June 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

Thanks, anon
by rclark＠nyx.cs.du.edu 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

n12070(a)anon.penet.fi (Anonymous dude) writes: >I considered bringing up this little anecdote that happened to me in >`real time' but decided against it, but now can't resist while the >subject is in the list's psyche and nanosecond attention span: Thanks. I'm geographically and culturally isolated in Indiana. You warn that your article is tedious, but it is no such thing. Thanks for posting it. It is perversely pleasing to me to know someone else on the list went through this sort of cop crap. Of course, I was at least technically in violation of the law, but hey. They went after practically everyone I knew, for the vile crime of having me in their address books. I wrote an article about that experience which should appear in the next Phrack. So that you won't feel that your anecdote was tedious, which it certainly was not, you might want to check mine out (it clocks in at about five to six times as long as yours.) >Thanks for listening to all this, it is immensely therapeutic for me >and hopefully some insight is contained herein to minimize a burden for you. Thanks for sending it out; it was nicely written, and concise. Bet they never see the computer again, though. Either someone ripped it off for their personal use, or for quick cash, and in either case they would have got them by now. They may just have hassled you as a last resort when the trail went cold. Police are, indeed, ungrateful brutes of the worst dye. Well, good luck, and I hope all that nasty stuff is over for you. Cop betrayals and "investigations" usually leave a bitter taste in the mouths of their targets, especially since cops can get nasty when they're not finding anything. Ah well. ---- Robert W. Clark rclark(a)nyx.cs.du.edu PGP signature available by mail or finger

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Remailer at rebma.mn.org
by wmo＠rebma.rebma.mn.org 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

My apologies to anyone who has tried to use the anonymous remailer at rebma.mn.org in the past several weeks. I upgraded the system, and forgot, apparently, to test out the remailer. No one reported that the remailer wasn't working, and it didn't occur to me to test it until today. I imagine that people who weren't successful were experimenters who chalked up the failure to something they'd done wrong. It's working again, now. Here's the PGP key. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.2 mQCNAisUI2QAAAEEAKgm07Hsje5KpmXYd5azk0R6AES+qK7LcofnVGojUs7GBghD WbwrmW8oOEOhRorlShRALKeYspV4xYIw4WDkJcJxuf1B254scz1urF/Eem3zPW9b yPAx7W/cGwvs6SouZvFcSDq4v1zApvGE9hP4szPzHeGmVr0NVNeaDK0guoCpAAUR tCBSZW1haWxlciAocmVtYWlsZXJAcmVibWEubW4ub3JnKQ== =/qHx -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: Chained remails
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- M. Stirner, <M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG>, writes: > Gee, am I amazed. An anonymous post claims to have been routed via > SIXTEEN (presumably cypherpunks) remailers. Using the posted list of > "active" cypherpunks remailers & the revised remailer manual, I have > been unable to get simple > > To: remailer(a)wherever.doodah.edu > > :: > Request-Remailing-To: > > test messages to run through any but a couple (9, 10 & 12 I believe). I > have _never_ been able to get any of the "insects @ Berkeley" remailers > to go with the standard syntax...or otherwise. The problem may be the Fidonet addressing. Many times I have tried to send mail to people with mailing addresses like M's, and not had the mail get through. I don't know what the rules are but perhaps some systems can get it and some can't. I'd suggest to M. that he take one of the systems that does respond to his remailing requests, and have that be the LAST one in a chain of two. So, he could send to, say, hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu, and follow that with elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu. Perhaps this would get through: To: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu :: Request-Remailing-To: elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu :: Request-Remailing-To: M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG Even if cicada can't mail to him, perhaps it can mail to rosebud which can then mail to Fido. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQCVAgUBLCpauqgTA69YIUw3AQEoYwP/TUiqRu8OHgA61WM6HVtrZ/CE37hXjVY7 WM7sN+RkUlO+1QTeZKi2r0gEy/CGKnZiMTbEHYHcWK486tIbDZIDXqdRoZigEemH 5jwComG9Vv6wPMFyhcLQkejgSX7nN0UU4TGzdOOq2kRyiplTysLd+1pqPyUzpsbU qR9lO8ZjVPY= -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Denning on Clipper review panel
by L. Detweiler 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

Denning says she is on the Clipper review panel which has just started. Also, noises about international Clipper cooperation from NIST. Finally the cypherpunk poster's earlier comment about the absurdity of French collaboration left to the imagination is brought to life... From: philip(a)charon.cto.citicorp.com (Philip Gladstone) Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy.clipper Date: 23 Jun 1993 17:53:19 -0400 >According to Lynn McNulty (of NIST) ... > >Also, the civilian review of the Skipjack algorithm has started (on Monday). >2 people are from academia, and 3 from private industry. One of the DOE >national labs is represented (but I don't know whether this counts as academia >or private industry). Dorothy Denning is one member (according to her). >McNulty wouldn't reveal any names. > >Also, McNulty beleives that escrowed keys would be made available to >foreign law enforcement organizations if requested. The following >scenario springs to mind: > > French LE to FBI: We have one suspect from the WTC bombing > under surveillance in Paris. He uses a > clipperphone to communicate. Can we have > the keys to chip ID 145632? > FBI to French LE: Are you working with the French Secret Service > who is trying to tap the phones of corporate > America? > French LE to FBI: NON! > FBI to French LE: Do you promise that the chip ID > 145632 really is in Paris and is not in the > phone of <fill in favourite US business leader>? > French LE to FBI: OUI! > FBI to French LE: OK - the key is 0b5e7f186ac85e5fb934. > >I'm not trying to pick on the french, but one of the purposes of the >Clipper (sorry Key Escrow) Chip is to protect against foreign >commercial espionage.

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Re: a new role for the NSA
by Peter Wayner 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

Many people have pointed out, perhaps correctly, that strong crypto could mean the end of the line for many of the workers at the NSA. If I was in charge of the NSA, I would argue to my budget-dispensing superiors that all of the strong crypto just meant that I needed a bigger budget to scan for data. So the terrorists get crypto terminals? Well, they probably won't have a Tempest class machine so there is plenty of SIGINT that can still be done. There are plenty of opportunities to target people and their communications links with localized bugs. It just requires some more money. I've often wondered whether the NSA's presumed approach of acting as a huge vacuum cleaner for data was the best way of gathering intelligence. It may have been in the 1960's and earlier when transmission rates were relatively expensive and people didn't call long distance unless their was a death in the family. Now, though, the sheer volume of data has exploded. Vaccuumming it all in and sorting it out in the buildings at Fort Meade must be much less cost effective-- no matter how many voice recognition computers that they have. Today, information is much, much cheaper than it used to be. Intelligence is just as expensive as ever. Incidentally, Bill Safire wrote a great piece on this a year or so ago. He argued that it was time for the Spy agencies to go back to Mata Hari type shenanigans because the magic window of SIGINT was about to be closed again. If anyone could dig it up, I would appreciate the reference. -Peter Wayner

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Re: Government fear of strong crypto
by Kelly Goen 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

From mail.netcom.com!toad.com!cypherpunks-request Wed Jun 23 23:23:59 1993 Return-Path: <mccoy(a)ccwf.cc.utexas.edu> Message-Id: <199306240625.AA19484(a)tigger.cc.utexas.edu> Subject: Re: Government fear of strong crypto To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Thu, 24 Jun 1993 01:25:13 -0500 (CDT) From: Jim McCoy <mccoy(a)ccwf.cc.utexas.edu> Cc: pfarrell(a)cs.gmu.edu In-Reply-To: <70188.pfarrell(a)cs.gmu.edu> from "Pat Farrell" at Jun 23, 93 07:29:41 pm X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL21] Content-Type: text Content-Length: 2400 > From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell(a)cs.gmu.edu> [...] > > The "government" as a whole is not against crypto. The NSA is _very > strongly_ against it. There are 60,000 or more bureaucrats in NSA that would > be effectively put out of work by widespread strong crypto. Hmmm..... actually I must disagree with this. The NSA may oppose strong crypto, but a few facts should be brought up: 1) The NSA is not chartered for domestic surveillance work. If you discover the NSA watching you within the US you can have them arrested. They are probably more interested in the systems being put in use around the world and less about systems internal to the U.S. According to the Bill of Rights Foundation Booklet "CIA OFF CAMPUS" Ex-President Reagan signed in 1981 Executive order # 12333 Which permits the CIA to operate domestically against US citizens if it is believed that said citizen is either an agent of a foreign power or acting on behalf of same. Since this definition has been used during COINTELPRO to allow one to have associates /friends that are foreign born to cause one to be subject to a whole range of unconstitutional activities performed by said agencies. BTW ANY federal intelligence agencie will act as a "cutout" for situations where the prime agency cannot operate legally but another can. I believe a FOIA is in order to find out if E.O. #12333 allows the entire national security apparatus to operate or only the CIA... Unhappily yours kelly > I believe that the FBI and other more public agencies are simply shills for > NSA. The many posting about real wiretap usage and costs simply can't > support taking all the heat last year of Digital Telophony and this year > over Clipper, esp. when they admit that smart crooks wouldn't bother to use > Clipper. Entirely True...!

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Government fear of strong crypto [was Re: Digital Cash$$$$
by Pat Farrell 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

Jim McCoy <mccoy(a)ccwf.cc.utexas.edu> writes: > IMHO, the real >reason governments are opposed to strong cryptography is that in an >information society it effectively places the population outside the >control of the government, the central government becomes superfluous. I'm not going to disagree that long term, the net makes governments obsolete, but I think that far fewer folks in the US government have _any_ understanding of the issues arround strong crypto. I spent yesterday at the "Computer Security Institute" conference in Washington (it is a commercial educational conference on computer security). Lots of government employees were there learning about security, products, etc. Most of the products were virus scanners, sigh. The "government" as a whole is not against crypto. The NSA is _very strongly_ against it. There are 60,000 or more bureaucrats in NSA that would be effectively put out of work by widespread strong crypto. All the $17 Billion that they use on signal intercepts would go to competing approachs (satelite recon, spys in the field, etc.) that are controlled by other agencies. Why? because signal intellegence is so easy now that it is extremely cheap and cost effective. Widespread strong crypto will not make evesdropping impossible, but it will make it _very_ expensive in time and money, and thus make it much less attractive. Rather than simply ranting about the evils of bureaucrats, think for a second about their motivation. There is no profit metric for bureaucrats to rely upon - they have to do their job as well as expected for the least amount of money. If they fail to deliver, they lose their jobs. (yes, they can be fired or reassigned to siberia...) So they spend all their life making sure that they do a "good enuff" job and follow all the approved actions. Having Signal intercepts work cheaply and well makes it easy to keep their jobs. I believe that the FBI and other more public agencies are simply shills for NSA. The many posting about real wiretap usage and costs simply can't support taking all the heat last year of Digital Telophony and this year over Clipper, esp. when they admit that smart crooks wouldn't bother to use Clipper. BTW, I talked to Dorothy Denning at the conference. She says that it is now called the "Key escrow chip" because of Intergraph's trademark on Clipper. I'll post more on my conversations with DE Denning later. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)cs.gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Re: Karn's note...
by peb＠PROCASE.COM 24 Jun '93

24 Jun '93

>sounds like Bob Smith on line 42 This is speaker recognition, not voice recognition. It turns out that the problem is solved in a very different way for each; voice recognition, in order to be speaker independent, must throw out the information that makes it possible to do speaker recognition (and vice versa: the latter does not need some of the information that the former needs). This is used in "roving wiretaps" that apparently are used infrequently as they scan whole exchanges or number sets (e.g., all payphones in some city). The idea is to capture phone calls from the suspects that are savvy enough to know that they are being tapped. At least one Mob boss was caught this way (in Los Angeles, I think, about 4-5 years ago). Paul E. Baclace peb(a)procase.com

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Re: Karn's note...
by Kelly Goen 24 Jun '93

24 Jun '93

From toad.com!cypherpunks-request Thu Jun 24 15:34:07 1993 Return-Path: <karn(a)qualcomm.com> Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 15:32:54 -0700 From: karn(a)qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) Message-Id: <9306242232.AA08245@servo> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com, pcw(a)access.digex.net Subject: Re: Karn's note... I tend to doubt that the spooks have voice recognition technology in regular widespread use, at least not the kind of ultra sophisticated stuff that AI types seem to dream about. It's possible that they use ln. Much Deleted... \ Hi Phil... All the reports I have seen on the widespread phone tapping and voice recognition by the NSA allegedly was in reference to Operation HARVEST According to private estimates immense intel value results even if the recog phase gets 15-20% accuracy on most? speakers... for phrases such as Spook, espionage,drugs etc... Most of the references I saw to HARVEST were published by the Bill of Rights foundation in various of their books and phamplets and reports from the Church Subcommittee hearings on intelligence activities during the earlier abuses of COINTELPRO, with a few references in "The Puzzle Palace" by Cliff Bamford. I also saw some refeneces about 5 years ago in comp.dcom.telecom... as to these kind of operations. Do they really do it??? hmm dont know but I am not taking any chances!! :) Phil

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Re: Karn's note...
by Peter Wayner 24 Jun '93

24 Jun '93

I believe the novel implied that the magic box didn't do voice recognition in the sense of identifying the words being spoken. It just said, "Hey, that sounds like Bob Smith on line 42." The point was that these guys were jumping around from phone to phone. But, I agree with you that traffic analysis should be much easier now with all of the ID tags. I think the Clancy box would be too much overkill because people really don't use that many telephones during the day. Especially now that they call carry pocket cellular phones. -Peter

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