December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Comments on NSA (was: "Pyrrhus Cracks RSA?")
by an52436＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, doesn't it make some sense given the utility of prime numbers in cryptography, that the NSA, or anyone else interested in breaking codes for that matter, would have simply dedicated a computer or two to the long-term project of determining all of the prime numbers under x bits long? Granted this would take a while, but the NSA has the time, the computers, and the other resources necessary to do this. Having all of these prime numbers would greatly reduce the effort necessary to crack PGP/RSA-type cryptosystems which rely on prime numbers. It would reduce the number of factors a brute-force attack would have to check dramatically. Or am I completely off-base? Mephisto ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Clipper update
by a2＠ah.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: _Electronic Engeering Times_ 22-nov-93 U.S. weights Clipper chip alternatives by GEorge Leopold Washington -- The clinton administration is readying a new encryption policy that could help defuse industry opposion to introduction of the government developed Clipper chip by embracing commercial technologies as alterntives for netword security, according to government and industry sources. A National Security Council panel lead by George Tenet, psecial presidential assistant for intelligence programs, is completing a broad review of government encryption policy with an eye toward empolying the Clipper chip, as well as commercial alternatives, to ensure privacy and security on public networks. Those would include the proposed electronic superhighway, or National Information Infrastructure (NII). Tenet could not be reached for comment on the review's status, but a U.S. official said last week the results of the seven-month National Security Council policy review will be announced soon. The Clipper chip, backed by the National Security Agency and proposed by the Clinton administration in April as a new data-encryption standard, is widely viewed by industry critics as a fait accompli, since the spy agency wants to use it to protect intelligence data. Asked in an interview last Monday whether the policy review would result in modification of the Clipper chip proposal, Micheal Nelson, special assistant for information technology in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, acknowledged the need to consider other encryption technologies for network security, including software solutions. He also said the government should have sought greater industry participation before proposing the Clipper chip. "Clipper is not a sliver bullet, it's not even a brass bullet," Nelson said, "It's only one approach." He added, "If we don't address these [network security] issues, people won't use the NII." Nelson said last week the National Security Council review was designed to bring industry and Congress into the process of looking for commercial solutions, besides Clipper, to the network-security issue. Industry groups said last week they have contributed to the review, which began shortly after Clipper was proposed. The review is expected to result in a decision on how to implement Clipper. A decision on how to proceed with the Clipper proposal was scheduled for Sept. 1 but was delay in response to a recommendation from a private-sector advisory group to the Commerce Department. Clipper, which scrambles telephone conversatinos using an encryption algorithm called Skipjack, is at the heart of an adminstration initiative annoumced in April on secure telecom networks and wireless communication links. Forced to balance the interests of campanies and private citizens with nation-security needs, President Clinton ordered a comprehensive review of U.S. encruytion policy addressing: * Privacy, including the need for voice and data encryption to protect proprietary business data. * The ability of federal law-enforcement officials to tap phones and computers. * The employment of modern technology to build the NII, including encryption technology needed to protect proprietary information transmitted over the information superhighway. * The need for American companies to build and export high-technology products to boost U.S. competitiveness. U.S. companies may offer encryption as a feature in software sold in the United States, but are prohibited from including encryption software in commercial software exports. Proponents of decontrolling encrypted software argue that restrictions are useless because encryption technology is widely available (see Oct. 18, page 18). Acknowledging industry's concerns, the initiative also includes creation of a key-escrow system to ensure the Cliper chip would be used to protect privacy. (A Commerce Department official said last week the government has dropped the Clipper moniker, referring to it instead as the "key- escrow chip," out of convern for possible trademark infringement.) Devices incorporation the chip would have two unique software keys government investigators would need to decode encoded messages. TWo key-escrow data banks would be overseen by a pair of independent agencies designated by the Justice Department and the White House. A decision on which agencies will oversee the detabases has not been made, Commerce spokeswoman Anne Enright Shepherd said last Wednesday. According ot a White House statement announcing the encryption policy, "We need the Clipper chip and other approaches that can both provide law-abiding citizens with access to the encryption they need and prevent criminals from using it to hide their illegal activities." Despite the administration's insistence that Clipper and the rest of the encryption policy are voluntary efforts, many U.S. high-tech companies have opposed it (see June 21, page 28). Instead, they want policy makers to retain the ubiquitous federal Data Encryption Standard (DES) and use other public-key encryption technologies, such as RC-2 and RC-4. DES uses a 56-bit key while Clipper employs an 80-bit key. Clipper "was forced upon [the Clinton adminstration] before they had a chance to evaluate its impact," Bruce Heiman, a Washington attorney representing the Business Software Alliance, said last Tuesday. "NSA sold them a bill of goods." The policy review means "they realize that Clipper has problems... but they don't want to rule it out entirely," Heiman said, adding that industry would accpet Clipper as one alternative to network security only if it is part of a truly voluntary program that includes public-key encryption.

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State Declaration of Ind.
by j.hastings6＠genie.geis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Neil admits that the following is not agorist, (or crypto-anarchist), but is a great republican idea: "...here is a ballot initiative I and a couple of other guys drafted while I was in Colorado (well, actually second draft which I did solo) immediately following the passage by the U.S. Senate of the crime bill containing the assault weapons bans. I will be devoting a considerable about of my energies in the forseeable future -- my life, fortune, and sacred honor, in fact -- to trying to get as many states as possible to put this on the ballot and start creating some free countries." *** THE AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE BALLOT INITIATIVE Preface In States where the people may place this initiative on the ballot to amend the State Constitution by direct ballot initiative, the proponents of this initiative should form a committee to do so and to combat legal challenges to the initiative being placed on that State's ballot. In States with no direct initiative procedures, or where legal impediments or challenges prevent this Initiative from being placed on the ballot, a political party may adopt, or be newly formed to adopt, the platform of placing this initiative on the ballot by whatever legal procedure is required in that State in order to effect its consideration. Question Shall [YOUR STATE] declare independence from the United States of America. Purpose The Declaration of Independence adopted by the Continental Congress dated July 4, 1776, states as follows: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,-- That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." A long train of abuses by the Congress of the United States, the Judiciary of the United States, and the Executive Branch of the United States having infringed upon the rights, privileges, immunities, and powers of the people of [YOUR STATE], in direct contravention to the purposes of the Declaration of Independence and the rights enshrined in the first ten articles of amendment to the Constitution of the United States, We the People of [YOUR STATE] do hereby resolve, effective immediately, the following: Resolved: That [Your State] does hereby declare itself independent of, and does hereby secede from, the United States of America, declaring itself the free and independent [YOUR STATE] Republic. All persons born in the territory or state of [YOUR STATE] or currently residing in this Republic are hereby deemed citizens of the Republic, and all individuals residing in the Republic or who otherwise are citizens of the Republic who have attained the age of 16 years are declared to be Sovereign Individuals, possessing all rights, privileges, and immunities, and subject to all duties, responsibilities, and penalties, of adults living in a free Republic. The legislature of [YOUR STATE] is hereby dissolved, and the Governor of [YOUR STATE] is hereby appointed President Pro Tem of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief Pro Tem of its State Guard and Militia, which consists of all Sovereign Individuals of the age of 16 or greater capable of bearing arms; however, no individual who conscientiously objects to Militia service shall be required to bear arms. The vote of no Representative or Senator from the state of [YOUR STATE] to the Congress of the United States shall be regarded as binding upon the will of the people of [YOUR STATE] in its relations as an independent Republic with the United States; however, such senators and representatives may retain their seats until the natural expiration of their terms of office, or until their offices are abolished by a Constitutional Convention of the Republic, which ever shall occur first. Within 90 days of the adoption of this Initiative there shall be a Constitutional Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of [YOUR STATE] in order to enact a permanent Constitution for the Republic, and any Sovereign Individual of the age 21 years or older who holds the proxies for 2500 other Sovereign Individuals of the age of 16 years or older shall be seated as a voting Delegate to the Convention, empowered to elect presiding officers of the Convention, to adopt the Rules of Order, and to decide upon all business that shall come before the Convention, except with the following limitations: that the Declaration of Rights which is enacted as part of this Initiative shall be the permanent and supreme Law of the Land, not subject to repeal, alteration, or abridgement by the Constitutional Convention or any deliberative body which shall follow it; that a Delegate to the Constitutional Convention shall be seated only so long as the sufficient number of proxies is maintained, and such proxies are revocable at any time during the Convention by notice to the recording Secretary of the Convention; that the Convention may be reconvened under these same limitations to propose new amendments at any time after ratification of the Convention by a majority of those voting in a popular initiative, and that all proceedings of this and subsequent Constitutional Conventions shall be available for public viewing and broadcast. Each Delegate to the Convention shall have one vote on the floor of the convention, irrespective of the number of proxies that Delegate holds in excess of the minimum number required to be seated. The proposed Constitution ratified by a majority vote of seated Delegates shall be submitted to a popular referendum within 120 days of the seating of the [a number representing 10% of your state's population]th Delegate, which shall be a quorum for the Constitutional Convention to begin. Every Sovereign citizen of the Republic having attained the age of 16 shall be entitled to vote in this referendum, and a majority vote in this referendum shall adopt the Constitution, which shall go into effect immediately. Within 90 days from the adoption of the Constitution, but in no event later than 180 days from the adoption of this Ballot Initiative declaring independence, all currently held elected, appointed, and civil offices of [YOUR STATE], including the presidency-pro-tem, shall expire, and the Republic shall hold such general elections as are mandated by this Ballot Initiative and created by the Constitution of the Republic. If the people have failed to approve a Constitution within 180 days from the adoption of this ballot initiative, then all legislative, judicial, and executive authority of the Republic shall remain with the Constitutional Convention or, respectively, with the people in popular referenda, until such time as a Constitution is approved by the people. The Constitutional Convention shall as its first order of business after the election of presiding officers and adoption of Rules of Order appoint an Ambassador to the United States of America to open communications for the purpose of discussing such subjects as are of interest to the people of the United States of America and the people of the Republic, to seek a peaceful divorce and coexistence. Any other State, Province, or Republic which shall adopt the following Declaration of Rights in total and without alteration may join in free Confederation with this Republic; and the Sovereign Individuals of those States, Provinces, and Republics shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of the Republic; and all public acts, records, and judicial proceedings, of such a State, Province, or Republic shall be given full faith and credit by the Republic. Alternatively, if the several states of the United States of America should adopt this Declaration of Rights into the Constitution of the United States of America in total and without alteration, the Republic shall, by popular initiative, vote whether it shall rejoin the United States. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS All Individuals within the borders of the Republic, and those of its Sovereign citizens abroad, are hereby declared to hold the following unalienable Rights, and this Declaration of Rights shall be the Supreme Law of the Land of this Republic, not subject to repeal, abridgement, or amendment; and all laws or regulations of the State of [YOUR STATE], or of the United States of America, which are repugnant to these Rights are immediately null and void: To be free from laws respecting an establishment of religion or taxing or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or taxing or abridging freedom of speech, or of the press, or of communication public or private; or peaceably to assemble, or to petition the Government for a redress of grievances; or to travel freely domestically or abroad. A standing Army being repugnant to the people's Liberty and creating a likelihood of foreign military adventures, and public liberty and security being predicated on the ability of Sovereign Individuals to act on behalf of their individual liberties and personal safety, a popular Militia is the natural defense of a Free Society, and posse comitatus drawn from such Militia is the best protector of public order and safety; however, no individual who conscientiously objects to Militia service shall be required to bear arms. The Right of all Individuals to keep, own, and carry, openly or concealed, any arms for defense of themselves, the public peace, and the Republic shall not be called into question in any place in the Republic, except for those persons being held to answer for an infamous crime or those who having been convicted of an infamous crime have had restrictions placed on their liberty as a condition of probation or parole, or in places where such persons may be incarcerated; nor, other than requirements that may be enacted for training of the Militia, shall the government place any burdens on the acquisition, possession, or ownership of arms; nor shall privately owned arms be enumerated or registered with any authority by force of law; nor shall any taxes, tariffs, fees, or regulations be placed on the manufacture of or trade in personal or militia arms; nor shall any Individual be held criminally or civilly liable for any reasonable act in defense of life, liberty, property, or the public peace; nor shall any sworn police or peace officer have any greater Rights or powers than those available to any Sovereign Individual. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except in punishment for a crime whereof the party be duly convicted, shall exist in the Republic or any place subject to its jurisdiction. No Sovereign Individual in the Republic may be denied or have abridged by law, public, or official act, any Right, privilege, or immunity held by the people as a whole; and any official, elected, appointed, or otherwise receiving remuneration from public funds, who violates the least of these Rights, even to proposing or supporting a law that would violate the Rights set forth in this Declaration, shall be held personally liable, criminally or civilly, for any damage or dishonor against any or all Sovereign Individuals of the Republic; and upon conviction of Criminal Violation of Sovereign Rights may as part of punishment be further barred from holding any office or position of public trust in the Republic thereafter. No military or government personnel shall be quartered in any house without the consent of the Owner. The right of all Individuals to be secure in their persons, houses, documents, files, private communications, and effects shall not be violated, nor any warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, by a Grand Jury elected yearly by the People, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the Individuals or things to be seized, and if such Warrant shall have come about by perjury, malice, manufacture of false evidence, or malfeasance by any Individual, such individual shall be held to answer, criminally and civilly, for such malfeasance. and Individuals not charged, or adjudicated to be innocent, shall be compensated in full from public funds for any costs or damages resulting from such a search, seizure, charges, or trial resulting therefrom. No Individual shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury elected yearly by the People, except in cases arising in the Militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any act be a crime in which it can not be proved that one or more actual Individuals was caused harm or could likely have been caused harm; nor shall any individual be held to answer as an adult for a capital or otherwise infamous crime who has not enjoyed the full rights, privileges, and immunities of an adult; nor shall any Individual be subject to charges arising from the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life, limb, or loss of property after an acquittal or failure of a Jury in a criminal trial to reach a conviction; nor shall anyone be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Any Sovereign Individual in the Republic may petition a Grand Jury to bring criminal charges against any public official he believes has violated his Rights; and if the person who might be charged sits upon that Grand Jury, that Grand Juror shall be recused and the charges considered by the remaining Grand Jurors. No magistrate may impose a punishment upon any Individual for Contempt of Court except by presentment or indictment by a Grand Jury and conviction on the charge in a criminal trial by Jury. No private property shall be taken for public use without full and just compensation, upon a vote of two-thirds of those voting in a popular referendum and for no other purpose than a clear and present danger to the Sovereign Individuals of the Republic or equally grave public purpose. Neither the Republic nor any of its subdivisions may have title to real property, nor may the Republic demand public use of private property, with the exception of rights of way necessary to the public's right to travel and engage in free commerce and recreation, national cemeteries, embassies and consular offices; and the devolution of public property into private ownership shall balance the public interest with the conservative advantages of private stewardship. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the Right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law; and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of competent and energetic Counsel for his defense. Furthermore, in all criminal prosecutions and civil matters each jury shall be selected from a pool of rational Sovereign Individuals who have demonstrated in their lives common sense, courage, a knowledge of the law in general and of the issues of the specific crimes being charged or issues being litigated, and shall be of a sufficient moral stature to overcome any preconceptions or prejudices that may have arisen in their minds from public discussion of the case prior to the commencement of trial; and each jury shall have the power to rule both upon the facts of the case and to nullify any charge or law for that case they consider to be unjust, and shall not be bound to the precedents established in any prior case; and the judge for each trial shall be elected by the jury and no fact or issue of law shall be considered except in open court with the full jury present. Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines be imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted, nor shall punishment be the primary purpose of criminal law except that it seeks redress on behalf of victims for harms caused by a criminal act. In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed five troy ounces of .999 fine gold, the Right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the Republic, than according to the rules of the common law. No law, treaty or contract shall exist in the Republic unless written in plain language understandable to an Individual of average intelligence and literacy; and all laws and treaties under consideration in any deliberative governmental body shall be made available free for examination to all Sovereign Individuals in the Republic; nor shall any law or treaty be enacted that is of such excessive length, or which has been so recently drafted, that the public has not had time to contemplate its effects. No law shall exist whose purpose is to prevent an adult individual from causing harm solely to himself or his own property, nor conversely from seeking to enhance his own health or well-being by chemical, medical, herbal, physical, or other means; nor shall the possession of medicinal substances, herbs, or materials used in growing or preparation of them be prohibited or burdened; nor shall any Individual be taxed to pay for his own future needs; nor shall the practice of medicine, or of the law, or of any other Profession or livelihood be licensed or regulated by the Republic or subdivisions thereof; nor shall any private and discreet religious, economic, or sexual practice between or among consenting adults be a subject of law. No law shall exist in the Republic that shall prohibit the termination of a pregnancy except that the fetus be healthy and viable apart from its mother's womb and there exists an individual capable of and committed to the adoption of the fetus when born and to assume all costs of support for the mother through the birth of the child, any costs relating to the birth, any costs of care for the mother and any of her other dependent children resulting from the continuation of the pregnancy to term, and burdens of parenthood for the fetus when born, in which case an abortion of such a fetus shall be tried as homicide; but in the event that no qualified person has committed to all these costs and responsibilities, then no criminal or civil charges for the abortion of even a viable and healthy fetus shall be permitted. No law shall prohibit any Sovereign Individual from using as a medium of exchange any legal commodity, nor require any Sovereign Individual to accept any note as legal tender, nor shall the Republic issue any currency not backed by a commodity in the Republic's treasury, nor shall the Republic or any of its subdivisions contract a bond or debt mortgaged upon the government's ability to collect future revenues except in time of war or public disaster. No tax shall be levied without the majority of the people voting in a direct referendum; and furthermore no tax may be levied except that it is to be used for a specific public purpose and no revenue raised for one purpose may be used for another without the majority of the people voting in a direct referendum; and no tax may be enacted such that it requires burdensome accounting or is ambiguous in its requirements or requires professional assistance to understand or comply with it; nor shall any Sovereign Individual suffer any criminal penalty for failure to pay a tax or evasion thereof. In all tax cases or other civil cases in which the government shall be a plaintiff against a Sovereign Individual or private property, all protections accorded to a defendant in a criminal proceeding shall be afforded to the defendant or property owner; neither shall there be any civil forfeiture of private property to the government except after judgment in a jury trial. The government may neither operate any enterprise in competition with a private enterprise; nor by grant of monopoly, subsidy, or other advantage to a private enterprise discourage free competition in any service or product offered to the public; nor prohibit or burden any private enterprise which would provide a service or product previously offered by a unit of government or enjoying an advantage due to government privilege. The enumeration in this Declaration of certain Rights shall never be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the People; and while no Rights here enumerated may be abolished or abridged by constitutional amendment or law, nothing here shall be constructed to prevent additional limitations on public power to enhance the protection of the people from tyrannical abuse. In all questions relating to the Construction of these Rights, let decisions be ruled according to the original intent of the framers of this Declaration, that Individual private powers be nurtured and the Sovereign Individual be protected from the natural tendency of any government to expand the sphere of public power. The protection of these Rights shall be the first and last duty of all persons holding any office of public trust, and the interpretation of these Rights shall firstly and lastly be decided by the Sovereign Individuals of the Republic, as expressed in their acts as members of juries and Grand Juries. First draft of this Initiative and Declaration of Rights was submitted by Scott Paul Graves, J. Neil Schulman, and Timothy H. Willis on August 26, 1994. This draft submitted by J. Neil Schulman, August 28, 1994. Reply to: J. Neil Schulman Mail: P.O. Box 94, Long Beach, CA 90801-0094 Voice Mail: (on AT&T) 0-700-22-JNEIL (1-800-CALL-ATT to access AT&T) Fax: (310) 839-7653 JNS BBS: 1-310-839-7653,,,,25 Internet: softserv(a)genie.geis.com Post as filename: BALLOT.TXT Blame this very long post on Kent - j.hastings6(a)genie.geis.com

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No Subject
by banisar＠washofc.cpsr.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

cpsr.digex.net> Date: Sun, 21 Nov 1993 18:18:21 +0000 From: Dave Banisar <banisar(a)washofc.cpsr.org> To: Cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: HR 3627 Encryption Exports Removed Maria Cantwell 1st District, Washington 1520 Longworth Building Washington, DC 20515 202-225-6311 Congress of the United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515-4701 For Immediate Release For More Information November 23, 1993 Larry West (202) 225-6311 Cantwell Introduces "Encryption" bill to Expand Export Markets for US Computer and Software Companies US Rep. Maria Cantwell (D-WA) has introduced legislation to amend the Export Administration Act to allow US computer and software manufacturers to compete in an international market that could mean as much as $6 billion to $9 billion a year to American high-tech industries. Cantwell's bill would liberalize export controls on software that features encryption capabilities, which protect computer data against unauthorized disclosure, theft or alteration. As communications systems link more and more computers and telephones around the world, Cantwell said, businesses and indviduals are becoming more concerned about protecting the privacy of their electronic files, messages and transactions. She said the worldwide demand for cryptographic software, and computer systems that employ such software, is growing rapidly and American companies must be allowed to meet that demand. According to Cantwell, this legislation is needed to ensure that American companies do not lose critical international markets to foreign competitors, who operate with few export restrictions. Currently, more than 200 software and hardware products for text, file and data encryption are available from 20 foreign countries. "The Export Administration Act has erected a wall between American high-tech companies and their international customers -- it's time to lower the wall," Cantwell said. "Computer and software technology are among the most competitive fields in the world, and American companies are the clear leaders. To maintain that lead, American companies must be able to respond to worldwide consumer demand." Robert Holleyman, president of the Business Software Alliance, an association of America's nine leading software companies, applauded Cantwell for introducing the leigslation and said the bill would "assist US software companies and maintaining their competitive edge in international markets." Dr. Nathan Myhrvold, senior vice president for Advance Technology at Microsoft Corporation in Redmond, Washington, also praised Cantwell for her leadership on this issue. "The ability to include encryption features in software we sell worldwide is important to our remaining competititve in foreign markets," Myhrvold said. " We commend Rep. Cantwell for recognizing the importance of this issue to the American software industry." CANTWELL ON EXPORT CONTROLS/ ADD ONE Cantwell said current export controls that prohibit the export of American software programs that offer good encryption capabilities only make it harder for American companies to compete internationally. She said the regulations ignore the realities of today's post-Cold War global economy and the needs of one of this country's most innovative and successful industries. American software companies currently command a 75 percent worldwide market share, and many of those companies earn more than 50 percent of their annual revenues from exports, but Cantwell said that could change quickly. "The United States' export control system is broken and needs to be fixed," Cantwell said. "It was designed as a tool of the Cold War, to help America fight against enemies that no longer exist. If we continue to prevent American companies from meeting the worldwide demand for cryptographic software, America gains nothing -- but those companies stand to lose $6 billion and $9 billion a year." Paul Brainerd, CEO of Aldus in Seattle, said, "Rep. Cantwell's bill would liberalize outdated export controls, which are threatening the continued success of America's software companies in world markets. In order to remain competitive worldwide, American companies must be able to offer features -- like information security -- demanded by our customers and available from foreign companies." Cantwell said her legislation would not interfere with the government's ability to control exports to nations with terrorist tendencies (such as Iran, Libya and Syria) or other embargoed countries (such as Cuba and North Korea). On the other hand, she said, current export controls on American software do not prevent anyone from obtaining cryptographic software. "Much of this is ordinary shrink-wrapped software," Cantwell said, "the kind millions of people buy every day for their home and business computers at regular retail outlets. International consumers who cannot purchase American computer systems and software programs with encryption features don't do without, they just buy those products elsewhere. They are concerned with protecting their privacy and keeping their businesses secure." Cantwell said she is determined to bring the issue out from behind closed doors and into the light of public debate before the House Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment marks up the Export Administration Act early next year. She said she hopes her bill will encourage the Administration to act quickly to revise export controls on software -- perhaps before Congress reconvenes in late January. "The Administration is reviewing this issue, and I think they are interested in making the changes that will allow American companies to remain competitive," Cantwell said. "I would like nothing better than to come back to Congress after the recess and discover that the problem had been solved." ### AMERICAN COMPUTER COMPANIES MUST BE ALLOWED TO EXPORT SOFTWARE WITH ENCRYPTION CAPABILITIES _Introduction and Summary_ America's computer software and hardware companies, including such well-known companies as Apple, DEC, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Lotus, Microsoft, Novell and Wordperfect, have been among the country's most internationally competitive firms earning more than one-half of their revenues from exports. Unfortunately, this vital American industry is directly threatened by unilateral U.S. Government export controls which prevent those companies from meeting worldwide user demand for software that includes encryption capabilities to protect computer data against unauthorized disclosure, theft or alteration. Legislative action is needed to ensure that American companies do not lose critical international markets to foreign software companies that operate without significant export restrictions. _The Problem_ With ready access to powerful, interconnected, computers, business and home users increasingly are relying on electronic information storage and transmissions to conduct their affairs. At the same time, computer users worldwide are demanding that computer software offer encryption capabilities to ensure that their data is secure and its integrity is maintained. Unfortunately, current unilateral U.S. "munitions" export controls administered by the National Security Agency and the State Department effectively prohibit the export of American software programs offering good encryption capabilities. Yet these unilateral U.S. controls are _not_ effective in restricting the availability of encryption abroad. More than 200 generally available, mass-market foreign commercial programs and products, as well as many programs available from the Internet, all offer good encryption. In addition, generally available software with encryption capabilities is sold within the U.S. at thousands of retail outlets, by mail and over the phone. These programs may be transferred abroad in minutes by anyone using a public telephone line and a computer modem. The only result of continued U.S. export controls is to threaten the continued preeminence of America's computer software and hardware companies in world markets. American software companies stand to lose between $6 and $9 billion in annual revenues from sales of generally available software. In addition, American hardware companies are losing hundreds of millions of dollars in computer system sales every year, because sales increasingly are dependent on the ability of a U.S. firm to offer encryption as a feature of an integrated customer solution involving hardware, software and services. _The Solution_ Legislation introduced by U.S. Rep. Maria Cantwell would ensure that exports of software with encryption capabilities would be controlled by the Secretary of Commerce as a commercial item and would be exportable. This legislation is strongly supported by the Business Software Alliance and the Industry Coalition on Technology Transfer. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF CANTWELL BILL EXPORT CONTROL LIBERALIZATION FOR INFORMATION ECURITY PROGRAMS AND PRODUCTS _Section 1_ Section 1 amends the Export Administration Act by adding a new subsection that specifically addresses exports of computer hardware, software and technology for information security including encryption. The new subsection has three basic provisions: 1) It gives the Secretary of Commerce exclusive authority over the export of such programs and products except those which are specifically designed for military use, including command, control and intelligence applications or for deciphering encrypted information. 2) The Government is generally prohibited from requiring a validated export license for the export of generally available software (e.g. mass market commercial or public domain software) or computer hardware simply because it incorporates such software. Nevertheless, the Secretary will be able to continue controls on countries of terrorists (like Lybia, Syria and Iran) or other embargoed countries (like Cuba and North Korea) pursuant to the Trading With The Enemy Act os the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (except for instances where IEEPA is employed to extend EAA-based controls when the EAA is not in force). 3) The Secretary is required to grant validated licenses for exports of sotware to commercial users in any country to which exports of such software has been approved for use by foreign financial institutions. Importantly, the Secretary is not required to grant such export approvals if there is substantial evidence that the software will be diverted or modified for military or terrorists' end-use or re-exported without requisite authorization. _Section 2_ Section 2 provides definitions necessary for the proper implementation of the substantive provisions. For example, generally available software is offered for sale or licensed to the public without restriction and available through standard commercial channels of distribution; sold as is without further customization; and designed to be installed by the purchaser without additional assistance from the publisher. Computer hardware and computing devices are also defined. --------------------------------------------------------------------- 103D CONGRESS H.R. 3627 1ST SESSION --------------------------------------- IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MS. CANTWELL (for herself and ___) introduced the following bill which was referred to the Committee on __________. --------------------------------------- A BILL To amend the Export Administration Act of 1979 with respect to the control of computers and related equipment. 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, 3 SECTION 1. GENERALLY AVAILABLE SOFTWARE 4 Section 17 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 5 (50 U.S.C. App. 2416) is amended by adding at the end 6 thereof the following new subsection: 7 ``(g) COMPUTERS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT.--- 8 ``(1) GENERAL RULE.---Subject to paragraphs 9 (2) and (3), the Secretary shall have exclusive au- 2 1 thority to control exports of all computer hardware, 2 software and technology for information security 3 (including encryption), except that which is specifi- 4 cally designed or modified for military use, including 5 command, control and intelligence applications. 6 ``(2) ITEMS NOT REQUIRING LICENSES.---No 7 validated license may be required, except pursuant 8 to the Trading With The Enemy Act or the Inter- 9 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (but only 10 to the extent that the authority of such act is not 11 exercised to extend controls imposed under this act), 12 for the export or reexport of--- 13 ``(A) any software, including software with 14 encryption capabilities, that is--- 15 ``(i) generally available, as is, and is 16 designed for installation by the purchaser; 17 or 18 ``(ii) in the public domain or publicly 19 available because it is generally accessible 20 to the interested public in any form; or 21 ``(B) any computing device soley because 22 it incorporates or employs in any form software 23 (including software with encryption capabilities) 24 exempted from any requirement for a validated 25 license under subparagraph (A). 3 1 ``(3) SOFTWARE WITH ENCRYPTION CAPABILI- 2 TIES.---The Secretary shall authorize the export or 3 reexport of software with encryption capabilities for 4 nonmilitary end-uses in any country to which ex- 5 ports of software of similar capability are permitted 6 for use by financial institutions not controlled in fact 7 by United States persons, unless there is substantial 8 evidence that such software will be--- 9 ``(A) diverted to a military end-use or an 10 end-use supporting international terrorism; 11 ``(B) modified for military or terrorist end- 12 use; or 13 ``(C) reexported without requisite United 14 States authorization. 15 ``(4) DEFINITIONS.---As used in this 16 subsection--- 17 ``(A) the term `generally available' means, 18 in the case of software (including software with 19 encryption capabilities), software that is offered 20 for sale, license, or transfer to any person with- 21 out restriction through any commercial means, 22 including, but not limited to, over-the-counter 23 retail sales, mail order transactions, phone 24 order transactions, electronic distribution, or 25 sale on approval; 4 1 ``(B) the term `as is' means, in the case of 2 software (including software with encryption ca- 3 pabilities), a software program that is not de- 4 signed, developed, or tailored by the software 5 company for specific purchasers, except that 6 such purchasers may supply certain installation 7 parameters needed by the software program to 8 function properly with the purchaser's system 9 and may customize the software program by 10 choosing among options contained in the soft- 11 ware program; 12 ``(C) the term `is designed for installation 13 by the purchaser' means, in the case of soft- 14 ware (including software with encryption capa- 15 bilities)--- 16 ``(i) the software company intends for 17 the purchaser (including any licensee or 18 transferee), who may not be the actual 19 program user, to install the software pro- 20 gram on a computing device and has sup- 21 plied the necessary instructions to do so, 22 except that the company may also provide 23 telephone help line services for software in- 24 stallation, electronic transmission, or basic 25 operations; and--- 5 1 ``(ii) that the software program is de- 2 signed for installation by the purchaser 3 without further substantial support by the 4 supplier; 5 ``(D) the term `computing device' means a 6 device which incorporates one or more 7 microprocessor-based central processing units 8 that can accept, store, process or provide out- 9 put of data; and 10 ``(E) the term `computer hardware', when 11 used in conjunction with information security, 12 includes, but is not limited to, computer sys- 13 tems, equipment, application-specific assem- 14 blies, modules and integrated circuits.''

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THE DETWEILER PLEDGE
by Sandy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Punksters, I hereby take the following Pledge. Will you take it too? WHEREAS, Larry Detweiler has posted long and numerous messages to Cypherpunks under his own name and several pseudonyms, AND WHEREAS, over time, such messages have became more and more unintelligible, repetitive and/or threatening, AND WHEREAS, attempts to respond to such messages have resulted in ever increasing psychotic reactions from Detweiler, I, therefore, pledge never to read, nor respond to, posts written by Larry Detweiler, or his pseudonyms. Further, I pledge never to read, nor respond to, posts written in response to posts by Larry Detweiler, or to subjects raised by Larry Detweiler. I offer the above pledge in the hopes that such action, especially in concert with others on the Cypherpunks list, will deprive Larry Detweiler of an audience and thus result in his voluntarily withdrawal from this forum. S a n d y S a n d f o r t >>>>>> Please send e-mail to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com <<<<<< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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ANOTHER FAVORABLE ARTICLE
by Sandy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Punksters, Strong encryption got another boost from the hard money crowd. The newsletter, /Strategic Investment/ featured an article called, "Escape to Cypherspace [sic]: The Information Revolution and the demise of the income tax." It was written by James Bennett who is the "Technology Editor of /Strategic Investment/ and is writing a book on nanotechnology for the M.I.T. Press. Here is the first paragraph: Readers of /Strategic Investment/ are already aware of the crucial role of the microchip in eroding the power of governments over their citizens. Recent developments herald an expansion of this role that promises to dwarf the effects seen to date. Just as atomic theory was seen as an arcane interest in 1939, so this development, known as public-key encryption, is now familiar only to a handful of academics. Yet in the coming decade, it may create consequences which change the life of everyone on the planet even more than the atomic bomb. Following this was some history and theory of public key. He had several nice paragraphs about PGP, the Clipper chip and the united front put up by "hackers and mainstream communications and computer companies" in opposing the Clipper. He explicitly mentions (and approves of) the threat offshore banks using encryption technology pose to taxing authorities. At one point he writes: This development [cypherspace commerce] will accelerate rapidly existing trends towards breakdown of large institutions and hierarchical structures. Governments will have much of their revenue base undercut--and any attempt to tighten the screws on taxpayers will just increase the escape to Cypherspace. But he later opines: Some observers of this trend predict a coming "crypto- anarchy" where governments fall apart entirely under the pressure of anonymous communication. This is not likely. Governments have shown an amazing adaptability over the millennia as they adjust to developments such as large-scale slavery, feudalism, gunpowder and industrialization. Quite a favorable article, over all. S a n d y >>>>>> Please send e-mail to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com <<<<<< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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META: Filter Detweiler
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- It appears to me that Detweiler is not receiving the list; for example, he apparently didn't see the posting giving the names of officials at his university until it was forwarded to him several days later. I would favor adding a filter preventing Detweiler's messages from appearing on the list. I know that this is a big step to take but his messages have become so deranged that they have, IMO, no redeeming value. Whatever validity his original points may have had (and I do think there was a kernel of a valid point there), his mental state is such that his postings are now worthless. I know that I can easily filter his messages myself, but it still wastes list bandwidth and, worse, distracts people's attention from other, more worthwhile, posts. By lowering the quality of the list as a whole Detweiler discourages people from subscribing. New subscribers may take his rants as typical of what we discuss here. We are all harmed by having people who could make a contribution leave the list, or be distracted by Detweiler's messages and the responses to him. Unless others strongly disagree, I urge Eric to install software to eliminate Detweiler's postings. I believe the evidence is strong enough that the anon.penet.fi account nicknamed "S.Boxx" is actually a Detweiler pseudonym that it should be filtered as well. If other pseudonyms appear I suppose we would have to consider them on a case by case basis. In order to conserve list bandwidth, let's try to avoid "me, too" postings. If you disagree, it's worth discussing, IMO, but if you agree I'd suggest that messages be sent directly to Eric at cypherpunks-request(a)toad.com or hughes(a)ah.com. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLPaZZagTA69YIUw3AQHSnAP8Cbo7o6622IpA7HwY8lQAm6h66YE9wCrc rkCZK2F6KnVRvuTxXbotvdx/RxQZPtIwZa6SmU8H1H/d/SAQSB74bavDsrzJRl5I V5BNPmVL+zFSPZWgfXOQ8Apb3KTrtWmTyhXIgRbhJle3kyO5YJU2km50j98ZoN5d 2cPpzM0wHxA= =hgGz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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META: Filter Detweiler
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- It appears to me that Detweiler is not receiving the list; for example, he apparently didn't see the posting giving the names of officials at his university until it was forwarded to him several days later. I would favor adding a filter preventing Detweiler's messages from appearing on the list. I know that this is a big step to take but his messages have become so deranged that they have, IMO, no redeeming value. Whatever validity his original points may have had (and I do think there was a kernel of a valid point there), his mental state is such that his postings are now worthless. I know that I can easily filter his messages myself, but it still wastes list bandwidth and, worse, distracts people's attention from other, more worthwhile, posts. By lowering the quality of the list as a whole Detweiler discourages people from subscribing. New subscribers may take his rants as typical of what we discuss here. We are all harmed by having people who could make a contribution leave the list, or be distracted by Detweiler's messages and the responses to him. Unless others strongly disagree, I urge Eric to install software to eliminate Detweiler's postings. I believe the evidence is strong enough that the anon.penet.fi account nicknamed "S.Boxx" is actually a Detweiler pseudonym that it should be filtered as well. If other pseudonyms appear I suppose we would have to consider them on a case by case basis. In order to conserve list bandwidth, let's try to avoid "me, too" postings. If you disagree, it's worth discussing, IMO, but if you agree I'd suggest that messages be sent directly to Eric at cypherpunks-request(a)toad.com or hughes(a)ah.com. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLPaZZagTA69YIUw3AQHSnAP8Cbo7o6622IpA7HwY8lQAm6h66YE9wCrc rkCZK2F6KnVRvuTxXbotvdx/RxQZPtIwZa6SmU8H1H/d/SAQSB74bavDsrzJRl5I V5BNPmVL+zFSPZWgfXOQ8Apb3KTrtWmTyhXIgRbhJle3kyO5YJU2km50j98ZoN5d 2cPpzM0wHxA= =hgGz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Telnet specs.
by Jeremy Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know this might not be the most appropriate list to post this to, but I need to know what ports Telnet uses for standard use. Mainly, I implemented the Telnet bouncer program that was posted here a while back, and when trying to connect to hosts that don't require a port number it still asks me for one. i.e., when I try to connect to archie.sura.net through the bouncer, it asks me for a port number. When I use my standard Telnet program it will connect with just archie.sura.net as the address. Does anybody know a site where I can find this info? Thanx in advance and my apologies for any waste of bandwidth! ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jeremy Smith -*jersmit(a)eis.calstate.edu*- My views are my own and nobody else can have them! -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Banning any subscriber...
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am new to the list as well as the local Austin CypherPunks group and have high hopes of contributing to the ongoing discussion of crypto. I have been playing w/ PGP since it first came available and crypto in general for quiite a few years. I was really attracted by the sence of community as well as the reputation of the CypherPunks. However, with the latest news that 'we' are going to start banning individuals because they have nothing to contribute is something I personaly cant support. If you want free speech then you have to give it. If you personaay want to filter your mail (equivalent to changing the channel) that is fine, but to a priori filter posts from a individual is cencorship (no letting you discuss your subject at all). I personaly do not support such authoritorian actions and will dis-associate myself from the CypherPunks and will advise others not to associate either. This type of action is un- called for and has no business on this type of communication network. I advise all subscribers to this list to NOT support any action by any individual or group to carry this idea into action. This is not what CypherPunks or freedom is about. "Those who give up essential liberty to obtain security deserve neither liberty or security." Benjamin Franklin

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Filter to exclude Detweiler?
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've personally come to the conclusion that it's no longer useful to (a) attempt to communicate with Detweiler, or (b) pay attention to what he writes. I am, however, opposed to source-filtering him at philosophical and practical levels. I think his bad craziness is evident enough from his postings that anyone paying much attention will conclude he's disconnected from external reality; it shouldn't take more than a few messages for folks to reach this conclusion. (I admit with some chagrin that it took more than a few for me to do that.) I think that source filtering is at least a close kin to censorship, and I'd vote to steer clear of it. I also think that attempting to source-filter him may lead to some sort of "identity arms race", via remailers, anon-servers, and the like. Such an arms race would be distracting, annoying, and lead to further wasted time, effort, and energy on the part of people who ought to have better things to do. :) I encourage folks to look into improving technology which would allow for destination-filtering, e.g., kill-files and their ilk. (Next-generation killfiles - ones which attempt some sort of textual interpretation/classification beyond headers - implemented at the destination point have the added benefit that the filter target can't easily deduce from the list traffic what algorithm/pattern is being used, and thereby avoid it.) For what it's worth, I write the above in spite of the fact that I don't have a kill-file in the reader-agent that I read C-punks with, and I pay for every minute of transmission time used to receive C-punks, including Detweiler's lengthy messages. -- Greg Broiles greg(a)goldenbear.com Baked, not fried.

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Looking for Remailers
by an32951＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I need a couple of good remailers. Can -- er, /would/ anybody point me in the general direction of one? Coerr ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Where the lonely wind blows next
by Brian Beker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here's something funny from an12070 that popped up in comp.org.eff.talk. I won't bother to forward it all, especially in view of all the recent talk of filtering this singular voice. The rest of it is in the news. Brian [Header's here for those of you who enjoy that kind of thing....] - From netcom.com!csus.edu!wupost!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi Fri Nov 26 23:49:21 1993 Xref: netcom.com talk.politics.crypto:1348 alt.privacy:9824 alt.privacy.anon-server:345 news.admin.policy:7982 comp.org.eff.talk:22312 comp.admin.policy:4449 alt.conspiracy:37431 Message-ID: <071303Z27111993(a)anon.penet.fi> Path: netcom.com!csus.edu!wupost!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy From: an12070(a)anon.penet.fi (The Executioner) X-Anonymously-To: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy Organization: Anonymous contact service Reply-To: an12070(a)anon.penet.fi Date: Sat, 27 Nov 1993 07:06:26 UTC Subject: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT Lines: 61 ATTENTION ALL INTERNET PERSONNEL THE INTERNET OUTLET szabo(a)netcom.com HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A CRYPTOANARCHIST CYBERSPACE INFILTRATION SITE TO A 93.67% DEGREE CERTAINTY VIA PSEUDOSPOOFING DETECTION SOFTWARE. MAIL, POSTS, AND OTHER EMANATIONS FROM THIS OUTLET ARE CONSIDERED LIKELY TO BE HIGHLY SUBVERSIVE AND DANGEROUS CRYPTOANARCHIST DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA FROM ONE OR MORE CRYPTOANARCHIST CO-CONSPIRATORS. MULTIPLE SENSITIVE INTERNET MAILING LISTS, FAQS, AND FORUMS HAVE BEEN CONTAMINATED. [Many more caps deleted.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLPcI6SJejrfgN5yJAQF+RgP9F6cAs0B/Ors7uu2e9m+BP4Elmq0dkkcb VHoEMRwQJx8xHFE+iKlgf0M0Hrme65cYjK31+hj7C41DJNgY7eymYBCjtcEL8X1y ZNLnwMFGTIVXtMUUAd/XwbfqURyGCDihzwos08mHLh/NzBOgsyHzC0Vqkp5uYjmZ Q92oCyENEJk= =xwos -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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The latest lunatic rant
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Newsgroups: >talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server, >news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy >From: an12070(a)anon.penet.fi (The Executioner) >Subject: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT As you can see, this one was pretty widely distributed. While I agree that it would be nice if he stopped bugging us, at least everyone here knows he's nuts. The same cannot be said for all of these newsgroups. Several people (especially szabo) should post replies and explain that he has been flooding our list with similar ravings and death threats for months. Those who have received death threats from the an12070 address could also send mail to Julf about him. Death threats would certainly be considered "improper use."

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cryptoanarchists?
by wknotten＠cs.uct.ac.za 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[start posting]

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The other side of LD
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I never thought I be caught dead forward an LD post, but here it is since I may be the only 'punk on the NEW-LIST announcements. Here we see the other side. I am beginning to get a funny feeling about all this. Consider: 1. The book published for profit by editing the submissions to rec.humor.funny. 2. The recent "compilation copyright" filed by Keith Peterson on the material contained in the Simtel archive. 3. The default apparent public domain into which all our postings seem to fall. Is LD, the prolific author that he obviously is, merely baiting the creative minds of the cypherpunks to gather material for his forthcoming novel(s)? Bart /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// Forwarded message: > From @VM1.NODAK.EDU:owner-new-list@VM1.NODAK.EDU Fri Nov 26 11:02:02 1993 > Message-Id: <199311261901.LAA15086(a)mail.netcom.com> > Date: Fri, 26 Nov 1993 12:47:04 CST > Reply-To: ld231782(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu, julf(a)eunet.fi > Sender: NEW-LIST - New List Announcements <NEW-LIST(a)VM1.NoDak.EDU> > From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu> > Subject: NEW: Cypherwonks > To: Multiple recipients of list NEW-LIST <NEW-LIST(a)VM1.NoDak.EDU> > > cypherwonks(a)lists.eunet.fi > > The brand new cypherwonks list on Majordomo(a)Lists.EUnet.fi is for > ambitious, energetic, can-do, hands-on individuals interested in > general cutting-edge `cyberspatial development' projects such as in > cryptography, digital cash, and `electronic democracy'. (A `wonk' is > slang for a `meticulous detail person'.) The list is both an informal > gathering place for the technically adept and also a focal point for > branching off into serious project coordination. We place a premium > on membership by technical professionals and try to hone our posts to > accommodate the busy (who, according to the adage, are those who get > all the serious work done). We are inspired by the Internet but > don't see it as ideal yet and are particularly interested in > cooperation, building prototypes, forging standards, and `long-term > incremental evolution' in our designs and goals. We're also > intensely interested in following and influencing the technological > and political developments of the emerging `national cyberspatial > infrastructure.' > > The list is *not* for political diatribes in the `radical > libertarian' agenda, e.g. rants against all forms of government as > oppressive, corrupt, or evil, or promoting the use of cryptographic > technologies for subversive activities like tax evasion, black > marketeering, or evading law enforcement. The list is *not* for > discussions of how to manipulate the honest through the use of > software technologies. The list is *not* for unconstructive > negativism against other's proposals. Above all, we are interested > in forging a `civilized cyberspace' out of the current `Internet > wilderness'. > > Historical note: the list was formed as a less ornery, more moderate > splinter group from the Cypherpunks by J.Helsingius (creator of the > popular anon.penet.fi anonymizing service) and L.Detweiler (author of > many FAQs including `Privacy & Anonymity on the Internet). > > To subscribe, send a message with the body > subscribe cypherwonks > to Majordomo(a)Lists.EUnet.fi. > > A more comprehensive charter is available with the command `info > cypherwonks' in the message body. > > To post, send a message to cypherwonks(a)lists.eunet.fi. > --

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response to Detweiler/Boxx/ad nauseum
by szabo＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm really at a loss how to respond to this lunatic. I hope the following doesn't just stoke his boilers more, but on a worldwide public forum I don't think I can let something like that go unanswered. Anybody out there with good advice (legal, tactical, or otherwise), I'd greatly appreciate it. Here's what I wrote: Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server, news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy Subject: Re: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT References: <071303Z27111993(a)anon.penet.fi> an12070(a)anon.penet.fi (The Executioner) writes: >ATTENTION ALL INTERNET PERSONNEL >THE INTERNET OUTLET >szabo(a)netcom.com >HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A CRYPTOANARCHIST CYBERSPACE INFILTRATION SITE >TO A 93.67% DEGREE CERTAINTY VIA PSEUDOSPOOFING DETECTION SOFTWARE. >.... Why Mr. Detweiler, that's mighty flattering of you! I'd be even more flattered by Detweiler's singling me out, if he wasn't also making death threats and accusations of criminal violations against several people who have recently disagreed with him, trying to track down our physical locations, and otherwise doing his best to scare the shit out of net users with his digital stalking. No, Mr. Detweiler, I'm not "pseudospoofing", but with nutcases like you on the net I sure as hell wish I was. Nick Szabo szabo(a)netcom.com

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Ways to Die
by an12070＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Many psychopunks, particularly T.C.May, E.Hughes, and D.Barnes, have been upset by my latest name variation, `The Executioner', supposing in their sweaty desperation at exposure for their crimes that it represents some kind of insinuated threat. Nothing could be further from the truth. The obvious meaning of `execute' in this context is `to carry out a plan', as in `execute a program,' as in `elicit the truth'. The connotation is completely harmless. I have no idea why anyone could construe it negatively, unless, as the saying goes, they have something to hide! Sorry, but I can't be responsible for tormented psyches and consciences in the face of Truth! I don't understand why these master pseudospoofers should be upset by a trivial name change. In fact, in the face of their own plethora of faces, it seems quite hypocritical! It would be like taking the words, `I'm going to come kill your family with a rusty razor blade' seriously. This idea of `execution' reminds me of historical cases of execution. There are very many variations. One of the best and my favorite is that by a lynch mob, led by a corrupt leader. The lucky criminals get hung, with their faces bulging around, and legs dangling below, a constricting, unremitting noose, sort of like a poisonous snake around the neck. `Brave New World' ends with a delightfully novel description of a hanging: NE, N, NE, N, NW, W, SW, ... (paraphrase!) I imagine that hanging is not a very bad way to die, of all the ways invented and experienced by man. Traitors were often hung by the noose in the Civil War, as I understand it, when our country turned in on itself in disunity. Who was it who was executed with the words, `I regret I have but one life to give to my country'? The infamous spy Benedict Arnold (who put on one face to the British, and another to the Americans, quite the ingenious pseudospoofer!) was hung, I understand. Other cases of execution, of course, are more grisly. We have the Inquisition to thank for some of the more hideous variations. I don't know if Poe's Pit and the Pendulum was ever really in use, but what a fantastic way to die! The shining, razor sharp blade gently swaying to and fro, hypnotically mesmerizing, swish, swosh, subtly, imperceptibly lower, approaching like a whisper in one's ear by Death. The victim in the tale faced anonymous black judges in a dark courtroom, as they handed down the sentence, described like a druglike stuporous hallucination. As I recall the protagonist in Poe's tale had his stomache glanced by the blade, dark red blood slowly oozing forth, but he was ingenious and saved himself by turning the vicious rats in the dungeon into a useful tool! Ah, what fantastic literary irony. The Pit and the Pendulum is a sort of mental and psychic torture. I wonder how many days the blade was descending over? The end could certainly not be as painful as compared with other physical torture devices, like the rack, used to elicit confessions. Who can forget that wacky human enclosure with spikes on the door? What amazing creativity. I've always been fascinated by the Guillotine in use during the French revolution. The doctor Guillotine was very humane and was tormented by the visions of humans who had a few moments of discomfort and displeasure ensuing after failing to perfectly align their necks with the executioner's blade. Of course, one swift and single CHOP! was ideal, but sometimes the executioner was drunk, or maybe his mask was in the way, and it took more than one CHOP! CHOP! CHOP! over a period of a few seconds to dispatch the soul on its merry journey. Guillotine invented his ingenious device, and executions were very rapidly improved in reliability and accuracy. This was very useful because all kinds of terrorists, counterrevolutionaries, and criminals had hidden themselves in the guise of the Victorious Revolution, and the public turned on itself after all the discredited leaders had been accounted for (in--what else?--a `head count'). The Guillotine was really unsurpassed in its efficiency at the time, a real technological marvel. I'm sure there were many people at the time who were quite impressed by it, and said that it was a fine piece of machinery, and that even though it could be put to evil uses, `Guillotines don't kill people, people kill people' and therefore no one should have any qualms about its existence and continued use, or safeguards and restrictions and regulations governing the authority of its operation by naive and unskilled unprofessionals, or even criminals, themselves ready amateur Executioners. One said, `yes, surprising as it sounds, I'm coming out in favor of the Guillotine.' The people got what they wanted. They weren't about to let some sinister, evil, oppressive government stand in their way of exercising their true glorious birthright freedoms, like killing each other. One of the things that really fascinates me is the possibility of cyberspatial-oriented murder. It seems to me that in a CryptoAnarchic society where there is no government or social order, things like hired assassins will be more readily hired, and certainly more abundant. What do you do when you are robbed or harassed? Call the police? Ha, ha, there are none of those annoying, meddlesome, timeconsuming and troublesome Social Justice Farces in our Private Utopia. Imagine the delight of hiring hitmen with completely untraceable cash, and communicating with them with Chaum style DC nets to describe the victim and pinpoint one's enemies for execution. That reminds me of the Focaultian idea that punishment and torture is related to the human body. The theory is, if you don't have a physical body, you can't experience pain. Some pseudospoofers in the psychopunk cult have suggested that they are unaccountable in this fashion -- pseudospoofing allows them to achieve a sort of godlike omnipresence and transcendance through their myriads of ephemeral identities. Actually, this philosophy appears to originate with one of the leaders and is a central tenet of their idolatry. The `fluidity of identity' exists in Cyberspace, to some extent, but all the pseudospoofers I know still have a real-world body that bleeds like any other, and all their tricky circumventions of its existence are no match for superior technology. That's The Truth! ``Any sufficiently evil machination is indistinguishable from murder.'' --S.Boxx ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Public Enemy #1
by an12070＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't know where all these slanderous accusations that I am L.Detweiler come from. I want to have absolutely nothing to do with that paranoid conspiracy theorist. People who are associating me with him are nothing but scurrilous hypocrites. You only allow anonymity so long as it doesn't threaten you personally! PseudoAnonymity that attacks the government through tax evasion and black marketeering is OK, but pseudoanonymity of L.Detweiler (who is really Hitler's grandson), who attacks the Cypherpunks, is Heretic Blasphemy, and he must be tracked down and punished! Why is it that no one bothers T.C.May about BlackNet or Deadbeat, anyway? I guess stealing information is a legitimate use of anonymity, but exposing corruption through whistleblowing is not. All of you who are so smugly certain that I am L.Detweiler, where do you get your insane fantasies? The only thing I can think of that would be objective and qualitative is the extensive style analysis software of E.Hughes, but it seems to me that would also show that he is posting pseudoanonymously under G.Broiles, and besides he's not really interested in sharing any of his software with anyone anyway, especially whatever helps him pseudospoof and detect it by others. However, I have many ideas on how to get even with L.Detweiler for his callous disregard for pseudospoofing. Imagine, the sheer arrogance of attacking our holy religion, and making our leaders look like pathetic fools for their deceptions! We are left trying to defend them with increasingly worthless tentacles. Y'know the ones that penetrated RISKS? They are *really* valuable, like N.Szabo, and he is on to them all. The man is an arrogant bastard for trying to prevent us from our joyous deceptions, perversions, and depravities. We have to make him pay. What can we do? One thing to do would be to slander him in public forums. I mean, he has done the tiniest smidgeon of CryptoAnarchic work, like that Anonymity FAQ (which was usefully infiltrated by quite a few of our pseudospoofed tentacles, including the eminent N.Szabo). But otherwise, he's just a self-important asshole like G.Spafford who has no life out of cyberspace. We should show no mercy. I propose that we mailbomb him some more beyond P.Metzger's feeble assault. And D.Barnes has not gone nearly far enough to root out his personal associates and friends and find any useful blackmail or other leverage, like his employer. E.Hughes and T.C.May can try harassing his postmaster some more. Maybe we can get the Holy Grail -- get him to lose his Internet account. Damn, that would be AWESOME. We wouldn't have to put up with any more of those slimy verbose FAQs. `Privacy and Anonymity' HAH. more like Pathetic Assholery. Here's an idea. I've been tampering with REMOBZ a lot lately and have gotten pretty good at it. I hear L.Detweiler was looking for a job awhile ago. (I stole his resume with a fake job advertisement in his mailbox as bait. Hee, hee! what a dickhead.) I am going to try to tap his home phone line and figure out what employers he has been talking to. I can rig it so that when they call his number, I spoof his answering machine (this is possible by recording his own message onto my own answering machine and redirecting the phone call). The employer records his message, `you have the job, report to work at 9:00 tomorrow' like nothing is wrong. But L.Detweiler never shows up! Hee,hee. And if he tries to find out what went wrong, he looks like a hallucinating drug user. `I never got your message on my answering machine!' Ah, a grand psychopunk prank in line with the best of the legendary K.Mitnik revenge techniques. (The master!) Here's another idea. We all know how much WetLiar admires that clueless NYT reporter Markoff -- you know the guy, the one who fell for our Big Movement facade hook line and sinker. (Hee, hee! Privacy for the Masses! The Cryptographic Revolution!) I propose that we infiltrate his system and impersonate Markoff's email to L.Detweiler. Unless it is for deception, it's not illegal! No problemo! L.Detweiler will go away crestfallen that his hero comes across as a clueless idiot in email. If he calls Markoff in desperation, we can do the old `redirect the phone call' trick and do our best Markoff imitation on the phone. Detweiler is such a clueless, trusting idiot that he won't know the difference. Hee, hee! I love poking holes in other people's delusions. The world is an ugly place, and it's about time that someone did a favor to L.Detweiler and taught him that. The asshole will learn what it means to tangle with Cypherpunks. OK, here's my best idea. You know his cutesy little mama's girl girlfriend, Sonia Applegate? The one that loves to cook him those big dinners when he gets home from a hard day of battling our beauteous tenacles? The one that he is going to marry next spring? (Thanks, BlackNet spies, for all your information, the checks are in the mail, also the REMOBZ wiretapping is also a really invaluable source.) I propose that we call her up and pose as a clinician from an AIDS testing clinic and tell her that L.Detweiler has AIDS and that he listed her as a sex partner. Regurgitate her all her personal information we found off the stolen credit records and then say, Yes, Ma'am, I'm sorry. You'll have to report to the clinic immediately for testing. Hee, hee! ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Secret sharing program available
by rjc＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Note: I'm not subscribed so if you reply, remember to Cc: me] A few hours ago I was bored so I started experimenting with Shamir "threshold" sharing in G++. The result: Cryptosplit. It's a hacked up but working implementation of polynomial interpolation over an integer field of prime order. Basically, you can take an arbitrary integer, D, generate m keys, k of which are required to reconstruct the original integer. Its inner workings are very simple. Pick a random polynomial P(x) of degree (k-1) over Z_p with constant term D, and generate m 2-tuples (x, P(x)). These "keys" are output in the form x*p+y which can be reversed by the division algorithm. The interpolation process generates a k X k matrix of linear equations by plugging (x,y) into y=a_n*x_n + ... + a_1*x + 1*D and then solving by Gaussian elimination (upper triangular matrix. element k,k is the constant term D) Right now it's not very usable since you have to choose your own prime modulus > D (I was too lazy to write a prime generation routine. I just choose Mersenne primes of sufficient size) and because it only accepts base-ten input from the command line. It needs to be optimized a lot too. If anyone wants the source (especially if they want to fix it up), let me know. -Ray -- Ray Cromwell | Engineering is the implementation of science; -- -- rjc(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu | politics is the implementation of faith. --

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CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT
by an12070＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ATTENTION ALL INTERNET PERSONNEL THE INTERNET OUTLET szabo(a)netcom.com HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A CRYPTOANARCHIST CYBERSPACE INFILTRATION SITE TO A 93.67% DEGREE CERTAINTY VIA PSEUDOSPOOFING DETECTION SOFTWARE. MAIL, POSTS, AND OTHER EMANATIONS FROM THIS OUTLET ARE CONSIDERED LIKELY TO BE HIGHLY SUBVERSIVE AND DANGEROUS CRYPTOANARCHIST DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA FROM ONE OR MORE CRYPTOANARCHIST CO-CONSPIRATORS. MULTIPLE SENSITIVE INTERNET MAILING LISTS, FAQS, AND FORUMS HAVE BEEN CONTAMINATED. INFORMATION ORIGINATING FROM THIS OUTLET IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS IS PARTICULARLY SUSPECT: - PROMOTION OF PSEUDOANONYMITY AND THE COLLECTION OF MULTIPLE FAKE CYBERSPACE IDENTITIES (MISTATED AS `PURE ANONYMITY') - PROMOTION OF UNTRACEABLE `BLACK' CASH AND RELATED CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES (PARTICULARLY CHAUMIAN) - FALSE REFERENCES AND DISINFORMATION ON THE ACTUAL `CRYPTOANARCHIST' AGENDA - PROMOTION OF THE `COLLAPSE OF GOVERNMENTS' - SUBTLE ANTI-DEMOCRACY GOALS AND ANTI-DEMOCRATIC SENTIMENTS - PROMOTION OF DISINFORMATION, PROPAGANDA, AND DECEPTION E.G. IN THE MEDIA - PROMOTION OF TAX EVASION - PROMOTION OF CRIMINAL EVASION OF IDENTITIFICATION MEASURES FOR E.G. BLACK MARKETEERING - ELEVATING AND PERPETUATING SUBVERSIONS OF IDENTITY E.G. PSEUDOSPOOFING AND PSEUDOPOOLS AS `LIBERATING FLUIDITY OF IDENTITY' ON THE INTERNET - PROMOTION OF ABUSE OF INFORMATION THROUGH E.G. LEAKS, BURGLARY, OR ESPIONAGE - FALSE DETAILS ON PERSONAL IDENTITY AND CORROBORATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER IDENTITIES - INFILTRATION, PROVOCATION, AND SABOTAGE OF MAILING LIST DISCUSSIONS OUTSIDE OF CHARTERS INTO THE `CRYPTOANARCHIST' AGENDA - PROMOTION OF OTHER FAKE IDENTITIES - PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ATTACKS ON REAL IDENTITIES EMPLOYING COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE CRYPTOANARCHIST MOVEMENT - MANIPULATION AND TERRORISM IN PRIVATE MAIL - COLLECTION OF SENSITIVE PRIVATE INFORMATION AND MAIL FROM COMMUNICATING `OUTSIDE' INDIVIDUALS INTERNET INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS ARE ADVISED TO EXAMINE AND PURGE ARCHIVES AND RECORDS OF ALL INFORMATION ORIGINATING FROM THIS OUTLET AS CRYPTOANARCHIST DISINFORMATION. ITEMS RECOVERED FROM THIS OUTLET SHOULD BE REPOSTED FOR PUBLIC EXPOSURE. QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS ADVISORY ALERT CAN BE ADDRESSED TO cypherpunks(a)toad.com BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE CRYPTOANARCHIST MOVEMENT IS AVAILABLE IN RISKS 15.25, 15.27, AND 15.28X, FTP CRVAX.SRI.COM DIRECTORY /RISKS: ADDITIONAL BULLETINS WILL BE ISSUED AS EVENTS WARRANT. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi. [end posting] > BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE CRYPTOANARCHIST MOVEMENT IS AVAILABLE IN > RISKS 15.25, 15.27, AND 15.28X, FTP CRVAX.SRI.COM DIRECTORY /RISKS: well, i've looked on crvax.sri.com and there is no (at least not anonymously ftp'able) risk directory. what is a cryptoanarachist anyway? see you william

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One man - One vote - One Program (another Boardwatch excerpt)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

excerpted from: B O A R D W A T C H M A G A Z I N E Guide to the World of Online Services Editor: Jack Rickard Volume VII: Issue 11 ISSN:1054-2760 November 1993 ============== EDITORS' NOTES ============== One Man - One Vote - One Program The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action document was released September 12 and made available to the online community in full ascii text form the same day. This document outlines the administration's blueprint for a future national data highway. We don't normally devote nine pages of Boardwatch to publishing government literature. But, while the document is easily available electronically, this will probably affect everyone online at some point or another. You will undoubtedly see it quoted and analyzed in coming months, but I'm going to guess the full text is not going to be carried widely in print. So we decided to run the whole thing - albeit as "the fine print." The NII Agenda is remarkable in that they did manage to assemble every cliche in the free world regarding online communications and actually pile them all into one document. As government detritus goes, it is actually quite readable. A persistent, if effete segment of the online community has campaigned for some time for government to "get involved" online. They parade across Washington in a continuous stream attempting to get our government to fund various notions of what they want the online world to look like. And in some areas, government participation in the online process has been productive. The National Science Foundation has devoted a relatively modest amount of public investment in the Internet and this money has leveraged a hundred times that much private investment in the technology. I agree, there is a role for government in the future network. But in the context of the other things this administration is trying to do, I originally approached this topic with some trepidation. These people have no moral qualms whatsoever in saying one thing and doing quite another. The concepts of truth and lies and right and wrong are foreign to their view of the way the world works. The action items regarding encryption and copyright law revision are worded innocently enough. Beneath those words I detect an agenda more in keeping with the current health care program proposal, the budget recently passed, a corps of youth working for the government, the addition of 50,000 police officers on a national basis, and an entire political agenda focused quite single mindedly on one thing - control of the population - at all levels and in areas American's just aren't accustomed to thinking of as something anyone would want to control. This document does refer to legislation that would open the local telephone loop to competition - a concept we first came out for in 1988. The legislation they refer to basically frees the local telephone companies to provide video, information, long distance services - it has little to do with competition in the local loop other than to provide these telephone companies precisely what they've been lobbying for - freedom to exploit their monopolies on the local line infrastructure. The players are cable tv companies and telephone companies. Six months ago telco U.S. West purchased 25% of Time Warner, and this past week, Bell Atlantic and TCI, the nation's largest cable company holding group, announced a complete merger. The standoff between cable companies and telephone companies is over - and there will be LESS competition, not more. The inside deal making all of this work is that the government becomes a "partner" in developing our telecommunications infrastructure - the "controlling" influence. The more pressing current concern is encryption and privacy. The administration rolled out the Clipper Chip proposal earlier this year as a toe in the water. Clinton apologists are quick to point out that this was a Bush administration proposal. Poppycock. There are thousands of proposals making the rounds in Washington in a continous cloud - the plankton of the political seascape. A relative handful ever see the light of day. This one, given little chance under the Bush administration, did under President Clinton. The Clipper Chip concept is a bit startling. Everyone gets to encrypt their data, and in fact are encouraged to do so - with the government holding the decryption keys. I can't separate the stupid from those accused of stupid here, so I'll just note that it was proposed, and is still pursued. But they do apparently feel it important that if anyone has any "secret stuff", the government should, as a matter of course, have access to it. You have no "right" to privacy - quite the contrary. In health care, before it is over, if you want health care coverage, it will only be available in ONE place - a government office. You will present yourself in person, along with a little basket of receipts showing you've paid your taxes, registered for the draft, the national service program, given blood, quit smoking, have exercised regularly, have your car insurance in order, your driver's license, social security receipt, and anything else necessary to "make us safe." And if all your papers are in order, and you pay the fees, you will receive a little plastic card allowing you to visit a doctor or clinic. George Orwell never had it so good. And I would fear this same socialist greed for control of our lives will be applied to the online community via this National Information Infrastructure. I would, but I don't, and I'm feeling particularly enchanted right now by why I don't. First, they can be counted on to be as buffoonish about it as possible given the laws of physics. Currently, the State Department is actually pursuing a lone Boulder programmer with a Grand Jury investigation of possible infraction of export controls - alleging that he illegally exported a data encryption program - Pretty Good Privacy. The farce is of course that he never left Boulder. He posted it on a couple of local Internet sites, and of course, within about 12 minutes it was all over the world. It allows anyone to encrypt e-mail messages in such a fashion that all the kings horses and all the kings men can't figure out what the hell you said in it on a bet. And this is the heartening jewel. The online world has always moved powerfully toward the least common denominator grass roots end of the electronic path. All things that have grown have grown DOWN toward the end user, not UP toward a central authority. The entire energy in the online explosion has been OUT and DOWN and many of the innovations have been to extend functionality to the least equipment, at the least cost, in a never ending quest for "free" and something I can run on my OWN computer. The natural conclusion of this will be instant worldwide communication from a handheld $4 pocket calculator. The Internet is fascinating in that it is a belief system that allows people to connect to a common backbone for communications. That was the part we needed. Something persuasively "in the middle." But it was ALL we needed. There are now 130 million personal computers out there. And some percentage of these people are Phil Zimmermanns. This one man, with one wee little Borland compiler, wrote a piece of software. And whether they prosecute him to make him an example or not, he released ONE program in the wee hours of the morning in 1991, that will never allow the government or anyone else to put the data encryption genie back in the bottle. It did not change the world. It demonstrated that the world had changed. It's free. It's everywhere. There is no way to track down all the copies in all the world. It transcends national boundaries. He did it for the notoriety - and he got it. But he could have just as easily done it anonymously. An avowed leftist himself, he really gets just as bristley as Pat Buchanon from the far right on this thing about government control of individuals. And he's not alone. Whatever elaborate systems are contrived, at the cost of billions of dollars, with the full collusion of giant corporate telco/cable entities controlling vast territories of fiberglass and copper, they will become symbols of vanity - towers of Babel standing in testimony to the futility of trying to use electronics to control people. Electronics is a good material for building freedom, and a most notably poor one for forging chains. Wherever there is one guy with an attitude, a compiler, and a few free afternoons, all the plans and all the plots of all the kings go awry with a single program release. We have lots of guys with attitudes, lots of compilers, and lots of afternoons. Let them build the NII. Let us use it without fear. With a handful of Zimmermanns, we can remake the world to suit us. Now, if only we could get Phil to compile us a health care program.... Jack Rickard Editor Rotundus P.S. Mr. Zimmermann, guilty, innocent, free, or jailed, will undoubtedly incur the usual mountain of legal fees - poor thanks for his contribution. It might just serve an interesting purpose to make a numeric show of force on his behalf to demonstrate that the usual economic coercion won't work either. Stick a lone dollar bill in an envelope and send it to his legal defense fund. For a buck twenty-nine, it's a cheap political statement. And if enough of us do it, maybe the world will change again. Phil Zimmermann Legal Defense Fund c/o Philip Dubois, Esq. 2305 Broadway Boulder, CO 80304

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Pretty Good Hero? (Boardwatch excerpt)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

excerpted from: B O A R D W A T C H M A G A Z I N E Guide to the World of Online Services Editor: Jack Rickard Volume VII: Issue 11 ISSN:1054-2760 November 1993 ============== LEGALLY ONLINE ============== by Lance Rose Phil Zimmermann is a computer programmer and good citizen with an earnest desire to help others. For much of his adult life he expressed his concern through political activism, from marches in the 70's through teaching classes in military policy in the 80's. Along the way, Zimmermann became a computer network user. As the 90's began, he saw a new threat to our civil rights surface: a movement to curtail the ability of network users to discuss matters in private. Many others on the net saw the same thing, but Zimmermann actually did something about it. He melded his humanitarian ideals with his programming and cryptographic skills to create an e-mail encryption program for Everyman called Pretty Good Privacy, or PGP. He did this at no small cost to himself. An independent computer consultant, Zimmermann shelved most of his paying gigs while finishing up PGP, missing five mortgage payments on his family's home in the process. Zimmermann finished PGP in early 1991, released it in the U.S. on the Internet from his home in Colorado, and it instantly achieved worldwide popularity among network cognoscenti. PGP is free, and its customers get a lot more than they bargained for. It uses a powerful RSA public key encryption system, in which each participant owns one or more private key/public key pairs. Messages encrypted by one key in the pair can only be decrypted using the other key. The great advantage of public key encryption is that, unlike older schemes, like DES, (the current U.S. standard), you can publicly circulate the key for encrypting messages sent to you by others, since only your secret private key can decrypt those messages. When someone sends you a private message using PGP, first it encrypts the message text using the IDEA algorithm, (the International Data Encryption Algorithm, developed in Europe and comparable to DES), and generates a unique, confidential key just for decrypting the message (we'll call it the "text key"). Then he or she uses the RSA public key they received from you to encrypt the text key, and sends you both the IDEA-encrypted message and the RSA-encrypted text key. You would then use your RSA private key to decrypt the text key, and finally use the text key in turn to decrypt IDEA-encrypted message. It would be conceptually simpler to use only the RSA public and private keys for encrypting and decrypting the text, and cut out the IDEA encryption step, but there is a practical cost. Text encryption using RSA requires far more computer processing time and power than IDEA-based encryption. Zimmermann wanted to give people the full benefit of PGP without wasting time watching their computers crunch numbers, so he used the far easier to process, (but still highly secure), IDEA technique for message texts, and saved the public key RSA process for encrypting only the IDEA text keys, which are a mere 128 bits long. Thus, PGP creates securely encrypted texts, gives people the ability to distribute their public keys far and wide with no compromise in security, and extends strong encryption capabilities to those with small computers. After its release PGP became something of a community development project, and it is now in version 2.3. Other programmers and cryptographers work on enhancing the source code, creating foreign language translations of the user interface, and porting PGP from its original DOS platform to other popular computer platforms such as Mac, Vax, and most flavors of Unix, further increasing its usefulness to network users of all stripes. In the past two months, however, some dramatic new chapters swiftly opened in the ongoing saga of Phil Zimmermann and PGP. First, on the positive side, some patent-related questions nagging PGP from the very beginning finally may be close to resolution. As soon as PGP appeared, a West Coast company called Public Key Partners, headed by Jim Bidzos, claimed it violated a patent they held in computer implementations of the RSA encryption algorithm. While Bidzos did not rush into court, he did seek to suppress PGP's distribution. Among other things, he sought out the major online distribution points for PGP, such as large online services like CompuServe and GEnie BBS's including The Well, and requested that they immediately remove the PGP files from distribution because they infringed on his patents. Most services discontinued providing PGP,and it soon became an underground classic, difficult to find unless you asked the right people. Fortunately, there were many such spread across the net. Rather than challenge the patent claim, which some net observers think a worthwhile effort, Zimmermann made many requests to Bidzos to obtain a license to use RSA without hassle in PGP. Eventually, network community and industry leaders tried to obtain some sort of compromise between Zimmermann and Bidzos. Bidzos refused all entreaties and continues to oppose PGP. In the meantime, a software company named ViaCrypt obtained a license a year or two ago from Public Key Partners, (who appear willing to license virtually anyone but Zimmermann), to use the RSA algorithm in software. ViaCrypt took some time after securing the rights to figure out how it would use them. Finally, last August, it approached Zimmermann with a proposal to create a commercial version of PGP. This was a great business opportunity. ViaCrypt could use its license to legitimize PGP for the commercial market, and both could profit from PGP's high profile among companies interested in encryption. To bring PGP within ViaCrypt's license from Bidzos, Zimmermann and ViaCrypt have been replacing PGP's existing RSA encryption subroutines with comparable licensed subroutines developed by ViaCrypt. Bidzos, through his attorney, publicly expressed some doubt about whether the new ViaCrypt product will fall within its RSA license rights. Anticipating this possibility, ViaCrypt shrewdly trumped it in advance by securing a legal opinion from Brown and Bain, considered by many computer lawyers, (this author included), to be the leading computer law firm in the country, that the hybrid product is within the scope of ViaCrypt's license from Public Key Partners. The new program, tentatively brand named ViaCrypt PGP, is scheduled for rollout on November 8th of this year. If ViaCrypt PGP succeeds in the market, Zimmermann will make some money, though he was never really was in it for the money. He is also working on a new approach to the free version of PGP that may end the patent threats that continually hinder its open distribution on the net. His current efforts center on a set of encryption subroutines called RSAREF, released by Bidzos through another of his companies, RSA Data Securities Inc. (RSADSI). There is a license to the public to use the RSAREF subroutines free for noncommercial purposes: you can't make money selling it, and you can't use it for commercial messaging. By replacing PGP's custom RSA subroutines with publicly licensed equivalents from RSAREF, Zimmermann could end the patent infringement problem. RSAREF was designed to let programmers develop privacy-enhanced mail (PEM) programs using a scheme similar to that used by PGP. The text is encrypted using an easy-to-process encryption algorithm involving a single key, ending the patent infringement problem may not have been as easy at it first seemed. The text key is encrypted using the processing-intensive RSA public key scheme. The problem is that for the text encryption stage, RSADSI chose the DES algorithm instead of the IDEA algorithm used in PGP. DES was not perceived as a problem cipher until August of this year, at a cryptographers' trade show called Crypto 93. A respected Bell Northern Research scientist named Michael Weiner dropped a bombshell on the conference by asserting, in essence, that DES was dead, as a dependably secure encryption algorithm. Weiner had designed a high-speed "inside-out" DES processor chip that could test 50 million keys per second, and serve as a the basis for a highly effective DES-cracking machine. He had also priced production of the chip with a chip fabricator, and in large but not enormous quantities it would cost about $10.50 per chip. Using these figures, he said a computer with 7,000 such chips would cost a vast amount, and could find the key to any DES-encrypted message within 7 hours by testing every possible key within that time, with a mean key-cracking time of 3.5 hours per encrypted message. For $100 million, well within intelligence agency budgets, a computer could be built that would crack the keys for DES-encrypted messages at a clip of two minutes per key. This result would be achieved for texts encrypted with 56 bit DES keys, where the decryptor has a little bit of plain text he knows would be in the encrypted message, such as someone's name, or a word or two. There are DES encryption schemes using longer keys, but the 56 bit key is the U.S. government standard, and the official or de facto standard in many industry applications as well. Weiner's brute force approach would be marvelously effective despite its lack of elegance. For PEM computer programs using RSAREF in its current form, there can no longer be dependable privacy. All texts encrypted using RSAREF's standard 56 bit DES approach will, from this point forward, be vulnerable to cracking at some point by a Weiner-type supercomputer. It will be pointless to hide the DES key inside RSA encryption. Owners of the supercomputer could find the key directly from the text, and need not bother with the encrypted key. As Phil puts it, the RSA encryption of the DES key is like those little secure boxes for holding front-door keys that realtors mount on houses being shown to prospective buyers. The little box may be nearly impossible to break into without the proper code, but there's always another possibility for getting into the house without permission: break down the door or smash in the window. There's a way to avoid this with RSAREF, by invoking deeper subroutines in the package to create PEM programs that use text encryption schemes more dependable than the suddenly-reduced DES, such as the IDEA algorithm used today in PGP. IDEA uses a 128 bit key instead of the 56 bit key standard in DES, and its security has not been seriously questioned to date, despite spirited attacks by some of the world's mightiest cryptographers. Unfortunately, the current RSAREF public license only permits programmers to use the high-level routines that require DES, and prohibits using the deeper routines to bring in other encryption algorithms - the very use necessary for PGP to remain dependably secure. However, after the Weiner revelation, RSAREF will not be in much demand if it continues to restrict PEM programmers to 56 bit DES. Accordingly, it is rumored that a public license to the deeper, roll-your-own algorithm subroutines in RSAREF may soon be forthcoming from RSADSI. If this new license is issued, Zimmermann may finally be home free in his quest to create a free, effective PGP with no specter of patent infringement hovering over it. It is possible that by the end of this year or early in the next, we will see both a commercial ViaCrypt PGP, and a free PGP for personal noncommercial use. That's the good news. The bad news is that Phil Zimmermann is now the target of an investigation by the U.S. attorney's office into violations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, or ITAR. ITAR is a set of laws administered by the State Department, designed to keep war-grade weapons from being exported out of the U.S. to certain foreign countries. While ITAR mainly regulates weapons-like parts for tanks, jets and submarines, it also regulates encryption devices, including encryption software, as "munitions" due to their military intelligence value. The U.S. attorney is not commenting at this early stage, but observers agree the investigation relates to PGP's worldwide distribution through the Internet. This distribution constituted a clean end run around the State Department's normal procedure of placing a roadblock against all cryptography exports, until they are reviewed by the National Security Agency for military potential. What is unclear, is whether Zimmermann did anything wrong by placing PGP on the Internet on computers located within the U.S. There are very good reasons for saying that Zimmermann's actions were totally legal, and that he should not have this cloud over his head. For one thing, Zimmermann did not intend for PGP to be exported. He was never motivated to put out an international encryption standard. To the contrary, his motivation was the perception that political forces within the U.S. seemed to be pushing towards outlawing private encryption in this country. In fact, he acted specifically to put PGP into circulation quickly while it was still legal in this country, before any laws might go into place prohibiting domestic use of privately developed encryption software. For another, Internet users outside the U.S. helped themselves to PGP. Zimmermann did not send PGP anywhere outside the country. He made it available on computers within U.S. borders, which is perfectly legal in itself. By analogy, I could legally go door-to- door in this country selling devices enabling people to encrypt their telephone discussions. I can even leave an open box of them in front of my house in New Jersey, and tell all my neighbors to pick one up for their own use. If some foreign tourists take a few and spirit them back into their own countries, why should I be held guilty for export violations? In addition, Zimmermann and all the users of PGP in this country have their First Amendment rights. Zimmermann has the right to freely publish the PGP program in this country. The Constitution says Congress will enact "no law" restricting freedom of speech and of the press. There are no Amendments to the Constitution that contain exceptions for speech or press distributed through the Internet. Additionally, people who send electronic messages to each other have the right to send them encrypted without government interference, and legal action against PGP would certainly interfere with such activities. In this instance, PGP's free speech rights derive from its assistance of PGP users in exercising their own rights of free speech. This kind of derivative free speech protection is very powerful. It is analogous to the protection of speech distributors applied in the past by the Supreme Court and other federal courts to book sellers, magazine distributors, and even CompuServe. Finally, there are privacy considerations. This is not really a legal argument, as much as a question of the limits of appropriate government intrusion into peoples' private lives. The question comes up almost daily these days, in settings ranging from the privacy of employee e-mail to the swelling commercial market for extensive data on each citizen in our country of consumers. A government push against the availability of PGP, regardless of the legal cause, would count as yet another blow against the dwindling ability of us all to retain a modicum of personal privacy. As the cypherpunks are often heard to say, "if privacy becomes outlawed, only outlaws will have privacy." Powerful as these and other arguments are, they will not deter government action on their own. The government can offer the fairly standard legal argument that Zimmermann "knew or should have known," that placing PGP on the Internet would result in worldwide export in violation of the ITAR. After speaking with Zimmermann, I am not sure he actually knew, in particular, that there was a law called ITAR, or that it applied to encryption software. As mentioned above, he certainly was not out to distribute PGP worldwide. Whether the government proceeds will depend as much on political factors as on its view of the legalities involved. The investigation is at an early stage, and in fact, has not been directed formally at Zimmermann. The only activity in public view so far was the service of subpoenas for document production by the U.S. Attorney's office in San Jose, CA on Viacrypt in Phoenix, AZ and another company named Austin Code Works in Austin, TX. Austin Code Works distributes PGP and other free software for encryption and other uses in source code form, for little more than the price of a computer disk. According to Zimmermann, he has no business relationship with Austin Code Works. He also had no idea they were distributing PGP until he read about the subpoena served on them. As soon as Austin Code Works was served, its president, Grady Ward, went public on the Internet with a ringing defense of its position. Ward claims they do not distribute executable programs, but only "source code algorithmic descriptions" of encryption techniques, thus falling under a "technical data" exception to ITAR. The State Department publicly countered that position, and is requiring Austin Code Works to register as a munitions dealer. There is no telling whether the investigation will proceed to charges against Zimmermann or others, but Zimmermann and others in the network community intend to be prepared. Phil Zimmermann's attorney, Colorado criminal lawyer Philip Dubois, is accepting contributions for Zimmermann's defense, (He can be reached at Philip Dubois, Esq., 2305 Broadway, Boulder, CO 80304, (303)444-3885, dubois(a)csn.org) The Electronic Frontier Foundation is also stepping forward in Zimmermann's defense, with financial commitments from EFF and several of its individual board members, and efforts to rally public support for Zimmermann and PGP. A lingering question in the current investigation is why the government waited over two years after PGP's release to start it up. Some speculate it is due to a link between the investigation and the government's efforts to establish a new encryption standard named CLIPPER as the replacement for the aging DES standard. The government has repeatedly stated it will not seek to make Clipper the only legal encryption standard in this country by outlawing all others. But if it proceeds to charge Zimmermann and PGP as a result of the current investigation, it could have the effect of using the government's legal artillery to blow away one of Clipper's most prominent competitors. Speculation aside, PGP's legal situation is slowly maturing, and within another year or so we should know for sure whether it's legal or illegal in the U.S. By that time, it will be in the hands of millions of people the world over, each using PGP to create his or her own private communications channel. Hopefully, we will not have to witness the ironic spectacle of PGP being banned in the country of its birth, while freely in use in the rest of the world. [Lance Rose is an attorney practicing high-tech and information law in Montclair, NJ. He can be found on the Internetat elrose(a)well.sf.ca.us, and on Compuserve at 72230,2044. He is also author of SysLaw, the legal guide for online service providers, available from PC Information Group at 800-321-8285. Pretty Good Privacy is available in it's latest July 1, 1993 release as PGP23A.ZIP with C language source code in PGP23ASR.ZIP. Phil Zimmermann can be reached at Boulder Software Engineering, 3021 Eleventh Street, Boulder, Colorado 80304; (303)541-0140 voice/fax; or via Internet at prz(a)acm.org ViaCrypt will make the commercial PGP available at an intro price of $100. ViaCrypt, 2104 W. Peoria, Phoenix, AZ 80209, (602) 944-1543. - Editor

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Banning any subscriber
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi again, I want to thank everyone for their repsonce to my earlier mail. I do have some questions however. 1. CypherPunks supports crypto so people cant tamper w/ my mail but you want to censor somebody at the source. How can you support this? 2. Everyone says this list is private. Nowhere has this EVER been mentioned in any conversation or info that I have read. The implication in all the posts, print articles, and talk at the local group meet led me to believe CypherPunks was a public forum for discussion and implimentation of crypto related material. Was I misunderstanding something? 3. Sine at least part of the networks and hardware the mail list is used on is publily funded how can you construe it as private w/o some form of moderator or subscriction contract? 4. The responces to L.D. about mail-bombs and posing as a AIDS lab is much worse and more troublesome to me than anything I have seen L.D. post. Not only is some of the actions proposed criminal but I fail to see how a group which relies on its reputation can support or condone such comments. 5. If you don't like what he says then kill the mail and forget it.

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Re: Give me your password- OR ELSE!
by kkirksey＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>Car alarms and security systems didn't convince the criminals who make their >>living ripping off cars that the *Good ole days were over* and it was time >>to get a job at Burger Sri, it spurred them to find new methods to ply >>their trade. > >How do you know this? Clearly some crooks may have just moved to more >violent methods, but it's quite probable that others moved off to >other fields where it's easier to make a buck, either legal or >illegal. Quite. From _Point Blank: Guns & Violence in America_ by Dr. Gary Kleck: "Like noncriminals, however, criminals do many things that are casually or only weakly motivated. Indeed, much crime is impulsive or opportunistic, with criminals committing some crimes only if it requires little effort and entails little risk (Feeney 1986)." Ken ============================================================================= Ken Kirksey kkirksey(a)world.std.com Mac Guru & Developer ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Among the many misdeeds of the British rule in India, history will look upon the act of depriving a whole nation of arms, as the blackest. - Mahatma Ghandi

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