October 2001 - cypherpunks-legacy

FIPR Release 16/10/2001: EMERGENCY POWERS ALLOW MASS-SURVEILLANCE FOR NON-TERRORIST INVESTIGATIONS (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Oct '01

17 Oct '01

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 23:26:02 +0100 From: Caspar Bowden <cb(a)fipr.org> To: cryptography(a)wasabisystems.com, cyber-rights-UK(a)mail.cyber-rights.org Subject: FIPR Release 16/10/2001: EMERGENCY POWERS ALLOW MASS-SURVEILLANCE FOR NON-TERRORIST INVESTIGATIONS FIPR Press release: FOR IMMEDIATE USE : 16th October 2001 EMERGENCY POWERS ALLOW MASS-SURVEILLANCE FOR NON-TERRORIST INVESTIGATIONS ======================================================================== *) Home Office undecided whether ISP data retention to be voluntary or compulsory *) Data revealing who you talk to, what you read, where you are, collected for "national security" *) Data can be trawled for public order, minor crimes, tax, health and safety *) E-Commerce to bear open-ended storage and data-protection compliance costs ======================================================================== As part of an emergency package of anti-terrorism measures, Home Secretary David Blunkett announced yesterday (Note 3) that Internet Service Providers would be "enabled" to retain logs detailing the online activity of their customers (but NOT the contents of communications). Data protection legislation (Note 4) currently protects electronic privacy by prohibiting blanket storage by ISPs of logs recording such details as websites browsed, To and From addresses of e-mails, and which 'newsgroup' articles are read by a subscriber. Other "communications data", such as the telephone number used to dial-up the Internet, may be kept so long as it is relevant to billing or fraud control. Although Mr.Blunkett's use of the word "enable" (rather than "require") implied that compliance will be at the ISP's discretion, the lead official told FIPR that retention may be made compulsory, enforced through civil law. The same source said a ministerial certificate will assert "national security" exemptions (Note 5) so that ISPs and telephone companies will not be in breach of European Directives. The government will only specify later exactly what data may be collected and for how long in a Code of Practice in consultation with ISPs. No new legislation is necessary for police and intelligence agencies to collect the data once it is recorded by ISPs and telephone companies. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Act 2000 (Note 5) allows records to be obtained for broad purposes including tax, health and safety, public order offences and minor crime. Although "communications data" provides a complete map of private life, revealing who you talk to, what you read, and where you go, the authorities can rubber-stamp compilation and trawling of large and detailed databases. In contrast, inspection of the contents of a single e-mail requires a warrant from a Secretary of State, and a search for documents requires a court order. Bulk requests can be made on groups or the history of an individual and kept by police and intelligence agencies indefinitely under data protection exemptions. This includes the exact co-ordinates of your geographic location - which 3rd-generation mobiles produce continuously whilst the phone is switched on. Computerised 'traffic analysis' (tracing links between individuals) is a powerful new form of mass-surveillance, but is only efficient at keeping tabs on the law-abiding. Professional terrorists know how to cover their tracks - for example throw-away use of pre-paid mobile phones. Reports of the modus operandi of the September 11th terrorists indicate they used Web-based e-mail from public terminals. Clearly it is not persuasive to argue for privacy to be sacrificed in the name of fighting terrorism if the measures would not in fact be effective. A leaked report from the National Criminal Intelligence Service last year revealed that police and security agencies are nevertheless pressing for a mandatory data retention law to warehouse the traffic data of the entire population for several years (http://cryptome.org/ncis-carnivore.htm) Blunkett's proposals amount to blanket 'dataveillance' for non-terrorist investigations, using the the tragic events of Sep 11 as justification. Providers of e-commerce authentication services could be affected as well as ISPs and telcos. Anyone offering "provision of access to, and of facilities for making use of...the transmission of communications" [RIP S.22(4) & S.1 defs] could face extra costs of providing suitable storage devices and media, and full compliance with data protection legislation. Quotes ====== Caspar Bowden, director of Internet think-tank FIPR (Foundation for Information Policy Research) commented: "Sensitive data revealing what you read, where you are, and who you talk to online could be collected in the name of national security. But Mr.Blunkett intends to allow access to this data for purposes nothing to do with fighting terrorism. Minor crimes, public order and tax offences, attendance at demonstrations, even 'health and safety' will be legitimate reasons to siphon sensitive details of private life into government databases to be retained indefinitely. This would be in flagrant breach of the first and second Data Protection Principles." (Note 6) Contact for enquiries: Caspar Bowden Foundation for Information Policy Research www.fipr.org cb(a)fipr.org +44(0)20 7354 2333 Notes for editors ----------------- 1. The Foundation for Information Policy Research (www.fipr.org) is a non-profit think-tank for Internet policy, governed by an independent Board of Trustees with an Advisory Council of experts. 2. FIPR's analysis of the RIP Act (www.fipr.org/rip) stimulated media debate, and led to amendments ensuring that people who lose decryption keys or forget passwords are presumed innocent until proven guilty, and prohibiting detailed surveillance of web browsing without a full warrant. 3. Home Office Press Release 15/10/2001: "BLUNKETT OUTLINES FURTHER ANTI-TERRORIST MEASURES" (http://wood.ccta.gov.uk/homeoffice/hopress.nsf/50e2456405b67f7d802566b3 006819dc/2a5fc6811dec4c7180256ae6004fa4d3?OpenDocument) 3. The Telecommunications Data Protection Directive 1996, implemented in UK law as SI 2093 (1999). The Office of the Information Commissioner (contact Iain Bourne) has stated that ISP blanket (i.e. for all subscribers) logging and retention of online Internet activity is prohibited. Logging of telephone numbers is permitted whilst relevant for billing or fraud control. 4. Section 32. of SI 2093 allows a certificate signed by a Minister of the Crown to over-ride the prohibition on blanket data retention for National Security purposes (http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si1999/19992093.htm) 5. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Part.1 Chapter.2, Section 22 (http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00023--c.htm#22) This Part is not yet in force and the relevant Code of Practice is open for consultation until November 2nd (http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/consultintro.htm) 6. Data Protection Act 1998, Schedule 1, (http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80029--l.htm#sch1) --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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US/China & 9/11 (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Oct '01

17 Oct '01

Frontline on PBS Thursday evening of this week. -- ____________________________________________________________________ The people never give up their liberties but under some delusion. Edmund Burke (1784) The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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NIST Key Mgmt. Workshop Documents (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Oct '01

17 Oct '01

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 15:34:53 -0500 From: Elaine Barker <elaine.barker(a)nist.gov> To: cryptography(a)wasabisystems.com Subject: NIST Key Mgmt. Workshop Documents Both the key schemes document and the key management guideline for the NIST key management workshop are now available at http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/kms/workshop2-page.html. Please register by October 30 by email, FAX or phone; see the web page for details. If unable to attend, a report of the workshop will be available on the web site shortly afterward, as well as any slide presentations. If you prefer not to receive further emails on NIST cryptographic activities, please let me know. Thanks. Elaine Barker National Institute of Standards and Technology 100 Bureau Dr., Stop 8930 Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 Phone: 301-975-2911 Fax: 301-948-1233 Email: ebarker(a)nist.gov --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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BBC report: Mata Hari "was framed"; possible new trial
by auto301094＠hushmail.com 17 Oct '01

17 Oct '01

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "Sacrificed": Leon Schirmann is convinced she was sacrificed by the French authorities in a bid to whip up patriotic fervour..." http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1602000/1602486.stm Mata Hari "was framed" By Hugh Schofield in Paris Tuesday, 16 October, 2001, 12:22 GMT 13:22 UK The French Government is considering a request to re-open the case of Mata Hari, the Dutch-born erotic dancer who charmed her way into European society before being shot as a spy in World War I. Two plaintiffs - Mata Hari's home town of Leeuwarden in the Netherlands and the Mata Hari Foundation - have lodged an official plea at the Ministry of Justice in Paris, asking for a review of her 1917 trial. They say new evidence has come to light that shows she was convicted on trumped- up charges. "We can show that the elements that led to her condemnation do not hold together," said lawyer Thibault de Montbrial, who presented the suit. "France would stand taller if it seriously re-examined its judicial history." Erotic dancing The story of Mata Hari-- born Margaretha Zelle in 1876-- has passed into modern- day legend. The daughter of a Dutch hat-seller and a Javanese mother, at the age of 19 she married a Scottish captain, left him seven years later and then set out for Paris to seek her fortune in the early years of the last century. Her highly suggestive and near-naked dances took the "haut monde" by storm. MI5 decided to keep tabs "She didn't exactly dance; but she knew how to remove her clothes piece by piece and move her long, proud, dusky body," wrote the French authoress Colette. She became famous across Europe and took a succession of well-connected lovers, but when World War I broke out she found herself stranded in Berlin. Her theatrical triumphs were on hold, and the money began to dry up. A year later, back in the Netherlands and bored, she was approached by German intelligence, who believed she would have privileged access to top-level circles in Paris, and asked to become a spy. She accepted and became Agent H21. But she was never any good at it. Mata Hari was not made to be a spy--she was simply a woman who liked to get the most out of life--Campaigner Leon Schirmann When she moved to Paris, the British and French secret services immediately blew her cover, and in 1916 she swapped sides and agreed to work for the French. They dispatched her to Madrid to seduce the German military attache there, a Major Kelle. It was he who brought about her execution. Telegrams he sent back to Berlin-- which were intercepted by the French-- suggested that H21 was back working for the Germans. Mata Hari was arrested on a train in February 1917, tried and shot by a firing squad outside Paris on 15 October. Nearly a century later painstaking research by a 92-year-old French resistance veteran has given substance to the long-standing doubts about the conviction. 'Sacrificed' Leon Schirmann is convinced she was sacrificed by the French authorities in a bid to whip up patriotic fervour. "Mata Hari was not made to be a spy. They used her as part of an anti-German propaganda campaign. She was simply a woman who liked to get the most out of life, and she didn't realise that with the war everything changed," she said. Digging through French, German and Dutch archives, Mr Schirmann has unearthed two vital new elements. First he claims he can show that the German military attache-- Major Kelle-- deliberately delivered Mata Hari to the French. He knew that his telegram would be intercepted by the French, so he filled it with incriminating information, implying that she was an extremely valuable German source--even though intelligence reports from Berlin showed she was almost useless. Missing head Second, Mr Schirmann says that officials from French counter-intelligence, the "deuxieme bureau", lied under oath at her trial. They accused Mata Hari of fabricating some of her testimony, even though they were well aware it was true. Under French law for a "trial review" to succeed, important new pieces of evidence need to be presented. The Justice Ministry said Mata Hari's case would be "studied-- like any other." After she was shot in the Bois de Vincennes, Mata Hari's head was removed and for many years kept--along with those of other celebrity criminals-- in Paris's museum of anatomy. A year ago researchers were baffled to discover it had gone missing. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: Hush 2.0 wl8EARECAB8FAjvMlQoYHGF1dG8zMDEwOTRAaHVzaG1haWwuY29tAAoJEKadvsVlUK4P B/cAoJ4CMZgMratuJJk73NBritdNdXSlAJ9eejUtTIKc4B7ewjvVVXETRXmXHA== =B6sz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Internation Patent Law doesn't apply to USG?
by Tim May 17 Oct '01

17 Oct '01

On Tuesday, October 16, 2001, at 02:45 PM, Meyer Wolfsheim wrote: > U.S. Sen. Charles Schumer, D- New York, said Tuesday a generic version > of > ciproflaxin, the antibiotic used to treat anthrax, should be made > available immediately for government use even though German drugmaker > BayerAG holds the patent for the drug. > > http://www.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/conditions/10/16/anthrax/ > http://money.cnn.com/2001/10/16/news/generic_cipro/ What else would anyone expect? The U.S. is a kleptocracy, a shakedown state. It operates by stealing money from citizen-units and then giving that money to welfare breeders and layabouts and corrupt contractors. Basket-case economies like Israel get $5000 million a year, with Egypt getting the same amount as a bribe. As for the grab of Bayer's property, what can Germany do about it? However, it looks like Bayer is getting the message from this threat to simply steal Cipro: they have committed to supplying enough Cipro to Our Federal Government to treat 10 million sheeple. (Why isn't this a matter for individuals to arrange for themselves, through some form of insurance? Because Hillary is getting her fondest wish: socialized medicine, via a State of Emergency.) --Tim May, Occupied America "They that give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." -- Benjamin Franklin, 1759.

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17 Oct '01

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Internation Patent Law doesn't apply to USG?
by Meyer Wolfsheim 17 Oct '01

17 Oct '01

U.S. Sen. Charles Schumer, D- New York, said Tuesday a generic version of ciproflaxin, the antibiotic used to treat anthrax, should be made available immediately for government use even though German drugmaker BayerAG holds the patent for the drug. http://www.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/conditions/10/16/anthrax/ http://money.cnn.com/2001/10/16/news/generic_cipro/ -- Hmmm. -MW-

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Re: mirror volunteers needed
by Steve Mynott 17 Oct '01

17 Oct '01

proff(a)iq.org (Julian Assange) writes: > An ability to create mail-aliases, gpg, perl5, and a good sense of humour :) What and where is the source? -- 1024/D9C69DF9 steve mynott steve(a)tightrope.demon.co.uk its ok the problem solved itself

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Welcome to our Daily Newsletter!
by freeze＠teamfreeze.com 17 Oct '01

17 Oct '01

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Re: Comments On Cathy Young's Defeatist Compromising
by Mike Alissi 17 Oct '01

17 Oct '01

Commentary From Reason Magazine Dear Matt - I wanted to be sure you've seen Jacob Sullum's latest column at Reason Online: <http://www.reason.com/sullum/101601.html> It's copied below. Thanks, Mike October 16, 2001 Fear of Prying By Jacob Sullum I first downloaded Pretty Good Privacy a couple of years ago, at the request of an interview subject. He was nervous about discussing his drug use through unprotected e-mail, and my willingness to use PGP reassured him not only that he would be safe from eavesdroppers but that he could trust me to take his privacy concerns seriously. It was a small illustration of encryption's power, but it brought home to me what a godsend this kind of readily available, easily used software must be to dissidents who risk prison by sharing unauthorized information or expressing forbidden opinions. Phil Zimmermann had such people in mind when he created PGP a decade ago and risked prison by posting it online. At the time, the U.S. government considered strong encryption software a "munition," and by making it available to human rights activists around the world Zimmermann was arguably violating a federal ban on the export of such weapons. Some politicians are trying to revive this sinister view of encryption in the wake of last month's terrorist attacks. In a floor speech a week after hijacked airplanes collided with the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, Sen. Judd Gregg (R-N.H.) worried aloud about "somebody out there using encryption technology for the purposes of pursuing a terrorist act in the United States." He declared, "There is no excuse for anybody to be underwriting that type of activity in our country." To prevent terrorists from shielding their communications, Gregg wants to make all producers of encryption systems design their products so the government can read the messages they generate. The surveillance would be "judicially controlled" to make sure it "simply gets at the bad guys." Gregg's opposition to strong encryption is echoed in some surprising quarters. Boston Globe columnist Cathy Young, a colleague of mine at Reason magazine, has confessed that "the idea of people being able to encrypt electronic communications so that they are beyond surveillance" has always seemed "scary" to her, "precisely because of the threat of terrorism." This is like saying that computers or telephones or airplanes or box cutters are scary. Any technology can be used for good or ill. The question is whether the potential for evil justifies restrictions on legitimate uses. As more than one critic has pointed out, the arguments against strong encryption could also be used against strong locks, since criminals tend to hatch their plans behind closed doors. That doesn't mean all of us should make extra sets of house keys for the police in case they need to search our homes. We have been down this road before with various proposals during the 1990s for "key recovery" arrangements through which the authorities could break otherwise unbreakable codes. Now as then, the most decisive argument against encryption controls is that they wouldn't work because PGP-like software is already available from a variety of sources. Does Sen. Gregg plan to come to my house and erase my copy of PGP? If not, how can he possibly hope to stop terrorists, who are much more highly motivated than I am to shield their communications, from obtaining and using such software? The attempt to do so would weaken security rather than enhancing it. A 1998 report from a panel of distinguished cryptographers and computer scientists concluded that "there are compelling reasons to believe that, given the state of the art in cryptology and secure systems engineering, government-access key recovery is not compatible with large scale, economical, secure cryptographic systems." A member of the panel, Matt Blaze, recently told The Washington Post, "I am extremely doubtful that this could be done without weakening computer systems, and the costs would be absolutely staggering." In addition to the bugs introduced by added complexity, keeping extra copies of the keys used to decode messages would create tempting targets for thieves. The keys could also be compromised by incompetent or corrupt officials charged with protecting them. Misuse of official records is not exactly unheard of in this country, and the problem would be magnified if every unsavory regime that has enlisted in the war on terrorism were to be trusted with the keys to its citizens' e-mail. For the dissidents Phil Zimmermann is rightly proud of helping, the whole point of encryption is to guard against official surveillance. If Gregg's vision were ever realized, they would once again have to watch what they say. ) Copyright 2001 by Creators Syndicate Inc. Jacob Sullum's weekly column is distributed by Creators Syndicate. If you'd like to see it in your local newspaper, write or call the editorial page editor. ************************************************************************** Subscribe to Freematt's Alerts: Pro-Individual Rights Issues Send a blank message to: freematt(a)coil.com with the words subscribe FA on the subject line. List is private and moderated (7-30 messages per week) Matthew Gaylor, (614) 313-5722 ICQ: 106212065 Archived at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/fa/ **************************************************************************

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