course what we urgently need is a free windows client. What is the score on this? --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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RE: Commercial Mixmaster
by syrinx＠c2.org (Syrinx Anonymous Remailer) 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

nelson(a)crynwr.com (Russell Nelson) wrote: > There *will* always be a free version of the client with source > code, but the proprietary improvements will probably not be merged > into the free version. Lance, and only Lance, as copyright holder, > has the publish the code under a different copyright. It's the same > thing that Phil Z. did with ViacryptPGP. It's not the same thing, though. PGP 2.6.2 and PGP 2.7 are compatible. You can compile 2.6.2 from the sources and have it interoperate with Viacrypt 2.7. The concern is not "commercialization", per se, but rather the use of "commercialization" as an excuse to build in "proprietary" features (Back doors?) for which no corresponding source code is involved. Since no one has made a good case for there even being a COMMERCIAL market for Mixmaster, could there be other motives? Without building an anonymous e-$ infrastructure first, there's no way to even charge for the use of a remailing service without sacrificing anonymity, even if people were willing to pay to have messages anonymously remailed. No, I'm not accusing Lance. But if he no longer has the time to support Mixmaster, then perhaps some other crypto-friendly group should take over the task and keep it an OPEN system, with source code available. In fact, even freezing Mixmaster as is would be preferable to "improvements" that people don't/can't trust. True, they *COULD* provide source code, but how many commerical products come with complete source code?

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[ASSENT NOISE] Re: C-punks, marketing for the masses
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:08 PM 9/16/95, Greg Broiles wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >No disrespect intended, but I think that the various "let's sanitize >the Cypherpunk message for mass acceptance" marketing/soundbite >proposals are pointless. Cypherpunks is a mailing list, not a political >party (or a platform). > >- From my perspective, the organizing meme for the list is not "strong >crypto is really important, so let's write some and lobby our lawmakers >to make sure it stays legal" but "strong crypto is here and is changing >the dynamics of force, politics, and power, so let's see what we can >do with it." Hear, hear! Greg is absolutely right. (And Dave Mandl was, too, about our mailing list not being a corporation trying to increase market share.) I applaud the efforts to lobby Congresscritters to vote in ways we would find desirable (though I note with some irony that the Congressman who has come out most strongly _against_ Net censorship is Newt Gingrich, often demonized by many. To the credit of EFF and EPIC, and others of that ilk, they noted this fact.) But as Greg points out, we are not a political party. More to the point, we have no centralized resources, no staff, no travel budgets, no ability to appoint spokespunks to speak to the media. This is a weakness, and a strength. I think it was Bill Stewart who noted that the "conventional" cyberspace lobbying groups, such as EFF, EPIC, CPSR, etc., are largely "director-driven," with a handful (or just one or two) directors making decisions, speaking publically, and getting all the attention. The Cypherpunks group is not like that. Lacking any formalized leadership, and--most importantly--lacking offices in D.C., we can't be asked to perform like the usual trained seals who produce the soundbites that fit into the stories too many reporters want. Again, a weakness and a strength. I sense in the debate here that some of us want to have more of an impact, more of a political impact. The cynic in me says these people have just not been in the game long enough to become realists (to a cynic, cynicism is realism). >(And no, I don't think it's important to spread that "meme" (a term >I use with some trepidation) around to get "market share" for it. >Ideas are not football teams nor initiative proposals.) > >I appreciate and support and have participated in various write-yer- >legislator activities. They're useful short-term. But if Tim May and >Duncan Frissell and the other list members who've dared to make predictions >about the impact of crypto on government and economics are correct, >what the government and the legislators want doesn't matter. If they're >wrong, what we want doesn't matter. I suppose it is mainly Duncan and I that make these points, with contributions also from Sandy Sandfort, Black Unicorn, Lucky Green, and others (sorry if I've left you out of the Cryto Anarchy Hall of Shame^H^H^H^H^H Fame). Please understand that I am not elitist in the sense of wishing to limit access to ideas many of us espouse. I discourage no one from calling in to radio talk shows, from writing articles, and so on. But I'm not convinced that "political action" matters very much. As Greg puts it, if we're right, politics won't matter. And if we're wrong, politics won't matter. --Tim ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Newbie Crypto question: MOD?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:39 PM 9/16/95, Childers James wrote: >Ok folks, I recently received "Applied Cryptography" as a gift, and just >have one question: How does the MOD function work in crypto functions? It >seems to work differently than what I've seen before, i.e.: C/C++ MOD. I >also didn't see anything in TCM's FAQ... > >If this is considered noise, I apologize in advance. I didn't put anything in my FAQ about "mod" because my FAQ was not a crypto FAQ per se, of which there are at least two. (Cf. sci.crypt for regular pointers.) And I doubt that either of these FAQs discusses the mod function, though I haven't checked. In any case, Schneier devotes several pages to mod, starting with "You all learned modular arithmetic in school; it was called "clock arithmetic"" (p. 198). After defining it, Schneier goes on to discuss its use in modern cryptography. If this isn't enough of an explanation, I don't know what more to say. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Commercial Mixmaster
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Adam Shostack writes: > Its worth noting that the source code to Julf's Penet remailer > is not public (AFAIK). People use it becuase they trust Julf, or > trust people who trust Julf. People don't use Julf's source code. People use the services provided by Julf's remailer, which runs Julf's source. Trusting anon.penet is relatively simple (conceptually) because the author, distributor, and user of the remailer code (where user = remailer operatror) are all the same person. I would be less likely to trust Julf if I thought he was running software he received (through unknown distribution channels, from an unknown author) as an executable without source. I trust Julf because (a) he seems to be a decent/trustworthy person, and (b) because I think he has enough information available to him to be sure that his system doesn't have intentional back doors nor glaring unintentional ones. If only one of (a) and (b) were true, I'd trust anon.penet.fi a lot less. I've seen messages from people who refuse to use ViaCrypt PGP because they can't see the source. I own a copy because I don't want to worry about licensing when I use it in a commercial context and because I don't think Phil would have been associated with it if the binaries distributed weren't free of known weaknesses different from those document with the freeware PGP or otherwise discloses. My inclination is to feel the same way about distributions of Mixmaster. If Lance is willing to sign the code which is shipped, my hunch is that there's nothing tricky going on. If Lance disappears, and the purchaser turns out to be unknown, I dunno if I'd run it before someone trusted had disassembled it (or someone liberated the source code) and it was inspected and found to be clean. [I think it's useful to continue beating the almost-dead horse of the marketing of Mixmaster because I suspect that the anonymous purchaser of Mixmaster subscribes to the list, and is thereby aware of what potential remailer operators and remailer users are going to like, and not like.] > Why pay for remailers when there are free ones? Speed and > lawyers pop right up as damn good answers. Putting up a couple of > p120s on a T1 in the Carribean isn't cheap, nor is making sure you > have a good lawyer who'll protect the machines when the bad guys show > up with warrants. I'd be much happier to use a fast system on good > legal ground than a freebie. It's safer still to use a system which doesn't keep logs and has otherwise taken steps to minimize inadvertent data leakage. (Imagine me mentioning here all of the by now tiresome ideas about thermite, degaussers, low-level-formats of the HD, etc, etc. Please, please, let's not start that thread again for at least 6 months.) I'm not sure that there are any special lawyer tricks to stop the execution of a search/seizure warrant. An attorney may help you keep items found out of court later. I suppose it'd be possible, if the cops were cooperative and the attorney immediately available and the magistrage/judge who signed the warrant was immediately available to try to stop the execution of the warrant, but that seems pretty far-fetched. I've been reading a lot of search & seizure cases lately for work and haven't seen anything like this mentioned, ever. If anyone's got a cite for "how to stop a warrant search & seizure in progress", please pass it along. I'm sure my boss (and his clients) would be interested. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMFuuJn3YhjZY3fMNAQGsRAP+PIm6ZsjfCFetFr0//LPUuBg+tiK9b8Dh 4WXji1ab6kCfB+SCbNhU7IDNCR7pK7c1rWjVL+r0gbded46Um6+mn5hDKagKhztD nqld1vTETJFX9TmsRe3mXBE/TW1pqysoiS3PnM4mZ8b0GjErOdSbNpxOizvBOdhi jLoNKnEGnpA= =3dgI -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Mixmaster Licensing Offer Explained
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- From: Lance Cottrell <loki(a)obscura.com> Date: 17 September 1995 Subject: Mixmaster Licensing Offer Explained Permission is granted to distribute this document in any media for any purpose as long as the entire document is distributed with the attached digital signature intact, or the document is clearly marked as having been modified with the locations of deleted text indicated. Several rumors have surfaced following my announcement of Mixmaster's changing status. I want to nip these worries in the bud. After discussion with the party interested in commercially licensing Mixmaster we have decided to explain the whole situation publicly. The company offering to license Mixmaster is Phoenix DataNet, a Houston area ISP. John Perry, a person well known to this list and the remailer community in general, is a Senior Systems Administrator at Phoenix. On Thursday I received a call from John. Some others at Phoenix had just noticed a Mixmaster remailer he had been running on one of their machines. Phoenix has several large corporate customers who need secure transactions for some special applications. The core engine of Mixmaster is well suited to that purpose. They offered to license the code from me to use as the framework on which to build these other programs. In the process they will rewrite many basic functions in Mixmaster that need major overhaul (e.g., key management). We will incorporate those improvements back into Mixmaster. This should lead to porting Mixmaster to several other platforms, and to fixing most of my worst coding atrocities. I had never considered licensing Mixmaster, but I know John Perry both personally and by reputation. He has thoroughly assuaged my fears that Phoenix would try to weaken or restrict Mixmaster in any way. John will be leading this project on the Phoenix end. He asked that I delay the release of the next version of Mixmaster pending clarification of every one's intentions. Now that we have reached an understanding the planned release of Mixmaster version 2.0.2 will take place as soon as I can get it ready. There are no plans to sell Mixmaster clients or servers. They will continue to be released free with source code. I will still control the contents of all releases of Mixmaster. All future versions of Mixmaster will be backward compatible. There will be no "Legal Kludges" preventing old clients from working with new remailers, and new clients will be able to generate old message formats. Currently there are no plans to change the message format at all. -Lance Cottrell -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMFvVivPzr81BVjMVAQHzhgf/f9zM91/N0S/JljicjDpoGzQ6Pt4gZVy9 ar407vp6js7EJ7Kg2XHtni6FwowM066rbGrt8W/8ZoQJGBxgKkfSvhLpEL7E926M tn5QDEysVa1itzkvym2rQuNRIALfLOwzcYyLMdfjBtPMhRJkfwDthrrl9ocHkrSR WW1wPwBRj/t+LFl6ueXwN8ZYLJVmbIoLy7BcqbNzLWjqmB7jgN2toxVCRfM7qfkE DX1M/+hPddE6dT8ZgWdSt9dUvMQ7hu8BfHKCkcf0XWKmmeJ8jh+XDISvC7EFgIGT H5XjkLpA2Eg+qmYzKHDOQaQT9SfzSVs4Y9sTzMlbewBi3jna6Dz/Sw== =G2pZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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Re: [ASSENT NOISE] Re: C-punks, marketing for the masses
by banisar＠epic.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >The Cypherpunks group is not like that. Lacking any formalized leadership, >and--most importantly--lacking offices in D.C., we can't be asked to >perform like the usual trained seals who produce the soundbites that fit >into the stories too many reporters want. Again, a weakness and a strength. Hey! Bark Bark Bark Bark Dave (partially trained seal protesting that description) PS Sorry all for my last message that should have only gone to Bruce. I'm claiming jetlag. David Banisar (Banisar(a)epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * ftp/gopher/wais cpsr.org Washington, DC 20003 * HTTP://epic.digicash.com/epic

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Trained Seals and Beltway Insiders
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:23 PM 9/17/95, Dave Banisar wrote: >> >>The Cypherpunks group is not like that. Lacking any formalized leadership, >>and--most importantly--lacking offices in D.C., we can't be asked to >>perform like the usual trained seals who produce the soundbites that fit >>into the stories too many reporters want. Again, a weakness and a strength. > >Hey! Bark Bark Bark Bark > >Dave (partially trained seal protesting that description) Well, sorry for letting my rhetorical excesses come to the fore! On even days I think the work of the Washington lobbying/policy groups is very useful, even if not always done the way I would do it. (Having grown up just outside D.C., nothing would ever get me to live in that area again, though.) On odd days, I think of them as "Beltway insiders," with the same handful of "spokeswonks" handling all of the issues, dealing with all of the press conferences, attending the various D.C. events, and essentially being part of the System. I never did memorize what all those "estates" are, as in the Third and Fourth Estates. But I think the Washington crowd has several components: The Gubment (itself divided into several branches), the Press, the Contractors, and the Lobbyists. The "think tanks" which ring D.C. and other areas (Brookings, Cato, the new Progress and Freedom Foundation, the military advisory think tanks, and a dozen or more others) are an industry unto themselves. Add to these the various lobbying groups (NRA, AMA, tobacco, Right to Life, etc.). And throw in various national groups with D.C. offices. Quite a stew. They all play off each other, with the lobbying groups trained to "give good sound" to the reporters who want some quotable line about child porn, or Clipper, or whatever. Any conclusions for us? Maybe, but I won't touch them here. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: CYPHERPUNK considered harmful
by David C. Lambert 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)polaris.mindport.net> wrote: > On Fri, 15 Sep 1995, David C. Lambert wrote: > > > BTW, I'm not for changing the name of the list, but I do see the logic > > in a more establishment-friendly name to use when lobbying the public. > > Distrubute [sic] watered down cypherpunk "teachings" in more benign forms which > hide their true (Ohhh! Scary!) potential in an effort to make them commonly > acceptable to joe sixpack. I believe you misstate the point that people are trying to make. I haven't seen anyone advocating the "watering down" of any so-called "teachings" to "hide" any "true potential". The only thing that people have mentioned is that some of the less clueful out there have a knee jerk response to the name "cypherpunk". That's all. > Can't we all see what road this leads down? No. Please enlighten us. > At the risk of politicizing the issue, I wouldn't be the first to call this > "left-speak" or "term-sanitizing." And this matters because...? > Really the core issue is that the citizens of their respective nations > need to either: > > 1> See cryptography for the important individual rights issue that it > is and latch on to the basic desire for free and unmonitored commerce and > exchange without censorship or observation. > > or > > 2> Decide that they are not interested in the issues because these > issues are too radical, or simply because their own political ideas > fall left (or statist) of this spectrum. What exactly is it that you feel "the citizens of their respective nations" are doing right now, if not this? > in the end I > don't care if every joe sixpack on the planet uses real crypto, just so > long as those I am to conduct commerce (of data or goods) with do. If this is the case, then I'm at a loss to understand how you fail to see the merit in a "term-sanitizing", as you put it, in order to make the use of strong crypto desired and required by Joe Sixpack. How do you expect the legality of string crypto to survive unless Joe and his friends exert political pressure to keep it alive? Isn't it obvious that unless this happens, that strong (unescrowed) crypto is on the path to being outlawed (at least in the US, and several other countries)? > The final judgement will be in the advantage of velocity and security of > transactions and the wealth that this "allocates" to those wise enough to > adopt crypto exchange systems. Evolution in action. If this makes me > elitist, so be it. Elitist or not, this is beside the point. People are bringing up political and rhetorical concerns because they feel that political and persuasive methods are required *right now* in order to preserve the *legality* of strong crypto. I only care about whether Joe Sixpack wants strong crypto because if I can't persuade him that he does, he won't help me keep it legal in my country of residence. Once it's legality seems safe(r) from attack, he can go on using rot13 for all I care. David C. Lambert dcl(a)panix.com (finger for PGP public key) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMFxSiapplsfgM88VAQGj5wQAoY2FQe0rh0InWF1xOmST91QDCy4TrYUj Y6Vnu/i3yspS/vDsKLMbIYAezAJEtgOPHEOf7Rv1Y4gKDyZNAJbYESXiYTQXD7O3 SNWNtb9nAT6l1RPqsnFR9yWAWYQ1CS3dLRpNpMBIqzL/HnKyKrgitLKQ530XtF8O 78u6jtmsBa4= =Jgoe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Mixmaster Licensing Offer Explained
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(I've trimmed the mailing lists I'm not on...) At 8:01 AM 9/17/95, Lance Cottrell wrote: > Permission is granted to distribute this document in any media for any >purpose as long as the entire document is distributed with the attached >digital signature intact, or the document is clearly marked as having been >modified with the locations of deleted text indicated. So sue me. :-} (That is, I'll treat this article in the normal way, trimming sections I'm not responding to and making note of elisions only where I think it important to.) ... >The company offering to license Mixmaster is Phoenix DataNet, a Houston >area ISP. John Perry, a person well known to this list and the remailer >community in general, is a Senior Systems Administrator at Phoenix. > >On Thursday I received a call from John. Some others at Phoenix had just >noticed a Mixmaster remailer he had been running on one of their machines. >Phoenix has several large corporate customers who need secure transactions >for some special applications. The core engine of Mixmaster is well suited >to that purpose. They offered to license the code from me to use as the >framework on which to build these other programs. In the process they will >rewrite many basic functions in Mixmaster that need major overhaul (e.g., >key management). We will incorporate those improvements back into >Mixmaster. This should lead to porting Mixmaster to several other >platforms, and to fixing most of my worst coding atrocities. First, I think it generally a Good Thing that remailer software gets commercialized and cleaned-up, or that at least commercial packages exist. (I'm not going to get into commercial vs. non-commercial and Microsoft vs. Gnu issues.) If Lance makes a bunch of money off this, more power to him. However, this commercialization raises some interesting issues. Others have dealt with various concerns about the code integrity, about features added, and even about TLA access. I'll address some liability and legal issues. * Will Phoenix DataNet be making the mix software available for purchase, or are they funding _internal development_? (That is, mixes for their corporate clients, which raises some interesting issues in and of itself, as discussed below.) * If Phoenix is planning to resell Mixmaster, or whatever they call it (as "Mixmaster" may remain a trademark of the appliance company which originated the name), what will be their liability for the various abuses which are likely to occur? None of the existing remailers/mixes has had "corporate" backing, and the "deep pockets" corporations are often presumed to have, so lawsuits have not gone after corporations. * On the other hand, if Phoenix is primarily aiming at internal use, for specified corporate customers, how will they stop others from using the service? If chaining is used, and absent any special "untraceable postage tokens" they might issue (as one way to control access), how will the Nth mix in a chain of M mixes "know" whether an incoming message can be remailed or not? (Schemes to sign the packets obviously flunk the anonymity test.) There are many other interesting issues which crop up when Giant Corporation begins to deploy and use remailers. What if, for example, the Justice Department claims that Phoenix and its customers are using remailers for price fixing and collusion? (Just to be clear on this, I personally have no problems with such collusion....but the Antitrust people see things differently.) (To be sure, telephones can and of course have been used to collude. Partly, wiretaps help here (until voice encryption happens...). But Justice has gone after airline reservation computer systems which they believe were used to "signal" price information. Imagine how overjoyed they'll be to see Phoenix DataNet deploy their system!) Again, don't confuse my arguing points here with any kind of advocacy of the Justice Department/Antitrust Division position. I'm only trying to think out what some of the legal issues will be that face the first U.S.-domiciled company to actually start selling remailers or to set up a remailer network for customers. Interesting times ahead. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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planning for life during the crypto night (was Re: CYPHERPUNK considered harmful.)
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)polaris.mindport.net> writes: > > 3. Unescrowed crypto banned, with advanced stego, panic passwords, > stealth PGP, incorporated remailers all across international borders > making offenders impossible to identify or catch. > > [...] I believe the goal is to propogate crypto far enough to at > least have a salient "underground" participants. > > Some months ago I called for advanced stego and stealth PGP as well > as larger keys in the event we all had to go "into the crypto > closet" for a time. > > I call for them again. Guess you're saying that a future underground cypherpunk group is going to need tools to continue if the US plummets into cryptographic darkness. And you'd like to see these tools available now, as it will be difficult to distribute, and set up if the big ban is already on us. A pre-emptive safety precaution in the event that it happens. So what threat model do you envisage tools being needed to withstand? A couple of the things you list are realisable with little effort, one is a PGP with large keys, I am using a doctored to go to 16k keys (I did this to amuse myself with getting timings for how long encrypt / decrypt & keygen take for varying key sizes). The patch is small, and easy to figure out, just a couple of #ifdefs, various people posted their patches to do this to alt.security.pgp some time ago. I think there was at least one patched version of PGP distributed (unofficially of course - PGPs largest allowed key size being 2048 bits), though I don't have any URLs for such a beast. Part of the problem is people seem to frown on distributing PGPs with larger keys, or alternate versions of PGP, due to version control issues, and such. Technically easy to do tho. Adding stealth features to PGP, or even as standalone, aren't hard either. I've been trying to add Hal's improved stealth algorithm to Henry Hastur's stealth program. It's basically finished, except for the problem that I am unsure about the security of the construct: x' = f(MD5(x)) * N + x where 0 < x < N and 0 < x' < M where M is a power of 2, and M > 2^64 * N and f is just a scaling function If that is secure I'd be happy to release an updated version of stealth, but without assurance, it is necessary to include random numbers, and the best way I see to achieve that is to build it in to PGP, and use PGP's ran no utils directly. If you're talking about a different version of PGP, perhaps this wouldn't be a big deal anyway. So that's big key PGP, and stealth PGP. I'm presuming most people figure 128 bit IDEA is suitably unassailable, but RSA keys are a moving target, and less predictable due to improvements in factoring algorithms. Already people are talking about an academic RSA129 like attempt on a 512 bit PGP key. What are views about creating Yet Another version of PGP. I've read a few discussions of this kind of thing in the past on alt.security.pgp, and most people were against it. But I think some useful things could come out of it. The other problem is working with pgp2.x when there is a version 3.0 being worked on, not sure what stage 3.0 is at, any coding.. perhaps if a stealth capable pgp2.x was worked on, and a few features demonstrated, the 3.0 folks would be willing to take a look at it to evaluate the features for possible version 3.0 inclusion. Just don't want to go do a of work, and then get a polite cease and desist from those with interests in managing the version control of PGP. Good stego tools are the other main problem. My understanding is that all of the stego programs to date do it by just ripping out the LSB of an audio or graphic image, and replacing that with the bits from a message with a stealthed message. Sending masses of pictures around is kind of suspicious tho, I mean several a day, each freshly scanned from what? I guess if video conferencing gets here, it would be fun to add the stego into that noisy stream, same for internet phone. Text stego, with bits hidden in the entropy of english text seems a harder objective, but a useful one. I'm presuming that plausible deniability, and facilities for anonimity are essentials. How does one go about doing that? Using newsgroups to carry on a two level communication might be a good way of maintaining plausible deniability. Either a stego interface to remailers in other countries, so that the stego gateway to remailers scans it's newspool, decrypts messages addressed to it, and forwards that off to the anon remailers. The outcome could be a further text or graphics stegoed message for posting to a suitably high noise news group. The recipient is also scanning his news spool for stego messages addressed to him. Sounds feasible. Perhaps a proof of concept would be easy to knock up, if a place holder is inserted for the 'good text stego' program should go. There was a 'texto' posted a while ago which did something suitable. Adam

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Re: "Hackers"-- brief review and anecdote...
by blancw＠accessone.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Ray Arachelian And that's where we, the cypherpunks come in, by advocating strong cryptographic protocols and tools, we can keep every machine safe from intrusion; it's not just Uncle Sam's evil minions that should have total privacy; normal citizens need privacy too - the spooks shouldn't be the only ones with it. :-) This message has been brought to you by the Cypherpunks. Use only Cypherpunks brand software ;-D ................................................ Cypherpunk crypto in every computer in every home. <g> .. Blanc

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Intellectual Property and Crypto collision
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> ELECTRONIC MEDIA PROTECTED UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW > A presidential task force has recommended that electronic transmission of > books, magazine articles and software should be classified as copies > subject to existing copyright laws. The task force also recommended that > it should be illegal to make or distribute products aimed at decoding > encrypted software without the consent of the copyright owner. Would this make it illegal to produce tools for decrypting key-escrowed software? :-) John

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cypherpunks as a newsgroup
by shields＠tembel.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PGP message

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Re: CYPHERPUNK considered harmful
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I haven't seen anyone advocating the "watering down" of any so-called >"teachings" to "hide" any "true potential". The only thing that people >have mentioned is that some of the less clueful out there have a knee >jerk response to the name "cypherpunk". That's all. At least early on, back when we were getting our 15 kilobytes of fame on the front covers of WiReD and the NYT magazine section, the name appeared to be useful for getting attention; Tim and Eric were getting occasional quotes in the mundane press, as was John Gilmore who has had longer-term relationships with some of the press through his other activities. Maybe the NYT isn't the paragon of respectability that it once was..... #--- # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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"Attachments"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why do people keep sending "attachments"? This was just a text article, and not an application (program), so why was it included as an "attachment"? At 8:27 PM 9/17/95, Michael Shields wrote: >Attachment converted: Macintosh HD:cypherpunks as a newsgroup (????/----) >(00005C4E) The message was, as Microsoft Word 6.0 saw it: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The general opinion seems to be that the netnews format is very convenient, though we should keep the list; but that entering Usenet or Altnet would lower the S/N. Why not, then, start a new hierarchy? Why not gate cypherpunks not to alt.cypherpunks or comp.security.cypherpunks, but to crypto.cypherpunks? We could feed it freely between us and set up NNTP servers which are open for just crypto.*. c.c would be the only crypto.* group for now, but it would also be easy to add more -- say, for the "respectable" splinter group, or for protocol WGs. We'd get the convenience of netnews without the high profile. I'm willing to run the gateway on news.tembel.org and feed other sites, if people think crypto.cypherpunks is a good idea. Opinions? - -- Shields. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMFyEm+yjYMb1RsVfAQF1YQQAneg8c6yUKJUUybqepl52yqyS53OGrpLq YfdrMYaIxMWdWKNpMAAus/g8WjWMwYrrB4p+8/WLMm4HsUEHO2ouNzbraiyMRwaB NEhf0v/91h9jGniZIX5uQyqSdM/VC5YupWV0cITqKte9iLZR77C5hVqXBiLhRcwG YL8GwDP5tYw= =roIF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Commercial Mixmaster
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:34 PM 9/17/95, hallam(a)w3.org wrote: >I seem to remember that Julf took over Stephie's code from Wizvax which >used to >post into the alt.sex.bondage group. I suspect he has modified it since but I >don't think that there is much to it. Actually, it was the code of Karl Kleinpaste that Julf took over...I seem to recall Julf saying this in an article. In any case, this is what Karl claimed last year: "There are 3 sites out there which have my software: anon.penet.fi, tygra, and uiuc.edu. I have philosophical disagreement with the "universal reach" policy of anon.penet.fi (whose code is now a long-detached strain from the original software I gave Julf -- indeed, by now it may be a complete rewrite, I simply don't know); ....Very bluntly, having tried to run anon servers twice, and having had both go down due to actual legal difficulties, I don't trust people with them any more." [Karl_Kleinpaste(a)cs.cmu.edu, alt.privacy.anon-server, 1994-08-29] >How does the cypherpunks remailer work? Does PGP encrypt the signature of a >message so that the identity of the sender is unknown? Or is it simply PEM >style >encryption so that the DN of the sender is in the clear :-( Assuming this is a serious question and not a troll, cypherpunks remailers (at least the ones I have used) completely encapsulate a message. No stuff "dangles outside" the remailed part. When PGP encryption is used, nothing is outside the block. If Alice sends something to Bob's Remailer, Bob decrypts the message and may or may not find further encrypted blocks inside. Envelopes within envelopes. I can't imagine it being done any other way. (I'm not counting the remailers possibly signing the sent messages, as a way of protecting against tampering, but this reveals nothing about the senders.) --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: CYPHERPUNK considered harmful.
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Black Unicorn writes: > Some months ago I called for advanced stego and stealth PGP as well as > larger keys in the event we all had to go "into the crypto closet" for a > time. > I call for them again. I know of three ways to get software: 1. Write it yourself. 2. Pay someone else to write it. 3. Find software someone else wrote that meets your needs. If (3) isn't working, perhaps you should try (1) or (2). (I've been "calling for" a big house with a hot tub for years now. Still no progress. I'll let you know if it works out.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMFswPX3YhjZY3fMNAQHatwP/ZJKuNEDRPdCldyvshGkG/w/io+37zx3m DyJ4h1+OicxYCtKbolXYVcX8C4d1j7hXY2sesepcDvYYyy+butdQ+/2tw3u0FW1j WpfCGURpypBVb5T7QlL21Qv39cBIu9mJxkasPkQSeSnrC24eGtoItmZzrIRZgJyj Dj2FOIfxiFY= =5DwJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: WAS_tem (fwd)
by keelings＠wu1.wl.aecl.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Incoming from Rev. Ben: > > On Thu, 14 Sep 1995, James A. Donald wrote: > > > If you draw a picture using paintbrush of an underage person engaging > > in sexual conduct, you are in violation of this proposed legislation. > > Doesn't that directly contradict the stated purpose of existing child [snip] > > Do the lawyers on the list want to pipe up? On cypherpunks?!? Whatever for? I imagine there's already a rousing discussion going on about this somewhere in AOL. Take it there. -- "Remember, obsolescence (Win95) isn't an accident; it's an art form!" keelings(a)wu1.wl.aecl.ca s. keeling, aecl - whiteshell labs

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Friday's NIST Key Escrow FIPS Workshop
by Thomas Grant Edwards 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I went to the NIST "Developing Key Escrow Encryption Standards Workshop" held in Gaithersburg, MD on Sept. 15, 1995. It turns out I know the guy who was running the conference so I knew I couldn't miss it...and I knew I had to wear my Cypherpunks t-shirt to show the flag (and it stood out, as there were few without suits there). I got to meet Dorothy Denning for the first time. I was mentioning how government key-escrow doesn't sound too bad to some in the libertarian/cypherpunk world, say for instance to ensure FOIA requests are not encrypted away. She said that would never be a problem, just getting the government to give you FOIA documents in the first place is the problem. In a nutshell, this was a conference to begin work on a FIPS for software key encryption escrow. Industry people there felt that a FIPS would be a great way to standardize key escrow for data recovery. However, except for one guy at IBM who said they tap employees phones alot, most industry people felt that it was not needed for tapping their real-time communications. There was a lot of talk from government people about the need for Law Enforcement to get access to encrypted real-time communication between government employees. This, to say the least, squicked many attendees, and there seemed to be much tension between the sides on that issue. I asked a couple of industry people and privacy advocates the question "Am I just paranoid, or is this FIPS a trial balloon for mandated civillian key escrow?" I got many "yes" answers. I also heard the occasional "this sounds like son-of-clipper" comments in the breakout groups. One noteworthy point is that RSA sent in a position paper to try to get the Digital Signature Standard replaced by RSA signatures for inclusion in key escrow FIPS due to its "virtual non-availability in commercial products," and noted that the US Govt. has free use of RSA sigs. Another noteworthy point is that NIST made clear that the key escrow FIPS should _not_ involve SECRET algorithms. The Workshop consisted of a discussion of goals and objectives by Ray Kammer (Deputy Director, NIST) and some initial thoughts on standards development by Miles Smid (NIST). Here is the gist of the overhead slides: The Goals of the workshop were based on the August 17 announcement by the Administration to allow for exportability of 64-bit software key escrow encryption, plans to allow Federal agencies to use Escrowed Encryption Standards compliant hardware devices for data communications, and the development of a FIPS for key escrow, implementable in software. This escrow FIPS would be used by Federal agencies in conjunction with FIPS-approved encryption techniques. This workshop was held to help begin the FIPS development. The workshop goals included 1) Providing input to the govt. on drafting a software key escrow encryption standard; 2) Helping govt. to identify additional policy and technical issues that need to be addressed and 3) providing the govt. with thoughts on drafting and follow-up The FIPS process involves developing the draft FIPS, a 90 day comment period, then addressing comments, and then it goes to the Secretary of Commerce for signature, and becomes effective six months after the signature. The purpose of the New Escrow FIPS is to foster a wider use of escrow technology...this means: no requirement for SECRET algorithms, software and hardware implementations, and exportability. It also will provide a government validation of escrow systems meeting the standard...theoretically allowing for security, integrity, and availability. Threats examined included compromise (unauthorized disclosure of keys and data recovery), and denial of service (modification or loss of keys, use of bogus recovery fields, and improper system operation). The FIPS will provide common formats and procedures which will facilitate data recovery and lower cost. Applicability of the FIPS will include the US Govt. and contractors. Applications include both stored and transmitted data. Encryption algorithms must be FIPS approved. And finally desirable features include: auditing, configuration control, backup capability, and efficiency. The questions asked to the breakout groups included: 1) Is a standard interface for the release of keys desirable? 2) What documentation is required? 3) How will operational procedures be developed? 4) How will conformance be validated? 5) Will security be evaluated? If so, under what criteria and by whom? 6) How will configuration control be maintained? 7) Are new FIPS-approved algorithms necessary? 8) Should escrowing be built into the Public Key Infracstructure? 9) Is a standard escrow system identification field needed? 10) Is split knowledge required? 11) Do systems which permit data to be encrypted for both storage and transmission need to provide for both kinds of escrow? 12) Does the government require special features (2-hour access, continuous real-time decryption, etc.)?

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Re: CYPHERPUNK considered harmful.
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by unicorn(a)polaris.mindport.net (Black Unicorn) on Sun, 17 Sep 6:39 PM >If some other 'punks want to get together and fund such >projects, I will participate. However, putting the >burden of financing this venture (which will have no >immediate economic return, as I will support no venture >which does not result in fully public software) What are the prospects of privacy-enhancing programing funded by contributors for non-commercial, non-governmental, "fully public software?" I would tithe, modestly but durably, to such work if I believed the promise. They call me Ishmael Sixpack. John Gilmore's (and others'?) underwriting toad is impressive. Along with the voluntary (?) effort of Hugh Daniels (and others, I don't know how toad survives). What else might be done cypherpunk-wise if material resources were available? And under what conditions and arrangements? The discussion of Mixmaster commercialization is instructive. And Julf's and the other remailers survivability and longevity in the face of attacks. How could the contributions be made without contaminating the product? No joke. Or, are only individually initiated and self-funded programs trustworthy, when all is said and done? And no planned program as rewarding as the eclectic irregulated. And bartering and bickering and rending and mending the only reputable method of exchange of the tumultuous souk.

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Re: "Hackers"-- brief review and anecdote...
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>I saw "Hackers" yesterday. It's not bad and its political sensibility is >>very cyberpunk. The ad campaign even uses the tag line, "Their only crime >>is curiosity." > >It may not be a crime, but it's not nice to steal a title. Well, what do you think of my latest predicament. My first book, "Agents Unleashed" will be retitled "Agents At Large" because SAMS, a division of Viacom, considers any title ending with the word "unleashed" to be an infringement of their tradedress. They came up with enough legal mumbo-jumbo about trademark to scare my publisher into changing it. -Peter

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