August 2001 - cypherpunks-legacy

10'th Anniversary
by Jim Choate 04 Aug '01

04 Aug '01

What would be the 'official' crank-up date on the Cypherpunks mailing list in 1992? Time for a 10 year anniversary. -- ____________________________________________________________________ Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night: God said, "Let Tesla be", and all was light. B.A. Behrend The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Extradition from the Great Beyond
by Faustine 04 Aug '01

04 Aug '01

Faustine wrote: Dr. Evil wrote: >> Not safe at all, even the unclassified programs are getting better all >> the time. Check the archives for some interesting past >> discussion--and if you feel like tinkering around yourself, there's a >> ton of free software you can download here: >> http://www.content-analysis.de/software.html > Very interesting! I wonder if it is possible to learn to write in > other "linguistic fingerprints"? I'll have to look into this. Part of the problem is that in order to do that you'd need to change the subjects, sub-subjects and themes you like to talk about, period-- because "fingerprint" goes a lot deeper than word frequency. Even pure code has a discernable "fingerprint" of sorts. It's a losing proposition. > Are there any such programs that are free and run under Linux? I'l bet there are, I just can't remember any off the top of my head. If you root through the links, I'm sure something interesting will turn up. And if you have access to a Windows box at all you could always disassemble a sample program you like and rewrite it under your own platform. I'd rather get in there and improve it than use it straight out-of-the-box anyway. >>More interesting by far would be to write software that sanitized the >>text. Learning to write with a *different* fingerprint should be easy. Not as easy as you might think: even a causal reader familiar with these analytic techniques knows how to spot a faked style--and if you're the only person in the group who takes a real interest in a certain cluster of subjects, how hard is it going to be to pin the nym to you, if you've already written a body of posts to compare it with? I've been told the FBI uses technology that would knock your socks off. I bet they had a lot of fun tracking down Hanssen's other usenet nyms...not a bad test case for the hobbyist, actually. Faking a style might be good for short messages and the like, but participating in a discussion group for a length of time? Forget it. Unless you're willing to put some serious work into creating a totally distinct persona, you're wasting your time. This might seem a little unorthodox, but if you're really intent on it, a couple of classics which could help are "Building a Character" and "Creating a Role" by Constantine Stanislavski. No need to re-invent the wheel... ~Faustine.

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Re: Slashdot | Roasting Sacred Cows
by John Young 04 Aug '01

04 Aug '01

Jim, I appreciate your resistance. Still, our experience on Cryptome with offering only URLs indicates that they are little used unless there's a taste of what is worth going to see. No doubt that it would be easiest to give only URLs and let the lazy bastards graze readers-digest crap elsewhere. But it's not the deadheads we'd like to swap info with, for they never give back enough to make it worthwhile -- usually the shits just send more URLs without explanation as if we can read their profound thoughts. What we've found is that if you treat your readers with respect they'll give it to you, even send you stuff you'd never see otherwise. That is, they'll inform you and educate you in ways you can't do alone, though that shared experience isn't for everyone, I'll grant you, in particular when you want only to talk and preach and not listen and learn. So we've found that the better we make our samples the more likely readers will figure we're offering something worth reading, and if they like it they'll eventually return the favor, and if we're lucky we get better than we offer -- indeed, that is always the case: the best stuff comes in from folks who figure they'd like to take part in a mutually rewarding situation, as we see on cypherpunks. URLs alone send a message of laziness, contempt, cluelessness about the benefits of communication as against dancing castaway on an island. For that solo shit you don't need CDR, the Net, the world, or think you don't until the radio farts coming from your ass are only cancer static.

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CodeRed Fix B
by Wilfred L. Guerin 04 Aug '01

04 Aug '01

Continued... I have found no obvious work on fixes yet... Resolve: Time to fix this annoyance and be done with it. Request: Need a "Simple" set of *instructions* to "paste" a line to apache/etc server control settings so that other individuals who are running an apache/etc server may cease "attacks" on their boxes. Basicly, I request from the community a simple set of 1.2.3.4.. style instructions which will allow apache/etc admins to redirect the /stupid.ida requests to a cgi or another operation (Cgi easiest to implement) which will then both report the assault to a central server (mine) and send a sequence of infallable retaliation worms (or multiple instances of one) to the 'evil' box (simple cgi open socket/etc) and therefore target and cease the moronic box's noise. Additionally, this design would require a 'heavy' server which accepts connections via tcpip GET on port 80 (known pass-through for fwall due to problem itself) of a simple report, most probibly /aa.bb.cc.dd/ee.ff.gg.hh or similar reporting that a..d has been fixed by e..h ... log of all connection feeds would be sufficient, need box. This is problematic, as us-fed and international authorities may percieve this logging operation as authorization to attack *it* as a threat...(idiots) This bullshit shall not be tolerated, therefore I suggest and request a server be made available in a politicly and logisticly neutral realm. Havenco have any interest in testing available bw/connection capability? Anyone else? ... I shall personally produce both a basic cgi and a revision of this VERY LOW QUALITY worm code for distribution shortly, unless someone informs that such has already been completed. Note, the quality of the code is horrible, im not gonna optimize it, but it's just VERY badly written. Too bad the origin cant even code an attack correctly, more bad is the fact that SOMEONE cant even code an os/server correctly... Oh well. The motivation is to both squelch by voluntary operation (from script-capable servers) any hostile attacks on these private boxes, but also neutralize quickly this annoyance. It will be expected that the next generation of annoyances will eliminate the file-crosscheck mechanisms, and will thus require a complete system penetration to disable and isolate the server... Sorry M$hit, but your failures warrent elimination of your products by force. Your failures threaten the operation of the global data infrastructure, we eliminate your software from operation (since it has already been disabled prior this conflict)... We may tend to this as it comes... Resolve: Assuming noone has completed this task, I will tend to coding this basic fix now, and hopefully someone will come forward with a central logging system capable of post-process analysis review. Additionally, it will be requested that all isp/datasec admins allow full outgoing packet flow to this target box/array for single-direction reporting. It is probible that a large number of "firewalled" failures in corporate networks are creating additional annoyances, all requiring fix. The cgi response script, if utilized, can have the option of reporting, reporting what, etc for compatibility with security issues. As for the wh.gov attack... I could care less. If these morons and their excess of IC and technical resources can not come up with such a basic fix and remedy, why should we care about their interests? Moronics not tolerated. So... Can someone please prepare an instruction of how to set apache and other servers up to route /*n.threat requests to a cgi/script/module/etc so we can immediately release this remedy... Im sick of the level of stupidity in this world. Time to start replacing the failed components. -Wilfred L. Guerin Wilfred(a)Cryogen.com .

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Book1
by CHIUPING 04 Aug '01

04 Aug '01

Hi! How are you? I send you this file in order to have your advice See you later. Thanks

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Your Turn 2 Profit!
by Profits 04 Aug '01

04 Aug '01

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Your Turn 2 Profit!
by Profits 04 Aug '01

04 Aug '01

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Your Turn 2 Profit!
by Profits 04 Aug '01

04 Aug '01

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Re: Traceable Infrastructure is as vulnerable as traceable messages.
by Tim May 04 Aug '01

04 Aug '01

At 8:43 PM +0200 8/3/01, Eugene Leitl wrote: >On Fri, 3 Aug 2001, Ray Dillinger wrote: > >> (2) The remailers themselves are not anonymous. > >No, but to shut them down you have to know where they are, and to make >your intent known to operators of such. > >The remailers could reside in a state with a weak mutual enforcibility >(Eastern Block successor states, Israel, developing countries). The >remailers could be physically hidden in a large facility (of course, you >could always whip up a firewall filter blocking them), or be connecting >via 802.11b and successors. The remailers could be packaged as part of a >well-behaved worm, thus overwhelming detection and enforcement >capabilites. Just so. And some of the recent "remailers can't work" critics (Dillinger, Farr) are breathtakingly ignorant of what was common knowledge in 1992. Worse, they haven't heeded recommendations that they get themselves up to speed. There is no sign that even the technologies described above (wireless, throwaways, worm-based, surreptitious, etc.) are needed to achieve excellent untraceability. A distributed set of remailers in N different jurisdictions is quite robust against prosecutorial fishing expeditions, though not as robust as we want against attacks by much more capable adversaries. Ways to increase robustness have been discussed many times. (Increase N, increase pool sizes at each stage, adopt constant-bandwidth approaches like Pipenet, throw in wireless and "rooms full of remailers" approaches, even adopt DC-Net methods as cores for sub-nets.) Dillinger and Farr have described only sophomoric attacks. Even the remailers of 1995-6 defeated the Scientologists. Crap about IP addresses being traceable is just obfuscation to cover basic ignorance of how remailer networks work. --Tim May -- Timothy C. May tcmay(a)got.net Corralitos, California Political: Co-founder Cypherpunks/crypto anarchy/Cyphernomicon Technical: physics/soft errors/Smalltalk/Squeak/agents/games/Go Personal: b.1951/UCSB/Intel '74-'86/retired/investor/motorcycles/guns

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Slashdot | Roasting Sacred Cows
by Jim Choate 04 Aug '01

04 Aug '01

http://slashdot.org/articles/01/08/04/0228234.shtml -- -- ____________________________________________________________________ Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night: God said, "Let Tesla be", and all was light. B.A. Behrend The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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