December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Does this seem illegal?
by an15348＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS Uu> From: gg(a)well.sf.ca.us ("George A. Gleason") Uu> ...Thank you, operator. A warm bulge rises in your pants as Uu> you contemplate your next move. Boy are you going to teach her a Uu> lesson! Uu> This special moment brought to you by Sprint TeleMap. Wait. You've done this before, right? ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Re: Definition of "Zero Knowledge"
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

khijol!erc(a)apple.com (Ed Carp) said: >This reminds me of a science fiction story that I read once, published in >Analog: the smart-ass encrypted the solution of how to produce stable >antimatter, or cold fusion, or something similar, using Godel's Theorem. > >The politicos back on Earth said that it would take them 200 years to >factor the N-size number that was sent back to Earth. :) > >Now, if I could just remember the name of the story and the issue... "The Gold at the Starbow's End", Frederik Pohl, Ballantine Books, 1972. Serialized in Analog in '71 or 72. Great book! You're showing your age. ;-) ( Like I'm not...if anyone on the list wasn't born at that point, I don't wanna hear about it :-) I think this was the first place I ever heard of Go"del numbering. Doug

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Re: Does this seem illegal to you?
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

mgream(a)acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream) said: >Although, it must be said that CDROM whitepages are available, and i'm >ignorant of what limitations have been built into them to stop people >(i.e. corporations) turning them into reverse directories. In the U.S., you can buy CD-ROM white pages for the entire US for $99, and the same database reverse-directoried for another $99. (Approximately; this is from memory from a magazine ad I saw 4 days ago.) Such things have been available on paper for a long time, but this media and these prices will doubtless have social repercussions. As before, people can make a point of having their address not listed in any such directory, forward or reverse, if they're careful enough. However, the need to do so probably increases as reverse indexing becomes so vastly more available. Doug

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Message to the net (fwd)
by Jeremy R. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a message a friend of mine wanted me to post on the 'Net. I figured the Cypherpunk list would be one of the best places to start. Jeremy Smith ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: 20 Sep 93 02:02:13 EDT From: Ole Grunbaum, 75320,672 To: Jeremy Smith, >INTERNET:jersmit@eis.calstate.edu Date: , 22:47 Subject: I am a Danish journalist, stationed in the US, writing for a daily newspaper in Copenhagen, mostly about technology, but also gennerally about culture. I am particularly interested in the political and ethical questions that computers and networks pose, pa rticularly in regards to government and large corporations. I have covered a lot of hacker cases, and right now I am interested in the Kevin Poulsen, alias Dark Dante, case. I am looking for people who know Kevin. I can not understand why he has been 30 mo nths now in custody without a court case. If anyone can help me, and are willing to talk to me, please write to my compuserve account, 75320,672 or internet: ogrunba(a)eis.calstate.edu - my name is Ole Grunbaum, and my newspaper is Politiken.

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meaningless rumor
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From a high-level source in contact with an *extremely* high level source: Rumor: Moby Crypto was targeted because G. Ward intended to include PGP on distribution disks. The investigation is primarily PGP oriented, and G. Ward is just a bystander who got caught up. PRZ & PGP is the essential target. Notes (1) phrasing of the subpoenas definitely confirms this -- PGP is mentioned in both. (2) can we find any Usenet postings where G. Ward announced intent to distribute PGP with Moby Crypto to help confirm this? (3) Current Underground Digest just came out -- it (contrarily) hypes the Moby Crypto `attack' as foremost, and *mislabels* PRZ's comments as `reaction to Moby Crypto attack' -- in fact, there is no indication that he knew of Moby Crypto when he wrote those.

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Re: meaningless rumor
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From a high-level source in contact with an *extremely* high level source: Rumor: Moby Crypto was targeted because G. Ward intended to include PGP on distribution disks. The investigation is primarily PGP oriented, and G. Ward is just a bystander who got caught up. PRZ & PGP is the essential target. Notes (1) phrasing of the subpoenas definitely confirms this -- PGP is mentioned in both. (2) can we find any Usenet postings where G. Ward announced intent to distribute PGP with Moby Crypto to help confirm this? Ward posted a note that (in essence) asked for help in evading the ITARs. (Well, I suppose it could have been someone forging a posting...). He went so far as to offer to provide mailing labels to someone abroad who would redistribute Moby Crypto, though from a country where that would be legal -- but never said how the first copy would get to the trans- shipment point. Some reasons were given why this sequence was going to be technically legal -- but if you were a U.S. attorney investigating the export of cryptographic software, it's the sort of thing that almost has to be investigated. Face it -- if Ward *wanted* to generate a test case, he couldn't have done a much better job; a private note to the authorities could have been ``misfiled'', but an announcement to tens of thousands of readers around the world? C'mon -- they may or may not be stupid, and they may or may not be paranoid, but their entire raison d'etre is to wield power, and Grady just slapped that authority in the face. Spitting at your local traffic cop would have been a lot safer. As for PKP -- *somehow*, it wandered out of the U.S. Probably, someone in power decided that that finally needed investigating in detail, to see if a law was broken. And Sternlight is right -- if they decide to indict, they may throw in charges of importing IDEA, though I doubt that they'd indict just on those grounds; in an era of key escrow, they'd certainly like a court to rule they had the power to exclude subversive foreign crypto.... --Steve Bellovin

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Re: What can we do in the next few days? (fwd)
by paul＠poboy.b17c.ingr.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I wrote Grady Ward under separate cover about Bruce Schneier's > upcoming book, published by John Wiley & Sons.. Last I heard, its > title was "Practical Cryptography," and it's scheduled to hit the > streets around November 1st. > The book includes source code for DES, RSA, DH, IDEA, and several > others (Snefru and Lucifer?). IMHO its most salient feature is the > inclusion of that source code _on a floppy._ > This should probably be added to the reference list; I've emailed > Bruce to get the ISBN number and will post it when he responds. > Illegitimus nil carborundum, > -Paul -- Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG | "Change the world for a better tomorrow. But perobich(a)ingr.com | watch your ass today." - aaron(a)halcyon.com Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how.

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Re: meaningless rumor
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Assuming that whoevever implemented PGP did not himself import the cipher, but based the implementation on the EUROCRYPT '90 paper that was 'imported' by Springer-Verlag, I don't understand what the basis would be for such a charge. Now an indictment against Springer for shipping the proceedings (which contained C source code for IDEA) into the US - that would be interesting... As you say, ``assuming''. The Feds can afford to lose that count because of the facts of this case; they can't afford to lose on a point of law. I don't know what the facts are, or what they can prove about them. They may not, either, at this point, pending the results of the grand jury probe.

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Re: KEY ESCROW PROCEDURES
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic(a)eff.org> >Message-Id: <199309181851.AA05084(a)eff.org> >Subject: Re: KEY ESCROW PROCEDURES >Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1993 14:51:57 -0400 (EDT) > >Carl writes: > >> Meanwhile, where is the proof that the key being requested corresponds to >> a person on whom a wiretap has been ordered? > >The authorized key request will normally occur after law-enforcement >officials have snagged the chip serial number from the LEAF >(law-enforcement field) of the signal they captured with an authorized >wiretap. Mike, that's the theory but there is no proof that the signal was captured with an authorized wiretap. For that, the key registration agents have to trust the law enforcement agency. If the LE agency can be trusted, there's no need for the key registration agencies. Part of the reason for encryption of communications is to guard against illegal actions by law enforcement agencies. - Carl

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Re: meaningless rumor
by an5877＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Assuming that whoevever implemented PGP did not himself import the cipher, but > based the implementation on the EUROCRYPT '90 paper that was 'imported' > by Springer-Verlag, According to idea.c in the PGP sources: * Algorithm developed by Xuejia Lai and James L. Massey, of ETH Zurich. * This implementation modified and derived from original C code * developed by Xuejia Lai. Of course, idea.c and PGP as a whole have been substantially improved by an international community; importing their warez may be as much of an "offense" as importing IDEA. (Certainly the prosecution of these actions is equal in absurdity.) DEADBEAT <na5877(a)anon.penet.fi> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQBFAgUBLJ26yfFZTpBW/B35AQEOlQF/WiYCKSLEDU9XDL57YIHGIRxaBae3vIiA BkTK/sLzZKsVPM87Ol2qGRa4n5kttHfU =MCTV -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Newsgroup...
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <Pine.3.05.9309192343.A161-9100000-9100000@netcom3> cvoid(a)netcom.com writes: > So, is there a specific reason why someone hasn't created an > <alt.cypherpunks> newsgroup? It seems appropriate, as most of the current > mass amounts of traffic are dedicated to paranoia and bickering... Erm... because this is the only place left we can have a sensible discussion without Sternlight bringing any argument down to the level of the absurd? G -- Personal mail to gtoal(a)gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings) Business mail to gtoal(a)an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!) Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678 Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212

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Encrypted logins?
by Forrest Aldrich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there a way to set up an encrypted login session, whereby the calling program would need a 'key' in order to decrypt the connection to even see the 'login: ' prompt? I thought I saw something like this for the ham-radio enthusiasts. It uses plain-DES to do the work. But this would require that your calling program be some type of comm prog with the decryption/encryption abilities within. I understand that some gov logins use this type of scheme.

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a quote
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry to add to the S/N ratio, but I can't resist passing on this (unattributed) quote I saw in someone's .sig: > Giving power and money to the government is like giving whiskey and > keys to a 17 year old. Well, I thought it was amusing. :-) Doug

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Re: a quote
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Sorry to add to the S/N ratio, but I can't resist passing on this >(unattributed) quote I saw in someone's .sig: > >> Giving power and money to the government is like giving whiskey and >> keys to a 17 year old. P. J. O'Rourke, _A_ _Parliament_ _of_ _Whores_ -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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Re: a quote
by Peter Wayner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I seem to think the quote should be attributed to P.J. O'Rourke. I'm also pretty sure it came from _Parliament of Whores._ -Peter

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Re: a quote
by jrk＠sys.uea.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lefty writes: >>Sorry to add to the S/N ratio, but I can't resist passing on this >>(unattributed) quote I saw in someone's .sig: >> >>> Giving power and money to the government is like giving whiskey and >>> keys to a 17 year old. > >P. J. O'Rourke, _A_ _Parliament_ _of_ _Whores_ He is American, I presume? Sorry to draw this tangent even further out, but I can't resist pointing out that in the UK it is perfectly legal to give whiskey and keys (car keys, I assume) to a 17 year old, and the heavens have not fallen. "Petrol and matches to a 5 year old" might be a better comparison. -- ____ Richard Kennaway __\_ / School of Information Systems Internet: jrk(a)sys.uea.ac.uk \ X/ University of East Anglia uucp: ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk \/ Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.

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Re: Restrictions on crypto exports
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mike - you write that an FTP archive is a library open to the public. While it looks like one to me, the important thing is convincing a grand jury or jury that it's true, or heading off a prosecutor who'll try to paint ftp archives as 'subversive hacker BBSs' or nonsense like that. (Which won't stop them from treating them as libraries if it's useful for other things they're doing.) Until there are some court cases setting precedent one way or the other, they can try to construe it narrowly when they want narrow and broadly when they want broad. It would seem that some cheap insurance in cases like this is to make sure that most of the interesting material finds its way into paper libraries, and start documenting it. Do you know if anyone's doing this in an organized fashion? (I'm in the process of moving west, so I can't start doing this with my friendly town librarian, but I may try once I'm resettled.) Bill Stewart

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META: list topicality
by hughes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just received this unsubscribe note here on toad.com. >Noise to signal ratio is worse than sci.crypt. Please unsubscribe me. I, personally, am getting tired of worthwhile people unsubscribing from the list because the impropriety of others. Recommendations: 1. Send more private e-mail. Keep your flames of _all_ types off the list. 2. If something offends you, _do_ respond, and only in private. I have the suspicion that certain members of the list are not receiving enough hostile email in response to inappropriate postings. We want more negative and postive reinforcement. 3. This is not a list for paranoids. Shut up here and go somewhere else. If enough people tell you you're paranoid, then it is likely that you _are_ paranoid. 4. Do not immediately reply to postings. Wait, be thoughtful, and make sure you're not going to make an ass out of yourself. And to be sure, there are some asses being made on this list. 5. Exercise restraint. If you must make a response to something, first make sure it shouldn't go in private email. Eric

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Re: Restrictions on crypto exports
by Mike Godwin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Stewart writes: "Mike - you write that an FTP archive is a library open to the public. While it looks like one to me, the important thing is convincing a grand jury or jury that it's true, or heading off a prosecutor who'll try to paint ftp archives as 'subversive hacker BBSs' or nonsense like that." I don't think we disagree here. "Do you know if anyone's doing this in an organized fashion?" No. I'm really just making a prediction of what the likely outcome of such cases will be. --Mike

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Re: a quote
by Peter Wayner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nah. When I'm drunk and driving I always use the left side of the road. If I was in Britain, there would be no problem!

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MISC: thought for the dat
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

thought for the day; In Starfleet, all communications are encrypted automatically. Although there is no honor in knowledge gained through stolen transmissions, some of our enemies have no honor. A true Klingon does not "sneak"-he shouts into the face of his enemy. But I have seen many types of dishonor, and so I am prepared for it. -Lieutenant Worf,chief of security, U.S.S.Enterprise From the star trek next generation book "20th century computers and how they worked" by Jennifer Flynn published by alpha books. ISBN 1-56761-257-1 Brian Williams Cypherpatriot

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money money money...
by Jim McCoy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have been tossing some of the electronic money ideas around in my head, and the two things that seemed to be the hardest problems were how to keep the feds from stomping on such a bank and how to give its currency value. Here are a couple of thoughts on these problems: Legalities: Why does it need to be a bank? Actually, it seems to me that the first step is to actually create the "currency" for use as a means of exchange and let the net provide the banking structure. Once currency exists cryptography will allow for the banking structure to be created in whatever manner the market demands. The hard part seems to be the jump-starting necessary to create the currency and get the system going. So why not approach this as a currency problem and not as a banking problem. In other words, how much easier is it to set up a "currency exchange and check cashing" operation compared to a bank or credit union? All the digital currency exchange would need to take in the money from users, and pay out digital coins in cash. Once such an operation existed the formation of a digital economy would be possible by just migrating existing services to work with the system. Such an operation could support itself by charging a small transaction fee (e.g. $0.25 for deposits and $0.25 for withdrawls plus the postage for sending the check...) Products and Value: I have only glanced over the papers available, but the IMP archive stuff (internet mercantile protocols) might just provide the immediate market for us to piggy-back upon. The imp people seem to be oriented towards using PEM for monetary transactions, but it seems to me that it would be possible to subvert such a system for our own use by simply setting up a server similar to an anonymous remailer that allows one to deposit electronic currency from the previously mentioned currency exchange and then creates a imp system PEM message coming from the remailer. The remailer can ask as a sort of purchasing agent, converting the digital coins created by the currency exchange into whatever type of imp certificates the user wants and it uses the purchasing agents identity to provide the anonymity that the imp schemes seem to not care about... So, what say you fellow cypherpunks? jim p.s. Anyone coming to the crypto conference in Austin Wednesday? If so and you want a copy of my most recent draft of a "Musings on a Crypto-Secure Linux" let me know and I will bring a few printed copies...

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Re: MISC: thought for the dat
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

thought for the day; In Starfleet, all communications are encrypted automatically. Although there is no honor in knowledge gained through stolen transmissions, some of our enemies have no honor. A true Klingon does not "sneak"-he shouts into the face of his enemy. But I have seen many types of dishonor, and so I am prepared for it. -Lieutenant Worf,chief of security, U.S.S.Enterprise From the star trek next generation book "20th century computers and how they worked" by Jennifer Flynn published by alpha books. ISBN 1-56761-257-1 Hardly a new sentiment. From Kahn: ``Gentlemen do not read each other's mail''. Henry Stimson, Secretary of State, 1929, shutting down the American Black Chamber. In 1940, Stimson was Secretary of War, and a recipient of MAGIC....

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Need to Declare Policies on Remailer Record-Keeping
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(I hope this is not considered "off-topic" by anyone.) It would be nice if the operators of the current remailers made clear their archiving/record-keeping policies on remailer traffic. An "ideal mix" is like an "ideal op amp": very hard to build in practice, but very useful as a concept. David Chaum's 1981 paper anticipated many of the issues some of us later discovered, and which are dwell upon at length on this list. Some brief descriptions of the "ideal mix" (remailer): 1. Records. No records kept of incoming or outgoing traffic (in Chaum's mix, done by tamper-resistant hardware implementing software that keeps no records; in DC-Net approach, no single entity knows traffic, so only collusion can reveal traffic). Score: Many remailers keep records/logs, either explicitly ("to help in debugging") or by default (Unix records, system requirements, etc.) I have been shocked on a couple of occasions--a useful, educational shock--to get e-mail messages from the operators of remailers, saying things like "I couldn't help noticing your comments--I agree with you that...." Now partly this was my problem, in that I was not using PGP to chain my transmissions (in which case no snooping remailer operator will be able to get my true name except by colluding or traffic analyis), but it also indicated that some remailers are not taking a sufficiently hands-off policy...more on this point later. 2. Encryption, obviously, to hide mapping between ingoing and outgoing traffic. Score: Pretty good (no pun intended), though use of encryption is reported to be low. PGP has helped immensely. 3. Latency: some number N of messagers needs to be stored (securely, unobservably, as in #1) and then sent out in an order that obscures order of arrival. (Lex order, for example.) Score: Someone has been trying to implement this, but it is not widespread. (People want fast response, and in a low overall message volume environment, this could be impossible. If N = 100, could be a very long wait.) 4. Padding of message lengths in such a way that messages cannot be tracked by message length. Score: I don't think this is being implemented. We've talked about "quantizing" to several standard message lengths ("short," "medium," and "long," uncreatively enough) for this reason. 5. Other issues can be found in Chaum's papers, in the attacks on DC-Nets (one of which I distributed with the 70 pages of printed material handed out at the first Cypherpunks meeting), and in the many messages on remailers here on this list. Hal Finney's analysis, for example. In light of the recent subpoena, I urge that #1, record-keeping, be addressed quickly. If the authorities are seeking sources of crypto material, or routes used in conveying such material, they may conceivably issue subpoenas for site records. Some suggestions, which protect the remailer operators and the users: a. Keep no records, use scripts to delete records that may be generated that you have control over. b. The "best" remailers will be on systems under the control of the remailer operator himself (there seem to be a few of these), as he can control archiving and logs. c. Remailer operators should announce their policies on logs, announcing their philosophy (e.g., "to protect myself, I keep copies of all traffic through my remailer," or, "I keep no records whatsover--once it's through my system, all traces are deleted."). d. Trust in what they remailer operators say is another big issue...if the FBI operated a remailer, would you trust what they say? One avenue for helping here is to have independent agents reporting on their experiences, and perhaps confronting the remailers with evidence (such as the "helpful messages" I 've sometimes gotten) of their actual policies. e. Increased use of encryption. Lots more here. For now, just getting the remailers to publically state their policies will be helpful. To us, in allowing better market choice in which remailers we use, and to them by making their lack of record-keeping (for example) a matter of public record. Let's plan ahead for the day when Cypherpunks traffic, and remailer records, get subpoenaed. That _could_ be the next test case. I don't think I'm being paranoid. In any case, there are some fairly easy _social_ changes to the remailer system that we can make that will improve the security against traffic analysis and subpoenas. -Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

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nonrandom string
by cjl＠micro.med.cornell.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I address this to the list at large hoping that one or more of you can explain something unusual that I observed. A friend of mine and I have been using PGP for several months and I just recently noted that in at least three of the recent posts to me that the first 18 characters of the encrypted message were identical. The first words of the plaintexts were not identical and so I assume that these characters are something else, perhaps the stuffer that I have heard mention of on this list. This repeating string is of concern for obvious reasons (e.g. so much for anonymity), and I would like to understand the cause of its recurrence. Please post to me and I will post a precis of the most reasonable suggestions. cjl

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