December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

attila sez
by paralax＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Date: Mon, 5 Feb 1996 06:49:57 +0000 (GMT) a> attila sez: a> It is not whether paralax does not know shit from beans, but that a> he proves to all that he would prefer to censor TCMay and James A. a> Donald than listen to their opinions, despite the fact he posted his a> own rather trivial and absurd point. a> political correctness and the liberal news intrepretations of "all I seek to censor no one. I prefer to confront racisim whenever and wherever I see (read) it. Mr. May embarassed himself with his denigrating application of the word "Jap" to describe the Japanese people after demonstrating a gross lack of knowledge and sensitivity about Jews. It is NOT a matter of "political correctness" unless YOU and Mr. May believe refraining from addressing an African-American as a nigger the moral equivalent of sucumbing to "politcal correctness". a> with this, I suppose I have been entered upon your "list" of a> enemies of the 'statist' nation along with TCMay and James A. Donald, All three of you would be flattering yourselves if any of you thought you made anybody's list. A. Paralax View

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Re: FV's blatant double standards
by John Pettitt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:26 AM 2/4/96 -0500, Simson L. Garfinkel wrote: >At 8:18 AM 1/31/96, Rishab Aiyer Ghosh wrote: >>FV demonstrated, through it's "card sharp" or whatever, that >>real-time transactions are vulnerable to sniffers on the recipient's >>own machine. Of course. We all knew that. But the mistake is to >>assume that FV isn't _equally_ vulnerable to that threat. If you >>can write a trojan that will somehow get privileged access to my >>machine, trap my keystrokes, and identify my credit card number, >>you can certainly write one that will, sitting on my machine: >> "intercept the user's electronic mail, read the confirmation >> message from First Virtual's computers, and send out a fraudulent >> reply" >>(to quote from Simson's article). Simson further quotes FV's Lee >>Stein: "A single user can be targeted, Stein said, but ''it is very >>difficult. . . . There are too many packets moving . . . to too many >>different machines.''" - which is of course equally true for real-time >>Netscape transactions. > >Oh, I think that such a program can be written. However, it would be much >harder to get right, considering all of the different ways that people read >e-mail. > > The code looks something like this: 1) hook into the winsock and look for an FV message in the web data stream, save the ID. 2) now look for an approve/deny/fraud, when you see one you know that the user uses an IP connection for mail and web. 3) Forward the ID to an anon box. 4) Look for outbound FV messages with 'fraud' or 'deny' and change to 'approve'. Clearly this will miss AOL, CI$ etc al but thats not important. The issue is not FV noticing the error, they will, it's how long it takes and how much you can steal in the interim. There is a Helen Keller quote I'm rather fond of which starts: "Security is mostly a superstition ..." *If the machine is not secure all bets are off* The most likly failure vector for this attack is that so few people use FV :-) John Pettitt, jpp(a)software.net VP Engineering, CyberSource Corporation, 415 473 3065 "Technology is a way of organizing the universe so that man doesn't have to experience it." - Max Frisch

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TWP on Indecency Protest
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Washington Post, February 5, 1996, p. A8. Language on 'Indecency' Sparks Telecommunications Bill Protest By John Schwartz Provisions in the overhaul of the nation's telecommunications laws that call for regulating adult materials on the Internet have sparked a storm of anger and protest on that medium. "This is the kind of legislation you'd see from a lot of senators and congressmen who have never logged on," said Michael Godwin, staff counsel for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a civil liberties group. "The Christian Right thinks they've hit a home run here, but the inning isn't over." The provisions, proposed by Sen. J. James Exon (D-Neb.), have gained momentum with support from religious conservative organizations. The legislation would make it illegal to make "indecent" material available to minors via computer, with penalties of two years in prison and up to $250,000 in fines. Exon called passage last week "a victory for children and families," adding, "We've come to a successful closing of the 'peep show' doors to our youth." President Clinton has said he will sign the bill. Those opposed to the regulations, however, said the "indecency" standard, which has been used in broadcast regulation cases, is too vague and would seriously restrict the potential of the emerging on-line medium. "I am concerned this legislation places restrictions on the Internet that will come back to haunt us," said Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.). He warned that quoting from such works as "Catcher in the Rye" and "Ulysses" in on-line discussions could court prosecution and said that making it illegal to "make available" indecent language would outlaw posting of messages or images that a child might see. "Imagine if the Whitney Museum ... were dragged into court for permitting representations of Michelangelo's David to be looked at by kids." But John McMickle, an aide to Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa), said drafters rejected the idea that Userious works of redeeming value" would fall within the law, which he said would apply only to "patently offensive" material. McMickle said the bill "is not a Comstock-type effort to wipe out literature or political speech." The American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic Frontier Foundation and other organizations are preparing a lawsuit challenging the indecency provisions on constitutional grounds. Other legal actions are in the works. An on-line publication, American Reporter, has announced it will soon publish a column by a Texas judge denouncing the legislation intentionally salted with "indecent" language; Randall Boe, a Washington attorney for the American Reporter, said he would immediately sue after publication. "We want to move promptly to have this statute set aside as unconstitutional," Boe said. "The longer it's in place, the greater the harm done to the Internet and to the First Amendment." Boe's firm, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, was defense council in the landmark "seven dirty words" case, which set the legal standard for indecent language in broadcasting based on a monologue by comedian George Carlin. Cathleen Cleaver, director of legal studies for the Family Research Council, said yesterday she expected such suits and that her conservative organization, which has pushed for on-line regulation, would fight to uphold it. The Justice Department has stated that the legislation would be vulnerable to attack on constitutional grounds. But in response to a letter from Grassley, Assistant Attorney General Andrew Fois noted last week that the department is defending the indecency standard in legislation "and will continue to defend similar statutes against constitutional challenges, so long as we can assert a reasonable defense consistent with the Supreme Court rulings in this area." -----

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Re: Fair Credit Reporting Act and Privacy Act
by Frank Willoughby 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Verily at 03:05 PM 2/5/96 -0500, Duncan Frissell did write: >At 08:25 AM 2/5/96 -0500, Frank Willoughby wrote: > >>If the Privacy Act were rewritten to be as strict as the BDSG, businesses >>would have a (mandatory) legal requirement to: >> >>o Ensure that personal data is stored properly (by encrypting it, etc) >>o Ensure that personal data is not distributed >>o Ensure that databases are *not* being maintained which describe the >> characteristics of individuals (buying habits, income, property >> ownership, etc) wantonly propagated by marketing (direct mail, >> telemarketing, etc) companies. >> > >Unfortunately, it would also: > >* Require government registration of computers and databases containing >information about people (whether these computers are used by business or >individuals). This eases regulation of computers and future confiscation. Works great in theory, not in practice. Having worked in Germany for 9 years, I can *guarantee* that the German gov't hasn't implemented the above. It may have been a good idea (in their eyes, not mine), but it isn't implementable in a democratic society - it bogs down in the implementation phase). Are you planning on registering every computer system that each person and company has with the gov't? Most sysadmins I know are up to their ears in work and are barely able (if at all) to recognize which users they have on their system, and why they have accounts at all (business justification). This might also get pretty wild when the ISPs get polled in terms of usage. (Compuserve notwithstanding). Gathering the registration data will be a bear to implement - keeping it current will be impossible (for the forseeable future). Besides, this would cast further shadows of "big brother" and remind former "ossies" in the former GDR/DDR & eastern block of days gone by - which they would probably rather not remember. Also, just because Germany tries this approach (and fails), doesn't mean we have to repeat their mistake in this area. > >* Reduce market efficiency by making it harder to match buyers and sellers >(because neither could easily find out about he other) thus causing higher >prices and poorer people. Actually, it would probably increase market efficiency as they would be spending their marketing budget on other appropriate methods which have a higher success-ratio. I don't know what the success rates are of mass-mailings, or tele-marketing, but I doubt if they approach 1% (wild guess). Seriously - what is your first impulse when you reach the phone and find out the caller is a tele-marketer? The annoyance factor is rather high for these. More than likely, this was also the reason that unsolicited mass-faxing of marketing info was forbidden by law a while ago? FWIW, personally, I think many marketing organizations have gone off the deep end in their efforts to try to be effective (to wit: putting logos on clothing, in video games, etc; sponsor's logos in Home Pages, 3-5 minutes of TV commercials every 6-10 minutes of TV (for those rare moments one gets to watch TV (thank heavens for cable TV & CNN)). 8^) > >* Do nothing to protect personal information from the government which >would get to collect more of it than ever in the course of enforcing data >protection laws. > You're assuming this isn't happening now? IMO, that would be a rather naive assumption. Personally, I think that the law should also consider exactly this point. The gov't should have no more access to personal information than it needs to carry on its job - and we as taxpayers should decide how much access they need to have. >If you don't want people to know things about you, don't tell them. Agreed....But, this essentially means giving up your phone, your credit cards, your house, your car, your job, and generally withdrawing from society. Not a particularly viable plan, IMO. The main problem is that the companies do little to nothing about protecting an individual's private data. It isn't any of my business how much money, you make, the amount your home is worth, your credit rating, info about your family (wife, kids, etc), religion, etc - yet, all of these are within the easy access of many individuals who don't have a "need-to-know" of this information. If I don't have a "need-to-know" about this info, I shouldn't be able to access it. > >DCF Of course since we are re-writing the Privacy Act from scratch, we can leave out the items you mentioned & design it the way it should be. Best Regards, Frank

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IEEE Security Symposium Program
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Mon, 5 Feb 1996 14:14:22 -0800 To: pem-dev(a)tis.com, ietf-pkix(a)tandem.com, ipsec-owner(a)ans.net >From: Stephen Kent <kent(a)bbn.com> Subject: IEEE Symposium Program Announcement I'm distributing a copy of this year's program to members of these security-oriented WG mailing lists as a means of "getting the word out" to individuals who may be interested in attending this sort of conference. As the chair of the former PEM WG, and current co-chair of the PKI WG, I feel that this announcement is appropriate for these lists, and I hope my fellow IPSEC WG members agree that it is appropriate for that list as well. I apologize in advance for those of you who, like me, will receive multiple copies of this announcement. Steve =========================================================================== 1996 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY _/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ May 6-8, 1996 _/_/ _/_/_/ The Claremont Resort, _/ _/ Oakland, California _/ _/ _/_/ Sponsored by the _/_/_/ IEEE Technical Committee on Security and Privacy _/ _/ In cooperation with the _/ _/ International Association of Cryptologic Research _/_/_/ _/ Symposium Committee _/ Dale M. Johnson, General Chair _/_/_/ _/_/ Stephen Kent, Vice Chair _/ _/ _/ John McHugh, Program Co-Chair _/ _/ _/ George W. Dinolt, Program Co-Chair _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ PRELIMINARY PROGRAM _/ _/ _/ Subject to Change _/ _/_/ MONDAY, MAY 6 08:30-09:00 WELCOMING REMARKS: Dale Johnson and John McHugh 09:00-10:30 PANEL: Object Management Group CORBA Security Standard Moderator: Terry Benzel Participants: TBA 10:30-11:00 BREAK 11:00-12:00 COVERT CHANNELS An Analysis of the Timed Z-Channel Ira S. Moskowitz, Steven J. Greenwald, Myong H. Kang Defining Noninterference in the Temporal Logic of Actions Todd Fine 12:00-13:30 LUNCH 13:30-15:00 PANEL: Goals for Computer Security Education Cynthia Irvine, Chair Leslie Chalmers Karl Levitt Steven F. Barnett Jim Schindler Roger R. Schell 15:00-15:30 BREAK 15:30-17:00 FIVE-MINUTE RESEARCH TALKS SESSION Submissions in the form of one-page ASCII abstracts due by email to mchugh(a)cs.pdx.edu no later than 2 April 1996. See http://www.cs.pdx.edu/SP96/ for more information. Abstracts to be distributed at the conference. 18:00-19:30 RECEPTION TUESDAY, MAY 7 09:00-10:30 DOMAIN SPECIFIC SECURITY Security for Medical Information Systems Ross Anderson Discussion Discussants TBA 10:30-11:00 BREAK 11:00-12:00 PROTOCOLS Entity Authentication Dieter Gollmann A Fair Non-repudiation Protocol Jianying Zhou, Dieter Gollmann Limitations on Design Principles for Public Key Protocols Paul Syverson 12:00-13:30 LUNCH 13:30-15:00 DATABASES Ensuring Atomicity of Multilevel Transactions Paul Ammann, Sushil Jajodia, Indrakshi Ray View-Based Access Control with High Assurance Xiaolei Qian Supporting Multiple Access Control Policies in Database Systems Elisa Bertino, Sushil Jajodia, Pierangela Samarati 15:00-15:30 BREAK 15:30-17:00 BIOLOGICALLY INSPIRED TOPICS IN COMPUTER SECURITY An Immunological Approach to Change Detection: Algorithms, Analysis, and Implications Patrik D'Haeseleer, Stephanie Forrest, Paul Helman A Sense of Self for UNIX Processes Stephanie Forrest, Steven A. Hofmeyr, Anil Somayaji, Thomas A. Longstaff Cryptovirology: Extortion Based Security Threats and Countermeasures Adam Young, Moti Yung 17:30-19:30 TECHNICAL COMMITTEE MEETING WEDNESDAY, MAY 8 09:00-10:30 MODELING A Security Model of Dynamic Labeling Providing a Tiered Approach to Verification Simon Foley, Li Gong, Xiaolei Qian A Communication Agreement Framework of Access Control Martin Roscheisen, Terry Winograd Decentralized Trust Management Matt Blaze, Joan Feigenbaum, Jack Lacy Security Properties and CSP Steve Schneider 10:30 11:00 BREAK 11:00 12:30 NETWORKS Security Flaws in the HotJava Web Browser Drew Dean, Dan S. Wallach On Two Proposals for On-line Credit-card Payments using Open Networks: Problems and Solutions Wenbo Man Secure Network Objects Leendert van Doorn, Martin Abadi, Mike Burrows, Edward Wobber Run-Time Security Evaluation (RTSE) for Distributed Applications Cristina Serban, B. McMillin 12:30 12:45 CONCLUDING REMARKS 12:45 SYMPOSIUM ADJOURNS 1996 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON RESEARCH IN SECURITY AND PRIVACY _/_/ _/ _/ REGISTRATION FORM _/ _/ _/_/ _/_/_/ Name:_______________________________________________ _/ _/ _/ _/ Affiliation:_______________________________________________ _/_/ _/_/_/ Postal Address:_______________________________________________ _/ _/ _/ _/ _______________________________________________ _/_/_/ _/ _______________________________________________ _/ _/_/_/ _/_/ Phone:_______________________________________________ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ Fax:_______________________________________________ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ Email:_______________________________________________ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/ Note: Address information will be distributed to attendees. Please enter the appropriate registration category. Payment must be included and must be by credit card or by check in U.S. dollars, drawn on a U.S. bank, made payable to "IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy." Dates are strictly enforced by postmark. Advance registration (up to 29 March 1996) ___ Member of the IEEE (Member # ____________, required)........$310.00 ___ Non-Member..................................................$385.00 ___ Full-time Student...........................................$100.00 Late registration (from 30 March 1996) ___ Member of the IEEE (Member # ____________, required)........$370.00 ___ Non-Member..................................................$460.00 ___ Full-time Student...........................................$100.00 Do you wish to present at a poster session or lead an evening discussion? [ ] Yes [ ] No Do you have any special requirements?_________________________________________ Please indicate your method of payment by checking the appropriate box: [ ] Check in U.S. funds drawn on a U.S. bank (PLEASE ENCLOSE WITH THIS FORM) Credit card authorization: (Charges will appear on your statement as made by IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY) Visa MasterCard American Express Diners Club [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Credit Card Number:_________________________________________________________ Card Holder Name:______________________________Expiration Date:_____________ Signature:__________________________________________________________________ Mail registration to: Or FAX this form (CREDIT CARD Stephen Kent REGISTRATIONS ONLY) to: BBN Corporation FAX: +1 617 873-4086 MS 13/2A VOICE: +1 617 873-6328 70 Fawcett Street Cambridge, MA 02140 >>>>SORRY, NO REGISTRATIONS BY EMAIL. NO REFUNDS.<<<< Five-Minute Research Talks Session ================================== At the 1995 Symposium a session of five-minute research talks was held for the first time. These proved very popular, so there will be another session this year. It is being held on Monday to give attendees more opportunities to contact the presenters during the rest of the conference. If you are interested in presenting a five-minute talk, please submit a one-page abstract in ASCII format by email to mchugh(a)cs.pdx.edu no later than 2 April 1996. See http://www.cs.pdx.edu/SP96/ for more information. Abstracts to be distributed at the conference. Please note that the five-minute time limit will be strictly enforced. Evening Sessions ================ The 1996 IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy will accommodate poster sessions and evening discussions. There will be rooms with blackboards and bulletin boards for interested parties to post presentations on work in progress, recent research results, and innovative proposals, or to lead discussions on topics of current interest. These rooms will be available Monday and Tuesday, May 6 and 7, from 8 p.m. to midnight. If you are interested in posting a presentation or organizing a discussion on a particular topic, please indicate so on the registration form. Hotel Reservations - The Claremont Resort ========================================= The Claremont Resort in Oakland, California is 20 minutes from San Francisco and just over an hour from Napa Valley. It is situated in the Oakland-Berkeley hills overlooking the San Francisco Bay on 22 acres of beautifully landscaped lawns and gardens. Facilities include the Claremont Pool and Tennis Club and The Spa at the Claremont. Oakland Airport is 14 miles from the hotel, or attendees may choose to fly into San Francisco and rent a car. SuperShuttle (+1 510 268-8700) provides service from the San Francisco Airport or the Oakland Airport to the Claremont Resort. The charge is $15 from Oakland Airport and $18 from San Francisco Airport, per person one way. Parking is available at the hotel at a cost of $8 per day for guests and a maximum of $9 per day for non-guests. Hotel reservations must be made under the group name IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. The group rate is $102 single, $114 double occupancy, plus 11% tax. The cut-off date for reservations is Saturday, April 6, 1996. Reservations made after this date will be accepted on a space available basis. Reservations must be accompanied by an advance deposit or credit card guarantee. You may cancel your individual reservations up to 72 hours prior to arrival, after which your deposit becomes non-refundable. Please be advised the check-in time is after 3:00 p.m.; check-out is 12 noon. For reservations and information, contact: The Claremont Resort, Ashby and Domingo Avenues, Oakland, CA 94623-0363; Phone: +1 800 551-7266 (7 a.m. to 8:30 p.m., PST) or +1 510 843-3000; Fax: +1 510 549-8582.

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Re: Encryption and Backups
by John Pettitt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 4 Feb 1996, Alan Olsen wrote: > Something that I have not seen addressed is the need for strong encryption > in backup software. > > Most backup software has an "encryption" option, but I have seen few that > have anything resembling strong encryption. Furthermore, I have seen no > real push for strong encryption for backups at all. > ... > Might be an idea for a product there... (And you can bet law enforcement > would throw a hissy fit about its existence.) > CP Backup (part of PC Tools for Central Point aka Symantec) has DES. As to how good the implementation is: I have no idea. -- John Pettitt email: jpettitt(a)well.sf.ca.us (home) jpp(a)software.net (work)

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Re: Encryption and Backups
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:33 PM 2/4/96 -0800, John Pettitt wrote: > >On Sun, 4 Feb 1996, Alan Olsen wrote: > >> Something that I have not seen addressed is the need for strong encryption >> in backup software. >CP Backup (part of PC Tools for Central Point aka Symantec) has DES. As to >how good the implementation is: I have no idea. I have a copy, but I have not yet verified the key sizes. It is on my list of projects. (My current project is for determining if an app is accessing your PGP files under Win95. I may be stuck for a bit though... Looks like I might need the DDK to compile it.) Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ Is the operating system half NT or half full?

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RE: Sometimes ya just gotta nuke em
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:33 2/3/96, "A. Padgett Peterson, P.E. Information Security" <PADGETT@hobbe wrote: >Tim rote: >>At 4:12 AM 2/3/96, Rich Graves wrote: >>>Who holds up the nuking of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as great victories >>>against tyranny? >>Since you ask, I do. > >And the biggest secret of the war was that "Fat Man" was the *last* A-bomb >we had or could build for about a year (had taken several *years* to >separate enough fissionable material for the three via two entirely >different processes). > >To me this is the great strength of the USA: given a theoretical problem, we >will develop a hundred different solutions, try them all in parallel, and at >least one will work. I agree - Not only were there two different separation methods but the two bombs dropped on Japan were of different designs (I think that the Hiroshima bomb was the same design as the land test version and the Nagasaki one was the untested design [so that if used, there would have been a tested design for the first drop]).

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Re: Arthur C. Clarke Supports Strong Crypto
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 08:05 PM 2/4/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: > >(Pardon me for mentioning crypto...) > >Arthur C. Clarke, known to most of you (author of many SF works, coiner of >the phrase: "all sufficiently advanced technlogies are indistinguishable >from magic," mention by Alan Olsen yesterday), has a role in a "Discovery >Channel" program called "Mysterious Universe." Actually, it was _I_ who mentioned this quote, but didn't specifically recall whom to ascribe it to. Perhaps Tim May didn't see it; a week or so ago May engaged in a shotgun-type killfile addition, including me when I was merely ( I still believe...) the victim in a local flamewar. If there is somebody out there who: 1. Is on speaking terms with Tim May. and 2. Has a little respect for my commentary, I would very much appreciate it if you would forward this comment to him to ensure that he sees it. The truly ironic thing is that Tim wrongly ascribes the comment to Alan Olsen, who is apparently the (recently admitted) perpetrator of at least one flamewar against me. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com Klaatu Burada Nikto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCUAwUBMRWQLvqHVDBboB2dAQF8zwP3SjAAIP46pqwsygL4Hm8YOChJ6xfIs4Vq vp+8rjMvPmZwxNtGN+7kcRTbXmau5P3MePSp94iK6k8qwisNqsoqCYkMBxs198fg 2YRZvfLAMQ0xsVznUSRA4bBTI3mLAv868xleSkIwhSjJ271qKUaI2K5exY1FgVK/ JnaVHWZTeQ== =tjA2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Fair Credit Reporting Act and Privacy
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I urge people to put thread names in the subject lines, and not just leave the subjects as "Re:" or "Your mail." I have added a subject line.] At 5:58 AM 2/5/96, Karl Ike wrote: >It is impossible to get changes in the Fair Credit Reporting Act in the >traditional way. Credit reporting agencies have far too much personal >information that is passed out with incrediable ease at the consumers expense. > >I have a suggestion! > >Today, with TRW, Equifax and TransUnion's vast network, it is easy to obtain >anyone's credit report from various sources. Do you think if someone, >outside of the USA, obtained the credit reports on half, maybe all, of the >US Senators, congressmen, judges, etc, and published them in their entirity, >on the internet, from outside the US, would get their attention? Then there >would be changes, overnight, protecting the right of privacy! Let them >become the victim of credit reporting agencies once and shit will happen >overnight. "Protecting the right of privacy"? If I tell Joe Bob that you welshed on a debt made in the past, something that the person you welshed on has informed me of, how is this a violation of your right of privacy? Better yet, abolish the laws about so-called "Fair Credit Reporting." If Tim's Pretty Good Credit Reporting knows that Joe Blow filed for bankruptcy in 1975, by what right should men with guns come to his file cabinets and announce that he may not reveal true information that is older than, say, 8 years? Facts are facts. Not just for 8 years, or even 20 years. Debts incurred 30 years ago and not paid may still be useful bits of information in deciding whether to extend credit to a person. And even possibly untrue things are not the main justification for the FCRA. The FCRA is _not_ primarily designed to correct wrong information, but to place time limits on correct information. It limits speech. And it interferes with rational economic decisions. Fortunately, strong crypto and cyberspatial data havens will make enforcement of the FCRA increasingly difficult. --Tim Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: THE JEWS (ALL of them!) Try to kick Ernst Zundel off Usenet!!
by ErnstZundl＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ich habe kleine Hoden

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RC2 source code post to sci.crypt
by koontz＠MasPar.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So, who cancelled the post anyway?

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Re: Sometimes ya just gotta nuke em
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rich, Neither dropping nuclear weapons on Japanese cities nor an invasion of Japan was necessary to secure surrender of the Japanese government. David Kahn explains: Communications intelligence contributed...in major ways to the Allies' Pacific victory. It stepped up American submarine sinkings of the Japanese merchant fleet by one third. This cutting of Japan's lifelines was, Premier Hideki Tojo said after the war, one of the major factors that defeated Japan. David Kahn. "Codebreaking in World Wars I and II: The Major Successes and Failures, Their Causes and Their Effects" (1980). In: Kahn on Codes: Secrets of the New Cryptology. Macmillan Publishing Co. 1983. Page 108. The water transport intercepts should provide case after case of how American submarines won one of the most important victories in the Pacific: the sinking of the Japanese merchant fleet.... Kahn. "Opportunities in Cryptology for Historians." Op cit. P 289. Some information came out shortly after World War II, when we all heard about how we broke some Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor, which...did help very much...in the successful American submarine blockade of Japan, which very largely brought the Jap- anese empire to its knees. Kahn. "Signals Intelligence in the 1980s" (1981). Op cit. P 292. In other words, it was Starvation City. --------------------------------------- As an aside. these three quotations from Kahn on Codes, a collection of articles, show that David's views in this regard are consistent over the years. Continuing-- Dropping nuclear weapons on Japanese cities or an invasion of Japan was not necessary to secure surrender of the Japanese government. William Langer explains: In the greatest air offensive in history [during May, June, and July 1945] United States land-based and carrier-based aircraft des- troyed or immobilized the remnants of the Japanese navy, shattered Japanese industry, and curtailed Japanese sea communications by sub- marine and air attack and extensive minefields. United States bat- tleships moved in to shell densely populated cities with impunity and the Twentieth Air Force dropped 40,000 tons of bombs on Japanese industrial centers in one month. William Langer. An Encyclopedia of World History. Houghton Mifflin Co. 1948. Page 1169. It was Devastation City. ------------------------ Then why Hiroshima and Nagasaki? There were two main reasons nuclear weapons were dropped on Japanese cities: (1) generally, to proclaim Pax Americana...with a bang (2) specifically, to declare war on the Soviet Union. For the sake of completeness, let's ask: If it really had been necessary to drop nuclear weapons on Japan in order to compel the Japanese government to surrender, should they have been dropped? Without hesitation. Cordially, Jim NOTE. The first part of the "Opportunities" article was published in 1972. The second part, dealing with World War II, was written perhaps a decade later for publication in the collection.

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No Subject
by Rishab Aiyer Ghosh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

India's Department of Telecommunications (DoT) charges a licence fee of $50,000 per _annum_ for BBS operators, and nearly twice as much for e-mail providers. It is preparing to finalise a policy for Internet service providers; as it doesn't understand the distintion between Internet _networks_ (MCI, Sprintnet etc) and "retail" providers (the geek in the garage), it is planning to charge well over $100,000 in annual licence fees. This is totally against the opinions of Telecom Secretary R K Takkar, as expressed to my newsletter, The Indian Techonomist, some months ago. I spoke to Mr Takkar for some time, providing him the "education" that he asked for in my newsletter and that large datacom companies here have been curiously averse to give him. He appreciated my point of view, and invited me to send a proposal for an alternative datacom policy, which I have done (and which is summarised below). I hope to meet him next week to follow this up. As a major part of my call for removing restraints is based on the Internet's treatment by other world governments, I would like letters of support to show this. My proposal may appear tame, but it isn't really. It will allow small ISPs to pay as little as $150 a year in licence fees; reduce the (high) likelihood of cartels between large companies; and entrench electronic free-speech at (some) parity with other media. (Note that the DoT has said that it is "not considering" blocking access to parts of the Net for reasons of morals or security. This despite the local media's loudly proclaimed discovery that the Net is 97.34% paedophile, or whatever.) Highlights 1. Definitions - The category for E-mail providers becomes redundant, leaving international gateway, national network, and "retail" service providers - Content providers have constitutional protection as electronic publishers - BBSes do not require licensing, being content providers 2. Goals - Licence fees not for revenue generation, but to ensure responsibility (unavoidable. Mr Takkar's words) - Licence fees based on telecom infrastructure costs, not revenues (at the moment, a licence is almost like income tax) - Regulation required for free and fair competition (see below) - TRAI should also handle datacom regulation, and datacom consumer complaints (the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India is likely to be very independent of the government, headed by a former Supreme Court judge) 3. Regulation - Equal access to gateway, network and service providers (to prevent denial of service and cartels, very likely here without explicit rules preventing them) - Rationalisation of DoT leased line tariff structure (now, a network costs more than the sum of its parts! too complicated to explain briefly) 4. Licensing - Uniform fee structure for gateway, network and service providers (say 2.5% of leased line costs, which are known as they are provided by the DoT) - Barriers to entry greatly reduced (minimal ISP pays $150 p.a) - However, total licence fee revenue for DoT not significantly reduced (important for success of this proposal; large nationwide network may still pay $100,000+ thanks to its huge leased line requirements) The full text of the proposal will be made publicly available on the Net sometime next week. Those who would like to see it, and a template for a letter of support, should send me mail at dcom-appeal(a)dxm.org. I would like letters from non-commercial organisations, lobby groups, policy bodies, and so on, but NOT datacom companies (I wouldn't mind _personal_ letters of support from them, but they wouldn't do for the DoT). I would particularly like to see something from Hong Kong, which I have used as a good example of how to do things in Asia. Thanks, Rishab ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The Indian Techonomist - newsletter on India's information industry http://dxm.org/techonomist/ rishab(a)dxm.org Editor and publisher: Rishab Aiyer Ghosh rishab(a)arbornet.org Vox +91 11 6853410; 3760335; H 34 C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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RC2 question [No Nuke Content]
by Kevin L Prigge 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone throw a little light my way with regards to the permute[] array being derived from pi? I'm just not seeing it, I guess. Sorry for the interruption, I owe the list several off-topic flames and a discussion of some random non-crypto stuff at a later date. -- Kevin L. Prigge | "You can always spot a well informed man - UofM Central Computing | his views are the same as yours." email: klp(a)tc.umn.edu | - Ilka Chase PGP Key Fingerprint = FC E5 EE E7 8B 2E E9 D5 DA 1C 5D 6B 98 52 F6 24

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Re: FV's blatant double standards
by John Pettitt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:39 PM 2/5/96 -0500, Simson L. Garfinkel wrote: >Yes, clearly if you are not concerned about missing 50-75% of First Virtual's >users, this attack will work just fine. >-simson > > Who cares - if 25 to 50% of a systems users are vulnderable doesn't that make it weak ? John Pettitt, jpp(a)software.net VP Engineering, CyberSource Corporation, 415 473 3065 "Technology is a way of organizing the universe so that man doesn't have to experience it." - Max Frisch

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[NOISE] just a few bits shy of a soul...
by Dave Del Torto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While chatting with a friend recently over brown rice in Boulder CO, he said something that I found raw-ther amusin'. Thought I'd share it. We'd been discussing bit-sizes of keys vs fifth-generation NSA cryptanalytical systems, etc and he said: "Wow, it's amazing how much [NSA] computing power is placed in service of [such a] '1-bit' consciousness." Heh... dave

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Re: CONTEST: Name That Program!
by Dave Del Torto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:10 AM 1/31/96, Bill Stewart wrote: >At 11:45 AM 1/30/96 -0500, Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb(a)nsb.fv.com> wrote: >> In fact, I'd settle for getting onto 10% of the machines, although I >> suspect I could get onto more like 80% without raising a sweat. If I were you, Nathaniel, I'd drop that petard of yours on the ground, grab a very absorbent hankie and run like hell. ;) >You've alleged that Macs and Unixen should be about as easy as Windows >machines to crack with your CardShark. I disagree - most Mac users I >know have been using virus protectors more consistently and reliably >than DOS/Windows users. However, if their virus software only stops >known viruses, rather than anything modifying critical resources, >you might get away with it for long enough to surf some numbers. [elided] Actually, for those who don't know, one of the most ubiquitous anti-viral utilities for Macs (Symantec Antivirus for Macintosh, aka "SAM") also offers a mode that constantly watches for any generic attempt to modify crucial file/app/system resources -- and offers the opportunity to deny such attempts. Thus, it doesn't _only_ offer protection against "known" attacks. It even specifies which application/virus is trying to modify which file, allows the user to teach it that certain mods are verboten and halts activity until the user decides how to proceed. This makes it all but impossible (if a Mac is so-protected) to even introduce a trojan-keystroke-sniffing-credit-card-transmitter, much less use it to take over the TCP stack (MacTCP) without the user's knowledge. As for FV's recent "discovery:" [a] I'm glad if FV _really_ wants to educate the public, but I hope they find a better way next time than a "hey, we found this really simple way to hack the universe, but we're not telling all you 13-year-old juvenile delinquent hacker-wannabes" broadcast (talk about yer invitations!), [b] confused why NB didn't anticipate the fuss and prepend a short disclaimer onto his posting of it to cpunx (how about _thrice_ burnt, Nathaniel?), [c] unimpressed by all the vitriol it stirred up and the glee exhibited by everyone in slamming Nathaniel and Co. (lighten up, even if it was deserved) and [d] bummed that no-one remembered my keycapture utility survey of nearly a year and a half ago...as in "gee, I wish _I'd_ thoughta that." ;) Frankly, I wonder if, in the long run, FV's stunt hasn't wrought more harm than good: I got a late-night call from a worried but clueless friend asking me to clarify this "credit card sniffer thing" he'd heard about from someone else: he was all worried that there was an invisible virus on his machine. >sigh< It's seems the brush has been set afire: now which way will the winds blow? Cheers, dave ____________________________________________________________________________ "With annual interest, compounded every nanosecond, that'll be $0.02000018."

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Disperse/Collect version 1.0
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To follow up on a post last year where I suggested that Rabin's information dispersal scheme might be useful for sending large files across unreliable remailer networks, I built a shareware package called Disperse/Collect out of my own Crypto++ library. Disperse splits up files into redundant pieces and encodes them in base 64. Collect decodes them and reconstructs the original files. You can download this software from my home page at http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai. Wei Dai

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Mike Godwin at HotWired
by Jon Lebkowsky 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PLEASE RECIRCULATE! Mike Godwin, staff counsel for EFF and eloquent supporter of civil liberties online and off, will be our guest at HotWired's Electronic Frontiers Forum this Thursday, February 8, at 7PM PST, 9PM CST, 10PM EST. Coincidentally, President Clinton is scheduled to sign the Telecom Bill the same day, and the '48 Hours of Protest' demonstration will begin when the bill is signed. We encourage online activists to participate in the ongoing EF Forums as a chat space wherein we can discuss new developments and issues of organization in support of a free and open Internet. A login is required but the account is free. We're at http://www.hotwired.com/club or telnet://chat.wired.com:2428. thanks, Jon L. http://www.hotwired.com/eff -- =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Jon Lebkowsky <jonl(a)well.com> http://www.well.com/~jonl Electronic Frontiers Forum, 7PM PST Thursdays <http://www.hotwired.com/club> Vice President, EFF-Austin <http://www.io.com/~efaustin> =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

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Re: Arthur C. Clarke Supports Strong Crypto
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 21:06 2/4/96, jim bell wrote: >At 08:05 PM 2/4/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >> >>(Pardon me for mentioning crypto...) >> >>Arthur C. Clarke, known to most of you (author of many SF works, coiner of >>the phrase: "all sufficiently advanced technlogies are indistinguishable >>from magic," mention by Alan Olsen yesterday), has a role in a "Discovery >>Channel" program called "Mysterious Universe." > >Actually, it was _I_ who mentioned this quote, but didn't specifically >recall whom to ascribe it to. It is known (at least among Science Fiction Fans) as "Clarke's Law" and I seem to remember it more accurately phrased as "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from Magic". It is similar to suggesting that "Magic is any Technology that you do not understand".

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Re: re Telecoms Bill
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- mianigand(a)unique.outlook.net ("Michael Peponis") wrote: >I think the first problem would be how to hide a sites true location. >For example, if I have a domain called xxx.offensivestuff.org, how would >I hide the sight so that while it is freely accessable to those who are >looking for it, yet not allow a goverment agency to home in on the >geographical locations via trace route. That's a problem... data havens come to mind, but that's another issue. Keeping the data in a domain/country where it is not restricted, or where laws are very laxly enforced is one start... then the issue is using crypto so that one can get the material from a country that restricts it. [Off topic... DC Nets/Anonymous or encrypted IRC comes to mind too...] [..] >Of course, this approch would result in a slower connection and more >packet hops. A price for maintaining security and anonyimity... [..] >:On the non-net side of things, implementing encrypted >:BBS/communications and file-transfers is useful. I'm told PGP-Phone [..] > >I like this idea, but I am not sure how the laws work. For example if a >BBS had subscribers sign a voucher stating that they were not agent of a >goverment agency, would it hold up? would lying constitue entapment? It wouldn't work, and would make them more interested in the material that BBS has. Any what about DMV/DOT employees, clerks, firemen, hospital employees, etc., who are non-enforcement people? Encryption would restrict wiretapping. If users send private encrypted email to each other (Isn't there a PBBS program that allows users to PGP-encrypt private mail to each other...?) that's another layer of security. Keeping the BBS on an encrypted partition also helps. BBS's aren't as prone to snooping as networks are, but then again, why should government employees be the only type of snooper? The comm program could also implement a kind of zero-knowledge proof or digital sig rather than the standard login, making the BBS secure against someone hacking an account. - --Rob Just some suggestions to dilute the noise ratio... - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMRcvjyoZzwIn1bdtAQGl2gF+INNeeX6GH9oX/8KSB0NPIi2ifzDuBVSu d2fwPoAmiJ3ds7mzBPCn3msATxaCROFd =kPGx -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Report available: "Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers"
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At the request of the Business Software Alliance (BSA), an ad hoc panel of seven cryptologists and computer scientists met last November to address the question of the minimum key length required to provide adequate security against exhaustive search in commercial applications of symmetric cryptosystems. We have just completed our report. We adopted a simple, and somewhat conservative, methodology in an effort to gain a realistic understanding of what size keys might actually be vulnerable in practice. It is common in analysis of key length to give all benefit of the doubt to the capabilities of the potential attacker and to make very generous assumptions about the technology and resources that might be available to mount an attack. In our analysis, however, we assumed that the attacker would employ only conventional, commercially-mature technologies and would be limited by budget and time constraints. We used several different technologies to design attack strategies that accommodate the budgets of various hypothetical attackers, from individual ``hackers'' to well-funded enterprises. Our conclusions, therefore, represent an approximation of an ``upper bound'' on the strength of various size keys; I believe more efficient attacks than those we considered might also be possible and should be taken into account by the prudent cryptosystem designer. The abstract of the report follows below. A PostScript copy of the full text of the report is available in ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/keylength.ps An ASCII version is available in ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/keylength.txt (The report will also likely appear on the BSA's web site shortly). -matt (speaking only for himself) ======================================================================= Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers to Provide Adequate Commercial Security A Report by an Ad Hoc Group of Cryptographers and Computer Scientists Matt Blaze (1) Whitfield Diffie (2) Ronald L. Rivest (3) Bruce Schneier (4) Tsutomu Shimomura (5) Eric Thompson (6) Michael Wiener (7) January 1996 ABSTRACT Encryption plays an essential role in protecting the privacy of electronic information against threats from a variety of potential attackers. In so doing, modern cryptography employs a combination of _conventional_ or _symmetric_ cryptographic systems for encrypting data and _public key_ or _asymmetric_ systems for managing the _keys_ used by the symmetric systems. Assessing the strength required of the symmetric cryptographic systems is therefore an essential step in employing cryptography for computer and communication security. Technology readily available today (late 1995) makes _brute-force_ attacks against cryptographic systems considered adequate for the past several years both fast and cheap. General purpose computers can be used, but a much more efficient approach is to employ commercially available _Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)_ technology. For attackers prepared to make a higher initial investment, custom-made, special-purpose chips make such calculations much faster and significantly lower the amortized cost per solution. As a result, cryptosystems with 40-bit keys offer virtually no protection at this point against brute-force attacks. Even the U.S. Data Encryption Standard with 56-bit keys is increasingly inadequate. As cryptosystems often succumb to `smarter' attacks than brute-force key search, it is also important to remember that the keylengths discussed here are the minimum needed for security against the computational threats considered. Fortunately, the cost of very strong encryption is not significantly greater than that of weak encryption. Therefore, to provide adequate protection against the most serious threats --- well-funded commercial enterprises or government intelligence agencies --- keys used to protect data today should be at least 75 bits long. To protect information adequately for the next 20 years in the face of expected advances in computing power, keys in newly-deployed systems should be at least 90 bits long. ----------------------------------------- 1. AT&T Research, mab(a)research.att.com 2. Sun Microsystems, diffie(a)eng.sun.com 3. MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, rivest(a)lcs.mit.edu 4. Counterpane Systems, schneier(a)counterpane.com 5. San Diego Supercomputer Center, tsutomu(a)sdsc.edu 6. Access Data, Inc., eric(a)accessdata.com 7. Bell Northern Research, wiener(a)bnr.ca

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Likely application for high-bandwidth proxies (fwd)
by lmccarth＠cs.umass.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It would appear that a potentially very popular application for high- bandwidth anonymizing proxies has arrived: Forwarded message from list-managers-digest: > From: Project Genesis <genesis(a)j51.com> > Date: Mon, 05 Feb 1996 02:42:13 -0500 > Subject: Speaking of spams... > > Did I mention that Project Genesis is an organization specializing in > religious education? The message below explains why all of our public lists > are moderated. I value privacy and have grave doubts about things like the > Exon amendment (which may make Internet providers liable), but I also think > that we need to ensure that the Internet not become one big red-light > district. Spams like this are a step in the wrong direction. It hit several > of our religion-oriented lists. > > Ken > > >Sender: kristina(a)free.org [User Unknown - I told her to go away.] > >Subject: LIVE NUDE VIDEOCONFERENCING! > > > >Hi, > >My name is Kristina. I'm a nude model and I'd > >love to take my clothes off and entertain you. > >You can watch me live and in color on your > >computer. We can type back and forth and I'll > >be happy to perform your erotic fantasy. If > >this sounds like fun, visit the website and > >download the software. The address is > >http://www.[I don't plan to help them].com or you can get the > >software from the BBS at 815-[ditto]. I'll > >turn the camera on in my studio and wait to > >hear from you. I think you'll like what I have > >to show you. This isn't a movie...you make a > >request and I'll probably fulfill it for you. > >Look for my picture on the Website. Hope to > >see you soon! > > > >Love, > >Kristina

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Re: Jim Bell - Murderous Terrorist
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [while I am replying to this anonymous, flaming message from what MAY be a stable nym, I specifically request a consensus opinion on whether I should continue to comment in this way. Some people say that a discussion of my "Assassination Politics" idea (containing, as it does, issues of good encryption and digital cash implemented with good encryption and blinding) is "on-topic" here, but on the other hand it does seem to bring out the flamers among us. I would be happy to go either way: To continue to respond to what is obviously a strenuous debate, or to ignore the issue here, in this area, and to direct the debate to another.] At 07:06 PM 2/4/96 -0800, jdoe-0007(a)alpha.c2.org wrote: >Dr. Vulis writes: > >AO> Alan Olsen <alano(a)teleport.com> writes: > >AO> I consider Mr. Bell to be a crank and a loon. > >DV> You're certainly entitled to your opinion. You might be interested to know that >DV> I consider Jim Bell to be highly intelligent, knowledgeable, and overall nice >DV> person. I'm particularly impressed by his calm and restrained response to your >DV> provocations. I've also formed a rather negative opinion of you, based on your >DV> actions in this incident. > >Jim Bell has advocated nothing less than paid death squads No, I haven't. The term "squad" implies more than one person. In practice, I think those people who are motivated to collect the anonymous awards will be individually self-selected people, and will not come in the form of "squads." If anything, the use of a "squad" defeats the entire purpose of the anonymity provided by my idea: Quite literally, nobody in the world except the killer himself needs to know who he is. >using crypto as a >means to hide payment to these murderous terrorists. <sigh!> Aside from the fact that the difference between "terrorists" and "freedom fighters" is primarily a matter of point of view, in effect you are merely objecting to people being able to defend themselves anonymously, by proxy as it were. > If you can find a conspirator >of murder as " highly intelligent, knowledgeable, and overall nice person" then >you also are in need of immediate mental health intervention. As my essay makes clear, the whole purpose of the system is to KEEP most people from being "conspirators of murder" by the legal definition. You may disapprove of people being able to defend themselves from government abuse, but I actually encourage it. >Should the mainstream media ever get wind of Bell's lunacy it will be one more >nail in the crypto-coffin spurring the Feds and international anti-crypto efforts to >a frenzy. As you know well, my current opinion is that the theory is tantamount to being inevitable. If anybody is worked up into a "frenzy," it'll be because they are afraid I might actually be correct. Anyone who is really convinced I am wrong will be quite calm, because they "know" nothing will come of my idea. > Bell is either a total fucking lunatic of the extreme right wing For the record, I was a minarchist libertarian for about 19 years, until about a year ago when I realized that pure anarchy (with protection for rights) could actually be made stable. I have as little sympathy for the "extreme right wing" as I do the "extreme left wing." And as I'm happy to point out, I upset both of their "apple carts" just as effectively, so both categories have "good" reason to hate me. >(having >read his suck ups posts supporting General Linda Thompson) This is an extremely odd assertion. While I have certainly heard of Linda Thompson (the highly controversial Indiana lawyer) I don't recall having written much about her, and certainly not on the Internet and certainly not within the last year or so. I don't think I've ever "defended" her, although I have occasionally criticized a few of her critics as buffoons. Because they WERE buffoons! (This does not automatically make Linda Thompson look any better, however. In fact, the only communication I've ever seen from her on the subject of "Assassination Politics" was actually critical. I responded, correcting some false conclusions of hers, and I never heard anything more from her. Even so, I challenge this guy to show (or even describe the "where and when" of these "suck up posts." > or an agent provocateur for the Feds. This is rich! I've proposed a system which may spell inevitable doom for the Feds no matter what they do, no matter what they try, and this guy tries to claim that I'm an "agent provocateur" for them! In past posts I've mentioned that I carefully considered the question of whether or not my posting would help or hinder the adoption of the "Assassination Politics" idea, and I came to the conclusion that the worst situation would be if the government could keep its ultimate weaknesses disguised for a few more years. That's why I published when I did. The first person to think of an "Assassination Politics" idea was probably some well-paid apparatchik in the NSA, who (quite opposite of my position) was terrified that it might come true. > One is as bad as the other. To quote your own >words to Mr. Olsen; " I've also formed a rather negative opinion of you, based >on your actions in this incident." > >AO> He has no interest in any sort of honest discussion. > >DV> Honest or dishonest, the discussion of Jim's political views has nothing >DV> to do with encryption. > >His plans for death squads success DEPENDS on the anonymity provided by >CRYPTO! Some anti-gunners argue that the public shouldn't be allowed to own guns because they might do something wrong with them. They are fools. If anti-crypto people take the same position with respect to crypto, they are even WORSE fools. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com Klaatu Burada Nikto "Something is going to happen. Something... Wonderful!" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMRbXR/qHVDBboB2dAQFdEgQApk8IhefbWiA9+Ae6ypaHWA6216yTZvYJ Jox1G/fpdToYeQpfQF6ARCl1dAmLjq7qSe5chJo4IF8W7sMbtSiOKMCNY8xIG6IL cS3XTRXELyNX8YEsHy7A8bYyaKe0J2X4M1MEcmWqVjt4HiaQ4dConh0pm7zc/5wy hXTDsvIEaQc= =D087 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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