December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

cowen(a)glia.biostr.washington.edu: though joe 6-pack might not vote, and likely won't even understand about the crypto of it all. he would understand the police listening in on his conversations with jill 6-pack. and not like it to well. i do think The police can listen in anyway... In fact, so can anyone. And it's much easier for the police to listen in now, than it will be after Clipper. Joe 6-pack may not really worry about Clipper. In fact, Joe 6-pack may even be persuaded by Dr. Denning that Clipper will only be bad for criminals. As much of the public does not necessarily share our objection to Clipper, which is a matter of *principle*, really. The only people who might be adversely affected by Clipper *in practice* are those who are lulled into a sense of false security that Clipperphones are secure, when they're not. Joe 6-pack is not even likely to *buy* a Clipperphone, he's quite happy talking to Jill over plaintext lines, and hasn't yet raised a furour over the LE right to (after 'due procedure') listen in to the *plaintext* lines. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "What is civilisation rishab(a)doe.ernet.in, rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in but a ribonucleic Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 hangover?" H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA -----------------------------------------------------------------------

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No Subject
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich > Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of > phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. > When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." Reminds me of the hilarious "How to lie with statistics". What 1000 Americans? The sort who read Time magazine? These are probably much more likely to be against Clipper anyway. Any Joe 6-packs? Probably not. "When informed" - what, and how was the information presented? Clipper can be described as an NSA plot to listen in to everyone. Or a measure against drug dealers and mafia that happens to provide more privacy to everyone using ordinary phones at the moment. It's not a good idea to take this debate to the ordinary public. The Congress, yes, Time readers, yes, but not Joe 6-pack, who quite happily gave up his gun is not likely to be concerned about principles of privacy. Particularly as an open debate could easily swing towards, and focus on, possible and current misuses of crypto technology, rather than any benefits. Joe is not as untrusting of governments as cpunks are, nor is he likely to appreciate digicash, anon posting or the Blacknet article. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "What is civilisation rishab(a)doe.ernet.in, rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in but a ribonucleic Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 hangover?" H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA -----------------------------------------------------------------------

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mo money woe
by Mark Hittinger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> G writes: >But the fact is, people can strip a bill down and *look* at these things >for themselves. I seriously doubt any such technology would remain >invisible to some lab hack who in an idle moment put it under his SEM >for a quick peek. (*any* school that fabs its own ICs could do it >trivially in seconds.) > Then anonymous writes: > On a slightly related topic, I know of an instance where the > Secret Service located a stolen color copier with somewhat > greater speed than one might have expected. > >Is it possible that these machines either: >(1) contain transponders >or >(2) hide a "signature" in their output ??? I was watching CNBC today and saw that some european banks were having trouble with counterfeit 100 dollar bills. They are calling them "super bills" because they only seemed to have three minor flaws that most experts would not detect. They said that a magnifying glass would not be enough to detect these flaws. Cut to your friendly secret service guy looking at two 100 dollar bills under a microscope. The SS said that they would figure out who was doing it and bust them. The guy actually had a smirk on his face. I suppose the quality of the work is so good; that alone narrows down the field of possibilities. The interpol was speculating that over 1 billion of these superbills were now in circulation. Wow. And I figured the US government was going to drive the dollar into oblivion all by itself! Perhaps they will have help along the way. Perhaps people may be driven to Sandy's (et al) digital cash simply because the technology to counterfeit paper cash is becoming more reliable and available with each passing day. It would be one of those weird things that happen if people were driven to bin-bucks not because of the desire for anonymity - but rather the desire to maintain money's store of value function. Gold coins are looking better every day. Superbills - gimme a break. --------- I'd like a 250 Mhz 128 bit hybrid processor with 64 meg of 8 way interleaved memory, a 10 megabyte per second i/o channel, two 3 gig hard disks, two dat drives with compression, and a large diet coke. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAiz4FWMAAAEEALBCb7HZS7V4gbsp9yJ7Yty49jQ9wcgRhkLjNNgdyJbrJZCq 5/sv4Ljy/4AhVhjlJyZS8L3owS8l0ClZVzWw4/kO3KN7MPz4YPPR7+qIlPQVM0yv gWpJ43EZZ8b8cvAkE9HATCKWktY2ReRSX5DLnScDH/n5jivw+MD/UO8fURCVAAUR tCBNYXJrIEhpdHRpbmdlciA8YnVnc0BuZXRzeXMuY29tPg== =VbKi -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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brainstorming on cpunks' eve
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As is mentioned in tims' latest Rant(tm), I've been working on ideas for creating other cypherpunk services that would be possible to deply to the net. I've come up with a few, but they are of dubious quality. I'm hoping that by posting ideas I know are flawed/of little use that followup disscussion might refine them. We saw a use for remailers -- to gain a certain anonymity not present in cyberspace. How about information drops? How about digital cash drops (alt.cash.drop anyone?) I know digicash isn't the rage, and such a group would probably do zero good for some time, but I'd like to start talking about the ideas. With payments in digicash, you could supply a public key (newly created, of course). After the cash is generated/remitted by the other party, it would be encrypted and posted to the group. Noone could use the cash as it sat there, since they can't unwrap the cash. (I like to think of it as dropping the cash in a sealed envelope). I'm trying to think of both uses and problems this exhibits. Lots of extra "session keys" is the only drawback I see. Other possible net services: random number services, which don't keep logs of the numbers it produces -- have it spit a statistically-correct random stream each time a port is opened? Would this be that useful? Also, one could set up a hashing/signing service, more akin to a time stamp service. Mail would be sent to your service, which would attach the output of 'date' to the bottom of the msg and then +clearsig it. I'm thinking that chains of two or maybe three reliable machines should be used, since all it takes to break this is to change the clock on the machine you're signing with. With a few (>1) machines, it becomes very clear that the message was sent at a certain time. Perhaps this could be used in the future for "Registered Mail" type exchanges, or perhaps as part of a "Digital Notary" system? As for our media coverage, I'm happy with it so far. I'm willing to bet digicash that we'll see _television_ coverage re: clipper in the next few months. EFF, among others, should be working on that; we've already been able to get the word out via newspapers/magazines and radio. I wouldn't be at all suprised to see a blip on 20/20 or maybe a 15-second spot by Tom Jennings & co. before July. And projects! I'm currently in the middle of finals, but I'm looking forward to getting back to work on the things that _really_ matter. I was wondering what people were thinking about putting together a page for WWW? Would it be useful? Would people browsing around look at it and would it be a medium to disseminate info? Maybe divide it up... RSA, DES, IDEA, 3-DES, etc. Clipper, Capstone, Skipjack, Tessera PGP, stego programs available, RIPEM, etc. EFF, CPSR, Cypherpunks---- |media coverage |remailers |stego |voice pgp |clipper projects-FOIAs, bigbro inside, etc. other sources of info: sci.crypt, alt.pgp, alt.whistleblowers, alt. privacy, alt.security. Ideas and suggestions appreciated. mt Matt Thomlinson Say no to the Wiretap Chip! University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Internet: phantom(a)u.washington.edu phone: (206) 548-9804 PGP 2.2 key available via email or finger phantom(a)hardy.u.washington.edu

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Seattle Cypherpunks Physical Meeting
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

When: Tomorrow, March 11, 1pm. Where: Espresso-Roma Cafe, University Way and ~42nd; University District. Since we haven't been able to secure a site where we can use MBONE, we'll be conducting a first physical meeting in a coffee shop. We'll be discussing possible options for next month's meeting tomorrow. Bring questions, topics of conversation, etc. Hope to see you there -- Contact me or blanc for more info: blancw(a)microsoft.com. ---- Also, we're thinking of setting up a cypherpunks-seattle list. Let me know if you'd like to be included. mt Matt Thomlinson Say no to the Wiretap Chip! University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Internet: phantom(a)u.washington.edu phone: (206) 548-9804 PGP 2.2 key available via email or finger phantom(a)hardy.u.washington.edu

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Re: The Coming Police State
by geoffw＠nexsys.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A VIRUS program and a WORM are two different kinds of programs. THEY ARE NOT EQUIVILENT. For more clarification may I suggest "Compuyter's under Attack" by Denning.

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Re: MAIL and Coming Police State
by mcb＠remarque.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Karl Barrus writes: > I mention this because I have asked and been told repeatedly by an > attorney friend of mine that running a remailer on a system where you > don't have authorization to do so is a violation of the ECPA. (i.e. > access beyond what the system administration intends for you to have). I would be interested in what legal research your attorney friend engaged in in order to come to this conclusion. Possibly it would be a violation if running a remailer was specifically prohibited by the operator (though this sounds more like a contract problem than an ECPA one), but I don't see anything in ECPA that would require affirmative authorization in order to do so. There is plenty of language about unauthorized access to others' communications, but it seems to me that in the case of a remailer you (the remailer operator) are authorized access to the communication BY THE SENDER for the limited purpose of re-sending. Holding this to be a violation is also particularly silly since it would make unlawful the doing of something by instrumentality of software an act which can easily be done (and was done, before the current era of software remailers) by hand. One would solicit for messages to be remailed, receive them normally in your mailbox, manually remove the headers and signature lines, then send them out again to a destination specified by the sender (possibly via out-of-band communication). This has gone on for year on mailing lists and Usenet groups. The example that comes to mind is soc.motss, where several posters offered to repost anonymous or pseudonymous messages for people who were not out of the closet, or would be embarrassed by gay-themed postings from their work or school account. -- Michael C. Berch mcb(a)postmodern.com / mcb(a)net.bio.net / mcb(a)remarque.berkeley.edu

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Re: Seattle Cypherpunks Physical Meeting
by joshua geller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

anyone else in the la area? josh

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Re: The Agency Whose Name May Not Be Spoken
by freeman＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim may darkly hints: > I have reason to > believe an economic espionage unit has been in existence for many > years, deriving from the Economic Warfare Unit in World War II. I hope he is waiting for someone to ask him to elaborate, because I expect several people will do just that... -- Jay Freeman

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Spy Satellites For Sale
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times Friday, March 11, 1994, p. A1 U.S. TO ALLOW SALE OF THE TECHNOLOGY FOR SPY SATELLITES ------------------------- Profit vs. Security Issue ------------------------- Marketing to Private Customers Assailed by Some Who Fear Use by Hostile Nations ------------------------- by Edmund L. Andrews Washington, March 10 -- The Clinton Administration announced today that it would allow companies to market sophisticated spy satellite technology to commercial customers around the world. The decision marks a big change from the comparatively strict limits now imposed on satellite-imaging systems, and it caps more than a year of intense debate among the Commerce Department, the Pentagon and Government intelligence agencies. The move, which could attract new business worth hundreds of millions of dollars to American industry, also marks one of the clearest examples so far of the Administration's intention to emphasize commercial and economic priorities over more traditional cold war-era concerns about national security. Change Raises Concern Some security experts questioned the decision to allow wider access to a technology that has been described as one of the most powerful tools in America's espionage arsenal. But others said the technology was already becoming available in other countries and that American companies should be allowed to profit from the trend. Under the new policy, American companies will be allowed to build and operate for-profit satellite systems that are powerful enough to take photographs from 22,300 miles above the earth and depict objects on the ground as small as one square yard, smaller than a subcompact car or a hot-dog stand. Several American companies, among them the Lockheed Corporation, are hoping to set up satellite imaging services for customers around the world. As envisioned by Lockheed, customers would be able to transmit instructions directly to the satellite, which would turn its cameras to the desired location and then beam the images back to the ground. Such customers might include oil and mining companies and environmental researchers. 'A New Era' Administration officials said that companies would also have greater freedom to export entire satellite systems to foreign countries, though such sales will still require approval from the State Department. "This is 1994," David J. Barram, Deputy Secretary of Commerce, said in an interview today. "This is a new era. We believe national security and economic security are intertwined. In order to have national security, you have to have vibrant and competitive industries that are allowed to do what they do best." But some experts warned that the decision could severely compromise national security by letting hostile countries use America's own spy technology to obtain detailed images of sensitive military installations in the United States or to plan military activities elsewhere in the world. "The main customers for these systems will be the intelligence agencies of other countries," predicted John Pike, director of space policy at the Federation of American Scientists, a nonprofit group devoted to science and public policy. "They have fairly strong safeguards here. But in practice it is going to be difficult to prevent North Korea or Iraq from using a front company to gain spy satellite photos in the same way they acquired nuclear and chemical missile technology." Numerous companies already market commercial satellite images, which can be used for mapping, geologic surveys and even agricultural purposes, like remote monitoring of cattle herds. But currently, the most sophisticated of these services is offered by Spot Image, a French company, and it cannot produce photographs showing land areas smaller than about 10 yards in diameter. And while the Spot system is being upgraded, it will still be unable to view areas smaller than five yards. Lockheed and other American companies have been arguing for permission to operate systems that could depict objects about a square yard in size, a request that had been resisted by the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency. Growing Market Despite the agencies' concerns, Administration officials said today that they fully intended to approve requests like those of Lockheed, and went on to argue that the higher-resolution images are essential if any significant commercial market is to be formed. The Commerce Department says that remote-sensing services, as they are known, currently make up a $400 million market worldwide; the market is expected to grow to about $2 billion by the year 2000. Besides Lockheed, two other American companies have sought permission to operate high-resolution satellite-imaging services. One is the Orbital Sciences Corporation, a small rocket and satellite company based in Dulles, VA. The other is World View Inc., a start-up company in Livermore, Calif. Administration officials said that while the companies intended to adopt the precise technology that has long been used on Government spy satellites, the new policy included a number of safeguards to prevent the technology from falling into the wrong hands. As happens now, the Commerce Department must still approve each application to operate a commercial satellite surveillance system or to sell such a system within the United States -- or to market the services around the world. Sales of such equipment outside the country, however, will be subject to the export-control procedures already in place for products that have military applications, which means that each sale must be approved by the State Department and that sales to hostile countries will likely be blocked. But under the new policy, the Government would be much more likely to approve spy satellite exports. Right to Decode To prevent the misuse of satellite data sold by the new commercial services, the Government said that the companies would have to maintain a record of every job the satellite had been instructed to carry out. Moreover, the satellites cannot scramble their transmissions with coding technology that the Government cannot decipher. An oil company could protect its business secrets -- for example, by transmitting its exploration photos in scrambled form -- but the Government would have the right to decode them. In addition, the new policy leaves room for the Government to shut down a satellite system during what an Administration statement described as "periods when national security or international obligations and/or foreign policies may be compromised." But industry officials who supported the new policy said they had been assured by Commerce Department officials that the country would need to be in a "Persian Gulf situation" before it began shutting down systems. Executives at companies that have pressed for more liberal rules said the new policy gave them virtually everything they wanted. "We are very pleased that the Administration put together such a forward-thinking policy that allows the application of defense technology for commercial purposes," said Brian Dailey, vice president at the Washington office of Lockheed Corporation. Gilbert Rye, corporate vice president at Orbital Sciences, echoed that view. "It's an outstanding development," he said. Security Agencies Sign On Today's decision was supported, at least in public, by the Defense Department and other agencies concerned with national security issues -- despite earlier resistance. Two Central Intelligence Agency officials were present at a news briefing for reporters today, though they did not make any comments. Some longtime national security experts said the new policy made sense, given the proliferation of satellite imaging technology around the world.

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Niacin warning (was Surveillance cameras)
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: rarachel(a)prism.poly.edu (Arsen Ray Arachelian) > you can also just pop a 400mg Niacin capsule... Niacin will > quickly dialate all your capilaries bringing lots of blood > to your face and making you look like a lobster. > > That should mess up any scan... so if you're a wanted > crook in an airport that uses ir-face biometrics, just > pop niacins like them were pop-corn. :-) I just want to warn anyone who is thinking of trying this that 400 mg is not the place to start with niacin. The flushing will be extremely intense at that level and you will probably either think you are dying or wish you were. Try 50 or 100 mg to start with. You do build up a tolerance to this effect of niacin pretty fast so experienced users will need higher doses to get the flushing. But for a non-user lower doses are adequate. Hal

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Re: Spy Satellites For Sale
by joshua geller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

so (to ask the obvious question) what is to prevent a foreign concern from using cryptography that US intelligence cannot decipher? these people are stupid. josh

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RE: The Agency Whose Name May Not Be Spoken
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message Fri, 11 Mar 1994 11:10:15 -0800 (PST), tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes: > Makes you wonder what TLAs are still largely unknown to the public. There are probably a fair number of obscure ones. Two that I know aren't often talked about are: DCA - Defense Communications Agency - responsible for DoD communication, MilNet, STU-III encrypted phones, and assorted odds and ends. DIA - Defense Intellegence Agency - DoD's own personal CIA. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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RE: 2nd CJ update
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message Fri, 11 Mar 1994 10:17:52 -0800, Phil Karn <karn(a)unix.ka9q.ampr.org> writes: > PS. Does anybody consider it odd that someone from the NSA would actually > identify themselves as such? Not anymore. Both CIA and NSA have recently (past few years) had "open" employees and contractors who can admit where they work. Some can even admit general information about what they do, such as "I'm a SyBase DBA in the administrative organization." In the olden days, the same minor "spooks" would simply tell you they worked "for the government" or "for DoD" So the old "If I tell you I have to kill you" line is left to Maxwell Smart. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Ride to either Cypherpunks meeting or to Kindness
by crunch＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is anyone living in Marin or SF planning to go down to the Cypherpunks meeting this afternoon. If so, I would like a ride. Please Email me or phone me at 415-381-5847. If not, then is anyone planning to go to "Kindness" this evening. I would at least like to go to that... John D.

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Heavy remailer traffic source?
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For the last day or two I have been getting several dozen messages (67 today, a similar number yesterday) similar to the following: > From remail(a)infinity.hip.berkeley.edu Sat Mar 12 00:10:07 1994 > Date: Sat, 12 Mar 94 00:05 PST > To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > From: nobody(a)infinity.hip.berkeley.edu > Remailed-By: Remailer <remail(a)infinity.hip.berkeley.edu> > Complaints-To: Sameer <sameer(a)soda.berkeley.edu> > Anon-To: remailer(a)entropy.linet.org > Anon-To: remailer(a)entropy.linet.org > Anon-To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > Anon-To: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu > Anon-To: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu > Anon-To: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu > Anon-To: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu > Anon-To: remailer(a)entropy.linet.org > Anon-To: remailer(a)utter.dis.org > Anon-To: remailer(a)rebma.mn.org > Anon-To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > Anon-To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > Anon-To: remailer(a)utter.dis.org > Anon-To: remail(a)infinity.hip.berkeley.edu > Status: R > > ## > Do-Inject: Yes > > -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- > Version: 2.3a > > rQeAYgVzdGRpbgAAAADCSE/UHZnlLco5W9yVWyw5M8XSD7rLnZFAd9IlwX5W2zkM > [...] > MEBR2/p7L6XuKfGQG38t4K4o7J8YbWNPDQ8qP4YeMBAg3Tvzl5tyTWN9/NN7NfCJ > fR3k > =ypSB > -----END PGP MESSAGE----- The "PGP" message appears to be just an ascii-armoring of random bytes. Is this an attempt by someone to provide the "masking" remailer traffic we have been discussing for some time? This is OK, but I think the volume is too high. What is the Do-Inject: header intended to accomplish? The message apparently is intended to provide multiple remailing addresses per message. However, my remailer only does one remail address per message. Also, my remailer does not accept "Anon-To" but only "Request-Remailing-To". So all these messages are ending up in my mail box. Anyone want to explain these? Hal

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Re: MAIL and Coming Police State
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Karl Barrus writes: >> I mention this because I have asked and been told repeatedly by an >> attorney friend of mine that running a remailer on a system where you >> don't have authorization to do so is a violation of the ECPA. (i.e. >> access beyond what the system administration intends for you to have). >I would be interested in what legal research your attorney friend >engaged in in order to come to this conclusion. Possibly it would be a Sure. The attorney is Ed Cavazos (polekat(a)well.sf.ca.us) - I met him first as a user on his BBS (Bamboo Gardens, WWIVnet, now in Houston after years in Austin) where he runs Modem/BBSLaw net, and then in person a few times at EFH (Electronic Frontiers Houston) meetings or events. He was involved in the Steve Jackson vs. Secret Service case, not as lead attorney, but as an assistant. Since this is the only case involving the ECPA to hit the courts and he was in on it, I'm going to have to go with his judgement, unless somebody can argue super persuasively (and preferably convince him too!) As a side note at the last EFH event, we had about 50 people in a room talking about the Clipper Chip and its cons - people that stayed after his talk on legal issues in cyberspace. Anyway, I've asked him several times about the legality of remailers, and during his last talk he addressed them, again ;). Like a fool, I didn't take notes, but from what I remember, the ECPA: * forbids others reading private communications * makes it a crime to attempt unauthorized access on a system with private communication facilities (i.e. email) * forbids you from access above/beyond what the system intended for you I think there is one more thing that goes along with the ECPA, but I can't remember. I will email polekat and ask again, hopefully in a few days or so he'll be able to get back to me. Again, this is all from memory. Anyway, the last one is the key. It says the even if you are a legit user, the following are still illegal: * you find a way to defeat security * you read files that you aren't supposed to, even if the permissions let you * you run programs or use the system in any way that the system administration didn't intend for you (i.e. you run crack all the time or you run a remailer) Now, I was careful to make a distinction: running a remailer on a current account, and running one on an old account. (Because the four remailers I used to run were on old account of mine when I was a student at UH. Now I am at Rice, and Ed said it is DEFINITELY a violation to run a remailer on an account you aren't even supposed to have anymore) But, he said that even running one on a current account is a violation unless you have permission. I mean, I don't mean to scare anybody or spread FUD - for example I am not out of the remailer business ;) it's just the next one I set up will be with the approval/blessing/whatever of the system administration! > violation if running a remailer was specifically prohibited by the > operator (though this sounds more like a contract problem than an ECPA Well, the way it is prohibited here at Rice is by a policy which forbids sending mail to any unauthorized or nonstandard program. Stuff like filter, procmail, slocal (if MH were on owlnet ;) would be allowed, but definitely not a remailer. > Holding this to be a violation is also particularly silly since it > would make unlawful the doing of something by instrumentality of > software an act which can easily be done (and was done, before the > current era of software remailers) by hand. One would solicit for Yeah, but by this logic why is it illegal to export cryptographic software when you can print it and mail it anywhere you please? Silly, yet illegal. Karl Barrus <klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLYH9GoOA7OpLWtYzAQE1cQP+MvYFldT0fkfMa66vz8bdj3eqwleuKohb VJzmBZolS2ki0D/Wz01BkCxyhUj4ENLCT1zr6C+mWw7cFhyx+MuTnKKOWPWyiTp7 9NgkyjYhqw66jCIXvP/s828sY831OhcBe7iZTjcuvGTPuPzbuV04J7Exj1DYPfp5 WeGl0kZ5+dE= =i4en -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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New member
by Gordon Joly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Me, that is... just in from the cold. Gordon Joly Phone +44 71 380 7934 FAX +44 71 387 1397 Email: G.Joly(a)cs.ucl.ac.uk UUCP: ...!{uunet,uknet}!ucl-cs!G.Joly Comp Sci, University College, London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT & mice-nsc(a)cs.ucl.ac.uk & http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/mice/gjoly.html &

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WARES - "Terminate Clipper" t-shirt (fwd)
by Arthur Chandler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Got this from another group. I haven't ordered the shirt, so can't say yea or nay about it, but thought folks here might be interested. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 11 Mar 1994 09:41:24 -0500 From: CountMind0 <mgardbe(a)ANDY.BGSU.EDU> To: Multiple recipients of list FUTUREC <FUTUREC(a)UAFSYSB.UARK.EDU> Subject: WARES - "Terminate Clipper" t-shirt (fwd) ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 09 Mar 94 22:29:15 EST From: FringeWare Inc <fringeware(a)IO.COM> To: mgardbe(a)andy.bgsu.edu Subject: WARES - "Terminate Clipper" t-shirt Sent from: sethross(a)aol.com i just got this really cool t-shirt from this place in Seattle... It's black and it says don't give BIG BROTHER THE MASTER KEY <image> TERMINATE CLIPPER NOW It has a pretty cool multi-colored image of a skeleton key on a chip..,,.. and some other stuff here's the rest of the info.... "...Snail mail orders to: Paul Clark PO Box 59152 Renton, WA 98058 Email COD orders at iplus1hope(a)aol.com $10 by check, $12 COD, black, XL only, 100% cotton heavyweight" ----- It's pretty a cool shirt; the guy is a pretty wild artist on the outskirts of Seattle. I sent him my address on email and he shipped it c.o.d. about a week after i I ordered it i wore it around today...it's pretty sad how many people don't know wha t's going on sethross(a)aol.com

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PowerMacPGP
by fhalper＠pilot.njin.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know if Mr. Zimmerman or anyone else will be writing a Power Macint -osh PGP porgram. What about the other popular encryption programs. Thanks, Reuben Halper -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3 mQCPAi16KosAAAEEAMUwRni4a9+GbuAhHDLcBWK60hCJUYxhr2hYokpELAhx0ejp 2fq61Tu9Hjn051CN8Xy5nu6sv2ODfG/t59l4DJSb5pirQaII3zaX0rMX0ydwGDoW YakL4ow1lNY+d/k14KpIuUW404+fNuNhIGSkdVLQIfbOgh0preK7/P44AKvdABEB AAG0JlJldWJlbiBIYWxwZXIgPGZoYWxwZXJAcGlsb3Qubmppbi5uZXQ+iQCVAgUQ LXorceK7/P44AKvdAQEUxwQAoffTibRlwE5tNQVGvrulh1OQgXNhTRec9vUaUwPy U64FIZ+KnmdfYgiJYXtcItA90EB9MDexazKeqJzMOPShVNOfyiwy2yUlnQs425f8 DxBvM//zuvj6s4/mXDTPUZtG9PP0HVaEGTJY15JdfRqtj/w+HHnsHlgCnj0NnIhX TW8= =D9UX -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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add cypherpunks
by an62213＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Clipper Cracks Appear
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Seeing as it is politics week here at cpunks, I have found some interesting comments from our friends at whitehouse.gov. Commentary by John Carey in BusinessWeek Magazine (Big Brother Could Hobble High Tech, 3/24/94 pg. 37) states that: So why is the Whitehouse pushing the retrograde notions? One reason is the Clintonites fear of appearing soft on crime and terrorism. "No one wants the head of the FBI walking around saying: 'I don't have the tools to do my job'" says Bellsouth's Markey. Things aren't entirely bleak. The administration, taken aback by vehement opposition from industry, congress and civil libertarians, is suggesting it may back off. "People are willing to work things out" says White House Staff secretary John D. Podesta, who is involved in technology issues. FBI director Freeh says he's willing to accept higher hurdles to get court appointed surveilence. And there are tantalizing hints that the white house is reconsidering its hard line on the clipper chip. <end> Seems that we are having an effect and cracks are starting to leak compromise from the Gov't. This is, however, just the beginning. A ploy used successfully by many groups (New York city's transit authority are masters at this) is to put forth an outrageous proposal, such as clipper etc. Then they soften the demands so that the opponent becomes disarmed, allowing that which the Gov't had intended to pass all along to go through as a compromise. This cannot be allowed. Time to step up the attack a notch. Write the whitehouse and ask them if they want to go down in history as the presidency that ushered in the era of Big Brother. I know Bill won't read it but someone has to. Keep on your congresscritters (I like that word) and put stuff in your local paper. Arm the populace. Lastly, I think many of you are giving this countries people less credit than they deserve. Many simple men and women founded this country. Try not to be so pompous. Scott G. Morham !The First, Vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu ! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLYJyUz2paOMjHHAhAQEbCgP/XobypXWta9OBbOAXePNWY7zznS6HHnxS 4fb7MWKlSjRxe283D2oWV0PnNttMLfAcEOknWT8l9/Z8Ef/RUNMo2vRENToE65If oVoUh/lne+PgVpiyT8+oXc8QSFe+8qWJBNL6L1T5YMpghDYYX7bpCn07dCsUQSIb gFItcKbPp8o= =4HsY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Voice encryption
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like someone with enough technical background to design and build a prototype IDEA/DES/RSA device suitable for voice encryption using modular phone jacks and plugs. The prototype and what is learned in the process of designing and manfacturing it, will be used to conduct a feasibility study on the manufacture and marketing of such devices. -uni- (Dark)

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No Subject
by qjones＠infi.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why not beam a time-delayed virus into one of NSA's arrays, destruct code armed and ready to go?? wayne -- **************************************************************************** * Qjones(a)infi.net So I'm a dog...what else is new? * * Qjones(a)larry.wyvern.com Quote from life and times of a man * ****************************************************************************

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Voice encryption
by peace＠BIX.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Say - why is it cypherpunks instead of cipherpunks? - its hard to remember! Unicorn> I would like someone with enough technical background to design and build a prototype IDEA/DES/RSA device suitable for voice encryption using modular phone jacks and plugs. Well now, I do that for a living. It isn't exactly cheap. The phone jack would probably be to a high speed modem, 14,400 or higher. The other side would be to a E&M (4 wire) jack attached to a handset. The rest is just an AtoD and DtoA converter and amps, probably with a compander, try intel 29xx chips. This gives a 64kbps full duplex data stream that needs compressed to the modem speed, probably with LPC - linear predictive coding. The DES or IDEA would need to operate at modem speeds - full duplex. How much you want to pay? Peace

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