December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

WNSTORM on wuarchive.wustl.edu
by rarachel＠prism.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've just uploaded wnstorm to wuarchive.wustl.edu in the /pub/wns directory. I don't know if others can see it yet, but give it a try.

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ABC Lateline tonight: `The Clipper Debate'
by mgream＠acacia.itd.uts.edu.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For those of interest, /This is primarily for an Australian audience, but as the Australian /Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) now broadcasts to Asia, this program /_may_ go out to the wider South Pacific. ABC Television's `lateline' current affairs program, tonight (Thursday 26th) at approx 10:30pm is /reportedly/ dealing with that insidious Clipper device. I haven't (and can't at the moment) verify it first hand. The format of this show is typically a video conferenced debate between the host and two or three noted commentators on the topic of interest. This debate goes for about half an hour, it is not generally just a replay of a report from somewhere else. If you've missed the above; Lateline is repeated the following day at about 1:30pm. Matthew. -- Matthew Gream Consent Technologies Sydney, (02) 821-2043 M.Gream(a)uts.edu.au

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Re: PGP 2.6 is dangerous in the long term ?
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >What if (the cypherpunk community) comes out with a secure program that > >doesn't rely on RSAREF? Can it be done? > > Bizdos and gang will _still_ hold the patent on RSA-style public key > encryption. What you're suggesting is, in essence, exactly what Phil > Zimmerman did with PGP 1.0. There are three different problems here: - Doing secure programs without the RSAREF implementation of RSA; this has US patent license difficulties unless you buy their stuff. - Doing secure programs without the RSA algorithm - other public-key methods are available, such as Diffie-Hellman, though RSA has a lot of technical advantages for many applications. PKP/RSADSI own patents that expire in 1997 that they claim cover the whole field of public-key crypto, and nobody's challenged the breadth of those claims in court. - Doing secure programs without public-key algorithms at all - you *can* use secret-key algorithms to do security, as long as you're willing to do key distribution by some usable but inconvenient method, and security systems like Kerberos can do this. But Public-Key variants solve a lot of the technical difficulties and make implementations much easier.

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Re: SUE - the legal morass (fwd)
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Was the dinosaur encrypted? Yes, but the key diddn't have enough bits to protect it for more than 50 million years under attack by the Feds :-)

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(fwd) FBI Digital Telephony Wiretapping a Done Deal??
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From alt.politics.crypto, several forwards deleted: >US NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 30, l994 >THE FREEH LOBBY. Thanks to intense personal lobbying by FBI >Director Louis Freeh, there are now sufficient votes on Capitol Hill to >assure passage of legislation that would make it far easier for law >enforcement officials to wiretap the nation's telephone system. The >snoop-friendly measure, which may be introduced this week, would >require manufacturers of telephone, computer and cable >communications equipment to design and build their machines so >that they could be readily accessed by wiretap and other types of >eaves-dropping devices used my US law enforcement agencies. The >legislation would cover communications equipment now in use as well >as items not yet on the drawing board.

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Re: Magazines commonly predate issues, e.g. June Byte at hand
by jpp＠jpplap.markv.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Oops. Boy, that was sure a snide, surly thing for me to say. Let me publicly apologise to you Harry, and to the readers of Cypherpunks. I though US News & World Report was a news paper, but that doesn't really excuse my tone. Sorry again. j'

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Re: (fwd) FBI Digital Telephony Wiretapping a Done Deal??
by sidney＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jpp(a)jpplap.markv.com (Jay Prime Positive) said: >> >US NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 30, l994 >A little early with this report aren't you? Weekly magazines are displayed on newstands for more than one day and are labeled with the end of their expected display period so that potential customers will not think that they are out of date. Similarly, people who have subscriptions should receive the magazine before the date on the cover. I guess news is like milk: You get it before the expiration date that's printed on the label. -- sidney markowitz <sidney(a)apple.com>

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Re: IBM's NetSP
by habs＠warwick.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > e.g., not very secure from a serious peeping tom.... > > /hawk > And people say the export laws have no effect on U.S. domestic crypto > software... > Jim_Miller(a)suite.com Agreed... 40 bit key feels like (to me) one of those locks that comes on suitcases that you could probally break open with a small hammer.. /hawk

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Re: Extropian Justice
by rjc＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim writes: > Most of my comments will be based on the material Ram Cromwell writes: > > > First let me explain something to people who don't know. The extropians > > list has a legal arbitration system to help keep down flames. We have > > rules against bringing verbal assaults into heated debates so that > > if you feel someone is insulting you, you may 'press charges'. If > > evidence is presented, the person usually gets a warning. 3 warnings > > and your posting privileges get revoked for a period between 24-72 hours > > to allow a 'cool down' period on the list. This was implemented out > > of neccessity because the list was averaging between 150 to 300 > > messages a day with most of those coming from only a handful of > > people. > > Ironically, I found that the legal code *caused* many flames, for > various reasons. This is my interpretation, and I "assign credit" (in > genetic programming terms) for dozens of flames between various > parties to the existence of a legal code that encouraged/facillitated > the filing of charges and countercharges, the issuance of warnings and > other judgements, and the seemingly endless debate about all of these > issues, as well as of the charges. All true, there was a "shakeout" in the legal system which caused huge debates over the fairness and objectivity of it. Everything has settled down since the commercialization of the list and since the big players have left. > > A common way of resolving a standoff debate on the Extropians list > > is to put your money where your mouth is -- a bet. This causes someone > > to get off their lazy ass and go look up the citation and present it > > With due respect for Ray here, this worked better in theory than in > practice. The issuance of a challenge typically resulted in each side > firing new volleys of charges, of clarifications, and of boring public > debate about the terms, judgement criteria, who would hold the money, > etc. Ad nauseum. I recall only one fairly positive example: some bet I agree that it worked better in theory than in practice, but it did seem to have the effect of shutting down a 'is so, is not, is so!, is not!' flame. For instance, Perry would often get involved in a discussion where each side was claiming a statistic and firmly standing by it without offering a reference. Perry would often end a thread like this by betting a huge sum of money that he was right. It seemed to me, that it often quieted the other person down. The claims might not have been resolved (because no one took up the bet), but the endless standoff of counter claims would end. Besides bets, there was Derek Zahn's accountability society which had one positive result and almost none of the negative flamage that bets had. > By the way, so far as I am aware, *nobody* has ever been kicked off > the Cypherpunks list. Not even Detweiler, who asked to be removed last > Novemeber or so, as he was entering his terminal phase. The disadvantage of this is that since your list software has no filtering capability, I must deal with a huge flood of messages everyday that Detweiler generates. For a simple list like majordomo, I think deleting trouble makers is a good short term solution. > There may be a lesson here. A formal legal code encourages "law > hacking" by those with an axe to grind. A formal system which attempts > to cover all possibilities encourages incompleteness, loopholes. (This > is often analyzed as being the result of Goedel's Theorem, which I > suppose it is in an informal sense :-}.) An interesting speculation. Legal systems are, after all, pretty close to being 'formal systems' Nobody ever said a legal system had to be consistent though. ;-) > I like the Cypherpunks system a lot better. Instead of bogging down in > claims, charges, formal bets, adjudication, appeals, etc., there are > relatively few if any rules. Somehow the turkeys end up leaving. With much heat and light generated in the meantime which is fine for some people, but irritating to others. Keeping in mind Coase's Theorem and Spontaneous Order, Harry and I are going beyond the idea of PPLs by attempting to create list software which allows 'personal justice', filtering, reputations, etc. We personally believe that the whitewater of noise which is out there now will become a tsunami when Joe Sixpack gets his 'entitled' account. The only way to defend yourself from this assault in cyberspace will be intelligent communications software. -Ray

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dispersed DES
by David C. Taylor 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have come up with (and implemented) a version of triple DES for true paranoids, which I call dispersed DES. All I do is append four bytes to the beginning of the output files for each cycle of triple DES. It seems like this should provide even more security than triple DES, but I am no expert. Any comments? Please include "dct(a)newt.cs.byu.edu" in your replies, as I am unable to maintain access to the mailing list because of volume. Thanks. David C. Taylor dct(a)newt.cs.byu.edu

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Re: dispersed DES
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In local.cypherpunks you write: >I have come up with (and implemented) a version of triple DES for true >paranoids, which I call dispersed DES. All I do is append four bytes to >the beginning of the output files for each cycle of triple DES. It seems >like this should provide even more security than triple DES, but I am no >expert. Any comments? Please include "dct(a)newt.cs.byu.edu" in your replies, >as I am unable to maintain access to the mailing list because of volume. >Thanks. >David C. Taylor >dct(a)newt.cs.byu.edu You have to be really careful when you invent new cipher modes, almost as much as when you invent an entire new cipher. It sounds like you have weakend 3-DES. Where do you get these 4 bytes? If they are fixed or deterministically generated, you will have made it possible for an attacker who can brute-force 1-DES (e.g., with a Weiner machine) to "peel off" each single DES key. Instead of a 112 (or 168) bit work factor (as with 3-DES), you'd end up with a 57 or 58 bit work factor. If you randomly generate the 4 bytes, you have to carefully evaluate your random number method. In any case it sounds like your mode is the weaker of 3-des and 1-des*(the complexity of your random bit generator). Perhaps I don't understand how your scheme works. Also, what intuition makes you think that it's stronger than plain old 3-DES? -matt

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No Subject
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ftp.netcom.com//pub/mpj has source for new macpgp

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Unicorn vs. tmp@netcom
by Cyber City 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Recently Black Unicorn posted that he had sued tmp@netcom, and settled out of court. A couple of messages followed which were supportive of his action. The text below is a rebuke to Unicorn. I post it in the hope that it will provide dimension to the debate. To Black Unicorn: Once upon a time, two strangers found a dog. Alice said, "That's my dog: I can clearly tell by its markings". Bob said, "No, I'm afraid you're mistaken. See his ears pick up when I call his name". And so the debate continued, until a third person, Sol, arrived. On hearing the pleadings of Bob and Alice, Sol told them, "Stand 10 meters apart and put the dog between you". Sol the scared the dog with a quick movement and a shout, and the dog ran to its true master. Likewise, when you were tested recently by net abuse, you went for relief to your master, the government. This is what distinguishes you from the rest of us. We might react against the abuse (or we might not), but I think that none of us - or at least a very few - would have gone to court for relief. "I spoke to a Federal Court of Appeals Judge who I have known for a number of years to try and poke some holes in the suit on substantive merits." Despite your protestation, "I also don't like to be a bully", it seems to me that your pursuit of this case was predicated on your ability to be a bully and an insider. Like your colleagues Cantor and Seigel, you emitted flamebait and then pretended offense at the inevitable flames. You taunted tmp@netcom about his illness, reminding him at least three times in one message to take his medicine. Nice behaviour for a person who supposedly believes in privacy. It seems to me that you sized up tmp@netcom as a person who could not fight back due to his illness, and then you provoked him in order to establish grounds for your suit. I believe that your case, which is apparently based upon testimony from your friends, could not have succeeded in court. But it didn't have to, did it? You only had to find someone who was ill, and then kick him while he was down. Was it Rousseau who said, "First, we kill all the lawyers"? The cost of a lawsuit in the U.S. today can easily be over $100,000. The cost of a contract murder is said to be $10,000-$50,000. Consider the economics. I think there is a role to be played by lawyers in the future of the net. The net does not like litigation, because it interferes with the free flow of information. But it does like protocols, which are seen to enhance the flow of information. Lawyers, by their training and practice, are especially good at formulating workable protocols. If we had a protocol governing the use of network resources by sick or abusive users, your conflict with tmp@netcom might not have transpired, or else a solution might have been easily achieved. Conflicts like this are resulting in conversion of newsgroups on Usenet to moderated groups - a very unfortunate trend in my opinion, as Usenet does not provide for the removal of moderators. Here is a proper outlet for legal talent, not in self-serving time-wasting resource-absorbing litigation. -- Alex Brock

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Re: Unicorn vs. tmp@netcom
by joshua geller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> To Black Unicorn: > Despite your protestation, "I also don't like to be a bully", it seems > to me that your pursuit of this case was predicated on your ability to > be a bully and an insider. Like your colleagues Cantor and Seigel, you > emitted flamebait and then pretended offense at the inevitable flames. > You taunted tmp@netcom about his illness, reminding him at least three > times in one message to take his medicine. did uni do this too? I thought that was me. of course, it very commonly occurs that things that I think I he done turn out to actually been done by someone else. josh

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Re: compatibility with future PGP
by remailer＠jpunix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ebrandt(a)jarthur.cs.hmc.edu (Eli Brandt) once said: EB> > From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)imsi.com> EB> > People overseas want to be able to use this program, too. There are EB> > 250 million people in the U.S., which constitutes under 1/20th of the EB> > Earth's population. EB> EB> You dropped the part of his message where he said that he believed EB> v2.5 was available abroad. If it's not, I don't think it will take EB> long. And once it's escaped from this little prison state of ours, EB> overseas users incur no risk in using it: they can't even be EB> Noriega'd, since they've broken no law in any country. It can be obtained from IRC, /msg pgpserv help. Patrick

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Re: Email firewall etc
by remailer＠jpunix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in once said: RI> Vincent.Cate(a)FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU: RI> > Companies like the idea of firewall machines to protect the security of RI> > their internal nets. I bet they would also like something called an RI> > "email-firewall". Names are important. :-) I think of the RI> > email-firewall as a slightly modified anonymous-remailer. RI> RI> I haven't delved into the wide world of remailers out there, but I'd like a RI> remailer that encrypted, though did not necessarily anonymize, incoming mail. RI> RI> I'm not really bothered about the NSA reading my mail. In fact, I'm not usually RI> concerned whether someone in New York, for instance read my mail. But I might RI> not want people closer to home (local sysadmins, etc) to read it. I'm sure many RI> others share this position. RI> RI> The problem is that I can't ensure that people encrypt their mail to me. They RI> may not bother, or be unable. An alternative would be for them to send it to RI> a remailer, which, knowing my public key, would encrypt and forward it to me. Version 1.99 of my Remail for Waffle actually does this: it checks if the recipient of the remailed message has a PGP public key, and if so, it encrypts the outgoing message, if it is not encrypted already. The remailers remail(a)vox.hacktic.nl and remailer(a)jpunix.com use this program. For testing you can also use remail(a)desert.hacktic.nl, or remailer(a)desert.hacktic.nl PAtrick

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Re: dispersed DES
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Good point about the source of the appended bytes. The reason I think it might >be more secure is that the length of the appended segment is less than the >length of the key on each pass, so it would seem to be the equivalent of a >one-time pad for those relying on the appended bytes to get the key. That is my >only basis for not worrying about wekening effects. Any holes? > >dct(a)newt.cs.byu.edu Let me see if I understand your scheme: you prepend 4 unpredictable bytes to the data before running through each single des cycle. What do you do with the 4 bytes from each cycle that are shifted into the end of the datastream? Is the datastram vulnerable to independent search there, too? Assuming the 4 bytes really are unpredictable, and assuming you deal with both "ends" of the stream, there doesn't seem to be an *obvious* attack that allows independent search for each of the 2 or 3 des keys. There was a paper in Eurocrypt this year (that I haven't seen yet) that discusses some not-so-obvious properties of multi-cipher modes that may reveal another attack, however. If you don't think you've weakened 3-des, now the question is whether you've strengthened it (or otherwise improved it). Your method doesn't seem to increase the complexity of a brute force attack on the 112 (or 168) bits of 3-des key material. In fact, you may have actually increased the number of bits of key material (if the decryptor has to know extra secret bytes in order to recover the ends of messages) that the good guy has to manage without increasing the work factor for the bad guy. 3 des is plenty strong, and if you don't trust or otherwise don't want to use 3-des, it's not clear that this offers an improvement. -matt

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Re: Unicorn vs....
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Sewell writes: > Granted, tmp is not responsible for so called moral > failures on the part of European business associates of > Uni's BUT tmp IS responsible for damaging Uni's reputation > by making it look as if he said things that tmp couldn't > prove he had said. If Uni lost a 7 figure business deal > because tmp attributed a comment to Uni that Uni didn't > make then tmp is definitely guilty of damaging Uni's > character and SHOULD be sued... But tmp is only responsible for damaging the reputation of the pseudonym "Black Unicorn". This is not the same as damaging an actual person by name. If I am in a frivilous mood someday and post a tongue-in-cheek article on alt.hamsters.duct-tape under the pseudonym "Rodent Ravisher", I have little cause to complain that my real-life reputation has been ruined if someone misrepresents my views. If I am dense enough to publicly associate myself with the post, then perhaps I shouldn't complain when the Good Christians begin avoiding me and perhaps even hiding their hamsters when they see me passing by. In any case, it is certainly not the fault of the other flamers if my career goes down the tubes. > The bottom line is that when you play on the net and flame > each other that is one thing, but when your games cause > someone's business and real-life character to be damaged > then you are playing in the real world and the name of the > game there is SUE, RESPONSIBILITY FOR YOUR ACTIONS, and TAKE > THE CONSEQUENCES FOR YOUR ACTIONS. But flaming an anonymous identity is not the same as flaming a real-life person. Anonymous identities allow one a little vacation from having to be deadly serious all the time. And an opportunity to play Devil's Advocate with ideas that may not necessarily be ones own. Let's lighten up a little here. > I suppose we all could use this as an opportunity to see > how well our anarchist, freedom of speech, privacy, > encryption ideas mesh with the 'real world'. This IS the 'real world'. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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Suggestions for InfoHighway Patrol dealing with abusive (cr)users
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alright, CP's, I've got a humorous one for you. The author is Gordon McLachlan (mclachlan(a)cardinal.com) and the article appeared in the "Crosswired" column of May 1994 Vol. 5 No. 5 Lan Computing. Hope it gives you a chuckle. (Unofficially included below) "Cane the Internet Loons" According to University of Michigan President James Duderstadt, it was a "monstrous act." An act that "made a mockery of the values of civility we hold dear." Was it a brutal campus murder? A rape? An assault? Did they lose a football game to Ohio State? Nope. It was email with the intent to inflict great psychological injury. In early April, someone apparently ripped off a Michigan student's password and made offencive racial and ethnic slurs to several Internet Usenet newsgroups. According to a written statement by university officials, this event "offended, hurt and frightened" many faculty, staff and students. Unfortunately the Internet has no official rules, and no way to effectively punish computerized criminals such as the person who sent these hurtful messages. Underlying Internet etiquette is the realization that the net hovers somewhere between anarchy and democracy. In effect this means you can say anything you want, but if you say the wrong thing, society's only recourse is to assemble an unruly mob at your electronic doorway to burn you out. If your transgression of netiquette is severe enough, you will be pilloried in public by your fellows and sent a barrage of hate mail. If you persist in being a pain in the ass, the system administrator at your home site will be flooded with mail telling him to cut you off. In the Michigan incident, this response was insufficient. All the well-meaning hate mail from the defenders of the net was sent to the wrong guy - the poor physics major who had his password stolen. Despite rapid action by the administration to deplore the act, write an apologetic missive to post on the net, and have "various units {sponsor} community forums where we can share our concerns," there isn't much anyone can do. Well, to hell with sharing our concerns. A monstrous act deserves a monstrous response. In Singapore, they'd hunt the perpetrator down and cane him. And if caning is good enough for a kid from Ohio who vandalizes cars, its good enough for a kid from Michigan who offends sensitive network types. Luckily our opportunity is at hand. At this very moment, congress is getting tough on crime, ready to fine, imprison and kill more young men for a variety of heinous offenses against society. I hope this shocking incident is enough to wake up our legislatures before there are more drive-by shootings on the information super-highway. First of all, we need a seven-day waiting period and a thorough background check before anyone can get issued a user-ID. This would give system administrators time to find out if a user is a loon, or has been bounced off of other systems for misbehaving. To support this effort, congress should establish a national database to keep track of network offenders. A quick scan of almost any mailing list or newsgroup will reveal sociopaths who should have their access priviledges revoked. And we should never forget that network access is a priviledge and not a right. Its ironic to me that we license people to drive cars, but all you need to get on the information superhighway is a MODEM. Of course, a waiting period won't stop network terrorists from stealing other peoples passwords and firing off their Scud missives, but there is much more we can do. By making MODEM manufacturers install something like the Clipper encryption chip in every MODEM they sell, we could trace offensive messages right back to their source so the Feds could confiscate the offending hardware. Maybe we could even use our national health plan ID cards to restrict access to the info highway by requiring every terminal or PC keyboard to incorporate a magnetic card reader. Furthermore, we should require speed licensing for the use of email distribution lists. Just as we have the right to bear arms but not fully automatic weapons, there are damn few good reasons why you need to have a mailing list. If its too much trouble to type out the names of all the people you are sending mail to, youre probably sending it to too many people. Curtailing the use of mailing lists would drastically limit the impact that any maladjusted weenie could have on our delicate sensibilities. That makes it worth any minor inconvenience it might cause. In the event that these steps are insufficient, we should impose stiffer penalties on network criminals. Theft of a password should be made a federal felony with manditory hard time. With "three strikes and youre out" a third breech of netiquette should result in revocation of all network priviledges and removal of your cable TV hookup. Some bleeding hearts may argue that these measures will stifle the free exchange of ideas, but if thats what it takes to stop people from being offended, hurt and frightened, its a small price to pay. -30- <hehehe> -NS

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RE: Unicorn vs. tmp@netcom
by Mike Markley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

| From: Cyber City <cyber1(a)io.org> | << partial quote removed >> | Likewise, when you were tested recently by net abuse, you went for | relief to your master, the government. This is what distinguishes you | from the rest of us. We might react against the abuse (or we might | not), but I think that none of us - or at least a very few - would have | gone to court for relief. I would have no problems at all going to court as a solution. Posting so called 'flamebait' does not make it right for someone to respond with attacks on the character of the original poster. If you must post responses to flamebait then attack the content of the article. As to the comments about contract murder, If you chose this route based on the economy of it, what are you going to do when you are arrested for the murder? I don't think the courts are going to buy a plea of "It was cheaper to deal with the problem this way." I don't think that this type of litigation is going to impact the free flow of information. Attacks on the character of the poster of the information are more likely to limit the flow than anything else. I'm not trying to sound PC here because I personally find the PC movement very offensive, but if you have a problem with someone deal with it privately and don't air your dirty laundry in public. Mike << rest of quote removed >> ===================================================== Mike Markley <mmarkley(a)microsoft.com> I'm not a Microsoft spokesperson. All opinions expressed here are mine. =====================================================

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ecash Press Release
by DigiCash Information 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DIGICASH PRESS RELEASE World's first electronic cash payment over computer networks. ============================================================= FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE (Release Date: May 27, 1994) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Payment from any personal computer to any other workstation, over email or Internet, has been demonstrated for the first time, using electronic cash technology. "You can pay for access to a database, buy software or a newsletter by email, play a computer game over the net, receive $5 owed you by a friend, or just order a pizza. The possibilities are truly unlimited" according to David Chaum, Managing Director of DigiCash TM, who announced and demonstrated the product during his keynote address at the first conference on the World Wide Web, in Geneva this week. Electronic cash has the privacy of paper cash, while achieving the high security required for electronic network environments exclusively through innovations in public key cryptography. "It's the first software only solution. In the past we've pioneered such cash for chip cards and electronic wallets, always with a tamper-resistant chip for storing the value--now all you have to do is download the software and you're up and running" continues Dr. Chaum. The product works with Microsoft(R) Windows TM, Macintosh TM, and most UNIX TM platforms. It was shown integrated with Mosaic, the most popular software for people accessing databases, email, or other services on the Internet and World Wide Web. The graphic user interface allows intuitive "dragging and dropping" of icons representing stacks of coins, receipts, record books, etc. The company will be supplying the technology through other firms who will release the products, under various cooperation and trial programs. The user software, which allows both paying and receiving payment, will be distributed free of charge. The product was developed by DigiCash TM Corporation's wholly owned Dutch subsidiary, DigiCash TM BV. It is related to the firm's earlier released product for road pricing, which has been licensed to Amtech TM Corporation, of Dallas, Texas, worldwide leader in automatic road toll collection. This system allows privacy protected payments for road use at full highway speed from a smart card reader affixed to the inside of a vehicle. Also related is the approach of the EU supported CAFE project, of which Dr. Chaum is Chairman, which uses tamper-resistant chips inserted into electronic wallets. The underlying 'blind signature' technology was described in the article "Achieving Electronic Privacy," by David Chaum, Scientific American, August 1992. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For more information contact: DigiCash bv info(a)digicash.nl Kruislaan 419 tel +31 20 665 2611 1098 VA Amsterdam fax +31 20 668 5486 The Netherlands ----------------------------------------------------------------------

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ecash Press Release
by DigiCash Information 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DIGICASH PRESS RELEASE World's first electronic cash payment over computer networks. ============================================================= FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE (Release Date: May 27, 1994) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Payment from any personal computer to any other workstation, over email or Internet, has been demonstrated for the first time, using electronic cash technology. "You can pay for access to a database, buy software or a newsletter by email, play a computer game over the net, receive $5 owed you by a friend, or just order a pizza. The possibilities are truly unlimited" according to David Chaum, Managing Director of DigiCash TM, who announced and demonstrated the product during his keynote address at the first conference on the World Wide Web, in Geneva this week. Electronic cash has the privacy of paper cash, while achieving the high security required for electronic network environments exclusively through innovations in public key cryptography. "It's the first software only solution. In the past we've pioneered such cash for chip cards and electronic wallets, always with a tamper-resistant chip for storing the value--now all you have to do is download the software and you're up and running" continues Dr. Chaum. The product works with Microsoft(R) Windows TM, Macintosh TM, and most UNIX TM platforms. It was shown integrated with Mosaic, the most popular software for people accessing databases, email, or other services on the Internet and World Wide Web. The graphic user interface allows intuitive "dragging and dropping" of icons representing stacks of coins, receipts, record books, etc. The company will be supplying the technology through other firms who will release the products, under various cooperation and trial programs. The user software, which allows both paying and receiving payment, will be distributed free of charge. The product was developed by DigiCash TM Corporation's wholly owned Dutch subsidiary, DigiCash TM BV. It is related to the firm's earlier released product for road pricing, which has been licensed to Amtech TM Corporation, of Dallas, Texas, worldwide leader in automatic road toll collection. This system allows privacy protected payments for road use at full highway speed from a smart card reader affixed to the inside of a vehicle. Also related is the approach of the EU supported CAFE project, of which Dr. Chaum is Chairman, which uses tamper-resistant chips inserted into electronic wallets. The underlying 'blind signature' technology was described in the article "Achieving Electronic Privacy," by David Chaum, Scientific American, August 1992. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For more information contact: DigiCash bv info(a)digicash.nl Kruislaan 419 tel +31 20 665 2611 1098 VA Amsterdam fax +31 20 668 5486 The Netherlands ----------------------------------------------------------------------

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Learning to divide ( again )
by Jyri Poldre 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

RE every1. Recently i became involved in project of designing semi-custom VLSI device for endecryption. The device uses variable length RSA for key exchange and IDEA for data encryption. For pipelinig IDEA block we have to use 6 multipliers 16 bit ant that leaves us with 96 bit adder for RSA calculations. ( The chip should be reasonably cheap ). Otherwise the RSA speed would not be so cruicial but we have to generate both keys in chip ( involves physically random generator based on variable frequency being samled with constant clock, VF generator is inside chip ) to guarantee absolute secrecy - you cannot tell Secret component if you do not know it. To generate keys we have to use Fermat test for primality and that takes time. Although the RSA keys need not to be changed so very often it is still important to keep the process running in 'normal' time limits. So - I can use multiple operand adders ( meaning a+b+c+d with one carry-propagation time ) For RSA basic operation a*b mod Z i have decided to use radix4 modified Booth algoritm for multiply , but i am still not sure about divide. Has any1 encountered similar problems? I would greatly appreciate Feedback, cause i have to make up my mind in some weeks. If you are interested in more details about the design, let me know. I would like it to be good product for use in different applications. JP from PLDesign lab of Tallinn Technical University.

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No Mail for last night...
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I had disk problems last night, and lost all mail that was sent between 5 and 9 this morning. If anyone sent anything important, send it again. Sorry- -j

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Unicorn vs....
by dwomack＠runner.utsa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have to support Black Unicorn's use of the courts. Really, what choices were available? a) Do nothing. Eat the losses. Suffer destruction of his reputation. Does anyone really advocate this? Even the religiously inclined don't advocate turning the other cheek ad inifinitum... b) Mail bombs or other amusements. Not only does one join the target in the same figurative gutter, there are real questions of efficacy and legality. Simply because one side foreswears the legal system, there is no guarantee both sides will. And, there is absolutely no guarantee that a sys. admin. won't seek criminal prosecution under a tampering with the computer theory. c) Hire some fool(s) to break the target's hands. Not only do you risk prosecution, ala T. Harding, but I rather doubt we want to enter this still lower gutter. d) Pursue a criminal indictment. Nice in that it really gets the target's attention, but it can be difficult to do. And if people object to civil litigaton, I suppose criminal charges would be even more objectionable. e) Sue the guy. It's legal, it's easy, and it get's people's attention. So, I, for one, think Black Unicorn took the best and most reasonable approach. I'd be very interested in which course (or some other undefined course I didn't think of) that the anarchists feel would be reasonable... Regards, Dave

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