December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: making public keys public
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Eric Hughes writes: > > If you're not going to make the public key public, why use public key > > cryptography at all ? Save time and effort and use a symmetric cipher. > > You can't do authentication with a shared secret key, because there's > nothing to differentiate the two sides of the link. Is it really important to distinguish the two sides ? The additional threat is that an attacker could spoof my correspondent to me, once she's grabbed my secret key. But a) I thought we were assuming that other people being spoofed is _their_ problem, not ours, and b) if she's nabbed my key, odds are she's hacked my account anyway, leaving me with much larger problems. > In addition, a closely held public key might be held by 10 people; Hmm, `closely-held' suggests that the `public' key is being passed around as a secret over some channels, in which case it might as well be a secret key being passed around over those channels to the 10 people. > with secret keys there are 90 different private keys instances to > manage. Wouldn't there only be 45 ? I agree that this is quite a few, but it's a reasonable tradeoff between disk space and processing speed unless you're communicating with a large number of people. - - -L. Futplex McCarthy; PGP key by finger or server "We've got computers, we're tapping phone lines; I know that that ain't allowed" --Talking Heads - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLuLvdWf7YYibNzjpAQG0GQP9FIJkCLF4XbZEoydrVfCnHg32FGL5EQ1A 2286GqvVQuy6hwtqV888TOZmLkQpMjrmq+paTQpozu5s8L4z/L9WZbbyk0C/alMv faTwpUe1neSStR3KbrxK0BuP70OBKBbdZZfHI/t4Kn8jTimeBA/IG2Iou/8gecX2 g8d0otexmwI= =FtUZ - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLuLwpyoZzwIn1bdtAQFUfgGAsdDHynQfWLxX+cmCz9vxkzwQ0sIikuVG XCp0rwhl/C1P1HXBF2Xk135HXa7RO6kC =OnyQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: future entrapment
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>* establish a local WWW server hosting some useful information >>* configure the server to record the IP addresses of people who >> access it, and cross-reference them to obtain geographical >> locations as registered with NIC. Feed this into a GIS and >> track local accesses. >>* have a list of people who I want to nail. >>* filter all HTTP requests through a script that >> - checks the list of victims >> - if a request for a file comes in from one of the >> targets, munge the outgoing web page to include >> a <IMG SRC= ...> tag pointing to a foreign site >> carrying images deemed pornographic in my jurisdiction >> - ring the console bell >> >>As soon as someone on the hit list downloads a file, you have prima >>facie evidence that they are probably in posession of some kiddie porn. >>Instant search warrant time ... "But your Honor, I had graphics turned off for speed." "The Geheimestaat Polezi has to prove not only that I connected but that I actually got something." "Too bad my swap file is on a partition that was corrupted when the ossifers grabbed my machine." The ancient question, do you possess something if it is encoded and cannot be decoded? DCF

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RE: Date?
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Is it really Christmas eve already where you are? Hehe, you caught me fiddling with my system date to generate a 2048 bit key with PGP. Actually, if it were Christmas Eve already, that would mean that the pain of holiday shopping had already past.... ======================================================================= Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent" jcorgan(a)netcom.com -Isaac Asimov PGP Public Key: http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html Or send email to: pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.ai.mit.edu Subj: GET jcorgan ======================================================================= -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLuMiW01Diok8GKihAQFs0QP/UplPL2g2t86goL1o5xK3gkv9IM6nGeEW GCe41PX3Q4yiYkopIz+1bXe9kGYvrd9jJ0fusM9CRp+QnaiizzZxudAL7BGRlsGD 9c0jLLR9KtFmiiSQM5pgBIMEzXC3zPY+Xm+hPhV6/URx84qxrcjneOrnOJjBtjkO ekZ8ApHUhxo= =wNu9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.30.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, as well as some help on how to use them, finger remailer.help.all(a)chaos.bsu.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"vox"} = "<remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post"; $remailer{"avox"} = "<anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk pgp post"; $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"rebma"} = "<remailer(a)rebma.mn.org> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"jpunix"} = "<remailer(a)jpunix.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash"; $remailer{"soda"} = "<remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu> eric post"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"usura"} = "<usura(a)xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. hash latent cut post"; $remailer{"desert"} = "<remail(a)desert.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post"; $remailer{"nately"} = "<remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"myriad"} = "<remailer(a)myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"xs4all"} = "<remailer(a)xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<tomaz(a)flame.sinet.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)nately.ucsd.edu> cpunk hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. Last ping: Mon 5 Dec 94 6:00:01 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- xs4all remailer(a)xs4all.nl ++##******+* 7:31 99.99% usura usura(a)xs4all.nl ++##******-* 13:31 99.99% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu +##**-*+*+** 11:24 99.99% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi +++++++++*** 1:00:13 99.99% c2 remail(a)c2.org +****-++++-- 37:40 99.96% flame tomaz(a)flame.sinet.org ***#***+*++* 8:43 99.92% nately remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu ++++++++++++ 44:54 99.92% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ###*-****** 6:46 99.85% jpunix remailer(a)jpunix.com ###****+*++* 8:11 99.83% vox remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl .-.-------- 10:32:31 99.99% desert remail(a)desert.xs4all.nl ----------- 8:03:49 99.99% myriad remailer(a)myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu ###*****+** 5:11 99.70% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ###**** **** 4:32 99.37% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu #*.# ** *+-* 50:33 99.05% mix mixmaster(a)nately.ucsd.edu -+-+- 59:51 98.94% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com ###**** *** 8:21 98.77% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com +---.--+++ 3:59:21 98.42% rebma remailer(a)rebma.mn.org -_.--..*-.. 22:38:33 98.13% soda remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu -....-. 12:55:27 86.22% For more info: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). Options and features cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. oldpgp Remailer does not like messages encoded with MIT PGP 2.6. Other versions of PGP, including 2.3a and 2.6ui, work fine. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. ek Encrypt responses in relpy blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. Comments and suggestions welcome! Raph Levien

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cypher bickering
by William A. Kennedy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

internet: kenned09(a)ssw.alcoa.com I am a relatively new member to this list. There is so much potential for great discussion because the topic is technically challenging and politically sensative. That's why it is extremely frustrating to see the list contributors, and it's moderator getting all tied up in their collective underwear over whether or not the moderator can and/or force people to affix a digital signature to every posting. What's worse, they seem to stay up through the night just to bicker about it. In the paper world, I send out many things that I don't sign. I don't sign them because it is of no significance that it be proven that I sent it. It also might be that the information is of such a general nature that it makes no neverminds who sent it. I submit that digital signatures are the same way. But, as Tim May proposed, it could be the "secret-decoder-ring" phenomenon at work. By digitally signing all of our postings we prove that we are committed members of the "cause." But to whom are we proving our dedication. We would be demonstrating it to people who, by nature of their own interest in this list, are already committed. Oh, but wait a minute. Maybe we're afraid that people who don't even own digital signature software, are posting there ideas on our favorite subject. Isn't the posting of any ideas on cryptography by anyone more important than who's doing the posting?

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crypto, why not catching on?
by William A. Kennedy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

internet: kennned09(a)ssw.alcoa.com This is a response to Tim May's well-thought-out piece on "why cryptography has not caught on." I think cryptography _has_ caught on. There are people in the crypto debate now that weren't there two years ago; perhaps even one. I think we should not measure the commitment to the cryptography debate buy counting the amount of encrypted traffic . There just isn't that much that people send that needs to be encrypted. Our debate should, and does, focus on the rights of people to have the technical tools to insure the privacy of messages and other communication that they deem to be worthy of special handling. Thanks to people like Phil Zimmermann and Romana Michado, and many others I'm sure that I don't even know about, we have those technical tools and should now be fighting for the right to use them. Interestingly enough, I sent a message to Phil and got a response from his vacation program. In it he tells us that, if we think that our message to him needs to be encrypted, then please allow more time to get it read.

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;-) The definitive argument for e$: tainted cash
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fun Facts to Know and Tell About *Your* Legal Tender... > >From the August 1993 American Bar Association Journal >> >> > >> >"The mere presence of trace amounts of cocaine on a common object ... >> > is insufficient to support a felony conviction of cocaine." Lord v. >> > Florida, 91-2147. >> > >> >"[T]he evidence of the narcotic-trained dog's alert to [tainted] currency >> > is of extremely little probative weight. . . . It cannot be doubted >>that >> > contaminated currency is widespread. The presence of trace narcotics on >> > currency does not yield any relevant information whatsoever about the >> > currency's history." US District Court Judge Thomas Wiseman of >>Nashville, >> > Jones v. DEA, No. 3:91-0520 (April 21, 1993). >> > >> >"The probability that every single person in the United States is >> > carrying drug-tainted money is almost certain." -- Dr. James Woodford, >> > forensic chemist in Atlanta. Woodford cites a 1989 experiment by Miami >> > toxicologist Dr. William Hearn, who gathered 135 dollar bills from banks >> > in twelve cities. 131 had traces of cocaine. >> > >> >It also cites a 1985 study by the Miami Herald, which asked eleven >>prominent >> >local citizens to supply a $20 bill for testing, including the Catholic >> >archbishop, George Bush's son Jeb, and Janet Reno. Ten out of the eleven >> >bills had traces of cocaine. >> > >> >Finally, there's a reference to an until-now secret 1987 DEA study >>showing >> >that 1/3 of the money at the Federal Reserve Building in Chicago was >> >tainted with cocaine. It's thought that cocaine is transferred from some >> >bills to agencies' high-speed sorting equipment [...] Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: Oceania?
by cactus＠seabsd.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199412050839.AAA11133(a)netcom18.netcom.com>, Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)netcom.com> wrote: >I won't say it's a scam, but a lot of people think it is/was. I >thought it had died some months back, when all posts (of which there >had previously been many) suddnly stopped. They've resumed. The partners had a falling out of some sort, and the "Eric Klein" one has progressed. The Oceania posts for the last n months can be read via NNTP from nntp.hks.net, newsgroup hks.lists.oceania. >The idea of soliciting "contributions" to fund some kind of seagoing >barge, sinkable with a single torpedo (anonymous delivered, easily >enough), is crazy. They're getting more productive than that. The current plan is that they're trying to help launch a business that designs and builds sea structures. They've got some pretty good ideas, and are focusing now more on the idea of producing small tangible results that may one day build to their desired goal. I'm still skeptical as to their chances for success, though, but if enough people with some pragmatic sense get sucked in, there is a chance... - -- Todd Masco | "Roam home to a dome, Where Georgian and Gothic once stood cactus(a)hks.net | Now chemical bonds alone guard our blond(e)s, cactus(a)bb.com | And even the plumbing looks good." - B Fuller - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLuNSlSoZzwIn1bdtAQGNYQF5AUBTWMAkeujdopRa2d5tBDUfdzoO/6Cm AE/U82Juo0LdWcs2eadBL5kFQ+DjIHKl =2dCz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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PGP on a VAX
by peace＠BIX.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ViaCrypt PGP is now running on a VAX. It will be released after all quality control is complete, in about 2 weeks.

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Re: Oceania?
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>They find government by Singapore particularly comforting >because Singapore has demonstrated expertise in minimizing >the dangerous infection of freedom that accompanies >capitalism. Here's something kinda spooky. An OSF staffer doing consulting with the Singapore gov't was asking about how well the DCE security server scales. They're starting a pilot program to make, from birth, every Singaporese an entity known to their server. Based on other questions, I gather the DCE identity card will be used by all gov't services. /r$

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Re: Remailers, RSAREF for PERL
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gah! I guess Mike won't send _me_ a copy of his Perl RSA routines... Oh well, I'll wait for some courageous soul to ftp it to garbo. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "In between the breaths is rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in the space where we live" rishab(a)arbornet.org - Lawrence Durrell Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Digicash and currency markets - Economist
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alex Strasheim <alex(a)omaha.com>: (?) > Yes, it is granted that Digicash is in beta, and not polished. But > beta testing usually happens after all significant functionality is > present. The Digicash beta isn't moving real money, and that's a > significant functional deficit. So far I haven't seen much discussion on the monetary effect of e-cash. The best (and only) analysis I've seen was in last week's Economist (no, I don't work there, I'm only a fan) of which John Young (jya(a)pipeline.com) was kind enough to offer e-mail copies. I excerpt: The Economist November 26, 1994, pp. 21-23 [NO INTEREST ON E-CASH:] The more disputed aspects of electronic money's future are those that relate mainly to money's other role, as a store of value. ... If, to command confidence, electronic money had to be convertible into legal tender on demand, then for every unit of electronic money there would have to be a unit of cash reserved in the real economy ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ...which is pretty much how the fledgling CyberCash, for example, plans to operate, requiring banks working with it to hold money converted into e-cash in an escrow account. It follows that, in an efficient system, if each e-cash unit represents an immobilised unit of real cash, then positive balances of e-cash will earn no interest, ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ because the interest they might earn would be offset by the interest foregone on the real cash that is backing them. It also follows that, in such a system, there would be no purely virtual lending: for this would increase the stock of digital money without a corresponding increase in the stock of real money, and so undermine convertibility. The virtual economy in this phase of its development would be free from usury. [BYPASSING REGULATED CURRENCY MARKETS:] If you pay yen for electronic dollars in Tokyo and buy something from a merchant based in Paris who cashes them for francs, a currency conversion has taken place. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ That, however, is an activity towards which most governments feel highly defensive; and if e-cash started to bypass regulated foreign-exchange markets by developing its own grey market for settlement, then governments might be provoked into trying to clamp down on it. Probably, therefore, e-cash will, at least in its early forms, be denominated in single conventional currencies and exchanged at conventional market rates. [Which wouldn't be much fun. For example, in India it's not easy for _me_ to convert rupees into dollars; 75% of dollars I earn must be converted into rupees. Assuming DigiCash takes off; I sell copies of Electric Dreams and become an e-cash millionaire. I can then buy stuff in dollars, which according to regulations I am not supposed to have. Similar problems arise in even less tightly regulated countries. [ON A TOTALLY DIGITAL CURRENCY WITHOUT PAPER BACKING:] It is possible to imagine the development of e-cash reaching this point, and no further. But it is also possible to imagine that the temptation to move away from a fully-backed digital money would prove irresistible. Instinct argues that people will want virtual credit, and that it must therefore find a price. ...there will come a ... stage towards a single overarching monetary system in which convertibility into Legal tender ceases to be a condition for electronic money; and electronic money will thereby become indistinguishable from -- because it will be the same as -- other, more traditional sorts of money. Money will be money whether it is constituted as a string of digits or a piece of paper or an entry in a ledger. Some electronic money might be backed by governments, some by private issuers.... Ideally, the ultimate e-cash will be a currency without a country (or a currency of all countries), infinitely exchangeable without the expense and inconvenience of conversion between local denominations. It may constitute itself as a wholly new currency with its own denomination -- the "cyber-dollar", perhaps..... Either way, it is hard to imagine that the existence of an international, easy-to-use, cheap-to-process, hard-to-tax electronic money will not then force freer convertibility on traditional currencies. "We know everything about you that we need to know" - Coleta Brueck, IRS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "In between the breaths is rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in the space where we live" rishab(a)arbornet.org - Lawrence Durrell Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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(Fwd) Re: GATT and RSA
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- With Rishab's permission today I forward his answer to my query about GATT's effect on copyright of software for those of you who may want to know. Forwarding mail by: rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in (Rishab Aiyer Ghosh) on Sun, 04 Dec 11:59 PM - ------------------- Rishab writes to another poster: > >So GATT is unlikely to affect RSA. JY asked: > May I assume that your remarks above indicate that you have > details of the GATT agreement that would clarify the following > general summaries in my local rag, The New York Times (I have > not been able to obtain a final copy of the agreement): US software companies benefit because GATT enforces _copyright_ including for software. Not software patents - something totally different, which is what makes PGP 2.3 illegal in the US but not so anywhere else. Rishab - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLuNl3ioZzwIn1bdtAQG1eQF9FoWSiCdVoG7zUMnwD8oy1aCrDx+88UZY wtW29fP6+mLWl3pqC0smBebiVLmSRzme =Ph6r -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Dupes?
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This morning I seem to be getting two copies of many of the messages that have come through. Anyone else getting this? ======================================================================= Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent" jcorgan(a)netcom.com -Isaac Asimov PGP Public Key: http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html Or send email to: pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.ai.mit.edu Subj: GET jcorgan ======================================================================= -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLuNpnE1Diok8GKihAQG/tAP/WVzEfrjUkaNOubRKcBg5E+FISzYCQw7z 8Lf+TB+n+Fhm9pmghYKADIcq1UYH4xhKu71FlRAEbNVqYrgh6Rfa71h+gdWouDIg 6wcm3ZNQmVhE3zbDGFpE/hUgNm6N28/CIWIdmPLeapBjb1JXDOPM5OOQ7XlvFFe1 kvN3vZgcgyw= =osLm -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: AA BBS - Thomases are going to jail...
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We have a Problem . . . H. Keith Henson Part of the Federal Government's law enforcement mechanism is under the control of the Religious Right. By reaching out thousands of miles through cyberspace connections, the RR is using Federal power to suppress constitutionally protected activities which they find offensive. I expect the RR people involved feel that what they are doing is fair return for Federal power being used to suppress the school Christmas pageant in a thousand sleepy little towns in middle America--and less dangerous than offing abortion doctors, or killing gays. Most of you reading these groups are familiar with the AA BBS case. In a nutshell, a postal inspector in Memphis called Amateur Action BBS in California, downloaded a dozen files, ordered other stuff, shipped the sysop some unsolicited kiddy porn, then arrested the sysop (Robert Thomas) and his wife (Carleen) for kiddy porn and (by Memphis standards) obscenity. They were tried in Memphis last summer by an obviously biased court. (The judge and prosecutor made no attempt to hide their longstanding mutual admiration.) The Memphis jury found the sysop and his wife guilty of obscenity, but even they couldn't buy the kiddy porn charges, and acquitted on that charge. Friday (Dec. 2, 1994), in the worst perversion of justice I have ever witnessed, the sysop and his wife were sentenced to three years. They were lucky to get that little time. I got a look at the pre-sentencing report. (I may be able to post some of it later.) The recommended sentence included about twice this amount of time based on the kiddy porn charge they were *acquitted* of. Those reports are simply *amazing*. They cover family members and history out a generation or so in all directions, not to mention school, medical records, tax filings, and any police record--even if you were found innocent! It seems to be the function of these things to put your entire life in the worst possible light. Someone should take the form and do one for Christ just prior to the Crucifixion. It would run something like: ". . . questionable father, . . low class occupation (carpenter), . . . accused of impersonating a doctor by healing sick, . . . known to associate with low class persons, . . . travels about (vagabond), . . ." Back to the problem. I find the situation intolerable--without having a clear idea of how to deal with it. With little more effort (though a lot more skill than the postal inspector demonstrated) the RR-controlled Feds can create crime and venue problems for just about anyone running a BBS or net node. Certainly *any* system which carries alt.sex.* is subject to the same treatment by the Religious Right (in the guise of the Memphis Feds) as AA BBS. In fact, the very .gifs that were found obscene in Memphis were made "freely distribute," by Robert and have been posted *many* times to the net. Could we use economic retaliation? I won't use Federal Express any more because it and Graceland (and the cat houses near Graceland) seem to be the economic mainstays of Memphis. Unfortunately, even a very effective economic boycott is not going to have an effect on the zealots, and depressing that area further might make it an even *more* repressive backwater because the last of the intelligent/tolerant people would move out. On the other hand, economic pressures might induce the more sensible part of the community to pressure the zealots into being more tolerant (at least of people 3 time zones away!). In recent years economic pressure has induced two states to change laws. A positive sign that economic pressure might be effective is that the local newspaper did *not* support the prosecution. Research question: Why did the Memphis Feds back off after the Deep Throat trials? Is the law any help? After nearly a year of watching the process, I am *quite* pessimistic. In its own way, the court system is deeply corrupt. I think even the RR folks know this is a political case and not a criminal one. In political cases, leaving a person out on bail during appeal is normal, but in this case, it is very much in the government's interest to have Robert out of circulation so he cannot pursue the Electronic Communication Privacy Act suit and other causes of action against them in civil court. Robert's motion for bail during appeal was denied. Are there political routes? Yes, but chancy. It is possible that a political fight with the RR might backfire and result in heavy restrictions on the nets. Coming down hard on the nets would be very popular with the Administration forces after the Clipper debacle. The power of the net to organize political force must be quite worrying to those in power. (It is clear to me that modern day revolutions, anywhere in the world, and peaceful or not, would be organized through the net. In some places this has already happened.) It may be that a general cutting down on the powers of the Federal Government is in order. This has pros and cons, and support (in some areas) even from the RR. How *does* one shrink the unshrinkable? Tax revolts (in the form of massive political pressure) seem to come about when the tax rates get as high as they are now. Another possibility is that the formation of private money may greatly shrink the ability of governments everywhere to collect taxes. Should people start thinking about direct action? I hope we don't come to this! There is nothing I can think of worse than arousing the technically knowledgeable to take the infrastructure apart. Problem is that pinpoint damage (like taking the 901 area code down for a few days or weeks) is somewhere between impossible and probably impossible. (Though ATT managed to take down their entire phone network for a day with a missing "case" statement.) Your thoughts and suggestions would be appreciated. Please post encrypted through a remailer chain if you absolutely *must* post ideas about the last paragraph! S ,.

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better than Oceania
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

'punksters, Far more interesting than Oceania is the Millennial Project. It is not only in it's second revised edition, but has a very active BBS and hopes to be a list on the net soon (there looking for an assist with this so anyone who can help them out, would be appreciated) They have also had two national gatherings, and the group has numerous engineers running various planning committees, and they have downloadable spreadsheets on various aspects. It is a definate breath of fresh air from all the doomsayers out there. They also have a healthy respect for privacy and encryption. The book is available at any good bookstore. "The Millennial Project" seven easy steps to colonizing the Galaxy by Marshall Savage. Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced communication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham "Have you ever had your phones tapped by the government? YOU WILL and the company that'll bring it to you.... AT&T" --James Speth

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Re: ;-) The definitive argument for e$: tainted cash
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- FWIW: A similar experiment done here in the DFW area a few weeks ago. 4 of 11 bills tested "positive" by DEA coke-sniffing machinery. Dave Merriman -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLuN4mcVrTvyYOzAZAQHtZAQAm8b86IuL02BdGihyyuhLExkcntHZozM0 S2iYFik2c9Wl0r5O7qV5XJBRRHcUSmLNTzk6AaaNIj8C0tOKAWqj3/GzqKsC03mU exxtxt7uAr59TL4iL88mL/C4Ne89H3zqIYnTOD8r6p0oIHpOWE5XfGBON5LpTIvw UWuhsvO0VV0= =STRk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)feenix.metronet.com for PGP public key and fingerprint. PGP encrypted Email welcome, encouraged, and preferred. "Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable." John F. Kennedy

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Re: (Fwd) Re: GATT and RSA
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I want to know whether GATT will affect the export of encryption software. It seems to frown upon any barrier to trade and I think I could argue, perhaps not correctly, that if ACME in Taiwan can't buy the necessary encryption software to do business with CENTRAL in Kansas, then ACME is prevented from competing in America. BONEHEAD Inc, from North Dakota won't have to worry about foreign competition. This means that either there can be no secure international EDI standard that anyone can use to do business or there will be trade barriers to foreigners interacting with American firms. Of course, this is just a random conjecture based upon a conversation I had with Dave Banisar. Is it silly? Or sensible? I'm sure there are exemptions for military hardware, but heck, when it comes down to it food is the ultimate strategic resource. Where does crypto lie in this spectrum? Everyone knows where it lies in the eyes of the NSA. Where does it lie in other people's reality? -Peter

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Re: PGP Tools under Linux (Pr0duct Cypher)
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: Pr0duct Cypher Pr0duct Cypher writes: >I wrote: >>I am using PGPTools to handle all the crypto functions in the second >>generation remailer that I have written. All the copies of PGPTools that I >>have found seem to be set up to compile on SUN workstations only. > >That's interesting, because I developed it under Linux and MS/DOS, and there >was a lot of trouble at the beginning with it not running on big-endian >machines. It sounds like whoever "fixed" it for sparcs broke it for >little-endian machines. The original should still be on ftp.csn.net; get it >there and it should work. > >>Mixmaster is both a remailer and a front end, and therefor must run on many >>different platforms. I have been able to compile PGPTools on Linux and >>FreeBSD, but PGPTools produces invalid RSA blocks. If you (or anyone else >>reading this) have ported PGPTools to other platforms could you send me the >>source and makefile, or point me to them. If not, could you help me do it, >>the source code is a tangle, and it will take me a long time to do on my own >>(I am a brute force programer, not a C wizard). > >Get the original, test it, and post the results. > <SNIP> > - Pr0duct Cypher Ok, I grabbed second oldest version (this included a bugfix). I compiles and seems to work fine when I use it with PTD. It fails when run under Mixmaster. The failure is deep inside pgptools. When I call pgpk_findkey to get a key from a public key ring (by name not number), it chugs along checking each key id in the ring. Each time it checks a key, it uses a pair of fifo's which it then destroys. After checking the second id, when it is destroying kc (k is destroyed without problems both times), I get a segmentation violation in the line nfb=fb->next; Since kc was simply a copy of k kc=fifo_copy(k); I suspect the problem lies in fifo_copy. These are all mem fifo's. If you want to look at the source code I am playing with (with tons of debugging printfs in it) let me know and I will stick it on my ftp. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLuOBVFVkk3dax7hlAQGYNAP9GvDMvdSKA1vUsmJB/xitPVsiazNeZjXJ NrjwouMg85VR1ri1rm1y2NuKbHEljGfwNB7z8euy7e1clptRsN4WWrP+ASSfrire 9Clan80Ep4lEA+83caArQv3Hcdb8+8FnLpXd/zrPI2V/3TVM2OrfU7/RtUo+3Pr3 JE2d0s6Jn+E= =jlbs -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Lance Cottrell <lcottrell(a)popmail.ucsd.edu> http://nately.ucsd.edu/~loki/ Home of the remailer chaining script "chain". PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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Remailers and "##"
by Jonathan Rochkind 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know there's some kind of a syntax you can use involving "##", with some of the remailers, and the remailer will insert a header line into the message. But I'm having trouble figuring out what syntax this is. Can anyone help me out?

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Re: AA BBS - Thomases are going to jail...
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:30 AM 12/5/94 PST, hkhenson(a)cup.portal.com wrote: >Part of the Federal Government's law enforcement mechanism is under >the control of the Religious Right. Stuff about the AA BBS bust elided. One should note that this prosecution is similar to others carried out against the sellers of physical visual pornography for years. The stings have been carried out by both Republican and Democratic federal prosecutors usually in border states. They started before there was an official Religious Right. The US Attorney in this case may have been a Democrat since most Republicans were replaced by Clinton. He, she, or it is probably not a member of the RR. >I find the situation intolerable--without having a clear idea of how >to deal with it. There will be an appeal. >Certainly *any* system which carries alt.sex.* is subject to the same >treatment by the Religious Right (in the guise of the Memphis Feds) as >AA BBS. In fact, the very .gifs that were found obscene in Memphis >were made "freely distribute," by Robert and have been posted *many* >times to the net. That will be an interesting case. DCF ************************************************************************* ATMs, Contracting Out, Digital Switching, Downsizing, EDI, Fax, Fedex, Home Workers, Internet, Just In Time, Leasing, Mail Receiving, Phone Cards, Quants, Securitization, Temping, Voice Mail.

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Privacy seminar
by L. Todd Masco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Has the privacy seminar been dropped? Last message I've seen from it was November 5. Thanks, -- Todd - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLuONtioZzwIn1bdtAQHK1wGAlR4l8iUNvGZ401ub4P6TMibXlW5vYAoP ZrSJysUUsdFIuPHUkauWYKwiiRtVRqga =Y5Vd -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Oceania?
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Oceania folks may or may not have been serious; I don't know them well enough to judge. If they were serious, they weren't competent - nowhere in their literature did I see anything that implied that the question "Can I look at your financial plans?" would get a useful answer. The primary gamble for Oceania is that you could set up a country without having a piece of dirt to anchor it to and get other governments to treat it as a government, rather than getting the US government to treat it as a drug-running boat on the high seas (i.e. target for Coast Guard piracy), or getting some other government or free-market pirates interested. (Secondary gambles are things like financial stability, hurricanes, etc.) One of their magazines had an article on a floating hotel built by Sven somebody that's recently been anchored off Vietnam. Rather than trying to raise $1B or so to build The Raft and gamble on not losing it all to governments or other pirates, you could make the same gamble by buying the floating hotel for $25-50M, which you might even be able to talk some rich investor into coughing up in return for a slice of the pie. That'd be enough to knwo if it works, get your satellite dish up, and see if you can convince a hundred or so enthusiasts to move there, run a gambling casino, and make back some bucks to pay some dividends for your investors and hire a few mercenaries to protect the place. However, they made some nice T-shirts :-) A more serious effort was done in the early 70s by the Minerva folks, who built up an island out of coral reefs in the South Pacific (the UN tends to require 1 foot above mean high tide to count as enough dirt to be a country.) About six months later the Kingdom of Tonga invaded and stole the place. Bill

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Re: Authentication at toad.com: WTF?
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hmm, yes, using agents for security verification seems reasonable; if you've got a legal relationship or other sufficient trust. It does also require an adequate communication path between you and your agent - on the incoming side so you know that the message the agent verified is the message you're seeing (e.g. the agent's signature on the message, plus potentially some check to make sure all the messages get delivered), and on the outgoing side to make sure your agent gets your messages correctly. Bill

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Re: Interoperability, one-use remailer tickets
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mike Ingle suggests adding a one-shot reply capability to the remailers, to discourage hit-and-run abusers by allowing replies to them. The reply token would become invalid after either one use or timeout. One problem with this approach is that, if the sender is on the mailing list / newsgroup that the message is sent to, he can use up the one-shot reply himself if he's quick, by being the first one to reply. It's also somewhat difficult to design a system where the one-shot replies would chain. Non-automatic non-mandatory one-shot replies are more useful, since there are times you may want to get replies. Bill

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