December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Online/offline transactions
by nelson＠crynwr.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Don't worry about online vs offline transactions. The credit card companies are moving toward all online transactions. A company down in NJ called RAM Mobile Data is helping them on this. They have base stations in 90% of urban business areas. The radios are fairly cheap (even though they need an appropriate thing to plug them into) and the per-transaction charges are about a dime. So I would say that the important problem to solve is "how do we make accounts anonymous?" rather than "how do we avoid double-spending?" -russ <nelson(a)crynwr.com> ftp.msen.com:pub/vendor/crynwr/crynwr.wav Crynwr Software | Crynwr Software sells packet driver support | ask4 PGP key 11 Grant St. | +1 315 268 1925 (9201 FAX) | Quakers do it in the light Potsdam, NY 13676 | LPF member - ask me about the harm software patents do.

1 0

list of spiffy places to put your money
by Vincent.Cate＠FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dan Harmon: >Robert Hettinga wrote: >> [...] But we knew this already, from a list of spiffy places >> to put your money published here a few weeks ago. > >Maybe we could get the list republished? The list is in: ftp://furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu/security/banks And for easy access to all sorts of fun stuff, try mosaic on: ftp://alex.sp.cs.cmu.edu/links/security/vac-security.html -- Vince

1 0

Re: list of spiffy places to put your money
by Vincent.Cate＠FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wrote: >And for easy access to all sorts of fun stuff, try mosaic on: > > ftp://alex.sp.cs.cmu.edu/links/security/vac-security.html But I really meant to give the following URL (more fun): ftp://furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu/security/README.html -- Vince

1 0

Re: back to programming projects...
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > On a related note, should encrypting remailers have the keys changed > > regularly? The RSA-IDEA combination isn't very suspectible to known > > plaintext attacks, right? Right. There are two sets of encryption used in the RSA-IDEA combo: 1) RSA, encrypting a random session key with a public-key algorithm. By definition, RSA-like public key algorithms can easily have known or chosen plaintext generated, since you can encrypt anything you like. RSA isn't susceptible to known-plaintext (except for verifying that a (presumably stolen) private key is correct, or by factoring very large numbers of very large prime numbers and checking them, which is computationally infeasible), and any other public key system that *were* susceptible to known-plaintext attacks wouldn't be very useful. Major breakthroughs in factoring theory could always change this, earning mathematical fame and fortune for the discoverer. Short RSA keys can be factored; you're better off with 1024-bit keys or longer for anything you're real serious about. 2) IDEA, encrypting the message itself using the session key. IDEA is not known to be susceptible to anything better than brute force, so known-plaintext attacks require trying 2**128 keys, which is computationally infeasible. Perhaps someone can find a hole in IDEA, but there's nothing major at present. 3) There's a third component that might use encryption - generating the "random" session key. Obviously, if you use the same session key to send different messages to different people, they might notice. If you use different session keys to send messages to people, but the session keys are easily derived from each other, and one recipient notices the pattern from several messages sent to him, he might try guessing the key for the next messages you send to other people. So use a genuine high-quality random number generator. There is one more special case, which is sending the same message to multiple recipients, with the message encrypted once with the session key, and multiple versions of the session key encrypted with each different recipient's public key. I've forgotten the details, but if there are more than e recipients, it's possible to crack this. (e is the encryption exponent, typically 3 or 17.) That's why PGP and other well-designed systems will pad the session key with random stuff before encrypting with RSA (which is an essentially free operation, since the RSA blocksize is much larger than the session key for IDEA.) Bill

1 0

Re: Protocol Wanted!
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> How does Bob make Alice aware that he can factor RSA keys > and make sure that he and Alice can do business without > either one of them getting ripped off or the NSA catching him. Sounds like a job for Blacknet, or similar anonymous-broadcast systems. He can't easily hide the fact that *somebody* is in the business from the NSA, since he can't easily tell that Alice doesn't work for the NSA and isn't planning to publish his business's existence to the net. But if he and Alice are both remailer-users able to post to the Blacknet broadcast (using whatever mechanism, like alt.waste), Bob can post a note to Alice saying he is able to crack RSA keys for money, and Alice can post replies saying she doesn't believe him and here's a message to crack. There are cut-and-choose protocols described in Schneier that can handle (awkwardly) the mechanics of getting Bob to recode and return the message, and Alice to hand over the digicash, without either of them feeling too ripped off, assuming there's a digicash system in place that gives sufficient anonymity. Bob has a bit of an advantage in convincing Alice, since he can probably read her encrypted posts to the net - he can start teh conversation by posting to her on Blacknet with some keywords from messages she's posted to other people. That doesn't directly tell her that he's cracking RSA rather than IDEA/3DES, but he could also include a note that the first n bits of her private key are ....... Alternatively, he can go on a political rant about Too Many Secrets, but having seen that movie he can announce the details of his decryptor on sci.crypt *before* announcing that he's giving a lecture at Stanford... :-) Somebody, in the discussion about pricing, said that some of the proposed protocols would take too much CPU time, cracking lots of keys just to demonstrate that he can do it, and that he should always charge money to avoid overloading his 486 box. If he's going to go into the business of factoring RSA keys for money, he'll probably make enough to afford a few *new* computers once he hits up a couple of wealthy customers, if he's not spending it all on air travel and bodyguards. "Bob"

1 0

RE: cypherpunks list wiped out again... (duplicate)
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

================ > From: IN%"rslau(a)usc.edu" 12-JUN-1994 17:57:04.72 > To: IN%"cypherpunks(a)usc.edu" > Subj: cypherpunks list wiped out again... (duplicate) > It looks like the cypherpunks list was wiped out again this afternoon... > I think I may have found the bug in majordomo that caused this or maybe > it's just coincidence since the last time this happened was also on a > sunday afternoon, i believe. there must be a timebomb in majordomo ala > pgp 2.6 :) > > Resubscribe by sending the following in the body of the message to > majordomo(a)toad.com: > > subscribe cypherpunks > > Robert Lau - Systems Programmer, Unix Systems 213-740-2866 > -- University Computing Services Internet: rslau(a)usc.edu > -- University of Southern California Bitnet: rslau@uscvm > -- 1020 W Jefferson, LA, CA USA, 90089-0251 UUCP: > ...!uunet!usc!rsla> This may sound like a "dumb" question, but if the list was "wiped out", why did I receive this? ====================

1 0

List Maintenance
by hugh＠ecotone.toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today the disk that the cypherpunks list lives on filled up, and then someone try to join the list and the list got zeroed again. I am currently installing a new version of MajorDomo and making changes to prevent this happening (at least we caught it in the act this time). The list will likely be up and down a little bit for the next few hours or day (hey, I have to sleep sometime! :r) but should be fully stable again by Tuesday in any case. This time I do plan to install a recent backup of the list. If you have any questions please email mail, this list it's self does not need any more crud on it. ||ugh Daniel Sometimes Postmaster hugh(a)toad.com

1 0

Re: CERT warning about majordomo
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Regarding the list going down again: I was just informed that CERT has issued a warning about a security hole in majordomo. Anyone have any info on this? Yes. The list owner will if he's on the majordomo list. He's presumably upgraded his copy of majordomo about a week ago. If he hasn't, he should. G PS Was a 22 line message for 3 lines of content really necessary?

1 0

Friends in high places
by paul＠poboy.b17c.ingr.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Friday, I got a message from Intergraph's chief counsel. "Great," I thought. "I'm about to get my peepee whacked for making PGP available over our internal software delivery network." Nope. He wanted to discuss the finer points of its use. He'd read the documentation and the _WSJ_ article about Zimmermann. He believes e-mail isn't secure enough for his purposes but that PGP will make it usable for him. Where'd he get the software? From one of the 4 executive vice-presidents here. Where'd he get it? No word yet, but I think I know :) It speaks well of our efforts that executives at a Fortune 400 firm are not only aware of PGP but that they approve its use. Keep up the evangelism. Keep talking to people. Keep answering questions. Keep writing code. If we build it, they will come. - -Paul - -- Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG | Catch the wave with Mosaic for CLIX! perobich(a)ingr.com | newprod -n newprod(a)poboy.b17c.ingr.com Of course I don't speak for Intergraph. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLfxbH6fb4pLe9tolAQH2SQQAl6/PWNY2b19qOVsWn75eG6mRoYYNcZL2 gD28z7eIYlehtKMPH7AdZvPG8X8nj3WQXIid1yWkeT+Hccp3gNNRIfXPwV/ZO3m9 kxuf0NiNo7j8hkFPDVMubeqRASJyMRi3fufyV9jMrvktjd8J/r/8rG21No27zrhP nsklqVfatk0= =XGl2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: back to programming projects...
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Hmmm - looks like you need a mechanism for setting up keys other than > for registered users - after all, one thing they will presumably want > to do is send anonymous mail to other remailers, with the mail > to those systems going out encrypted. > > Bill > What I envision here is that the user will have to setup the keys for the various accounts on other re-mailers. The only other option I have is to make a header switch such that the outgoing is clear-text. I am not shure if I want to support this feature or not. What I had intended was to build it to support person to person transmissions w/ the anon built in to make traffic analysis by address harder. I will have to look at chaining. Thanks for the input...

1 0

How irritating are anon encrypted pgp messages
by dfloyd＠runner.utsa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is something I have been wondering about for a while: How rude is it for people to post (or mail to a mailing list) anon messages encrypted with someone's PGP key? It makes it easy for the receiver to obtain it, but how irritating is it to people? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLfx6cXDkimqwdwa5AQE5PgQAr7vFwaMiKhAcdUqQW1B85W+nehSYUp47 iyL1cREjD2yypC9XnAkzucCAAie9so1fY74KQwQhWS99h9oMn/QWEUT50OBhVX8+ Mt98Tpr2/9pf2ovlvmqTtkyEC7DY38tsBmbYcRvwyZ1/6Dlvs4gJtmwtwwhW3UDj +pQFp+GSv+4= =jGCF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

3 3

My 1984 t-shirt arrived
by jim＠acm.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Looks great: "1984 [eye] we're behind schedule... NSA" on the front and the Cyber Rights Now fist on the back. Thanks, John -- it's worth the wait. Jim Gillogly Mersday, 23 Forelithe S.R. 1994, 16:13

1 0

Messages in Time
by kentborg＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It just occured to me. Duh! Squeemish and ossifrage were effectively messages in time. Sure, the NSA probably got the message sooner than the rest of us, and the amount of time for the message to be received was grossly mispredicted, but a whole bunch of us saw that original Scientific American article and years later saw the contents. Given our familiarity with the whole event I think it is pretty clear how impractical this technique is for info time traveling. -kb -- Kent Borg +1 (617) 776-6899 kentborg(a)world.std.com kentborg(a)aol.com Proud to claim 28:15 hours of TV viewing so far in 1994!

1 0

DNA
by Mats Bergstrom 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Databases of fingerprints and retina-images might still have a future for specialized applications but DNA-typing (why not on a simple blood sample at birth) combined with a fixed social security number valid for life will probably become a widely used method for governments to control the identity of their serfs. Even without legislation stating compulsory testing of all citizens there are great possibilities with this method. Serologic tests for various reasons (i.e. HIV, rubella in pregnancy etc) are routinely performed on a majority of the population in developed countries. These samples are usually frozen and saved for decades (for the purpose of comparison if the individual should fall ill; and for research if something might get interesting) at most laboratries. DNA- analysis efter thawing is no big deal with modern techniques. So if one is planning to commit hideous crimes in the future, or if one has other reasons to maintain DNA privacy, one should demand that blood samples taken from oneself are destroyed after testing (alternatively take the tests under a pseudonym). Unfortunately there is no known method of encrypting one's DNA code in situ but hopefully they will safely (in escrow?) encrypt it in the databanks. For most purposes a cheapish imprint (sort of a hash function) of an individual's DNA code will suffice, i.e. for secure identification. Longer strains of code will give additional information on the person's genetic dispositions of course (until now only for physical diseases and risk factors but coding relating to schizophrenia and psychopathy are expected Real Soon - the science of molecular biology is in an exponential phase). For such an extended analysis it is, at least for some more years, not enough with a frozen blood sample for serologic testing or a blood/semen-stain from the clothes of a victim but culturable cell-lines are necessary. These observations were provoked by the following forwarded letter: //mb Date: Thu, 09 Jun 94 05:06:29 MST From: mednews (HICNet Medical News) To: hicnews Subject: Course: DNA Databanks and Repositories Message-ID: <iHJNNc7w165w(a)stat.com> DNA DATABANKS & REPOSITORIES will be presented 4-5 November 1994 at the Sheraton Inn Midway, St Paul Minnesota, USA. SPONSORS: Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the American Registry of Pathology. GENERAL INFORMATION: AFIP Education Dept. (INT), 14th & Alaska Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20306-6000 USA; (301)427-5231; FAX (301)427-5001; or INTERNET: LOWTHER(a)email.afip.osd.mil CONTENT: DNA typing of biologic tissues and fluids has revolutionized criminalistics. This technology is so powerful that over one half of all states have legislatively mandated the creation of DNA databanks and repositories for law enforcement purposes with other states considerating the same. The passage of the federal DNA Identification Act will bolster the growth of these databanks. DNA repositories also have been established for military remains identification, for scientific human geneic diversity studies, and for numerous public health reasons. This is the third national conference devoted strictly to the establishment of DNA databanks and repositories. This conference is designed to be a practical discussion on the creation and the set-up of DNA databanks/repositories, focusing on forensic identification. It is intended for DNA repository directors, policy makers, and administrators considerating establishment of a DNA collections program, and other interested persons. Lectures will be presented on current state sex offender databanks, the FBI's National DNA Index, the DNA Identification Act, practical aspects of databank setup and administration, and the associated legal and ethical issues. Convictions based on the Minnesota State DNA Database will be featured and a tour of the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension's facility will be conducted. (English) COURSE DIRECTOR: Victor W. Weedn, LTC, MC, USC TUITION: $220.

3 3

(None)
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

dfloyd(a)runner.utsa.edu (Douglas R. Floyd) writes: > How rude is it for people to post (or mail to a mailing list) anon messages > encrypted with someone's PGP key? It makes it easy for the receiver to > obtain it, but how irritating is it to people? Fairly. In fact, it's considered downright rude. It's like sitting around a table of, say, 3 people, and whispering with someone next to you. The first person is you -- you're sending the message. The second person is your friend -- he's recieving it. The third is me -- I'm just watching two people whispering. Further, newsgroups are a very inappropriate place to send private mail for propogation. --Jeff -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+

1 0

Re: Cantwell Bill
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry wrote, >For those who haven't been paying attention, the Cantwell Bill could >die in the intelligence committee. Please pay attention to Stanton >McCandlish's alert from EFF and act on it TODAY. Call up those >congressmen! When I called, most of them indicated they hadn't heard >from people. Make the phone ring off the hook with concern that this >measure pass! I *cannot* figure out why nobody has responded in a week to this new revelation, as it has total relevance to the Cantwell Bill! Once again, Sumex-aim.stanford.edu, the internet's biggest Mac ftp archive has been *EXPORTING* MacPGP2.2, many times a day, every day for over a YEAR. This is automatic, since there are mirror sites in most countries on the internet, including Singapore and China. *Had* someone picked up on this sooner, there would still be time to spread the word to the point where congresscritters would know this was going on. I don't care any more. Y'all deserve what y'git. I send my fax.

2 1

Crytography - Solution (long) (fwd)
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message:

1 0

Re: (None)
by Ben.Goren＠asu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:50 PM 6/13/94 -0500, Jeff Gostin wrote: >dfloyd(a)runner.utsa.edu (Douglas R. Floyd) writes: > >> How rude is it for people to post (or mail to a mailing list) anon messages >> encrypted with someone's PGP key? It makes it easy for the receiver to >> obtain it, but how irritating is it to people? > Fairly. In fact, it's considered downright rude. It's like sitting >around a table of, say, 3 people, and whispering with someone next to you. >The first person is you -- you're sending the message. The second person >is your friend -- he's recieving it. The third is me -- I'm just watching >two people whispering. Further, newsgroups are a very inappropriate place >to send private mail for propogation. Might it be appropriate, though, to create an alt group for that purpose? Sort of the digital equivalent of putting "coded" messages in the personals section of your favorite newspaper's classified section. You know--"John, you have five days to pay up" means to meet at the Ritz for dinner next Thursday, and "I love you, Sally" means to run for the border. But far, far more effective digitally. Could be especailly useful for people "in the field," considering how many universities and other places permit Usenet posting without an account, so long as your IP is considered local--easier to get access. > --Jeff b& -- Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music net.proselytizing (write for info): Protect your privacy; oppose Clipper. Voice concern over proposed Internet pricing schemes. Stamp out spamming. Finger ben(a)tux.music.asu.edu for PGP 2.3a public key.

3 2

Anon posts (was irritating posts...)
by dfloyd＠runner.utsa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Mon Jun 13 14:23 CDT 1994 > X-Sender: ben@localhost > Mime-Version: 1.0 > Date: Mon, 13 Jun 1994 12:17:00 -0700 > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu > Subject: Re: (None) > Precedence: bulk > > At 12:50 PM 6/13/94 -0500, Jeff Gostin wrote: > >dfloyd(a)runner.utsa.edu (Douglas R. Floyd) writes: > > > >> How rude is it for people to post (or mail to a mailing list) anon messages > >> encrypted with someone's PGP key? It makes it easy for the receiver to > >> obtain it, but how irritating is it to people? > > Fairly. In fact, it's considered downright rude. It's like sitting > >around a table of, say, 3 people, and whispering with someone next to you. > >The first person is you -- you're sending the message. The second person > >is your friend -- he's recieving it. The third is me -- I'm just watching > >two people whispering. Further, newsgroups are a very inappropriate place > >to send private mail for propogation. > > Might it be appropriate, though, to create an alt group for that purpose? > Sort of the digital equivalent of putting "coded" messages in the personals > section of your favorite newspaper's classified section. You know--"John, > you have five days to pay up" means to meet at the Ritz for dinner next > Thursday, and "I love you, Sally" means to run for the border. > > But far, far more effective digitally. > > Could be especailly useful for people "in the field," considering how many > universities and other places permit Usenet posting without an account, so > long as your IP is considered local--easier to get access. > > > --Jeff > > b& > > -- > Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music > net.proselytizing (write for info): Protect your privacy; oppose Clipper. > Voice concern over proposed Internet pricing schemes. Stamp out spamming. > Finger ben(a)tux.music.asu.edu for PGP 2.3a public key. > > That is a good idea, creating a special USENET group for coded messages. Alt.security.coded.messages would be a good moniker. Personally, I am not familar with gopherholes or message havens, so I do not know how good they are, and can log telnets in. It is harder to log nntp reads of alt.security.coded.messages or such. If an admin is very nosy, they could be snooping your terminal and packets as well, though... Another idea could be an anonymous FTP site, but someone can go and delete all the messages on there, and ftps are logged as well... Any better ideas on being able to anon-post and anon-read with as few ways for a third party to log as possible? (This is for my curiosity only, as I rarely have anything worth saying that needs this much protection.)

2 1

Test; please ignore
by whitaker＠dpair.csd.sgi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Test; please ignore TEST Mon Jun 13 12:58:52 PDT 1994 -- Russell Earl Whitaker whitaker(a)csd.sgi.com Silicon Graphics Inc. Technical Assistance Center / Centre D'Assistance Technique / Tekunikaru Ashisutansu Sentaa Mountain View CA (415) 390-2250 ================================================================ #include <std_disclaimer.h>

1 0

Re: Anon posts (was irritating posts...)
by analyst＠Onramp.NET 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why not just use alt.test (with appropriate IGNORE subject line), alt.binaries.pictures.erotica with your data steagonograpically hidden in a JPEG or any other agreed upon group. Many anon posts would be quite irritating, esp. on a high volume list such as this one. -- Benjamin McLemore analyst(a)onramp.net

1 0

Telco snooping ... (fwd) "every time you fire up a modem" ??
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Sounds like a load to me, but what the heck might as well pass it on, just in case. :] Forwarded message: From: c.zeps(a)genie.geis.com Date: Sun, 12 Jun 94 11:34:00 UTC Subject: Telco snooping ... [...] >From : ROGER CRAVENS Number : 296 of 296 To : ALL Date : 06/06/94 18:46 Subject : Big Brother Still Listeni Reference : NONE Read : [N/A] Private : NO Conf : 048 - GN - RadioTalk ********************************************************************* ======================================================================== As someone involved in the telephone industry on the level of security and data integrity... I would like to inform everyone that uses modems and/or are bbs operators of some information. The first thing that everyone that uses a modem should know is that every time you fire up your modem your activating monitoring equipment somewhere in the U.S. I have worked for several large telephone networks that routinely monitor and reroute modem and fax transmissions through devices that allow them to view what is being transmitted and even decodes encrypted data and fax packets used by major corporations and governmental agencies. This is allowed under the heading of "Maintenance Monitoring" and may be continued for up to 6 months without the need of any legal paperwork being generated. Under an obscure pre-WWII ruling by the agency that is now the FCC... "No information may be encoded or transmitted over PUBLIC or PRIVATE forms of telephony or radio with the exception of those agencies involved in the National Security" a further designation goes on to say "with the exception of the MORSE system of 'transmittal', any communication that is not interpretable by the human ear is forbidden and unlawful." The information gathered goes to 3 seperate database facilities...1 is codenamed Diana and is located in Brussels, the 2nd is named Fredrick and is located somewhere in Malaysia, the 3rd is named Elizabeth and is located in Boulder, Colorado. The information stored in these systems is accessable by the US Government, Interpol, Scotland Yard and various other such agencies. Your credit rating is also affected by your modem usage... if you ever get a copy of your credit history and find a listing that has HN06443 <--= this is a negative risk rating. or a code 87AT4 <---= an even more negative risk rating.... these will usually have no description on them... and if you inquire about them they will tell you that it just comes from the system that way. I am currently working for another major carrier as a consultant and have been able to watch these systems operate...at one unnamed long distance carrier here in Columbus Ohio in their NCC, Network Control Center, you can see several rows of computer terminals which have approximately 30 to 40 separate windows in each... these windows have data transmissions that are being monitored... banks of 9 track tapes are going constantly to record everything. Everyone should realize that even if a sysop posts a disclaimer at the beginning of his bbs about no access to governmental agencies or law enforcement...that it isn't worth the time it takes to type it in... looking forward to hearing reactions to this. --- * SLMR 2.0 * * My Castle BBS 614-236-4015 10pm to 10am M-F 6pm-6pm S-S -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist F O R M O R E I N F O, E - M A I L T O: I N F O @ E F F . O R G O P E N P L A T F O R M O N L I N E R I G H T S V I R T U A L C U L T U R E C R Y P T O

1 0

Re: Remailer REORDER not DELAY
by fnerd＠smds.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

i wrote- > > Delay--time--isn't what matters. It's confusion about which message is > > which that matters. So if I get 10 messages in one minute, I can scramble > > the order and send them out the next minute, and I've done my job--at > > least the order-scrambling part. (You also need to pad or packetize > > messages.) > > > > So use serial numbers, not times! Send a message for every one you get, > > keep a fixed number of messages queued, and add dummies if necessary > > to keep things moving. Jim replies. > Wrongo...the random time stamp does randomly re-order then. As to bogus > messages, not on my system you won't.... Okay, first I'll go over the case where delay without dummies does NOT reorder. Then I'll go over the case where delay simply adds needless, well, delay. Then I'll talk about the cost of dummy messages. Assumption: Your remailer assigns each message a number from 0 to 59 and remails it at that minute of the hour. Whether it's hours in the day, minutes in the hour or seconds in the minute only changes which of the following two cases is more likely: Case 1: The remailer receives no messages for 61 minutes, then one message, then no messages for 61 minutes. Result: In the hour following receipt of that one message, only one message is sent. Guess which message it was. Case 2: 60 messages arrive in one minute. Result: The last one(s) go out about an hour later. They could have all been sent in the next minute with equivalent reordering. P.s., if 60 messages arrive *every* minute, under the assumption above, you have to save an average of 3600 messages. So, with this method, you can adjust the delay time down to guarantee delivery time, or up to make reordering *more likely*, but you can't guarantee reordering. If you want 1/N reordering to be likely, you need to set the response time to N times the inter-arrival time for the *quietest* traffic periods. To guarantee reordering you have to either wait indefinitely for enough messages, or after a while insert some of your own. To get over the problem of needless delay, you either need to invent some kind of tricky variable-delay scheme, or turn your attention away from clock time and focus on ordering. > I have a system which runs of a SLIP feed and bandwidth is sacrosanct. > If you would like to pay for an additional line to handle the added > load then fine but my pocket book won't support it. Say the worst turnaround you want is 24 hours, and you want to get 1-out- of-10 reordering. Then on a day where you receive only one message (for this you got a SLIP connection?) you would need to generate 9 dummies. Assuming 10Kbyte messages, the bandwidth required is... 10.4 baud. For a turnaround of 2.4 hours ... 104 baud. 15 minutes ... 1040 baud. And remember, you generate only enough dummies to keep up the minimum *total* traffic, so in reasonable-traffic periods, you generate no dummies and the amount of real traffic you can handle isn't affected. > the consideration of the future where there will be many small systems > with minimal bandwidth and monetary resources then I realy doubt they > will be interested in any system which slows down or otherwise wastes > a precious and critical resource. I guess this sentence, which you quote, wasn't clear: > > Plus, if the remailers only generate > > dummies when necessary, the total dummy traffic is self-regulating, since > > multi-hop dummies are x-lax for every remailer they pass through. In other words, in a world of communicating forwarders, a dummy message from one just looks like regular traffic to any others it goes through, and serves to keep their traffic levels up--the more remailers the fewer dummy messages each remailer has to generate. > I also oppose the implied synchronicity of your methods as well. I am > looking at a resonably secure asynchronouse method of making the > traffic analysis difficult (the real reason for all this mumbo jumbo > in the first place). Traffic analysis is difficult when the order of messages is sufficiently scrambled. If you don't reorder, then delay doesn't help. If you do reorder, then added delay doesn't help. Whether one message is "synchronized" or not with a random other message isn't useful information to an outsider. > Why should I provide a potential monitor with the > information that a certain amount of information going out will be > bogus? How might this information help analyze traffic? Also, as I mentioned, if you send your dummies to yourself indirectly, then pretty soon the level of input will match the level of output, and the ratio of bogus to real messages *won't* be visible. As far as I can see, dummy messages are simply necessary if you want to guarantee both reordering and response time. Please explain if you believe differently. > You obviously don't pay all the costs for your feed or else you are very > rich... Are you charged per byte or just a flat rate? -fnerd - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - the snack that eats like a food -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvt3niQCVAgUBLMs3K ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2tPEot1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz 3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hSnC1R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG sRjLQs4iVVM= =9wqs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Economist Clipper Article
by kentborg＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lead article in the Science and Technology section of this week's Economist is about Clipper. As usual for the Economist, it is really quite good. Good description of the LEAF and Blaze's hack. Mentions the 47,000 CPSR signatures, Wired, and makes a good case for how a "voluntary" standard might not be, and the export issues. Wish all general-interest publications were so well done. The profile of Clipper is rising, and the press is not too shiny for the NSA. -kb, the Economist-reading Kent P.S. In the middle of the page is a great line-drawing of a evil-looking cloaked spy in hat and dark glasses, poised with a dagger and skeleton key at a key-hole equipped computer. Wish I had a high-res scanner, Postscript-ized those with fast RIPs could get it in its full copyright-breaking glory.

1 0

Re: Anon posts (was irritating posts...)
by Ben.Goren＠asu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:34 PM 6/13/94 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >[. . .] >To see this, think of the Cypherpunks list as one large (by today's >standards) message pool [. . . .] Just out of curiousity, how large *is* Cypherpunks? I've been subscribed just about a week now, but I've been quite pleasantly shocked by the S/N ratio, after getting completely turned off by the Sternlight wars on Usenet. Ironic that a group calling themselves "punks" should be civilized, intelligent, scholarly, altruistic, and basic good 'net citizens, while sci.crypt is often little more than a bunch of people playing "did so!" games. And the PGP group! >--Tim May > > >-- >.......................................................................... >Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, >tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero >408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, >W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. >Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. >"National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway." -- Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music net.proselytizing (write for info): Protect your privacy; oppose Clipper. Voice concern over proposed Internet pricing schemes. Stamp out spamming. Finger ben(a)tux.music.asu.edu for PGP 2.3a public key.

4 3