December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Whoa, now... (was Re: Digital Cash)
by James G. Speth 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Graham Toal <gtoal(a)an-teallach.com> writes: >There is a *considerable* difference between kiddy hackers breaking >game protection, and breaking a cryptographically secure protocol. It seems to me that Mikolaj Habryn's original posting was taken out of context. He made a valid point that so called un-interpretable and un-alterable algorithms are routinely cracked by elite warez d00dz. He never implied that the software crackers were going to render your PGP key insecure. In fact, he began this thread by citing someone who was talking about using an obscured algorithm to prevent digital cash double spending. (ie. If you can't get to the algorithm, you can't cheat the system.) His comments were on the dangers of relying on this. Graham Toal <gtoal(a)an-teallach.com> writes: >Sure, but what's that got to do with cracking crypto? If you can't see >the difference between STO protection schemes and mathematically hard >algorithms, ... That's the point. Mikolaj was _never_ referring to cryptographic security. He was pointing out how security through obscuring algorithms can never be considered reliable. Extinguishing a match with a fire-hose, Jim ________________________________________________________________________________ james speth email for pgp compatible public-key december(a)end.com ________________________________________________________________________________ Have you ever had your phones tapped by the government? YOU WILL and the company that'll bring it to you... AT&T

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"If you're against unreadable encryption, don't use it!"
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It's probably time for us to remind the security services (over and over) that they're within their rights to pass rules like "if you have access to classified information, then you're required to include the info's owning agency as a recipient in every encrypted message you send (since PGP and RIPEM both allow multiple recipients and there's nothing to stop the Dept of Energy, the CIA, the NSA, etc., from generating PGP and RIPEM keys to be used for this purpose.) This might have a chilling effect on whistleblowers, but it should keep those agencies from claiming that PGP and RIPEM are a security threat via spies. - Carl Ellison cme(a)sw.stratus.com RIPEM MD5OfPublicKey: 39D9860686A9F075A9A83D49589C677A PGP 2.4 Key fingerprint = E0 41 4C 79 B5 AF 36 75 02 17 BC 1A 57 38 64 78

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Re: Whoa, now... (was Re: Digital Cash)
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

:From: "James G. Speth" <december(a)end.end.com> :In fact, he began this thread by citing someone who was talking about using :an obscured algorithm to prevent digital cash double spending. (ie. If you :can't get to the algorithm, you can't cheat the system.) His comments were :on the dangers of relying on this. :That's the point. Mikolaj was _never_ referring to cryptographic security. :He was pointing out how security through obscuring algorithms can never be :considered reliable. Oh, well if that's what he meant, we agree completely. I thought he was saying his el33t hackerdoodz buddies could break the crypto part of ecash. By the way, the reason I've never discussed the ecash threads on this group is because it was obvious right from the start that double-spending makes the schemes unworkable, and that only a central reference authority could patch the system to make it work, which (in my seldom humble opinion) entirely negates the point of these schemes. My suspicion is that anonymous ecash can only be made to work if giving the tokens to someone else is a destructive operation - the way core memory (I'm probably one of the few people on this group who've had to worry about stuff like this :-) ) used to be erased when read. Except that these days, the destructive read would have to be something secured by the laws of physics, like say a quantum state being trashed by virtue of being observed. (The way secure quantum comms works - if we had something akin to a quantum delay line in a card, maybe that would work.) However, the technology to do that sort of stuff is probably centuries off. G

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Re: Where is PGP 2.4?
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> What's PGP 2.4 ? There are several PGP 2.4's around. The ViaCrypt commercial version calls itself 2.4, and if I'm not mixing it up with something else, the SGI internal-use version (which uses a licensed RSA) also calls itself 2.4.

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Yet another crypto/Clipper article
by dmandl＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This time it's the magazine "New Media." The cypherpunks are mentioned prominently, and there are a few quotes (or more) from tcmay. Seemed like a pretty sympathetic piece, based on my quick skim of it. It's also fairly long. --Dave. -- Dave Mandl dmandl(a)panix.com

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Re: EFF Pioneer award: I nominate Phil Zimmerman...
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Robert A. Hayden" <hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu> writes: > A hearty second! I officially nominated PRZ for last year's award, and got a reply from the EFF vote/nomination counter that I was one of many. But it didn't make the cut then. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Another Censorship, Freedom of Speech, Rights of Vendor Issue
by jdwilson＠gold.chem.hawaii.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To supporters of freedom of speech - please read, act and share this as your conscience dictates: Unofficially excerpted from Infoworld 3/7/94 Brian Livingston's Window Manager column. "Can CompuServe succeed in silencing Windows dissenters? Having your electronic mail account cut off is the modern equivalent of solitary confinement. Many services I use, such as Microsoft Windows forums, exist exclusively on systems such as the CompuServe Information Service. There is no other place for information. "That's why I took notice when CompuServe threatened to cut off a subscriber's account if he even mentioned on-line a lawsuit that the company filed against him. "Compuserve filed suit January 31 in Federal District Court in Ohio against Richard S. Patterson, the developer of a shareware program called Windows Navigator (WinNAV), which he has distributed on Compuserve for several years. This suit came about after Patterson complained on a Compuserve forum last December that the company's plans to release a product called Windows Navigator infringed upon his trademarks. "Prior to initiating the suit, Compuserve modified the name of its product to CompuServe Navigator, Windows Version. It asks the court to find that Patterson has "no trademark rights" that it has infringed, and for an unspecified monetary penalty. "I don't know who will prevail in this suit. But what really bothers me is this threat in a letter to Patterson dated January 31, from Kevin J. Osterkamp, Compuserve's attorney in the firm of Roetzel and Andress, of Columbus, Ohio; "I am as legal counsel for Compuserve compelled to advise you that it is Compuserves position that you will be terminated if you mention, discuss, or comment upon the lawsuit or the issues related thereto as a part of the CompuServe Information Service. Termination will also result from any other disparagment of Compuserve, its management, employees, or business practices. "I've never met Mr. Patterson, but I know him tangentially from his other software, Zip Tools, which appears in Windows Gizmos. "My columns have promoted CompuServe many times, so I asked for it's position. The gist of the reply I received from Mr. Oster- kamp was this: "Regarding the case of Compuserve vs. Patterson, my ethical obligations (and Mr. Patterson's) prohibit me from commenting directly on the case. I can, however, assure you that our request that Mr. Patterson stop using Compuserve's online services to disparage the company is simply good, old-fashioned common sense. After all, why should CompuServe - or any online service - allow a disgruntled party the opportunity to bad- mouth the company in its own forum? "Why, indeed? It's called "a free exchange of ideas." It is much sought after by people around the world. "If AT&T could cut off my phone because I criticized them while using long distance, we would be in very serious danger of losing our freedom. "It is unclear whether electronic services are "common carriers" (like AT&T) that must carry all communications, or "publishers" (like magazines) that are legally responsible for the words they choose to print. "But Compuserve knows which it prefers to be. In separate cases, it has been sued by the National Music Publishers Association and Cubby Inc. for distributing material uploaded by subscribers. Compuserve argues that it should be free from any liability because "it is a distributor and not a publisher." "Our future "information highway" will inevitably center on just five or six giant corporations. That's why it's so important that access not be denied to someone whom these entities don't like. "Because children read forums, I agree that obscene language should be banned. But I've read the forum messages, and Patterson is not guilty of that. "Do me a favor. Sit down right now and tap out a message to Mauryve Cox, the CEO of Compuserve. His I.D. number is 70003,1550. Tell him how important it is to you that no one be denied access to Compuserve forums. Send me a copy, if my account still works after this column appears. (Brian Livingston is the author of "Windows 3.1 Secrets" and "More Windows Secrets", and co-author of "Windows Gizmos." Send tips to Compuserve: 70053,2035; or fax: (206) 282-1248.)

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On TV Tonight
by crunch＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm going to be on FOX-TV tonight on a show called "On the money", talking about hacking and such. Here in Bay area, it's channel 2, so set your VCR's.

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WinPGP 1.0 now on oak.oakland.edu.
by GRABOW_GEOFFREY＠tandem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

WinPGP 1.0 is available for immediate downloading via anonymous ftp on oak.oakland.edu as pub/msdos/windows3/winpgp10.zip. It also available on any of the SimTel mirrors. Enjoy, G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | "What we demand are rigidly defined | | Oyster Bay, New York | areas of doubt and uncertainty!" | | | -------------------- | | grabow_geoffrey(a)tandem.com | Clipper, SkipJack & Digital Telephony | | | JUST SAY NO!!! | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | PGP fingerprint = C9 95 0F C4 E9 DD 8E 73 DD 99 4E F5 EB 7A B6 1D | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Solution to Remailer Abuse
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was riding the train tonight, re-reading some old crypto papers, including Chaum's Auscrypt paper on digital pseudonyms, credentials, and such. He described a method for letting libraries catch people who don't return library books, while still preserving confidentiality of all transactions. It occured to me that a modified form of his idea could help curb abuse of remailers. (It might also work for the anonymous video rental problem we have discussed here from time to time.) Chaum's idea was pretty complicated, but I think a simpler approach could work using the existing Magic Money software. One idea we have talked about to help curb abuse would be to simply charge digital postage for every message. However, it was pointed out that in practice postage costs would probably be so low that this would only help in extreme cases of volume abuse. My idea is to have the coins not represent money, but to have them be "non-abuse tokens". With every message would be included a non-abuse token in the form that Magic Money uses when you exchange incoming money at the bank. This is composed of the coin itself, plus what is called a "proto-coin" which is a blinded version of what will become the new coin. The remailer would check the incoming non-abuse token to make sure it hadn't been seen before, just like the bank does with Magic Money. However, it would not immediately sign and return the blinded proto-coin. Instead, it would hold onto it for a day or two to see if any complaints came back about the message. This would require remembering the outgoing message-ID along with the proto-coin, but nothing else would have to be remembered about the message, and of course with remailer chains the true source of the message would be completely unknown. If no complaints come in (which is the case with the vast majority of messages, in my experience) the remailer would sign and publish the blinded proto-coin. This would be put in some public place which was generally available to all who might use the remailer. The user who sent the message would be watching for this proto-coin and pick it up, un-blinding it with his Magic Money software, to produce a new non-abuse token which he can use to send another message. If serious complaints do come in about the message, the remailer would not sign the proto-coin, and the sender would have lost a non-abuse token. The nice thing about this system is that it protects the privacy of the user of the remailer system. With the Magic Money technology each non-abuse token is blinded so there is no linkage possible between issuing of such tokens and their use. The big problem with the remailers now is that abusive messages can't be addressed without trying to track down who sent them, which is usually impossible. This system addresses the problem without hurting anyone's privacy. A couple of issues that I have glossed over would include how the non-abuse tokens are issued in the first place. There is the obvious danger that an abuser manages to keep getting new tokens by pretending to be a new net user who would like to use the remailer. Two solutions to this would be first, to charge a significant sum for a handful of non-abuse tokens; this would be a one-time fee for non-abusers but could get expensive for those who abuse; or second, to only give non-abuse tokens to users who could be identified by their True Names. (This isn't a situation which needs military- grade security; semi-secure methods of identifying true names should be adequate.) One other thing I suggested above which might seem a little controversial was that the signed but still-blinded proto-coins could be made available in the clear. Since these are in the form r*f(x)^(1/d) where r, a random number, is only known to the user who created the proto-coin, I think they are effectively one-time-pad encrypted. So I don't see any need for these messages to be hidden with a public key. In fact, I don't think Magic Money would really need to have a public key for the user since it is only used to protect these messages, and I don't think they need protection. Comments are welcome on this point. One last point involves the definition of abuse. As far as I am concerned that is up to the remailer operator. Last week I got a very polite and worried letter from a girl wondering why she had received mail from my remailer inviting her to such some guy's finger, except it wasn't his finger. (Despite our recent discussion of this list's implicit "X" rating I am reluctant to be more explicit.) I don't get too many of these but I feel bad about them all the same. My current approach is to add each person to the list of blocked outgoing addresses, but I think the technology would allow for a more effective solution. Hal

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Must manufacturers provide backdoors?
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

uni says: > The bill in its draft from provides that common carriers who do not > provide the encryption device are exempt. The meaning on its face is > that common carriers are gaining some immunity to sanctions if they did > not provide the customer with the encryption he or she is using and > instead provide a means for the government to compell the common carrier > to produce in the clear that which they caused to be encrypted. > The practical effect the bills has is to impose on common carriers that manufacture encryption devices, a duty to provide to the government those > conversations which are made with said devices over their lines. > If AT&T manufactures some encryption device, and I use it over AT&T > lines, one reading of the bill would suggest that AT&T is now RESPONSIBLE > for decrypting this if the government should request it. The Act does exempt carriers from providing backdoors in the encrytion it *doesn't* provide; it makes no mention of any exemption or obligation for *manufacturers.* Here's an excerpt: > (5) 'intercept' shall have the same meaning as set forth in > subsection 2510(4) of title 18, United States Code, except that with > regard to a common carrier's transmission of a communication encrypted by > a subscriber, the common carrier shall not be responsible for ensuring the > government agency's ability to acquire the plaintext of the communications > content, unless the encryption was provided by the common carrier and the > common carrier possesses the information necessary to decrypt the > communication; Manufacturers are obliged to make available equipment to the common carriers "compliant with ... this Act." Even if manufacturers are not (like AT&T) also common carriers. The Act does not elaborate on the manufacturers role in producing "compliant" equipment, nor on their responsiblities towards the "provisions of this Act." An interpretation could be that ALL EQUIPMENT must facilitate the decryption of plaintext under court order. After all, the Act does require common carriers to provide backdoors in any ecnryption they provide. > "(d) Cooperation of support service providers and equipment > manufacturers. Common carriers shall consult, as necessary, in a timely > fashion with appropriate providers of common carrier support services and > telecommunications equipment manufacturers for the purpose of identifying > any services or equipment, including hardware and software, that may > require modification so as to permit compliance with the provisions of > this Act. A provider of common carrier support services or a > telecommunications equipment manufacturer shall make available to a common > carrier on a timely and priority basis, and at a reasonable cost, any > support service or equipment, including hardware or software, which may be > required so as to permit compliance with the provisions of this Act. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "What is civilisation rishab(a)doe.ernet.in, rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in but a ribonucleic Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 hangover?" H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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NewMedia article, April 1994
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just got this in the mail, and flipping through it I saw a decent article (with quotes from our own prolific Tim May!). Any mistakes are probably OCR errors -- it's 3am and time to go to bed. _You_ proof it! Privacy in the Digital Age by Curtis Lang NewMedia, April 1994 Welcome to the digital frontier, where network by network, metaphor by metaphor, a splendid, global, multimedia palace is being built through trial and error. You won't need to take a long and winding road to this frontier, though, it's coming soon to your home. You'll know it has arrived when you can read messages on your telephone, have a dialogue with your television and watch beautiful movies on your PC. AT&T has already established a giant encampment on this digital frontier, and it is now concentrating on building a virtual community. In advertisements, the company paints seductive pictures of fully wired--and wireless--consumers interacting in the cyberspace equivalent of Hemingway's dean, well-lighted place. A happy couple in a jumbo kitchen uses a computerized telephone to take and receive electronic messages and make reservations for the ball game. A nomadic businessman in an airport shuttle bus tells his PDA how much he's willing to spend on a used car for his son, what makes he prefers and the maximum acceptable mileage. He sends his PDA on a shopping trip around the region with a single touch. It all sounds thrilling--empowering for consumers and businesses alike. But in the 21st-century world of interactive television, broadband Internet access and ubiquitous multipurpose communications gizmos, every message you send and each dollar you spend could be an unbidden messenger as well. Electronic traces of your passage will remain in data banks of cable, telephone and on-line service providers. And the government wants to install a trap door in software and hardware used to encrypt messages and data from medical smart cards, IRS records, digital cash transfers and plain old e-mail. These databases will be digital gold in the world of direct marketing, where vendors and advertisers will tailor special offers to individuals based upon this information and deliver coupons that will issue from your smart cable TV set-top box What's to prevent unscrupulous third parties--or underpaid government workers with access to the software trap door--from obtaining information that could be used to harm consumers? Not much, judging from stories like that of black-data buccaneer Al Schweitzer, who bought and sold confidential government files for a living (see "Penetrating Uncle Sam's Data," page 68). Unless government agencies, infrastructure suppliers, software wizards and producers of programming can guarantee privacy in the rapidly expanding web of cyberspace, it may be impossible for the trust upon which a virtual community depends to develop sufficiently to make the grand digital experiment a success. Without this assurance there will be no secure business communications, and the kind of transactional data that is currently gathered by insurance firms, credit companies and banks might fall into the hands of anyone with the skills to track it across the global network Security of transactions over cable networks is already a concern to American consumers, according to surveys by Viacom Cable and others. And the lack of secure transaction methods may already be hampering buying and selling via modem. Consumer's unwillingness to put it on their Visa when traveling in cyberspace has slowed public acceptance of such services as American Airlines' Easy Sabre ticket service, available on Prodigy, America Online and other on-line services. Consumers, like businesses, are eager to take advantage of the digital highway, but they are leery of financial data and other sensitive information falling into the wrong hands. ENCRYPTION MAY BE THE KEY When you make a phone call or send a letter, you can be fairly certain that the contents of your communications will remain private. Such trust makes our postal and phone systems possible. AT&T hopes to give customers that same sense of security about wireless communications. It is the first company to implement General Magic's new Telescript communications software in its PersonaLink Services, which will be the foundation for AT&T's multimedia web of services that include smart messaging, electronic shopping and custom news delivery. "Telescript. .is a technology which creates something called agent-based communication," explained Marc Porat, chairman and CEO of General Magic, at a winter conference on electronic consumer appliances in New York Such software agents will be able to travel throughout wired and wireless networks searching for information, like-minded individuals or bargain prices on PCs. Agents will act as your virtual doorman, your e-mail bozo filter, tossing mail on subjects you nix into the trash. "General Magic is a really good idea," contends Jerry Michalski of the industry newsletter, Release l.a "You can create a little agent that .[will] go out there and look for things for you. Let's say you're a stamp collector--it can look for a particular kind of stamp, or a bubble-gum card or whatever, and maybe even buy the thing for you automatically. Now, gosh, you're putting that up on AT&T's network. They could find out within very small fractions of activity what you're doing, what your preferences are, what kind of agents you've decided to broadcast into the world. So you're only going to do that if you have some kind of confidence that they're not going to misuse that information." To that end, AT&T and General Magic intend to set up "trusted spaces," secure virtual meeting rooms where your agent can meet with another agent, representing a vendor or an individual, and communicate, shop, cut deals or consummate business transactions free from prying software. But what about the security of these networks? And how will you know the identity of the entity lurking behind the vir- tual agent that your virtual agent is schmoozing up in supposedly secure cyberspace? "Most wireless communications systems are security nightmares," says Jim Bidzos, president of RSA Data Security Inc., a giant in the global cryptography business. "They have no real encryption, no authentication.... General Magic realized that for a lot of people, wireless services of any kind simply can't be trusted. So they built RSA encryption and authentication services right into the foundation of Telescript and Magic Cap [the interface for General Magic's PDA]." A DIFFERENT VIEW Advocates of civil liberties such as the cypherpunks, the grassroots encryption experts who have developed widely distributed personal encryption shareware for e-mail, worry that even in such a security-conscious system, the government will find a way to snoop. They see alternatives to AT&T's vision of tomorrow. "The issue of digital money is going to be key," argues Tim May, "so that people can buy access codes." May, formerly a physicist with Intel and one of the most visible cypherpunks, envisions a future in which digital cash is used for most transactions. In such a system encryption schemes would be floating through the computer community that could make most financial transactions virtually untraceable. "Imagine a satellite dish on your roof," he continues. "You decide to buy an X-rated movie, and you don't want records kept of that on your monthly bill. [There will be] mechanisms by which you can buy 'coupons' that are usable on a one-time basis to decrypt a packet, and the vendor of the service--say, the seller of the X-rated movie--has no idea that you, in particular, are decrypting his packet. I think that'll be essential." DO YOU TRUST UNCLE SAM? After months of review, during which a torrent of digital complaints flooded the White House from multinational corporations, the Software Publishers Association, cypherpunks and civil libertarians, President Clinton announced that he wants the National Security Agency (NSA) to implement secret standards for encryption to be used in computerized communications systems to facilitate e-mail surveillance. The Computer Security Act of 1987 mandated that the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a civilian agency, develop appropriate standards for digital communications networks. At the time it was clear that there would be a need for digital envelopes (cryptography), digital signatures and other technologies to provide security and enable legally enforceable digital transactions on the Internet, and eventually across fiber-optic cables and wireless systems connected to telephones, computers, TVs and PDAs. However, during the Bush administration, a series of executive orders placed authority for developing those standards in the hands of the NSA, America's largest and most secretive spy organization, which has a checkered history that includes large-scale illegal surveillance of Americans. Thus it was no surprise that the agency's proposal to provide digital encryption systems focused on easy wiretap surveillance rather than privacy, security and other civilian needs. The NSA produced a 64-bit encryption algorithm, classified "Secret" and called Skipjack The NSA declined to make the algorithm public, prompting concern that, given the NSA's track record, there might be a "trap door" in Skipjack that would allow secret surveillance of all Skpjack-encoded messages. In April 1993, the White House outlined plans for a microcircuit called the Clipper chip, which would scramble telephone conversations. Each chip, encoded with Skipjack, would generate an encryption session key, a chip unique key and a chip family key, all of which are sent to the receiver. The White House asks users to register their chip unique key with the government, which will then split each key into two parts and "escrow" the parts with two different agencies, so that law enforcement agencies can unscramble suspects' messages. SURVEILLANCE ON THE UPSWING The White House claims that the system would be used by government officials with legal authorization to conduct wiretaps and thus represents no intensification of government surveillance. But in NIST's letter inviting five hand-picked cryptography experts to do a quick survey of Skipjack, the agency says that key components will be made available "only to authorized government officials under proper legal authorizations, usually a court order." They said usually, not always. The distinction was not accidental. For the last several years, the FBI has been increasing its surveillance of all Americans at a dizzying pace as part of a mind-boggling expansion of its powers and activities. This includes increased access to computerized data on Americans, which now often no longer requires a court order to be accessed. The Bush average of 332 wiretap applications per year was double that of the Reagan administration, and state agencies' wiretaps also increased during the Bush years. Despite the rapid increase of such requests, wiretaps are far from widespread, and according to the June 1993 issue of the Privacy Journal, the FBI has publicized no instances in which its investigations were hampered because a suspect had used encrypted e-mail or other digital security devices. The Clinton administration asked for an amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting Act that would allow the FBI to obtain credit information, without a court order, by issuing a "national security letter." The rationale is that although the FBI has access to your bank records, it will not know which banks' records to obtain without ready access to your credit reports, as David MacMichael reports in the National Security Alumni Association Magazine, Unclassified (October/November 1993). OPERATION ROOT CANAL Meanwhile, the FBI continues to move forward with "Operation Root Canal," also known as the 1992 Digital Telephony Proposal, which encourages service and equipment providers to design their computerized systems in such a way that the government can easily "obtain the plain text contents of voice, data and other communications," according to FBI memoranda obtained by the nonprofit Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) from the Commerce Department in November of last year. The threat of the Digital Telephony Proposal to telecommunications companies is very real. CPSR reported that Rep. Jack Brooks, a Texas Democrat, said that Root Canal "could obstruct or distort telecommunications technology development by limiting fiber optic transmission, ISDN, digital cellular services and other technologies until they are modified...and could impair the security of business communications. .could facilitate not only lawful government interception, but unlawful interception by others [and] could impose on industries' ability to offer new services and technologies." And the NSA, which oversees export-control regulations of weapons of war--including encryption products--has signaled its intent to prevent grassroots cryptography from enlisting enough users to constitute a de facto standard. Recently Phil Zimmerman, the creator of Pretty Good Privacy, a popular and widely available piece of encryption shareware, was busted for export-control violations (see "Penetrating Uncle Sam's Data," below). After all, if everyone has access to encryption techniques, when law enforcement agencies decrypt the Skipper algorithm on someone's intercepted message, they'll find a secondary layer of encryption that could be more difficult to crack That would render Skipjack pointless; some Clinton critics worry that the logical outcome of Skipjack implementation will be the criminalization of other forms of encryption. Never mind the implications for secure business communications. With a government-imposed Skpjack standard, the feds would be able to do something they have never been able to do before--easily conduct mass surveillance. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY "No right of private conversation was enumerated in the Constitution," said Sun Microsystems' Whitfield Diffie, one of the pioneers of modern civilian encryption, in June 1993 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance. "I don't suppose it occurred to anyone at the time that it could be prevented. Now, however, we are on the verge of a world in which electronic communication is both so good and so inexpensive that intimate business and personal relationships will flourish between parties who can, at most, occasionally afford the luxury of traveling to visit each other. If we do not accept the right of these people to protect the privacy of their communication, we take a long step in the direction of a world in which privacy will belong only to the rich."Canada and most European countries regulate public and private data collection. By contrast, direct marketers and credit and insurance companies in the United States are able to obtain large amounts of data about the buying habits and lifestyles of most citizens. U.S. Law provides no redress for the individual who complains of privacy violations, other than the right to sue the violator. That great amounts of information are being gathered about each of us is hardly news. And the evidence that privacy has become a commodity has been accumulating for years. Want an unlisted number? You pay for it. Want to restrict direct marketers' ability to target you over cable TV? You may pay again. "If you don't want to be intruded on at home, don't have a home phone," advises Esther Dyson, a policy consultant on all things digital for the Clinton administration. "Which is what I do. If you really are worried about this, take action. That's very difficult on a lot of things, but people sort of act like they're helpless, and they're not." Or, in the immortal words of Count Niccolo Machiavelli, counselor of princes: "Only those means of security are good, are certain, are lasting, that depend on yourself and your own vigor." We have seen the future, where everyone plays James Bond in the palatial network that composes tomorrow's worldwide digital web. In such a world, the Count could become a best- selling author again. Matt Thomlinson Say no to the Wiretap Chip! University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Internet: phantom(a)u.washington.edu phone: (206) 548-9804 PGP 2.2 key available via email or finger phantom(a)hardy.u.washington.edu

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Cousin Brucie At CFP `94
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To get this in first... Bruce Sterling Saturday night in Chicago: "Being afraid of large institutions when they have computers is like being afraid of 600 pound gorillas particularly when they are on fire." DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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"Computer Insecurity" on CNN
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Next week's Science & Technology Week, airs first Saturday @ 8 am, then Sunday at 9:30. (And perhaps other times as well).

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Projects for parallel machine?
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've got access to a zippy, 9-processor, mostly unused box. What ever should I _do_ with it? Factoring routines? What? I'm looking for a decent project to work on this next quarter, and I'd like to include this big boys' muscle. Any computations that can be done in parallel are game; I just can't think of anything. Any comments appreciated. Matt Thomlinson Say no to the Wiretap Chip! University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Internet: phantom(a)u.washington.edu phone: (206) 548-9804 PGP 2.2 key available via email or finger phantom(a)hardy.u.washington.edu

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Answers to Summit questions
by jkreznar＠ininx.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > -- Questions for Discussion Groups -- > 1. What is important to your group? Truth and honesty. > 3. What does your group want not to happen with the NII? For it to de facto preempt honest alternatives. I'm afraid that the NII will be funded in part by taxation. An honest person cannot in good conscience willfully accept services funded by taxation when he has a reasonable alternative. The NII threatens the viability of honest alternatives. The reason is that even an honest person will find it hard to justify paying more for access to a user-funded network when a cheaper alternative such as NII is available because it is sustained by expropriating the fruit of the toil of unconsenting others. Some of us would prefer that relations among people be by mutual consent or not at all. Government programs, by contrast, imply imposition by the politically victorious upon all others. > 5. What would you be able to do with the NII, that you would not > otherwise, if you did not have to worry about the cost of access? One can _not_ of course not worry about the cost. The people who install and maintain the system have to eat, too. The pertinent question is whether that money is given freely in exchange for service rendered, or is expropriated from another without his consent through taxation. An honest user of the system suffers ongoing distress to know that he benefits only because of another's oppression. The NII should not come to be. The ``N'' in NII stands for ``National''. Nations are abominations, functioning as they do to supplant personal choice with collective dictate. John E. Kreznar | Relations among people to be by jkreznar(a)ininx.com | mutual consent, or not at all. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLZZwxcDhz44ugybJAQEbTwQAgCHVdhmdC3zyQWRKOhNLTFzM8AFH29re jOdOmnIKkGiJWzjPGLb/x4cagv+tS56OgfpSMmBet9xsm9f7Yf3gGpGgPVgiYr2n pseH5x7ON0a6u0YVYZX8SIPyOjUUEiDBwhAfOOALJ2fWWMI0hYhREiAQuNS1Ag8T /oYQtUFf274= =QDwY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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personal manifesto (comments appreciated)
by jdblair＠nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The following is my manifesto of net.beliefs. I recognize their lack of precision, their foundation in principles of faith, and their lack of a clear vehicle for realization. I do not profess them to be a statement of cypherpunk beliefs. I do submit them for discussion, criticism, suggestion, rant, or flame. If you disagree this is your chance to educate a misguided individual with hopelessly antiquated beliefs. If you agree, this is your chance to point out badly constructed arguments, awkward sentences, repetition, and poor word choice. I cannot work for something unless I know what it is IUm working for. 1) My vision of the Net is utopian, or I would not spell it as I do, with a capitol N. While the most likely possibility is that the Net will simply mirror current society, a Net of this structure would fail to realize its potential as an agent of social change. 2) The Net has the potential to become the greatest de-centralizing force in the history of humanity. The potential ability of the individual to cheaply reach, and organize, vast numbers of like-minded individuals is unprecedented. 3) Current arguments for regulation of cryptography by government agencies depend on the argument they are maintaining their current abilities in the brave new world of cyberspace. I argue that even if this were the case, we have a responsibility to do more than simply maintain the status quo. This argument can be mapped to possible future objections by authorities. 4) It is the responsibility of the information haves to spread their knowledge to the information have-nots. A Net which allows the economic exploitation of information have-nots by those with the information is, while perhaps profitable, immoral. Information wants to be free. Knowledge which is not of a personal nature should be freely accessible. 5) Along with these positive potentials, it is possible for the Net to be constructed in such a way as to allow the formation of the most powerful authoritarian societies the world has ever seen. The potential for the death of the Individual, just as for the empowerment of the Individual, is very real. We must work to prevent totalitarianism. 6) The Net is no better than its users. Current crises of economic inequality, of homelessness and hunger, will not be affected by the Net unless we work to change them in pre-Net society. People cannot participate in a democratic society if they are not educated to a minimal level required for functioning in that society. This is the crux of our societal problems, as well as the crux of possible problems with the Net. 7) It is better to help oneUs fellow human than to hurt. It is better to give than to receive. Equally, one human has an enormous capacity to injure and exploit another human. We must decide which ability we wish to empower, and judge which we actually do. 8) There are fundamental problems with the structure of society. Realizing the democratic vision of the Net is a way to re-structure society. My hope is that this restructuring will create a better society than the one I know. I recognize it can be worse-- much worse. With vigilance, it will not be. 9) My beliefs are hopelessly utopian. I have faith in democratic principles to shape society into a more just social hierarchy. This faith must not be confused with certainty. It is impossible to predict the shape of the society which will be created. A few risks are of the tyranny of the majority, and the willful formation of totalitarian dictatorships (hyperlink Weimar Germany). The will of the people is impossible to define, much less judge, gauge, measure or regulate. We must be satisfied with approximations. 10) All actions have moral implications. Ignoring these implications is irresponsible and, yes... immoral. - -john. - -------------------------------------------------------------------------- John Blair: <jdblair(a)nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu> voice: (513) 529-4877 PGP public key available upon request. KILL YOUR Privacy in the information age is a right, not a privilage. TELEVISION Information = Power = Control. Fight the centralization of information. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQBVAgUBLZZOOBD3efpluabZAQH/swH9FmFB45S9jcMs2oqMn12wTEfqcbGFDdSN LAc5NEt1us7aipazZIouu+abSsPRlqq2lhIxOzJ65KGlYNdWjJ0tPw== =NiD7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: personal manifesto (comments appreciated)
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Blair says he welcomes comments and criticism, so here goes: > 1) My vision of the Net is utopian, or I would not spell it as I do, > with a capitol N. While the most likely possibility is that the Net > will simply mirror current society, a Net of this structure would fail > to realize its potential as an agent of social change. I often use the term "the Net" as well, but perhaps this usage is skewing our thinking in the very direction we mostly despise: the creation of a monolithic entity, as epitomized in "the" National Information Infrastructure. Perhaps we should be thinking in terms of "many nets," "many communcations channels." Come to think of it, "cyberspace," though sometimes hackneyed (hackerneyed?), captures it best, at least for me. > 3) Current arguments for regulation of cryptography by government > agencies depend on the argument they are maintaining their current > abilities in the brave new world of cyberspace. I argue that even if > this were the case, we have a responsibility to do more than simply > maintain the status quo. This argument can be mapped to possible future > objections by authorities. Not the best one-paragraph argument for crypto I've ever seen. But I don't disagree. > 4) It is the responsibility of the information haves to spread their > knowledge to the information have-nots. A Net which allows the economic > exploitation of information have-nots by those with the information is, > while perhaps profitable, immoral. Information wants to be free. > Knowledge which is not of a personal nature should be freely accessible. I disagree with nearly everything here! If I know how to design circuits, and some "have-not" does not, what is wrong with that? Is knowledge to be made illegal? Are consultants, writers, designers, etc. to be told they cannot use "the Net"? Arghh! Words fail me. Perhaps our ideologies are just too far apart. > 5) Along with these positive potentials, it is possible for the Net > to be constructed in such a way as to allow the formation of the most > powerful authoritarian societies the world has ever seen. The potential > for the death of the Individual, just as for the empowerment of the > Individual, is very real. We must work to prevent totalitarianism. And part of preventing totalitarianism means not interfering with economic transactions made by folks. See how this applies to your point above. > 6) The Net is no better than its users. Current crises of economic > inequality, of homelessness and hunger, will not be affected by the Net > unless we work to change them in pre-Net society. People cannot > participate in a democratic society if they are not educated to a minimal > level required for functioning in that society. This is the crux of our > societal problems, as well as the crux of possible problems with the Net. A platitude. Ditto for "End Hunger Now" and "Save the Dolphins." > 7) It is better to help oneUs fellow human than to hurt. It is > better to give than to receive. Equally, one human has an enormous > capacity to injure and exploit another human. We must decide which > ability we wish to empower, and judge which we actually do. It's OK that you believe this, of course, but I fail to see any real links with what it is we're doing, what crypto and digital privacy is all about, etc. My fear is that these nice thoughts will be used by others, especially politicians, to their own ends. > 8) There are fundamental problems with the structure of society. > Realizing the democratic vision of the Net is a way to re-structure > society. My hope is that this restructuring will create a better > society than the one I know. I recognize it can be worse-- much worse. > With vigilance, it will not be. Be sure you read up on the problems with "democracies." (For the most part, I'm opposed to democracies. Too many issues to go into right now, but I can if there's interest.) > 9) My beliefs are hopelessly utopian. I have faith in democratic > principles to shape society into a more just social hierarchy. This Instead of so much talk of democracy, think of _free choice_. Is "deomcratic input" needed in determining what books get published, what magazines are created and sold, what CDs get produced? No, the "market" decides. Not perfectly, not to everyone's liking, and "injustices" do occur. But far better that the success of a book or a CD depend on customer willingness to buy than that some committee or democratic vote has decreed that 2 Live Crew is not needed. The extension of this notion to cyberspace is both obvious and natural. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Digital Cash
by John.Schofield＠f903.n102.z1.fidonet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--==<Quoting Uucp to John Schofield about "Re: Digital Cash">==-- Uu> I have always been skeptical of this observer-chip approach, because Uu> it wasn't clear that it was feasible to make a tamper-resistant chip Uu> economically, and because the specialized hardware that would be Uu> required would prevent the system from being used on widely-available Uu> PCs. However, now we see that our military rulers apparently trust Uu> tamper-resistant technology well enough to put it into thousands of Uu> public hands, without fear that even one chip will be opened and read. Uu> Breaking an observer only lets you double-spend the coins it holds, Uu> while breaking Clipper allows you to permanently defeat the escrow Uu> provisions of the whole system. So this suggests that the technology Uu> is adequate for observers. I once asked my grandfather if he was sure he could take apart the tractor he was working on. His response? "A man put it together." Anything one man can do, another can undo--the only variable is the degree of effort required. I'm sure we can make a tamper-resistant chip, but can we make a tamper-proof one? No. Considering the determination and intelligence of some of the people involved, I'm sure that a tamper-resistant chip would be compromised pretty quickly. --John Schofield ... I tried an internal modem, but it hurt when I walked. --- Blue Wave/RA v2.12 -- : John Schofield - via mcws.fidonet.org - Public Access (213)256-8371 : ARPA/INTERNET: John.Schofield(a)f903.n102.z1.fidonet.org : UUCP: ...!cheshire!mcws!903!John.Schofield : Compu$erve: >internet:John.Schofield@f903.n102.z1.fidonet.org

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Communications Law 302
by nobody＠soda.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know what happened to the banks lovely sytem a while back when New York account holders found out that withdrawls were made twice on their accounts? What happened, did someone actually get creditted with the corresponding debits, or was this another case of an operator putting up a tape twice? -- As an aside, I remember an old wire from some years ago when $58Million was held up by the US with co-operation of European authorities. In case anyone is interested the following was the reult of the legal wranglin'. and is dated 11/93. Forget Clipper, and check out how else they're stickin it to ya. In short they 'seized' data packets, at an intermediary remailer. They have made information seizable **EGADS** -- AN PTS2096146 HL U.S. WINS MAJOR VICTORY ON WIRE SEIZURES DL ESTIMATED INFORMATION UNITS: 4.7 WORDS: 569 DD 11/01/93 SO * Money Laundering Alert (MLAL) Alert International, Inc Vol. 5, No. 2 LP When operatives of the Santacruz-Londono Cali drug cartel were arrested in June 1990 in Luxembourg, a flurry of wire transfers flew from hundreds of cartel bank accounts in Europe. Anticipating the transfers, Luxembourg authorities asked other countries to freeze the money linked to those accounts TX Of the $58 million seized worldwide, $12 million was frozen in New York City banks which had served as "intermediary banks" in the wire transfers. The role of those banks was to credit the accounts of certain correspondent Colombian banks who would then notify the beneficiaries that the funds were available. The banks were instructed by DEA agents to attach all funds on deposit in the names of Cali cartel associates, including "all related entities and individuals," and to say which transfers were destined for beneficiaries in Colombia. Two groups of Colombian clothing exporters filed claims to about $6.5 million of the seized funds saying the money was legitimately earned. They also sued the New York banks for loss of use of their funds and for violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). Their suits against the banks were dismissed. After a two-month trial last year, the jury found that 18 of the 22 accounts seized were forfeitable. Now, in a case of great importance to the emerging wire transfer battles between the government and the movers of dirty money, the key federal appellate court which rules on issues arising from the New York financial center has given a resounding victory to the government. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that wire transfers that pass through intermediary banks can be seized even without "alleging facts sufficient to show that specific property is tainted." All the government must show are "facts sufficient to support a reasonable belief that (it) can demonstrate probable cause for finding the property tainted," the court said. By naming the intermediary banks and the beneficiaries, the U.S. described the property with "reasonable particularity." Moreover, the U.S. did not need a warrant for the seizures because the law permits the Justice Department to seize property when it has "probable cause to believe" it is subject to civil forfeiture, said the court. "Because the (transfers were) fungible and capable of rapid motion due to modern technology,...exigent circumstances were present here," said the court, dismissing the claimants' assertions that their constitutional rights had been violated. Likewise, there was no violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act, said the court, because the claimants did not maintain "accounts" at the banks. The ECPA also provided no relief to the claimants because that law deals with the use of "devices" to "intercept" communications. Here, no devices were used and there was no interception, said the court. The court also ruled than an EFT at an intermediary bank is "clearly a seizable res (thing) under the forfeiture statutes" and that only a "nexus" and not a "substantial connection" between seized property and illegal drug activity must be shown by the government to show probable cause. The case has far-reaching implications since a majority of international wire transfers pass through intermediary banks, many of them in New York. (U.S. vs. Daccarett, Docket Nos. 92-6229 and 6259, 2nd Cir. Ct of App., September 10, 1993). ---Richard M. Lucas, CPA, is a consultant for the Philip Manuel Resource Group and a former IRS Special Agent. COPYRIGHT 1993 by Alert International, Inc. I0607 * END OF DOCUMENT.

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Ames/clipper compromised?
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Okay here's the scoop on the Ames/clipper bit, from the guy who wrote it. Permission to distribute is granted as long as it is reproduced in it's entirety. Termcomp.zip, the electronic version of TERMINAL COMPROMISE is available for ftp at ftp.netsys.com under /pub/novel for those who asked. - From p00506(a)psilink.com Fri Mar 25 08:04:37 1994 Date: Fri, 25 Mar 94 11:01:56 -0500 To: talon57(a)well.sf.ca.us From: "Winn Schwartau" <p00506(a)psilink.com> Organization: Inter.Pact Subject: Ames/Clipper Connection More About Clipper and Ames by Winn Schwartau March 25, 1994. The Ames/Clipper item I wrote in the Feb. 1994 issue of Security Insider Report has apparently caused quite a hub-bub. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is looking for more, the general media has picked it up, and the net is buzzing. As a result, I have been asked to put a few words out regarding this story. First of all, it is a story, one that was told to me by a person whom I know well, respect, and was at the actual meeting where the subject of Ames/Clipper was discussed. In RISKS 15.67, Dorothy Denning said that she didn't think that the Clipper Ames story/rumor made sense. While I am sure that the people to whom she spoke told her what she wrote, I was given the story by my source who WAS AT THE MEETING. Does that make it all true? No, it doesn't. And the item in Security Insider Report contained strong caveats at both the beginning and the end of the article. It was NOT printed as 100% accurate: it was printed as I was told it, and it was read and approved prior to publication by the source. I, too, have sought for confirmation, and been unable to find it. So, when Dorothy said she couldn't, that's no surprise. I have enclosed the piece that originally appeared in SIR. I fail to understand Dorothy's inability to accept possibilities and capabilities. That's one of the basic tenets of intelligence and a strong defensive posture. I find it very easy to accept that the intelligence community is considering everything that Ames might have spilled, including Clipper. What is so strange about that? That's their job! In the same issue of SIR, I examined how the FBI used technology to monitor Ames'computer. In the next issue of SIR, I will be looking at Ames' hacking abilities and skills which possibly lend credence to the possi bility that Clipper was compromised. The tale is still unfold ing. "Ames and the Clipper Connection" (From The February, 1994 Issue of Security Insider Report) Let me preface this item with a caveat. I received a call from a very well placed and highly reliable person in Washington who passed on the information. I asked if there was any way I could confirm what he told me, and I was told no. It's too sensitive. Nonetheless, it is so intriguing that SIR readers expect and would want to know what people are thinking about, even if it turns out not to be true. We in our industry deal with possibil ities and capabilities and since this discussion did take place, I'm passing it on as it happened. If this item has any shred of truth to it, well . . . decide for yourself. My contact, we'll call him something original, like 'Joe', was asked to attend a meeting where representatives from the FBI (he wasn't clear if it was the Counter Intelligence 3 [CI-3 from Half Street who keep track of Soviets and Russians] or from FBI HQ), the CIA and the National Security Agency. All told more than a dozen and less than twenty people assembled in an off-site "neutral" location to figure out what to do. It seems, according to a number of people at this meeting, that alleged CIA traitor Aldrich Ames, had access to the Clipper keys. Whoah! I nearly fell off my keyboard when I heard that. "You mean he knew the crypto-secrets behind the whole thing?" I asked. "Why would a Humint [Human Intelligence] guy know the secrets of Clipper?" "He had access to them; it would have been a normal part of his job to be in that loop." So what this group of initialed reps are allegedly attempting to do is: 1. Determine how much access Ames had to Clipper. 2. Determine if he did have access, did he in fact take advantage of it. 3. If he did get some Clipper secrets, is there a record of that access? 4. Then, what did he do with them? The fear, understandably, is that Ames might have compromised the entire Clipper/Capstone/Tessera program. The words I also heard were, "If there's only even a 1% chance that Clipper has been compromised, the whole thing's over. We have to start from scratch." So, according to my sources, the spooks-that-be are looking for a fast alternative to Clipper and Skipjack, under the theory that Ames may have blown the whole wad. Civil libertarians might shout with glee if this turns out to be true, but I think it's a hell of way to win a ball game. Bitter sweet irony. Sure, I'm not in favor it, and I am indeed nervous about 'the other shoe' but this is not the way I wanted Clipper to go away. I repeat: as of today, this is only a story, there is no confir mation. If SIR readers have anything to add, please let us know in any way you can. (C) 1994, Winn Schwartau and Inter.Pact NOTE: As of March 24, 1994, my sources reconfirmed that the story as I told it is 100% accurate. (Security Insider Report is published monthly by Inter.Pact Press, 11511 Pine St., Seminole, FL 34642. Voice: 813-393-6600, Fax 813-393-6361, email wschwartau(a)delphi.com. Hardcopy sub scriptions are $99/Yr. and electronic site licenses are available for selected organizations.) Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced comunication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLZNPndCcBnAsu2t1AQEsJwQAhLOSV4jLiGgTGNELeZipoXqNTMjUROfo /iCGCKzJJEhk3d25/9jyZsqj7Y0O83j1+oGdqvGB/HyUeHAh/jzNSWwOFaYhBpqJ kWIIjt9YNSRBc+e7ua1bKOD6ZajYw1aOyot8yCjwO0GSZwXdWQHWgd2TkTFobHvH 8CN9hjQ84gs= =x6t+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Ames/clipper compromised?
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks much for posting. I have a lot of trouble with much of the article, though, on purely technical grounds. Consider the following passage: The words I also heard were, "If there's only even a 1% chance that Clipper has been compromised, the whole thing's over. We have to start from scratch." What does it mean to ``compromise'' Clipper? The algorithm is known? No big deal, in my opinion -- Skipjack was almost certainly designed to be strong even if the algorithm was known. (As I've said before, I tend to believe NSA on that point. I suspect they're telling us the truth about Clipper -- just not the whole truth -- and what they've said is damning enough even if 100% accurate.) It's also quite unlikely that Ames would ever have seen the algorithm; it's just not something he'd have any reason to know. Might he have stolen the family key? More plausible, though again it's not something that would be left lying around, as opposed to being embedded in equipment. Could he have turned over a magic decoder box, which would have to know that key? Not at all unreasonable -- and the decoder boxes are at a sufficiently early stage of design that they may not yet be armored against tampering. But from everything that's been published, very few Clipper chips have been deployed so far. It would not be a major project to recall and rekey the devices. Copies of the key escrow databases? Same argument applies -- though if that's what was stolen, we have to ask how he had access to ``both'' of them. I don't believe there have ever been any categorical statements about how FISA access to Clipper conversations would be obtained. See above under ``whole truth''... It may be, of course, that the episode has made the powers that be wonder about the wisdom of keeping any such keys around. There's been a very strong trend in recent years to avoid *any* sort of cryptography where session keys live anywhere but inside sealed boxes, precisely to avoid key theft. (See Diffie's retrospective on public key technology for more detailed discussion and some examples.) And it's also why the government doesn't want to use Clipper -- as opposed to Skipjack -- for classified information. So -- if the story is true, just what did Ames steal that would require them to ``start over from scratch''? Is there another back door? That's the only thing I can think of that would require such an action -- which means that if they do hold off, there's a new topic to explore via FOIA requests and the like. --Steve Bellovin

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NSA in the WSJ
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday March 22, 1994, p. B1 TECHNOLOGY Clipper Chip Is Your Fried, NSA Contends NSA Seeks to Dispel Misgivings of Public About Clipper Chip By Bob Davis Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal. FORT MEADE, Md. --- The National Security Agency wants everyone to know that its new computer-security system will protect individual privacy. But as the spy agency knows, hardly anyone believes that. Critics fear the government will use the NSA technology, designed in secret, to spy on Americans. The project "is a focal point for the distrust of government," acknowledges Clinton Brooks, the NSA scientist who led the so-called Clipper Chip project, in the agency's first interview on the subject. The Clinton administration last month adopted the NSA plan for a series of computer chips that would protect telephones and computers. Use of the technology would be voluntary. Federal agencies would adopt it first, and public use is expected to spread gradually. Under the plan, cryptographic "keys" that could unscramble the communications would be split in two and held separately at the Treasury Department and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. That way, law-enforcement agents could tap the communications by getting court authorization to obtain the two halves. The idea is to boost security but to keep the technology out of the hands of criminals and spies. The NSA is the world's biggest eaves-dropper. Equipped with the latest in super-computers and satellite receivers, it targets communications by foreign governments. The agency shuns publicity but agreed to the interview to explain its role in the Clipper controversy and try to dispel fears. Mr. Brooks, a 26-year veteran of the NSA, says the project began in 1989 and cost more than $2.5 million. He says the NSA is consumed with what it calls the "equities problem" --- how to balance privacy rights against the needs of law enforcement, national security and private industry. In 1989, he and Raymond Kammer, deputy director of NIST, began discussions about how to improve computer security without making it impenetrable to police. NIST is a Commerce Department agency with formal responsibility for unclassified computer security. Before the interview, Mr. Brooks takes a look around a small cryptographic museum just outside the NSA's gates. He stands before an exhibit of Enigma machines, used by the Germans during World War II to encrypt messages --- and later broken by Allied intelligence. Enigma started as a commercial product; recognizing its military value, the Nazis pulled it off the market. "That was the concern we're wrestling with today," Mr. Brooks says --- commercial encryption technology becoming so good that U.S. spy agencies can't crack it. In 1989, NIST and the NSA put together an eight-person team, split evenly between the agencies, to quietly work out security concepts. The team decided against using a weak encryption code --- "Roman Numeral One is that it had to be good security," says Mr. Brooks. And it also rejected a so-called trapdoor approach, in which the computer code would be designed so it would have a weak spot --- a trapdoor --- that federal agencies could enter via computer to tap the communications. Someone else could discover the trapdoor, they decided. The team settled on a system with a powerful encryption formula, called an algorithm, and encryption keys that would be held by outsiders. Law- enforcement agencies could get copes of the keys when they needed to bug the conversations. The toughest decision, both Mr. Brooks and Mr. Kammer say, was to keep the algorithm, dubbed the Skipjack, secret. That meant the public wouldn't know for sure whether the NSA had inserted a trapdoor or some other eavesdropping device. "It would defeat the purpose [of the project] if we gave the knowledge of how the algorithm worked" to the public, says the 56-year-old Mr. Brooks. "It was going to have to be kept classified." Otherwise, he explains, engineers could use the algorithm to design computer-security systems that the government's encryption keys couldn't unlock. By 1990, he says, as many as 30 NSA "cryptomathematicians" and other employees were working to perfect the algorithm and other features. A year later, the NSA launched what it called the Capstone Project to build the algorithm into a computer chip. The NSA contracted with Mykotronx Inc., a small company in Torrance, Calif., to do much of the development. By September 1992, the NSA was confident the system would work. None too early for the NSA. Earlier that year, Mr. Brooks says, American Telephone & Telegraph Co. informed the NSA that it wanted to sell a phone using a popular encryption technology to scramble conversations. The NSA balked. "We said it probably wouldn't get an export license from this country," Mr. Brooks says. Instead, AT&T was told of the Capstone work and agreed to use the technology if it became a federal standard and was exportable, he says. The NSA then took some of the functions of the Capstone chip and tailored it to phone equipment, calling the resulting product the Clipper Chip. For computers, Capstone was encased on a computer card that became known as Tessera. The the Bush administration, enmeshed in a re-election bid, never pushed Capstone. So shortly after the election, National-security heavyweights importuned the Clinton transition team to move quickly on Capstone. Just weeks after the inauguration, the new administration's national-security team was debating the NSA proposal and in April announced to the public that it would adopt the scheme. Last month, the administration gave the final go-ahead --- despite withering criticism from industry. Vice President Gore called encryption a "law and order issue." NIST's Mr. Kammer says the new administration was also trying to line up backing among national-security officials to liberalize export controls on computer equipment and other high-tech gear. The high-tech industry was stunned at the decision. David Peyton, vice president of the Information Technology Association of America, a trade group of computer companies, says the scheme will dangerously centralize power in the federal government and will limit exports. James Bidzos, president of a computer-security firm, RSA Data Security Inc., goes further. He posted a letter on the Internet computer network arguing that Clipper may be the "visible portion of a large-scale covert operation on U.S. soil by NSA." Nonsense, responds Mr. Brooks, who says he is distressed by the "emotionalism" of the arguments. "The only reason we're involved is that we have the best cryptomathematicians in the country." --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Ames/clipper compromised?
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

sommerfeld(a)orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld) : >BTW, my guess at the most likely back door is that the unit keys will >be generated as a cryptographic function of the serial number and a >*small* random number generated for each chip and unknown to the >agency. They would have to search a mere 2**16..2**32 keys once they >get the serial number out of the LEEF. The existance of such a >backdoor would be difficult to prove, since there would be no visible >evidence for it in the individual chips. It is also difficult to >disprove such a theory because the clipper key generation algorithms >are classified. I just read a paper that might apply to this type of backdoor; it was by someone at RSA, with the title "..RSA's trapdoor can be broken". I'll look the article up when I get home. Basically, it argued that the smaller keyspace generation approach used above would be detectable. I think it might be generally applicable. I'll look it up again. mt Matt Thomlinson Say no to the Wiretap Chip! University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Internet: phantom(a)u.washington.edu phone: (206) 548-9804 PGP 2.2 key available via email or finger phantom(a)hardy.u.washington.edu

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by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know of a utility to crack Lotus 123 files? Someone's lost their password. I believe 123's encryption is very primitive... Ideally the utility should be ftp-able. Thanks ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "What is civilisation rishab(a)doe.ernet.in, rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in but a ribonucleic Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 hangover?" H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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