June 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: term for ibm
by Pat Farrell 27 Jun '93

27 Jun '93

In Message Fri, 25 Jun 1993 16:07:03 -1000 (HST), Timothy Newsham <newsham(a)wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu> writes: >The problem is that the package is (c) and shareware. Furthermore >none of the documents say anything about the status of the >demo programs. I estimate it would take 30 minutes to an >hour to get encryption up and running with that term program. > >Does anyone know of a small terminal program that has >a few essential features, with good modularity? One that >is publically available or we could use with the authors >blessings? The Microsoft C/C++ compilers come with the source code for a simple windows based terminal program. While it is copyrighted, it is all over the planet. In Timmothy Mann's book: Windows Programmer's Guide to Serial Communications, isbn 0-672-30030-3, are sample code for a mid-level terminal program (complete with xmodem). The source is in the book and on a diskette. There are _no_ copyright messages in the sources. The book itself, is of course, copyrighted. In Mark Nelson's book: Serial Communications: a C++ Developer's Guide isbn 1-55851-281-0, are sample code (and diskette)in C++ for DOS, Windows, FOSSIL, and pure UART drivers and a terminal program (complete with ZModem). The code _does not work_ for Windows, but works fine with DOS. Again, no copyright messages in the source code. Kermit (anon-ftp from watsun.cc.columbia.edu) is a free, source available terminal program. Copyrighted Columbia, but enhancements encouraged. Kermit's modularity is at best marginal. Nelson's code is very good. Mann's is acceptable. The Windows TTY is acceptable, but being a Windows program, hardly counts as "small" The Microsoft Visual Control Pack for Visual Basic and Visual C++ includes a "serial control" that should handle most of the hard work in building a terminal program. I can't get it to work from MSVC, and can find no one else on the planet that can either. But if you wanted to start in Visual Basic, I expect that a simple terminal program is no more than a day's work. Pat p.s. I'm using a hacked version of MS TTY as the starting point for my WinPOP mail client. If you think I've spend several hundred dollars looking for working code to build upon, you're right. Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)cs.gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Returned mail: User unknown
by Mail Delivery Subsystem 27 Jun '93

27 Jun '93

----- Transcript of session follows ----- While talking to toad.com: >>> RCPT To:<cyhperpunks(a)toad.com> <<< 550 <cyhperpunks(a)toad.com>... User unknown 550 cyhperpunks(a)toad.com... User unknown ----- Unsent message follows ----- Received: by sun.Panix.Com id AA25038 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for cyhperpunks(a)toad.com) Sat, 26 Jun 1993 08:58:20 -0400 From: Harry Shapiro <habs> Message-Id: <199306261258.AA25038(a)sun.Panix.Com> Subject: Re: Government fear of strong crypto To: kellyg(a)sco.com (Kelly Goen) Date: Sat, 26 Jun 1993 08:58:19 -0400 (EDT) Cc: cyhperpunks(a)toad.com In-Reply-To: <9306241425.aa09999(a)vishnu.sco.com> from "Kelly Goen" at Jun 24, 93 02:25:06 pm Reply-To: habs Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Length: 325 a conscious being, Kelly Goen wrote: > > 1) The NSA is not chartered for domestic surveillance work. I figure this means the FBI has an office at the NSA and has NSA staff members working under contract to the FBI so that while the NSA is ot overseeing domestic interception their staff is doing it for the FBI. /hawk

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Int'l Conf on Signal Processing Apps & Tech, Santa Clara, 28Sep93
by gnu 26 Jun '93

26 Jun '93

Folks interested in DSP's, including voice compression and encryption, fast exponentiation, etc, may want to attend this conference. Particular sessions of interest: Workshop, 27 Sep: Low Cost Speech Compression Technology for Consumer Applications. (costs extra $150) Digital Encryption System for Speech Communication over the Public Switching Telephone Network, Sofi'a Moreno Pe'rez, Rafael Sarmiento de Sotomayor, Luis Di'ez del Ri'o, Jose' Parera Bermu'dez, Marcelino Veiga Pe'rez, and Ramo'n Garcia Go'mez, E.T.S.I. de Telecomunicacio'n, Spain. Real-Time Implementation of Variable Rate QCELP Codec using TMS320C30 DSP, Kyongo Han, Byungsik Yoon, Insung Lee, and Sangwon Kang, Electronics & Telecom. Research Institute, Korea Improving the Cryptanalysis Algorithms Based Upon the Multiple Residues, S.J. Tabatabaian and G.P. Singh, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, U.K. three more papers on Speech Coding Algorithms 15 more papers on Speech Coding Implementation and about 100 other papers. Price: $495 before 25Aug93; $595 after. Students: $350 before, $425 after. DSP Associates 18 Peregrine Road Newton Centre, MA 02159 USA +1 617 964 3817 +1 617 969 6689 DSPWorld(a)world.std.com

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No Subject
by nobody＠cicada.berkeley.edu 26 Jun '93

26 Jun '93

* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS > Are most remailers down on any given day? _That_ question has been partially answered in another post! Uu> Well, I really used only 5 different remailers, total of 16 hops. I Uu> Should haf made that clearer. Uu> This message will go through 24 hops, just for the heck of it. Well, it made it, I suppose. I'll try this one via the same remailers, plus another one I know to be working. ********************************************************************* * <m..stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers * * > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not <* * > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <* * > of resistance? Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787 <* ********************************************************************* ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 -- M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201 INTERNET: M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG

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Remailer at rebma.mn.org
by nobody＠soda.berkeley.edu 26 Jun '93

26 Jun '93

* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS Uu> My apologies to anyone who has tried to use the anonymous remailer at Uu> rebma.mn.org in the past several weeks. Uu> I imagine that people who weren't successful were Uu> experimenters who chalked up the failure to something they'd done Uu> wrong. I did, indeed! Uu> It's working again, now. Uu> Here's the PGP key. Does this remailer _require_ an encrypted header, or will it take the | | :: | Request-Remailing-To: | plaintext command? ********************************************************************* * <m..stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers * * > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not <* * > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <* * > of resistance? Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787 <* ********************************************************************* ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 -- M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201 INTERNET: M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG

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No Subject
by nobody＠soda.berkeley.edu 26 Jun '93

26 Jun '93

* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS Uu> It is rarely to one's advantage to "assist the police." In fact in Uu> British English the sentence "Fred C. Schwartz is assisting the police Uu> in their investigation" means that Fred C. Schwartz is the prime Uu> suspect. Rather like "very tired" when used to describe the public appearance of an MP as in, "...Sir Henry appeared very tired." The term "very tired" apparently is the pervasive newspaper euphemism for "very drunk." Uu> My wife (who in many ways was just the sort of female Kipling had in Uu> mind when he penned 'Deadlier Than the Male')... Splendid finds, these, when one can keep them in alliance. It's always a joy to introduce them to firearms. Uu> In due course, a sewer inspector rang Uu> our doorbell. My wife demanded to see his warrant. He was shocked Uu> and mortified. Uu> Over the next few weeks, various bureaucrats called my wife and tried Uu> to get her to change her mind. They said, "You're not going to force Uu> us to waste all that time and money and get a warrant, are you?" She Uu> replied, "Consider it a valuable education on the 4th amendment." I won't waste a great deal of time in idle & uninformed speculation, but I seem to remember that certain "public safety" types do not need a warrant to intrude. As a matter of fact, I know of instances where cops accompanied such functionaries on trumped-up "inspections" to avoid the trouble of getting warrants. . I should be pleased to hear qualified legal opinion on this. Uu> Who is writing this in the terrorist capital of the US - Jersey City, Uu> NJ - but who has been denied a tactically necessary assault rifle by Uu> Governor Jim Florio. Yes, but don't you feel _much safer_ disarmed? No? Well, be content with a nice shotgun. Uu> When amonium nitrate and diesel fuel in a 16 to 1 ratio are outlawed Uu> only outlaws (and farmers) will have amonium nitrate and diesel fuel Uu> in a 16 to 1 ratio. This shall no doubt turn up in sigs before week's end. ********************************************************************* * <m..stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers * * > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not <* * > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <* * > of resistance? Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787 <* ********************************************************************* ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 -- M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201 INTERNET: M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG

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Re: chained remails
by nobody＠rosebud.ee.uh.edu 26 Jun '93

26 Jun '93

* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS Uu> The problem may be the Fidonet addressing. Many times I have tried to Uu> send mail to people with mailing addresses like M's, and not had the Uu> mail get through. I don't know what the rules are but perhaps some Uu> systems can get it and some can't. Note that _this_ message goes through an RBBS/UUCP gate. The problem remains, however. On the other hand, I just noted a sheepish message about the remailer(a)rebma.mn.org being ill for the past couple of weeks, which would explain my failures with that system. Uu> I'd suggest to M. that he take one of the systems that does respond to Uu> his remailing requests, and have that be the LAST one in a chain of Uu> two. So, he could send to, say, hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu, and follow Uu> that with elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu. Perhaps this would get through: An interesting experiment I shall try today, perhaps with this very message. Thank's, Hal, for the input. I should like to see these remailers popularized, along with encryption, as one of the best political moves we cypherpunks can make. De-glitching them for broader use may be a thankless task, but would be worth it if it results in their general use. Uu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- P.S.: Have you heard anything of the alleged bug with version 2.3 being unable to verify plaintext PGP signatures? ********************************************************************* * <m..stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers * * > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not <* * > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <* * > of resistance? Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787 <* ********************************************************************* ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 -- M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201 INTERNET: M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG

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Remailer origin lines
by M..Stirner＠f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG 26 Jun '93

26 Jun '93

* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS Uu> 1) Chop off anything that even looks signature-like, whether the Uu> user intended it or not -- I consider this ugly, evil, and Uu> unreliable, and likely to chop stuff I want kept and leave stuff I'd Uu> like chopped. Yes, this seems fraught with problems. Uu> A "Dont-Mess-With-Trailers:" header line would help a bit. I agree. Uu> I don't know how much of Uu> M. Uu> ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 Uu> -- Uu> M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201 Uu> INTERNET: M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG Uu> was added by the author, how much by the Blue Wave and/or Uu> 8:914/201, or even for certain whether M. Stirner is the author or Uu> merely a machine owner; I'm guessing the author, and I'm guessing Uu> everything but the initial "M." was added automagically under the Uu> machine-owner's control. The BlueWave blurb was added by the program & can be stripped by re-editing the message before upload. Everything else is out of my control completely & added automagically by the host or the UUCP gateway. The sucker stays, no matter what I do. Some anonymity! Uu> 2) Cut-Here: lines of various sorts, either following a pre-specified Uu> syntax or a MIME-like flexible syntax. I like this approach, since Uu> it gives the user a reasonable level of control and very seldom Uu> guesses wrong, but there are so many standards to choose from, and a Uu> proper implementation would have to leave in the line (or add an Uu> equivalent) at each hop to avoid accretion of path-traces, and make Uu> sure it gets the correct syntax for each following remailer. And Uu> the user does have to explicitly request it, which some people Uu> view as a problem, especially if they don't know the characteristics Uu> of the later mail-handlers in the chain. I, personally, could live with it just to get the remailers to be truly anonymous. The rest of the user input is not especially easy anyway, particularly if accessing internet via a gateway. Another line wouldn't kill me. Uu> 3) Encryption-based systems, which only retain the encrypted portion; Uu> this means the user has to know more about the remailers being Uu> used, and there has to be a standard for expressing which remailers Uu> to forward to if more than one will be used (which it probably will Uu> be, for anybody security-aware enough to really want an encrypting Uu> remailer.) As an interrim measure I guess this is what I'll have to do, but as an early PGP partisan, I've had enough PGP experience not to be turned off by the extra trouble. Most casual users would be. In any case, I think that this is undoubtedly the most user-labor-intensive solution. Uu> Solving the problem for message headers is tougher than solving it Uu> for trailers. In that case, let's have this solved by Monday. 8-) ********************************************************************* * <m..stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers * * > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not <* * > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <* * > of resistance? Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787 <* ********************************************************************* ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 -- M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201 INTERNET: M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG

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term for ibm
by Timothy Newsham 26 Jun '93

26 Jun '93

I needed to do some DOS programming at work, and used the 'MCOMM' serial package. It comes with a demonstration program called 'smalterm.exe' I read through it a few times and it dawned on me how easy it would be to hook it up to LINK (link encryption). The problem is that the package is (c) and shareware. Furthermore none of the documents say anything about the status of the demo programs. I estimate it would take 30 minutes to an hour to get encryption up and running with that term program. Does anyone know of a small terminal program that has a few essential features, with good modularity? One that is publically available or we could use with the authors blessings? ...

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Re: Contempt of Court
by axelrod＠s106.es.llnl.gov 26 Jun '93

26 Jun '93

You do have me confused with Mike Godwin. I did write: > >If the key itself had embedded testimony that was incriminating, then it is > >possible one could invoke the 5th amendment to avoid disclosure of the key. > >But, I suppose a court could do an end run around that by giving limited > >use immunity for the incriminating content of the key. Comments? But the rest of your questions refer to Mike Godwin. My guess is that one could be compelled to reveal the combination to a lock because the combination is not testimony. I'm sure that govenment lawyers would argue that a key is not testimony, just as a combination to a safe is not testimony. Perhaps some research would turn up the answer to this question. There is also the matter of discovery in civil actions. If one had financial records in encrypted form, a court could order you disclose the key under the threat of civil contempt. Civil contempt can be worse than criminal contempt. The court can ruin you financially and keep you in jail until you comply with the order. Mike.

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