March 2001 - cypherpunks-legacy

Czech cryptologists discover bug in OpenPGP format
by Pawel Krawczyk 27 Mar '01

27 Mar '01

http://www.i.cz/en/onas/tisk4.html Press Release Prague, 20.3.2001 Cryptologists from Czech company ICZ detected serious security vulnerability of an international magnitude A bug has been found in worldwide used security format OpenPGP. The bug can lead to discovery of user's private keys used in digital signature systems. OpenPGP format is widely used in many applications used worldwide, including extremely popular programs like PGPTM, GNU Privacy Guard, and others. The bug detection comes on the right time, as Philip Zimmermann, the creator of PGP program, has left Network Associates, Inc. and aims to boost OpenPGP format in other products for privacy security on Internet. From the scientific point of view, the discovery goes far beyond actual programs - it has wider theoretical and practical impact. Two Czech cryptologists, Vlastimil Klima and Tomas Rosa, from a company Decros (member of ICZ group) detected insufficient security protection of private signature keys while working on a research for the Czech National Security Authority. The private signature key is the most sensitive and therefore the most protected information in all digital signature systems. The attack is described in detail in a research report to be released shortly on Internet (http://www.i.cz) in both Czech and English. The attack on OpenPGP format leading to discovery of DSA and RSA private signature keys is described in the research report. OpenPGP format is being proposed as an Internet standard for exact definition of content and meaning of data records, in relation to encryption and to digital signature. This format is used not only in groups of programs called PGPTM, but also in other applications, including GNU Privacy Guard. The list of products based on OpenPGP is available on Internet at [1]http://www.pgpi.org/products. OpenPGP format and all the applications need to be reviewed the same way as the PGPTM program itself. The attack was successfully verified and demonstrated on PGPTM(*) version 7.0.3 using AES and DH/DSS algorithms, which are deservedly being considered as highly secure. This serious bug is caused by incorrect implementation of the above-mentioned strong cryptographic techniques. The private signature key is the basic and the most sensitive information in the whole system. The user is using it for digital signature. In all systems, including OpenPGP, it is therefore protected by a strong cipher. AES, one of the latest strong algorithms, has been used in the attacked system. However, the protection appears to be illusory. The authors proved that attackers do not need to attack the strong cipher itself. They can simply bypass it as well as the secret user's passphrase. A slight modification of the private key file followed by capturing a signed message is enough to break the private key. These tasks can be performed without knowledge of the user's passphrase. After that, a special program can be run on any office PC. Based on the captured message, the program is able to calculate the user's private key in half a second. The attacker can then sign any messages instead of the attacked user. Despite of very quick calculation, the program is based on a special cryptographic know-how. Insufficient security of public and private parts of signature keys in OpenPGP format has been analyzed for DSA and RSA algorithms. The step-by-step description of the attack on both private signature keys is being demonstrated. The attacks apply to all RSA and DSA parameter lengths (modules, keys). The demonstrated attacks have a strong impact on security of the programs mentioned above. To complete the attack, it is not always necessary to visit the attacked user's workstation. The vulnerability of the system is also in the files with exported private keys used by the user for transferring the keys between workstations. The fact that the private key is stored in an encrypted form can cause an illusory feeling of security. If this file or diskette is captured by an attacker during the transfer, the security of user's private key is in serious danger. We can often see that users store private key files on shared devices on a network to maintain easy access. Knowing that the key is protected by a strong cipher, the user considers such storage to be safe enough. The authors proved that this feeling is illusory. Typically, the server administrator can be the attacker. Knowing the details of the demonstrated attack, the user of programs based on OpenPGP is in a difficult situation when he/she realizes that an invalid signature value has been generated. The user cannot be sure whether this happened because of the attack, or 'just' because of a technical failure. It is obvious that every file with an invalid signature has to be handled carefully, the same way as a file with the private key in open form! This includes careful secure wiping of the file from the workstation or the server. The completed analysis of the OpenPGP format has discovered serious defects that make OpenPGP based applications vulnerable. The practical example is PGPTM program which is not resistant to the attack on DSA algorithm. However, the program is resistant to the attack on RSA algorithm because of additional protections beyond OpenPGP format. Though the attack relates to RSA and DSA algorithms in OpenPGP, similar vulnerabilities can be expected in other asymmetrical cryptographic systems, including systems based on elliptic curves. OpenPGP format and PGPTM program are likely not the only examples of systems that can be attacked because of insufficient protection of the parameters mentioned above. In the end of their research report, the authors propose cryptographic measures correcting OpenPGP format and PGPTM program as well. They strongly appeal for very careful design of cryptographic systems. Contact: ICZ a.s. V Olšinách 75 100 97 Prague 10 [2]http://www.i.cz Miroslav Votruba Marketing Director ICZ Tel.: 02/81 00 21 43 e-mail: [3]m.votruba(a)i.cz _________________________________________________________________ (*) Note: PGP is registered trade mark of Network Associates, Inc. All other registered and not registered trade marks listed in this document are owned by their appropriate owners. References 1. http://www.pgpi.org/products 2. http://www.i.cz/ 3. mailto:m.votruba@i.cz -- Paweł Krawczyk *** home: <http://ceti.pl/~kravietz/> security: <http://ipsec.pl/> *** fidonet: 2:486/23

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1º Aniversário, Obrigado
by info＠giganetstore.com 27 Mar '01

27 Mar '01

Lisboa, 27 de Março de 2001 Estimado Cliente, A giganetstore.com faz amanhã um ano de actividade comercial. Queremos agradecer-lhe o facto de ser nosso cliente e de ter utilizado os nossos serviços ao longo deste primeiro ano de actividade. Durante este período tivemos oportunidade de contribuir de forma significativa, e com a sua ajuda, para o desenvolvimento de Comércio Electrónico em Portugal. Ao longo deste primeiro ano tivemos mais de 5500 encomendas, entregamos os produtos em média 4,5 dias após a encomenda. Atingimos uma base de mais de 12.000 clientes registados que utilizam os nossos serviços para compras, recolhem informação sobre preços, características de produtos e mantém-se informados sobre as nossas promoções. A sua contribuição foi decisiva para que fossem desenvolvidos novos serviços e funcionalidade e corrigidos procedimentos que se revelaram desajustados. Durante este segundo ano de actividade iremos continuar a trabalhar para tornar as compras mais simples, mais rápidas, com maior variedade e aos custos mais baixos do mercado. Decidimos também abrir nossa plataforma de Comércio Electrónico a outros comerciantes devidamente certificados no sentido de tornar o destino de compras www.giganetstore.com <http://www.giganetstore.com/> cada vez mais atractivo, o que irá acontecer no segundo semestre deste ano. O que alcançamos até agora é no entanto apenas um primeiro passo num caminho que estimamos que seja longo e que traga cada vez mais vantagens aos nossos clientes impondo o nosso modelo de negócio como um modelo ganhador para si, para os nossos trabalhadores e para os nossos accionistas. Para tal contamos consigo, quer fazendo a giganetstore.com como o seu site de referência para as compras on-line, quer através das sugestões e criticas para melhorarmos todos os dias o nosso serviço e o valor que lhe oferecemos, quer através da explicação desta nova forma de comprar aos seus amigos e familiares. Acreditamos que a revolução ainda só agora começou, que as compras via electrónica podem trazer mais valor e maior comodidade respeitando o seu recurso mais importante o seu tempo e o uso que faz dele, e que só com clientes exigentes podemos ser os melhores. Para comemorar este dia a www.giganetstore.com <http://www.giganetstore.com/> criou uma promoção especial válida apenas por 24 horas em que irá atribuir um desconto de 5% a todas as encomendas entradas nos dias 27 e 28 de Março de 2001, para tal deverá utilizar o seguinte código no processo de confirmação da sua encomenda 200128032803 . Em nome de toda a equipe da giganetstore.com quero mais uma vez agradecer-lhe as visitas e compras que fez durante este primeiro ano. : - ) Miguel Dias de Carvalho ( Administrador Delegado) <http://www.giganetstore.com/>

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Re: CNN.com - Scientist: 2 gunmen involved in JFK assassination - March 26, 2000
by George＠Orwellian.Org 27 Mar '01

27 Mar '01

Choate self-important msg redacted. I give up, asshole, what does that story have to do with the cypherpunk lists? Or are you now down to claiming you can post any damn thing because otherwise you are being censored?

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Slashdot | Congressman Boucher Responds
by Jim Choate 27 Mar '01

27 Mar '01

http://slashdot.org/interviews/01/03/27/1432221.shtml -- The Laws of Serendipity: 1. In order to discover anything, you must be looking for something. 2. If you wish to make an improved product, you must first be engaged in making an inferior one. Tivoli Certification Group, OSCT James Choate jchoate(a)tivoli.com Senior Engineer 512-436-1062

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NIST Symmetric Key Block Cipher Algorithms workshop
by Declan McCullagh 27 Mar '01

27 Mar '01

http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar20010800/frwebgate.access.gpo.… [Federal Register: March 27, 2001 (Volume 66, Number 59)] [Notices] [Page 16658-16659] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr27mr01-38] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Institute of Standards and Technology Public Meeting Announcing a Workshop for the Analysis of Modes of Operation for Symmetric Key Block Cipher Algorithms AGENCY: National Institute of Standards and Technology, Commerce. ACTION: Notice of public workshop. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announces a workshop on modes of operation for securing data using symmetric key block cipher algorithms, such as the algorithm specified in the draft Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Interested parties may suggest ideas or submit papers for discussion at the workshop, including proposals of modes of operation, to the address below. DATES: The Second Modes of Operation Workshop will be held on August 24, 2001, from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. ADDRESSES: The workshop will be held at the Holiday Inn Santa Barbara, 5650 Calle Real, Goleta, California. Details regarding workshop registration will be available at the modes home page: http:// csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/modes/. Suggestions, questions, comments or submissions should be sent to Modes of Operation Workshop, Attn: Elaine Barker, NIST, 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930, or to EncryptionModes(a)nist.gov. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, contact EncryptionModes(a)nist.gov or one of the following: Elaine Barker, NIST, 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930; telephone 301-975-2911; fax 301-948-1233 or via e-mail at Elaine.barker(a)nist.gov; or Morris Dworkin 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930, Gaithersburg, MD 20899- 8930; telephone 301-975-2354; fax 301-948-1233; or via e-mail at morris.dworkin(a)nist.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Block ciphers can be used as building blocks for encryption modes and for other modes for securing data. For example, block ciphers can be used in the construction of message authentication codes, hash algorithms, and random bit generators. With the advent of new block ciphers, such as the AES, there is an opportunity to update such modes of operation for current and future applications and technology. The purpose of this Federal Register notice is to announce a workshop on modes of operation for securing data using symmetric key block cipher algorithms, such as the algorithm specified in the draft Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Prior to the workshop, suggestions and submissions from the public to aid NIST in planning an appropriate workshop and facilitate the comparison and analysis of block cipher modes of operation are welcome. The workshop will aid NIST in developing a standard or guideline that is secure and responsive to the needs of government, industry, and the public. NIST will consider for discussion at the workshop, at a minimum, the modes that were proposed at the October 20, 2000 public workshop on this topic. These are available at the modes home page, and NIST encourages public analysis of these modes. The workshop may also consider other existing modes or their generalizations, or other modes that are proposed in comments and papers. It will be helpful to receive analysis and proposals for variations of counter mode, arising from alternative methods for prescribing the generation of counters. All suggestions received will be publicly available at the modes home page. In order to encourage a common framework for comparison, a workshop approach to evaluate and analysis is available on the modes home page. NIST believes that participants in the upcoming workshop would be interested in comments that include statements regarding the intellectual property and/or licensing requirements of any proposed modes. Test vectors will also be useful, to provide analyzers of the modes a means to check the validity of their implementations. Fuller descriptions are available at the modes web site. The results of the workshop will aid NIST's efforts to develop a complete ``suite'' of modes of operation from which individual modes can be selected to fit the needs of a wide range of applications and environments. The recommended modes are expected to support the eventual Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and other block ciphers. Submissions for discussion at the workshop should be made early enough to provide time to prepare the meeting agenda. Papers proposing new modes of operation are requested as soon as possible, to provide time for the analysis of the new proposals. Authority: NIST's activities to develop computer security standards to protect sensitive (unclassified) systems are undertaken pursuant to specific responsibilities assigned to NIST in section [[Page 16659]] 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-106), the Computer Security Act of 1987 (Pub. L. 100-235), and Appendix III to Office of Business Management Circular A-130. Dated: March 19, 2001. Karen Brown, Acting Director, NIST.

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Branded/Private Label Realtime Internet Travel Booking Engine
by John Hazlewood 27 Mar '01

27 Mar '01

Hi, My name is John Hazlewood and I came upon your site and think there is a GREAT opportunity for us to partner. At TheStoreMaker.com you can create your own branded/private label travel website with your own banners, logo's, custom design, and graphics for FREE. You can then create a link from your home page to your new branded travel site that includes on line real time air, car, and hotel reservations. We offer a feature that allows you to disable air, car, or hotel...for example if you only want to sell air and car you can easily disable the hotel booking engine. Once the branded travel site is created you add a link from your home page to the first page of your branded travel site. When someone comes to your branded travel site and buys something you will make 30% of the commission. Please take a look at some of the sample sites created and then make your own for FREE with our automated branding tool...it is very easy to do and only takes a few minutes. Use the advanced edit button for greater customization. Our site is located at http://www.thestoremaker.com . Please feel free to email or call me with any question. I can be reached in Austin Texas at 512-327-5223. If I accidentally emailed the wrong person I sincerely apologize. Can you please forward this to the appropriate person in your organization? Thank you and have a GREAT day! John P.S. You may have heard about the laws being passed regarding unsolicited emails. The law requires that I include following opt-out instructions: Future transmissions to you by the sender of this email may be stopped at no cost to you by replying to this message with .remove. and the email address in the subject. P.P.S. Another great advantage about our travel booking system is that we not only sell retail/published fares but also integrate consolidator/negotiated prices so you and your customers get the cheapest fares available. TheStoreMaker.com Inc 2108-A Homdale Austin, Texas 78704 John Hazlewood<john.hazlewood(a)thestoremaker.net>

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Idiot Oregon cops arrest wrong people
by Declan McCullagh 27 Mar '01

27 Mar '01

http://www.oregonlive.com/news/oregonian/index.ssf?/news/oregonian/01/03/me… Sheriff's office pays for errors 2001-03-27 07:07:46 Sheriff's office pays for errors Sheriff Jim Spinden says the $258,000 Washington County has paid in claims for police errors since 1998 is reasonable Monday, March 26, 2001 ______________________________________________________________________ By Alex Pulaski of The Oregonian staff HILLSBORO -- On Dec. 11, 1998, Washington County sheriff's deputies arrested Kevin Schuh on a probation violation. The man they were looking for was Kevin Dean Schuch. The man they arrested was Kevin Lee Schuh. Even though the man in custody showed identification indicating he had a different name, address, birth date, Social Security number, driver's license, weight, height and hair color from the wanted man, he was booked into jail. Eight months later, the county paid for the mistake: Kevin Lee Schuh and his attorney got a check for $1,773. Schuh's case is not unique. [...]

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Re: kid porn
by George＠Orwellian.Org 27 Mar '01

27 Mar '01

Shyoba22(a)aol.com spurted: # I am intersted in how to access sites involving very young girls in # sex acts w/adults. Not willing to pay $$$$exhorbitant.....thanx Well, according to The News, reporting on the shutting down of some Russian sites for KP: the U.S. government estimates there are 100,000 WWW sites that are involved or related to KP. Are you sure you can't find any? ---- Try "child pornography" (with the double quotes) at Google. You'll see all sorts of sites for reporting KP. Copy one or more of them, such as www.missingkids.com, into your own new "reporting" site. You'll get direct tips as to where KP is. ---- And, of course, there's Usenet.

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kid porn
by Shyoba22＠aol.com 27 Mar '01

27 Mar '01

am intersted in how to access sites involving very young girls in sex acts w/adults. Not willing to pay $$$$exhorbitant.....thanx

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[ANNOUNCEMENT] OpenSSL 0.9.6a Beta 2 released
by Richard Levitte 27 Mar '01

27 Mar '01

The second beta release of OpenSSL 0.9.6a is now available from the OpenSSL FTP site <URL: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/>. OpenSSL 0.9.6a is a bug-fix release of version 0.9.6, and currently contains 43 documented changes. Among others, this release should build on all Windows platforms, which 0.9.6 failed to do. Just as for version 0.9.6, this one comes in two variants, one containing the now well-known ENGINE code and one that doesn't. The tar files are: openssl-0.9.6a-beta2.tar.gz openssl-engine-0.9.6a-beta2.tar.gz The changes since the first beta are: - made ms/32all.bat and ms/16all.bat to work. - a few warnings under WIN32 fixed. - a missing module in the VMS build system was added. - a memory leak in the error data code was plugged. - the support for shared libraries changed as in 0.9.7-dev. [N.B.: shared library support is still *EXPERIMENTAL* and not really supported considering the big number of changes that are coming in future versions of OpenSSL] - a PKCS#12 key generation bug was fixed. - a few typos were corrected. - more configuration possibilities for Unixware were added. If this beta is shown to build and test correctly on all reported platforms, there will be no need for another beta. Otherwise, there will be a third beta. In any case, that next release is scheduled for Tuesday 2001-03-27. To make sure that it will work correctly, please test this version (especially on less common platforms), and report any problems to <openssl-bugs(a)openssl.org>. -- Richard Levitte levitte(a)openssl.org OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org/~levitte/ Software Engineer, Celo Communications: http://www.celocom.com/

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