November 2000 - cypherpunks-legacy

CDR: pictures free speech compulsory youth education camps
by anonymous＠openpgp.net 28 Nov '00

28 Nov '00

Nov 28, 2000 - 12:12 PM Court to Review Whether Boys Drawings Constitute a Threat The Associated Press BOSTON (AP) - The states highest court is reviewing two drawings penned by a 12-year-old Worcester, Mass., student, to determine if they were a threat against his teacher. The drawings, made two years ago, depict a boy holding a gun pointed at a teacher as she says "please dont kill me" and sobs. A lower court sentenced the boy last year to more than five years probation. The Supreme Judicial Court heard arguments in the case Nov. 7 and is expected to rule soon. Kathleen Kelly, the boys lawyer, told the SJC that a picture cannot be considered a threat, The Boston Globe reported Tuesday. "If a picture communicates a thousand words, why does one need a thousand words?" Chief Justice Margaret Marshall asked. "Because if its a picture alone, theres no intent within that picture to communicate the threat," Kelly answered. Worcester County prosecutor Sandra Hautanen argued that schools must be mindful of recent school shootings. Students in several Massachusetts town have been arrested, disciplined or expelled this year for alleged threats. Some student rights advocates say school leaders have overreacted in the wake of high-profile school shootings. "The punishment really does need to fit the crime, and I feel like weve been using a sledgehammer when a little tapper might be more effective," said Isabel Raskin of the Juvenile Justice Center at Suffolk University Law School.

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CDR: SnapSheild offers encrypted phone service.
by Trei, Peter 28 Nov '00

28 Nov '00

(Vin McLellan pointed this out to me). http://www.computeruser.com/news/00/11/23/news6.html http://www.snapshield.com/ Snapshield (formerly Microlink) is offering a product consisting of special box which sits on your phone line and special PBXs which allow 'end-to-end' encrypted voice/fax etc, based on DES (apparently single DES) and El-Gamal. Calls to or from their Snapshield equipped phones are routed via a special PBX box which provides encryption between the PBX and the phone. If both phones support encryption, the entire link is encrypted. Their page is kind of light on details. In particular it's not clear whether session keys are negotiated between the 'Snapgate' PBX box or between two of the phone boxes. Since they support point-to-multipoint calling, and indicate that monitoring is possible, I suspect the former. For some users, this means that the Snapgate box is an unacceptable point of attack. I can't find any suggestion of robust authentication, though I have not checked everything on their site. They are targetting telcos (for people willing to outsource their security) and large private networks. Anyone have any more information or comments on this product? Peter Trei PS: Their webpage wants me to install a plugin called Data Detective PC Search by Appletware. Anyone know what it does? It sounds ominous. pt Disclaimer: The above represent my personal opinions only.

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CDR: On 60 inches tonight, damn you all
by George＠Orwellian.Org 28 Nov '00

28 Nov '00

http://foxnews.com/national/court/scotus_roadblocks.sml # # Drug Checkpoints Struck Down by High Court # # Tuesday, November 28, 2000 # # In a divided 6-3 ruling, the Supreme Court on Monday struck down # as unconstitutional random roadblocks intended to catch criminals # trafficking drugs. # # The ruling weighed privacy rights against the interests of law # enforcement and found that Indianapolis' use of drug-sniffing # dogs to check all cars pulled over at the roadblocks was an # unreasonable search under the Constitution. # # The majority, in an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day # O'Connor, said the ruling does not affect other kinds of police # roadblocks such as border checks and drunken-driving checkpoints. # Those have already been found constitutional. # # But the reasoning behind those kinds of roadblocks - chiefly # that the benefit to the public outweighs the inconvenience - # cannot be applied broadly, O'Connor wrote. # # "If this case were to rest on such a high level of generality, # there would be little check on the authorities' ability to # construct roadblocks for almost any conceivable law enforcement # purpose," the opinion said. # # The three dissenters were the court's most conservative justices: # Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and # Clarence Thomas. # # Lawyers for Indianapolis conceded that the roadblocks erected # there in 1998 detained far more innocent motorists than criminals. # # The city said its primary aim was to catch drug criminals. Civil # liberties advocates called the practice heavy-handed and risky, # and asked the Supreme Court to ban it. # # Law enforcement in and of itself is not a good enough reason # to stop innocent motorists, the majority ruling concluded. # # The court was not swayed by the argument that the severity of # the drug problem in some city neighborhoods justified the # searches. # # "While we do not limit the purposes that may justify a checkpoint # program to any rigid set of categories, we decline to approve # a program whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable # from the general interest in crime control," the majority opinion # said. # # Cars were pulled over at random in high-crime neighborhoods in # Indianapolis, motorists questioned, and a drug-sniffing dog led # around the cars. Most motorists were detained for about three # minutes. # # The city conducted six roadblocks over four months in 1998 before # the practice was challenged in federal court. # # Police stopped 1,161 cars and trucks and made 104 arrests. # Fifty-five of the arrests were on drug charges.

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CDR: BEST DEAL ON NEW CARS AND TRUCKS!
by NEW CAR 28 Nov '00

28 Nov '00

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Excerpts from "The Design and Verification of a Cryptographic Security Architecture" available
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 28 Nov '00

28 Nov '00

In August I finally submitted my PhD thesis, coming close to wrapping up my long career as a tenured graduate student. Although the work hasn't been accepted yet, there has been some interest expressed in portions of it so I've put a few chapters online. Note that these chapters represent a draft only and are not the completed work. The main part of the thesis, Chapters 1-5, is available from http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/thesis.html. These chapters look at an alternative way of building what people have been trying to do with Orange Book B3/A1-type systems, but in a way which is feasible and practical for an open source system where you don't have tens of millions of dollars and 5-10 years available to produce a product. The chapters are (from the web page, where they're links to the docs): The software architecture, wherein the cryptlib software architecture is presented The security architecture, wherein the cryptlib security architecture is presented The kernel implementation, wherein the implementation details of the cryptlib security kernel are examined Verification techniques, wherein existing methods for building secure systems are examined and found wanting Verification of the cryptlib kernel, wherein a new method for building a secure system is presented. Peter.

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None
by Robert Huddleston 28 Nov '00

28 Nov '00

believer(a)telepath.com) Subject: ip: TechNews: NSA Builds Security Access Into Windows Cc: starla_pureheart(a)yahoo.com http://www.guncontrolvictories.com/enemies_ms.html Gun Control Victories ECHELON (NSA) in Windows Technology News NSA Builds Security Access Into Windows A careless mistake (what a crock my comment) by Microsoft programmers has shown that special access codes for use by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) have been secretly built into all versions of the Windows operating system. Computer-security specialists have been aware for two years that unusual features are contained inside a standard Windows driver used for security and encryption functions. The driver, called ADVAPI.DLL, enables and controls a range of security functions including the Microsoft Cryptographic API (MS-CAPI). In particular, it authenticates modules signed by Microsoft, letting them run without user intervention. At last year's Crypto 98 conference, British cryptography specialist Nicko van Someren said he had disassembled the driver and found it contained two different keys. One was used by Microsoft to control the cryptographic functions enabled in Windows, in compliance with U.S. export regulations. But the reason for building in a second key, or who owned it, remained a mystery. Now, a North Carolina security company has come up with conclusive evidence the second key belongs to the NSA. Like van Someren, Andrew Fernandes, chief scientist with Cryptonym of Morrisville, North Carolina, had been probing the presence and significance of the two keys. Then he checked the latest Service Pack release for Windows NT4, Service Pack 5. He found Microsoft's developers had failed to remove or "strip" the debugging symbols used to test this software before they released it. Inside the code were the labels for the two keys. One was called "KEY." The other was called "NSAKEY." Fernandes reported his re-discovery of the two CAPI keys, and their secret meaning, to the "Advances in Cryptology, Crypto'99" conference held in Santa Barbara. According to those present at the conference, Windows developers attending the conference did not deny the "NSA" key was built into their software. But they refused to talk about what the key did, or why it had been put there without users' knowledge. But according to two witnesses attending the conference, even Microsoft's top crypto programmers were stunned to learn that the version of ADVAPI.DLL shipping with Windows 2000 contains not two, but three keys. Brian LaMachia, head of CAPI development at Microsoft was "stunned" to learn of these discoveries, by outsiders. This discovery, by van Someren, was based on advance search methods which test and report on the "entropy" of programming code. Within Microsoft, access to Windows source code is said to be highly compartmentalized, making it easy for modifications to be inserted without the knowledge of even the respective product managers. No researchers have yet discovered a programming module which signs itself with the NSA key. Researchers are divided about whether it might be intended to let U.S. government users of Windows run classified cryptosystems on their machines or whether it is intended to open up anyone's and everyone's Windows computer to intelligence gathering techniques deployed by the NSA's burgeoning corps of "information warriors." According to Fernandes of Cryptonym, the result of having the secret key inside your Windows operating system "is that it is tremendously easier for the NSA to load unauthorized security services on all copies of Microsoft Windows, and once these security services are loaded, they can effectively compromise your entire operating system". The NSA key is contained inside all versions of Windows from Windows 95 OSR2 onward. "For non-American IT managers relying on WinNT to operate highly secure data centers, this find is worrying," he added. "The U.S government is currently making it as difficult as possible for 'strong' crypto to be used outside of the U.S. That they have also installed a cryptographic back-door in the world's most abundant operating system should send a strong message to foreign IT managers. "How is an IT manager to feel when they learn that in every copy of Windows sold, Microsoft has installed a 'back door' for the NSA -- making it orders of magnitude easier for the U.S. government to access your computer?" he said. Van Someren said he felt the primary purpose of the NSA key might be for legitimate U.S. government use. But he said there cannot be a legitimate explanation for the third key in Windows 2000 CAPI. "It looks more fishy," he said on Friday. Fernandes said he believed the NSA's built-in loophole could be turned round against the snoopers. The NSA key inside CAPI could be replaced by your own key, and used to sign cryptographic security modules from overseas or unauthorized third parties, unapproved by Microsoft or the NSA. This is exactly what the U.S. government has been trying to prevent. A demonstration "how to do it" program that replaces the NSA key can be found on Cryptonym's website. According to one leading U.S. cryptographer, the IT world should be thankful the subversion of Windows by NSA has come to light before the arrival of CPUs that handle encrypted instruction sets. These would make the type of discoveries made this month impossible. "Had the next-generation CPUs with encrypted instruction sets already been deployed, we would have never found out about NSAKEY," he said. Related Stories: U.S. Uses Key Escrow To Steal Secrets Report: U.S. Uses Key Escrow To Steal Secrets Posted (09/03/99, 2:05 p.m. ET) By Duncan Campbell, TechWeb WANT TO KNOW MORE? http://www.guncontrolvictories.com/enemies_ms.html THEN SCROLL DOWN.... http://www.guncontrolvictories.com/00_contents.html - =============== http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_437000/437967.stm BBC News | Sci/Tech | Windows 'back door' security alert Friday, September 3, 1999 Published at 22:18 GMT 23:18 UK Sci/Tech Windows 'back door' security alert By Internet Correspondent Chris Nuttall Cryptographers mark up code for a new key found in Windows [ Picture ] Cryptographers are sounding the alarm on a major security issue involving Microsoft Windows that could eclipse its Hotmail public relations disaster. The BBC's Kathy Riddell: "This has set alarms bells ringing" The findings of a computer security expert that America's National Security Agency (NSA) may have been given a back door into every copy of Windows 95, 98, NT4 and 2000 worldwide are being debated across the Internet. Microsoft has issued a strong denial of allegations of misuse of a second encryption "key" in Windows. "These are just used to ensure that we're compliant with US export regulations," said Scott Culp, Microsoft's security manager for its Windows NT Server software. "We have not shared the private keys. We do not share our keys." But cryptographers in the UK described the implications of the findings as "immense". Windows is installed on more than 90% of the world's computers. Second key for Windows Andrew Fernandes, Chief Scientist at the Ontario-based Cryptonym Corporation, is credited with discovering the identity of a second key used by Windows for encryption purposes. The BBC's Chris Nuttall: "Windows is used on 90% of the world's computers" Caspar Bowden, director of London-based Internet think-tank FIPR, said: "The allegation is that every copy of Windows contains an extra 'magic number' which would permit it to work with encryption modules designed by the US National Security Agency, as well as those approved by Microsoft." The approval mechanism was introduced to ensure that the weak encryption in non-US versions of Windows could not be replaced with stronger software without it being checked against a "key" embedded in Windows, proving that it had been digitally signed off by Microsoft. Two years ago, cryptographers found an alternative, and apparently superfluous, second embedded key. The new details came to light through debugging information erroneously left in the latest service pack for Windows NT. Significantly, the key has the data tag "_NSAKEY" giving rise to speculation that the NSA persuaded Microsoft to give it special access to Windows in a secret deal. Microsoft says it called its function an "NSA key" because the body reviews technical details for the export of data-scrambling software. MS talked with NSA It is known that Microsoft negotiated with the NSA on including encryption in its product. The export of strong encryption is banned by the Clinton administration, which fears terrorists and other criminals could turn it against the US. There are two theories on why this unnecessary second key is included in Windows: * Conspiracy theorists say the key can be used to infiltrate targeted computers. It gives the NSA a direct way of doing this without having to use Microsoft's own key. * A more charitable theory is that Microsoft allowed the NSA a special key to secure the thousands of government computers running Windows. "The innocent explanation is that the US wished to create bespoke encryption modules for official use on government systems without reference to Microsoft," said Mr Bowden. "Ironically, introducing the second key has created a major security loophole in a mechanism which was designed to enforce US export controls on strong cryptography." Microsoft suffered serious embarrassment on Monday when hackers exposed a simple way of breaking into the mailboxes of more than 40 million users of its Hotmail e-mail service. --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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None
by Robert Huddleston 28 Nov '00

28 Nov '00

believer(a)telepath.com) Subject: ip: TechNews: NSA Builds Security Access Into Windows Cc: starla_pureheart(a)yahoo.com http://www.guncontrolvictories.com/enemies_ms.html Gun Control Victories ECHELON (NSA) in Windows Technology News NSA Builds Security Access Into Windows A careless mistake (what a crock my comment) by Microsoft programmers has shown that special access codes for use by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) have been secretly built into all versions of the Windows operating system. Computer-security specialists have been aware for two years that unusual features are contained inside a standard Windows driver used for security and encryption functions. The driver, called ADVAPI.DLL, enables and controls a range of security functions including the Microsoft Cryptographic API (MS-CAPI). In particular, it authenticates modules signed by Microsoft, letting them run without user intervention. At last year's Crypto 98 conference, British cryptography specialist Nicko van Someren said he had disassembled the driver and found it contained two different keys. One was used by Microsoft to control the cryptographic functions enabled in Windows, in compliance with U.S. export regulations. But the reason for building in a second key, or who owned it, remained a mystery. Now, a North Carolina security company has come up with conclusive evidence the second key belongs to the NSA. Like van Someren, Andrew Fernandes, chief scientist with Cryptonym of Morrisville, North Carolina, had been probing the presence and significance of the two keys. Then he checked the latest Service Pack release for Windows NT4, Service Pack 5. He found Microsoft's developers had failed to remove or "strip" the debugging symbols used to test this software before they released it. Inside the code were the labels for the two keys. One was called "KEY." The other was called "NSAKEY." Fernandes reported his re-discovery of the two CAPI keys, and their secret meaning, to the "Advances in Cryptology, Crypto'99" conference held in Santa Barbara. According to those present at the conference, Windows developers attending the conference did not deny the "NSA" key was built into their software. But they refused to talk about what the key did, or why it had been put there without users' knowledge. But according to two witnesses attending the conference, even Microsoft's top crypto programmers were stunned to learn that the version of ADVAPI.DLL shipping with Windows 2000 contains not two, but three keys. Brian LaMachia, head of CAPI development at Microsoft was "stunned" to learn of these discoveries, by outsiders. This discovery, by van Someren, was based on advance search methods which test and report on the "entropy" of programming code. Within Microsoft, access to Windows source code is said to be highly compartmentalized, making it easy for modifications to be inserted without the knowledge of even the respective product managers. No researchers have yet discovered a programming module which signs itself with the NSA key. Researchers are divided about whether it might be intended to let U.S. government users of Windows run classified cryptosystems on their machines or whether it is intended to open up anyone's and everyone's Windows computer to intelligence gathering techniques deployed by the NSA's burgeoning corps of "information warriors." According to Fernandes of Cryptonym, the result of having the secret key inside your Windows operating system "is that it is tremendously easier for the NSA to load unauthorized security services on all copies of Microsoft Windows, and once these security services are loaded, they can effectively compromise your entire operating system". The NSA key is contained inside all versions of Windows from Windows 95 OSR2 onward. "For non-American IT managers relying on WinNT to operate highly secure data centers, this find is worrying," he added. "The U.S government is currently making it as difficult as possible for 'strong' crypto to be used outside of the U.S. That they have also installed a cryptographic back-door in the world's most abundant operating system should send a strong message to foreign IT managers. "How is an IT manager to feel when they learn that in every copy of Windows sold, Microsoft has installed a 'back door' for the NSA -- making it orders of magnitude easier for the U.S. government to access your computer?" he said. Van Someren said he felt the primary purpose of the NSA key might be for legitimate U.S. government use. But he said there cannot be a legitimate explanation for the third key in Windows 2000 CAPI. "It looks more fishy," he said on Friday. Fernandes said he believed the NSA's built-in loophole could be turned round against the snoopers. The NSA key inside CAPI could be replaced by your own key, and used to sign cryptographic security modules from overseas or unauthorized third parties, unapproved by Microsoft or the NSA. This is exactly what the U.S. government has been trying to prevent. A demonstration "how to do it" program that replaces the NSA key can be found on Cryptonym's website. According to one leading U.S. cryptographer, the IT world should be thankful the subversion of Windows by NSA has come to light before the arrival of CPUs that handle encrypted instruction sets. These would make the type of discoveries made this month impossible. "Had the next-generation CPUs with encrypted instruction sets already been deployed, we would have never found out about NSAKEY," he said. Related Stories: U.S. Uses Key Escrow To Steal Secrets Report: U.S. Uses Key Escrow To Steal Secrets Posted (09/03/99, 2:05 p.m. ET) By Duncan Campbell, TechWeb WANT TO KNOW MORE? http://www.guncontrolvictories.com/enemies_ms.html THEN SCROLL DOWN.... http://www.guncontrolvictories.com/00_contents.html - =============== http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_437000/437967.stm BBC News | Sci/Tech | Windows 'back door' security alert Friday, September 3, 1999 Published at 22:18 GMT 23:18 UK Sci/Tech Windows 'back door' security alert By Internet Correspondent Chris Nuttall Cryptographers mark up code for a new key found in Windows [ Picture ] Cryptographers are sounding the alarm on a major security issue involving Microsoft Windows that could eclipse its Hotmail public relations disaster. The BBC's Kathy Riddell: "This has set alarms bells ringing" The findings of a computer security expert that America's National Security Agency (NSA) may have been given a back door into every copy of Windows 95, 98, NT4 and 2000 worldwide are being debated across the Internet. Microsoft has issued a strong denial of allegations of misuse of a second encryption "key" in Windows. "These are just used to ensure that we're compliant with US export regulations," said Scott Culp, Microsoft's security manager for its Windows NT Server software. "We have not shared the private keys. We do not share our keys." But cryptographers in the UK described the implications of the findings as "immense". Windows is installed on more than 90% of the world's computers. Second key for Windows Andrew Fernandes, Chief Scientist at the Ontario-based Cryptonym Corporation, is credited with discovering the identity of a second key used by Windows for encryption purposes. The BBC's Chris Nuttall: "Windows is used on 90% of the world's computers" Caspar Bowden, director of London-based Internet think-tank FIPR, said: "The allegation is that every copy of Windows contains an extra 'magic number' which would permit it to work with encryption modules designed by the US National Security Agency, as well as those approved by Microsoft." The approval mechanism was introduced to ensure that the weak encryption in non-US versions of Windows could not be replaced with stronger software without it being checked against a "key" embedded in Windows, proving that it had been digitally signed off by Microsoft. Two years ago, cryptographers found an alternative, and apparently superfluous, second embedded key. The new details came to light through debugging information erroneously left in the latest service pack for Windows NT. Significantly, the key has the data tag "_NSAKEY" giving rise to speculation that the NSA persuaded Microsoft to give it special access to Windows in a secret deal. Microsoft says it called its function an "NSA key" because the body reviews technical details for the export of data-scrambling software. MS talked with NSA It is known that Microsoft negotiated with the NSA on including encryption in its product. The export of strong encryption is banned by the Clinton administration, which fears terrorists and other criminals could turn it against the US. There are two theories on why this unnecessary second key is included in Windows: * Conspiracy theorists say the key can be used to infiltrate targeted computers. It gives the NSA a direct way of doing this without having to use Microsoft's own key. * A more charitable theory is that Microsoft allowed the NSA a special key to secure the thousands of government computers running Windows. "The innocent explanation is that the US wished to create bespoke encryption modules for official use on government systems without reference to Microsoft," said Mr Bowden. "Ironically, introducing the second key has created a major security loophole in a mechanism which was designed to enforce US export controls on strong cryptography." Microsoft suffered serious embarrassment on Monday when hackers exposed a simple way of breaking into the mailboxes of more than 40 million users of its Hotmail e-mail service. --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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CDR: Re: Internet anonymity/pseudonymity meeting invitation
by Adam Back 28 Nov '00

28 Nov '00

Peter wrote: > > This first meeting is a brief, relatively unstructured get-to-know-you > > affair, designed to identify those interested and start them talking to > > one another. > [...] > > -- J. Bashinski > > Secretary, NymIP-RG > > Does anyone besides me find irony in having a 'get-to-know-you' > session for a group studying anonymity? Will they allow masked > attendees? I don't think anyone will be demanding government ID. Short of a ski mask though attendees might get to see what you look like. John did have some things in the organisation stuff about pseudonymous participation. If it's still in there you might find it here: http://nymip.sourceforge.net/ Yes it's still there: | Pseudonymity | | Members, whether core members or at-large members, may participate | under pseudonyms. Pseudonymous members need not disclose their "real" | names or other identifying information to RG officers or to any other | party. Pseudonymous members must, however, disclose their | organizational affiliations and potential commercial interests, in | sufficient detail to permit other members to reasonably assess the | potential for collusion or conflicts of interest. The level of detail | required in such disclosures shall be determined by the Chair, and | need not necessarily include the names of specific organizations in | all cases. No single person may hold multiple core memberships under | different identities. Although I'm not sure the restrictions are possible except for people who physically attend meetings, but I'd guess the intention is clear enough: allow pseudonymity, encourage pseudonymous people to disclose conflicts of interest. > Will the mailng list allow posts from anonymous remailers, or is it > closed? http://lists.sourceforge.net/mailman/listinfo/nymip-res-group Says: | On November 25, 2000, Scott Bradner, NymIP-RG Chair, set the | moderation policy for this list as follows: | | I'd just as soon have the mailing list be open and moderate | it only if we start to get too much spam or wacko-ites. > Is there a website to allow anonymous reading? Well you could always use freedom on the web archive :-) http://www.geocrawler.com/lists/3/SourceForge/7558/0/ Adam

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CDR: ip: TechNews: NSA Builds Security Access Into Windows
by R. A. Hettinga 27 Nov '00

27 Nov '00

--- begin forwarded text

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CDR: RE: Re: Jim Bell arrested, documents online
by Trei, Peter 27 Nov '00

27 Nov '00

> ---------- > From: Greg Newby[SMTP:gbnewby@ils.unc.edu] > "de puta madre!" > > But seriously, folks: How would you work with a like-minded > distributed group to murder someone? Preferably with guaranteed > no risk of discovery or prosecution to the participants. > > - Would we need to assume the someone would be the "hands," e.g., > your good ole' professional hit-man? How would s/he be contacted? > > - How would the person be paid? How would the money be collected > from the different people who pay? > > - What trust model would work? Would it be more desirable for > all players to be completely anonymous? Cells of people who know > each other? > > - Could this all be done legally (without the individuals who > are planning and paying needing to commit any crimes)? [...] > -- Greg > Um, governments and organized crime achieve this goal on a regular basis. Governments by having an effective monopoly on violence in a given area (George the Second bears the blood of over 300 people who presented no threat to society (they were already incarcerated)). Organized criminals by having the resources and manpower to effectively separate the person ordering a hit from the person doing the hit, and to cover up the evidence. Beyond that, even non-distributed murders are often unsolved, especially when there is no pre-existing link between murderer and victim (eg, many serial killers). Peter

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