June 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

Geer Zolot White Paper: Clipper Initiative
by peter honeyman 28 Jun '93

28 Jun '93

------- Forwarded Message Geer Zolot White Paper: Clipper Initiative On April 16, 1993, the U.S. Government issued a "Public Encryption Management" directive, requesting that communications vendors install into their products chips that implement a secret algorithm with controversial key-escrow facilities. These chips (called "Clipper" and "Capstone") stem from work by the NSA (National Security Agency) and its contractors; they implement the SKIPJACK algorithm, which is classified SECRET and is therefore not available for public review. For more information on the initiative, consult the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Computer Security BBS at 301.948.5717 or via Internet ftp to csrc.ncsl.nist.gov in the /pub/nistnews directory. The Government states that one motivation for this initiative is to allow authorized wiretapping of encrypted communications by escrowing the keys corresponding to individual components. A pair of "entities" (choices not announced) will have responsibility for keeping keys secure and releasing them only to government officials who have received legal authorization to perform a wiretap. The Government recommends use of the chips instead of already existing cryptographic algorithms, such as the secret-key DES algorithm (a Federal Information Processing Standard and the basis of Kerberos and other network security tools) and the public-key RSA algorithm. Since DES and RSA have been subject to public scrutiny, experts have tested and confirmed their strength, which has led to their adoption within internationally-agreed networking standards; since SKIPJACK is secret and can never receive this scrutiny, it is unlikely that it will ever have such acceptance. Further, DES and RSA can run in both hardware and software, which satisfies performance and system integration requirements; the Government has limited Clipper/Capstone to hardware, which restricts the range of systems that may use it. For now, the Government is recommending that equipment vendors use the chips on a voluntary basis; however, some observers regard the initiative as an attempt to establish a precedent that could later lead to governmental restrictions on the availability and use of open cryptographic systems. This could limit innovation in cryptographic technology. Further, user organizations could lose control over protecting and managing the keys on which their security depends. This summer, the Government plans inter-agency discussions of future policies in this area; observers have noted that policy development should also reflect private sector interests. Concerns about personal privacy raise additional controversy. Significant debate on these topics is likely in upcoming months. Geer Zolot Associates believes that availability of open and exportable cryptography serves our clients' interests. Because of this, we are concerned about the implications of the "Public Encryption Management" initiative, and of its possible chilling effect on development, availability, and use of cryptographic technology. The initiative raises many issues, including: o If the Government mandates enclosing cryptography in hardware modules, this will surely delay the vital process of enhancing the security of today's distributed computing base--it could even prevent some systems from being secured at all. We want to avoid the prospect of our clients being forced to choose between systems that satisfy their operational needs and other systems containing Government-provided hardware encryption components. o Introducing a requirement for procurement, integration, and use of special-purpose components (which manufacturers must separately handle and program on a per-unit basis) will increase the cost of security integration. o If flaws in the hardware-implemented Clipper/Capstone cryptographic algorithms ever come to light, users of the chips will have been subjected to a data compromise from which no clear recovery path exists. o It appears that gaining access to a Clipper/Capstone chip's escrowed keys, through whatever means (authorized or unauthorized), may reveal the contents of all its encrypted traffic (past, present, and future). Effectively, this is analogous to binding an unchangeable password into hardware, an undesirable characteristic. o It appears unlikely that international telecommunications users and providers will reach uniform agreement on an encryption technology whose algorithms are known only to the US Government. As a result, the initiative may force companies engaging in international commerce to use and support different encryption systems, depending on the parties involved in the communication. Such a course of action will lead to increased costs in hardware, software, user training, and systems management. We invite and encourage you to consider the Government initiative, including its impact on your organizations and distributed system security plans, and that you submit comments to your representatives. If your business plans rely on open cryptographic systems, based on publicly documented algorithms and available in hardware or software form, we encourage you to make this clear to your representatives. If you wish to share any of your comments or observations with us, we would welcome them. Further, we are happy to serve as an organizer for assembling and coordinating such information. Please indicate whether we may identify your organization (specifically or generically) as the information's source. John Linn & Dan Geer ------- End of Forwarded Message this is forwarded to the cypherpunks mailing list with dan geer's permission. peter

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1st Amendment vs. ITAR: bibliography
by gnu 28 Jun '93

28 Jun '93

We sent this off to the State Dept. today. law office of Lee Tien 1452 Curtis Street Berkeley, California 94702 _______________ tien(a)well.sf.ca.us voice: (510) 525-0817 fax: (510) 525-3015 June 28, 1993 Clyde Bryant Foreign Affairs Officer Compliance Division Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Office of Defense Trade Controls U.S. Department of State PM/ODTC SA-6 Rm. 200 Washington, DC 20522 Dear Mr. Bryant: Mr. Dan Cook told my client, Mr. John Gilmore, that you and the Compliance Division of the Office of Defense Trade Controls are presently reviewing aspects of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) with respect to First Amendment questions. My client volunteered to send some law review articles in order that all relevant materials be available to you in this review. I am pleased to provide you with some materials which you may find useful in your review. They address First Amendment and other constitutional issues raised by the Arms Export Control Act, the ITAR, and the Export Administration Act. We believe that information about cryptography, including research papers, discussion of cryptographic algorithms, and implementations in source-code form, is protected speech within the meaning of the First Amendment. We also believe that the export controls of the ITAR violate the First Amendment because they infringe the rights of cryptographers to speak and publish freely. The licensing procedure amounts to prior restraint. The laws and regulations are vague and overbroad. I have enclosed the following materials: 1. Ferguson, Scientific Inquiry and the First Amendment, 64 CORNELL L.REV. 639 (1979) 2. Note, National Security Controls on the Dissemination of Privately Generated Scientific Information, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 405 (1982) 3. Cheh, Government Control of Private Ideas -- Striking a Balance Between Scientific Freedom and National Security, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1982) 4. Greenstein, National Security Controls on Scientific Information, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 50 (1982) 5. Alexander, Preserving High-Tech Secrets: National Security Controls on University Research and Teaching, 15 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 173 (1983) 6. Wilson, National Security Control of Technological Information, 25 JURIMETRICS J. 109 (1985) 7. John Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Memorandum to Dr. Frank Press, Science Advisor to the President, Re: Constitutionality Under the First Amendment of ITAR Restrictions on Public Cryptography (May 11, 1978). This memorandum was reprinted in The Government's Classification of Private Ideas: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 268-84 (1980). These hearing transcripts were accompanied by a House Report. House Comm. on Gov't Operations, The Government's Classification of Private Ideas, H.R. REP. NO. 1540, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS. (1980). We strongly recommend that you read both the hearing transcripts and the summary report. We hope that these materials will assist you in formulating a constitutional export control policy for scientific research in general and for cryptography in particular. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you wish to engage in further exchanges. Sincerely, Lee Tien Attorney at Law On behalf of Mr. John Gilmore cc: Mr. Daniel Cook Mr. John Gilmore

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Remailer ping test
by nobody＠rosebud.ee.uh.edu 28 Jun '93

28 Jun '93

I tried pinging all the remailers on the latest copy I have of Karl's remailer list (except extropia, which I know only accepts encrypted messages). I sent to each: :: Request-Remailing-To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com then a short test message. I only heard back from 8 of them, to wit: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com Sun Jun 27 08:48:08 1993 hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:15 1993 remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:38 1993 nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:43 1993 phantom(a)u.washington.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:40 1993 elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:56 1993 hal(a)alumni.cco.caltech.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:59 1993 dis.org!remailer(a)merde.dis.org Sun Jun 27 09:17:24 1993 I did not hear back from the following remailers. Perhaps their operators could check on them, or notify Karl if they are no longer operating. 1: hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu 2: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu 6: remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu 7: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu 9: remailer(a)rebma.mn.org 14: 00x(a)uclink.berkeley.edu Hal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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Re: triggerfish
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 28 Jun '93

28 Jun '93

Brian D Williams <talon57(a)well.sf.ca.us> wrote (re TRIGGERFISH): > It would be child's play for the NSA to accomplish this from >orbit.....hmmmmm I wonder what they call it? My guess would be that it can't be done. Just getting up in a light aircraft with a cell phone is instructive. With every cell site in 50 miles being about the same distance (even from LEO) I don't think you could pick out a single conversation. On the other hand, with enough directionality . . . . nah, the antenna would be a monster. Keith

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Re: Remailer ping test
by nobody＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 28 Jun '93

28 Jun '93

> I did not hear back from the following remailers. Perhaps their operators > could check on them, or notify Karl if they are no longer operating. > > 1: hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu > 2: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu > 6: remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu > 7: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu > 9: remailer(a)rebma.mn.org > 14: 00x(a)uclink.berkeley.edu > > Hal > hfinney(a)shell.portal.com From: dmandl(a)lehman.com This is distressing. I just used some of these (1, 2, and 9, which has just been brought back up) with no problems. Have any of these remailers been going up and down? I've found service to be a bit unpredictable in the past. It's a pain to have to test remailers first before each use, and I can't ping from my site, which makes things even more inconvenient. Has anyone else experienced intermittent problems with these reamailers? Is there any reason why they should work from some sites and not others? --Dave.

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Re: Remailer at rebma.mn.org
by nobody＠pmantis.berkeley.edu 28 Jun '93

28 Jun '93

> * Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS > > Uu> My apologies to anyone who has tried to use the anonymous remailer at > Uu> rebma.mn.org in the past several weeks. > > Uu> I imagine that people who weren't successful were > Uu> experimenters who chalked up the failure to something they'd done > Uu> wrong. > > I did, indeed! > > Uu> It's working again, now. > > Uu> Here's the PGP key. > > > Does this remailer _require_ an encrypted header, or will it take the > | > | :: > | Request-Remailing-To: > | > plaintext command? >From dmandl(a)lehman.com: It is indeed working OK now. Encryption is not required. Good to see this remailer back up, especially because it introduces a long delay, making traffic analysis more difficult. FYI, sending a message to myself (in NYC) through this remailer, it took about 15 hours for it to come back. This is either very good or very bad depending on your purposes. Bad for urgent messages, good for more...er...sensitive applications. --Dave.

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Remailer ping test
by M..Stirner＠f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG 28 Jun '93

28 Jun '93

* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS Uu> I tried pinging all the remailers on the latest copy I have of Uu> Karl's remailer list (except extropia, which I know only accepts Uu> encrypted messages). I sent to each: Uu> :: Uu> Request-Remailing-To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com Uu> then a short test message. Uu> I only heard back from 8 of them, to wit: Uu> hfinney(a)shell.portal.com Sun Jun 27 08:48:08 1993 Uu> hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:15 1993 Uu> remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:38 1993 Uu> nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:43 1993 Uu> phantom(a)u.washington.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:40 1993 Uu> elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:56 1993 Uu> hal(a)alumni.cco.caltech.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:59 1993 Uu> dis.org!remailer(a)merde.dis.org Sun Jun 27 09:17:24 1993 I have had problems with getting the same test routed through hh@soda and phantom(a)u.washington. I have not tried dis.org! yet. Uu> I did not hear back from the following remailers. Perhaps their Uu> operators could check on them, or notify Karl if they are no longer Uu> operating. Uu> 1: hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu Uu> 2: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu Uu> 6: remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu Uu> 7: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu Uu> 9: remailer(a)rebma.mn.org Uu>14: 00x(a)uclink.berkeley.edu #6 has worked for me. The others have not, though the hh@_berkeley remailers will sometimes work if the message is first bounced through another reliable remailer. Why this should be, I know not. Sending the PGP-encrypted message & header to remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com seems to work very well for losing those stupid footer IDs, & is usually my first leg of multiple-bounce test transmissions. BTW, I note that hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu has a different address in the first batch of successful remailers. The address hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu has worked well. Uu> Hal Uu> hfinney(a)shell.portal.com Thanks for your efforts! ********************************************************************* * <m..stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers * * > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not <* * > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <* * > of resistance? Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787 <* ********************************************************************* ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 -- M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1 UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner INTERNET: M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG

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SEARCH ME
by Duncan Frissell 28 Jun '93

28 Jun '93

(an12070) It is rarely to one's advantage to "assist the police." In fact in British English the sentence "Fred C. Schwartz is assisting the police in their investigation" means that Fred C. Schwartz is the prime suspect. (Trivia contest for ex right wing nuts - Who was Fred C. Schwartz?) My search warrant story need not use penet.fi. In the early 80's I was residing in a rented house in a city located in a region of the country that was once Democratic Farm Labor Party territory. Being an inveterate reader of the newspaper, I was one day surprised to discover that our house was to be searched by the authorities at some point in the next few weeks. Specifically, the article said that the houses on <my> block of <my> street were going to be searched as part of a survey to determine how many had illegal basement drains. Apparently the criminals who had constructed much of the housing in that neighborhood in the 1920s had connected basement drains to the *storm sewers* from whence who knows what hideous substances could drain into the navigable waters of the United States without undergoing tertiary, secondary, or even primary treatment. What's more, they had not complied with the Water Quality Act of 1970, as amended. Who could believe that such evil exists in the human heart. My wife (who in many ways was just the sort of female Kipling had in mind when he penned 'Deadlier Than the Male') and I decided to resist this search. Since I was away during the day, it would fall to here to deal with the authorities. In due course, a sewer inspector rang our doorbell. My wife demanded to see his warrant. He was shocked and mortified. He tried to talk her into allowing the search. He used primate arguments like "everyone else is letting us in." My wife used Northern European arguments like "I'm not everyone else." He went away. Over the next few weeks, various bureaucrats called my wife and tried to get her to change her mind. They said, "You're not going to force us to waste all that time and money and get a warrant, are you?" She replied, "Consider it a valuable education on the 4th amendment." Eventually, they showed up with a warrant and some cops just in case we resisted. My wife took her time reading the warrant. It said they could search the basement so she led them around to the back door and led them down to the basement where they discovered our criminal drain. If I hadn't been working 70 hours a week, maybe I would have had fun and tried to quash (not squash) the warrant and explored the modern case law involving regulatory searches - a nasty area. When we told our neighbors what we had done they said that they didn't know that one could resist a warrantless search. A good time was had by all. Quo warranto? This was also a town where the public and catholic schools all ended summer vacation on the same day. After that day, my youngest daughter was going about from place to place without apparent lawful occupation when an officious intermeddler asked her why she wasn't in school. She then told her questioner what I had told her to say, "My father doesn't believe in your schools, he says that they are all dominated by communists." Shuts them up every time. Duncan Frissell Who is writing this in the terrorist capital of the US - Jersey City, NJ - but who has been denied a tactically necessary assault rifle by Governor Jim Florio. When amonium nitrate and diesel fuel in a 16 to 1 ratio are outlawed only outlaws (and farmers) will have amonium nitrate and diesel fuel in a 16 to 1 ratio.

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Landlords accepting search warrants....
by bear＠eagle.fsl.noaa.gov 27 Jun '93

27 Jun '93

An anonymous writer wrote: >9) I still wonder if the officers would have been able to get a warrant >under my circumstances. At the time I was convinced that they wouldn't >have without additional evidence (of which there assurredly is none). >I had in the back of my mind that I would rather have them search when >I didn't expect it or through my landlord when I wasn't there. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ This keeps popping up, probably due to old _Dragnet_ episodes... As I understand contract law regarding leases, a landlord _cannot_ grant permission for a police search unless the lease is in default. Or, more precisely, if they did you could sue them for "breach of contract" and extract pretty hefty penalties. Perhaps California leases have some standard clause which permits this, but in general a "lease" transfers all "non-freeholder" property rights, except for those explicitly -returned- within the contract. That means the tenant is the property owner for all intents and purposes except for "freeholder" rights (e.g., a tenant can't sell the property). Bear Giles

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Re: remailer origin lines
by M..Stirner＠f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG 27 Jun '93

27 Jun '93

* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS Uu> How about a header line such as: Uu> X-Cut-End-Lines: 6 Uu> Which would instruct the remailer to cut the last six lines Uu> off the mail message as it receives it. Thus a user could figure out Uu> how many lines at the end of his message is added on without his Uu> control and instruct the remailer to cut out that amount of lines. The number of lines added seems to vary with the gating. I'm sort of leaning toward a ........8<....(cut here).....8<....... kind of solution; I mean, I know for a fact where I stopped, so anything beyond that ought to be eaten by the remailers, IMHO. There is probably a good argument against that solution, but I can't think of it offhand. ********************************************************************* * <m..stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers * * > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not <* * > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <* * > of resistance? Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787 <* ********************************************************************* ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 -- M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201 INTERNET: M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG

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