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Fwd: Re: Banning privacy: A radical proposal
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

==================BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE================== >From: "Jean-Francois Avon" <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> >To: "William H. Geiger III" <whgiii(a)invweb.net> >Date: Wed, 24 Jun 1998 10:38:12 -0500 >Reply-To: "Jean-Francois Avon" <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> >Priority: Normal >X-Mailer: PMMail 98 Standard (2.00.1500) For Windows 95 (4.0.1111) >MIME-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >Subject: Re: Banning privacy: A radical proposal > On Wed, 24 Jun 1998 00:38:06 -0500, William H. Geiger III wrote: > >And if they really want to save some children why don't they shut down the >multi-billion dollar infanticide industry known as abortion. Why are these >medical hacks allowed to do to children what they would be jailed for >doing to a dog? Perhaps because it serves nicely with the elitist goals of >population control (need to keep the number of niggers, bean pickers, and >white trash down to a controllable number) not to mention that their >pockets are well lined by the hacks. Hey William, that's called "woman freedom to choose". Woman right precedes the baby-that-might-be rights for she is the sine-qua-none condition for the baby-who-might-be to exist. But it is only *very* rarely that I disagree with you... ;-) Ciao jfa Definition: FACISM: n.: a political and economic movement, strongly nationalistic, magnifying the rights of the state as opposed to those of the individual, in which industry, though remaining largely under private ownership, and all administrative political units, are controlled by a strong central government. ------------------------------------------------- "One of the ordinary modes by which tyrants accomplish their purpose, without resistance, is by disarming the people and making it an offense to keep arms". - Joseph Story, U.S. Supreme Court Justice. ------------------------------------------------- "1935 will go down in history! For the first time a civilized nation has full gun registration! Our streets will be safer, our police more efficient, and the world will follow our lead in the future!" -Adolf Hitler, April 1935 ------------------------------------------------- PGP keys: http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pks-toplev.html PGP ID:C58ADD0D:529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 PGP ID:5B51964D:152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C ===================END FORWARDED MESSAGE=================== Jean-Francois Avon, B.Sc. Physics, Montreal, Canada DePompadour, Société d'Importation Ltée Limoges fine porcelain and french crystal JFA Technologies, R&D physicists & engineers Instrumentation & control, LabView programming PGP keys: http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pks-toplev.html PGP ID:C58ADD0D:529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 PGP ID:5B51964D:152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C

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Skipjack extensibility
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

NSA made a claim that Skipjack couldn't be extended past 80 bits of key. Most plausible explanation to my mind is that they're lying. Second is that there is an attack against a class of Skipjack-like ciphers that requires only a few plaintexts and 2^80 operations. Third is that some common key-lengthening tricks like those for 2-key-3DES, DES-X, and DEAL fail when applied to Skipjack. I can hardly fathom one resistant to all three, but I guess it's possible with NSA. Seems to me that you could always figure out some construct so that no practically-secure cipher with Skipjack's observable properties could evade having its key lengthened with much probability. Or maybe not. IANAC. Besides, it's impossible to make a cipher that can't be used to construct constructs with bigger key lengths: Skipjack(cryptovariable, IDEA(key, plaintext)) -- terminology jab intended -- provably has an effective key length as long as IDEA's. Even if that is cheating...

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NSA Declass Query
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Spyrus claims in a press release yesterday that NSA announced declassification of SKIPJACK and KEA on June 6, earlier than the DoD notice on June 23. Does anyone know where and how NSA made this earlier announcement, and whether there is a document on it? We've queried Spyrus but no answer yet. Spyrus has scheduled a June 30 conference on its release of a FORTEZZA library and products in connection with the NSA declassification. Bruce Schneier is a keynote speaker. http://www.spyrus.com/company/releases/pr_swf.html

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CIA 4 Nags: Hackers Crypto Y2K Foreigners
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

June 24, 1998 CIA Head Forsees Better Hackers Filed at 5:43 p.m. EDT By The Associated Press WASHINGTON (AP) -- Intrusion into government computers will become increasingly more sophisticated and better organized and is likely to involve hostile nations, CIA Director George Tenet told lawmakers Wednesday. "Potential attackers range from national intelligence and military organizations, terrorists, criminals, industrial competitors, hackers and disgruntled or disloyal insiders," Tenet told the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. "We know with specificity of several nations that are working on developing an information warfare capability." While Tenet did not identify the countries, committee Chairman Fred Thompson, R-Tenn., who received a classified briefing on Tuesday, named some of them. Citing published reports, Thompson said China, Russia, Libya, Iraq and Iran and at least seven other countries are developing information warfare programs. The challenge facing U.S. intelligence will be to detect attacks on U.S.computers and information systems by organized or individual hackers. In some cases, Tenet said, disruptive intrusions orchestrated by hostile states may be disguised as amateurish efforts by individual hackers. "Our electric power grids and our telecommunications networks will be targets of the first order," Tenet said. "An adversary capable of implanting the right virus or accessing the right terminal can cause massive damage." The shift of the computer hacker problem from individuals and terrorist groups to governments is only beginning, Tenet said, but he added, "Down the line we are going to encounter more and it will be more organized." Tenet cited one case, without naming it, of a foreign government targeting the United States for intrusion into information systems. Sen. Joseph Lieberman, D-Conn., asked if the U.S. government is taking steps to develop its own offensive hacking capability to disrupt adversaries and to serve as a deterrent for computer-based attacks. "We're not asleep at the switch in this regard," Tenet replied. Air Force Lt. Gen. Kenneth Minihan, head of the National Security Agency, said it was not going too far to think in terms of an "electronic Pearl Harbor," a well-organized assault on the United States based on strikes aimed at electronic information systems. The most sensitive information centers, such as CIA and Pentagon classified files, are heavily guarded against such intrusion and, in most cases, are fenced off from Internet-type transfers. The problems are more likely to arise in less well-guarded areas such as financial networks or industrial control centers. "They're not going to attack our strengths," Minihan said. A key area of vulnerability within the intelligence community, Tenet said, is the possibility of a disloyal or disgruntled employee wreaking havoc with CIA computers. Another scenario stems from the difficulty the CIA is encountering finding enough software specialists to grapple with the "Year 2000" problem, caused by computers not being programmed to recognize the shift in the calendar from 1999 to 2000. Most of the contractors available to help the agency, Tenet said, would use foreigners, affording "an easy opportunity to come in and see how your system works and what your vulnerabilities are." The running debate over the availability of increasingly sophisticated encryption technology, which scrambles messages and data from unauthorized intrusion, also poses a worry, Tenet said. Unless the computer industry and the government find a legislative compromise, the government could fall victim to hackers able to hide their own actions in impenetrable encryption codes. It may take a major computer-hacker incident to create the political pressure needed to allow the government the "recovery" power to access encrypted databases. "There is a train wreck waiting to happen unless we deal with the recovery aspect of the encryption debate," Tenet said. ------

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Skipjack SIMULATIONS
by bill payne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

willis(a)rand.org http://www.jya.com/skipjack-fi.htm Markus.Kuhn(a)cl.cam.ac.uk http://www.jya.com/skipjack-uk.htm perry(a)piermont.com http://jya.com/skipjack-pem.txt mab(a)research.att.com http://www.jya.com/skipjack-mab.htm colin(a)nyx.net http://www.jya.com/skipjack-cp.txt Guys I looked at your neat, what I would call, SIMULATIONS of the skipjack algorithm. I get an uncomfortable feeling in terms of work involved in implementing /* The permutation G */ #define G(l, r, key, koff) \ ((l) ^= F[(r) ^ (key)[(koff)%10]], \ (r) ^= F[(l) ^ (key)[((koff)+1)%10]], \ (l) ^= F[(r) ^ (key)[((koff)+2)%10]], \ (r) ^= F[(l) ^ (key)[((koff)+3)%10]]) on, say, an 8051. NSA gave Sandia similar algorithm SPECIFICATIONS. I simulated Benincasas NSS/USO algorithm in Forth to make sure I THOUGH that I understood it. And could produce the test vectors. http://jya.com/da/whpda.htm In the REAL WORLD at Sandia some of the following considerations IMMEDIATELY DOMINATE THE ALGORITHM. 1 power budget 2 thermal constraints 3 size limitations 4 conducted and radiated emissions 5 radiation-hard requirements 6 speed requirements 7 memory requirements 8 red/black analysis 9 hardware fault tolerance [DELFAS] 10 implementation work GUESS 11 software technology limitations [Can we use Forth?] 12 ... I am guessing that putting Skipjack on, say, on a smart card might involve some hairy engineering. NSA KG units Brian Snow showed me were fairly small in size. Say about 1-2 inches x 1-2 inches x 5-6 inches. Shift register crypto technology is much simpler than number-based crypto technology. Size, power, scalability, ... are the reasons, I think, that NSA uses shift registers for its GOOD STUFF. Also, NSA/Sandia had SOME REAL project DISASTERS with number-based crypto. Expensive, embarrassing, ... What ever happened to Sandias low- and high-speed public key crypto chips? I am very pleased to see all of this information getting out so everyone can look at it. I may have a project coming up - protecting gas pipeline survey data from competitors. I DO NOT plan to TRY TO reinvent a crypto algorithm. I will implement someone elses idea. Good idea from a liability standpoint too! Morales and I need to complete our SETTLEMENT PROJECT so that we can all move on to other CONSTRUCTIVE projects. Best bill http://www.apcatalog.com/cgi-bin/AP?ISBN=0125475705&LOCATION=US&FORM=FORM2 http://www-hto.usc.edu/software/seqaln/doc/html/gfsr.3.html Subject: Judicial Misconduct at Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Date: Mon, 22 Jun 1998 13:29:01 -0600 From: bill payne <billp(a)nmol.com> To: art morales <armoral(a)sandia.gov>, senator_hatch(a)Hatch.senate.gov, senator(a)thurmond.senate.gov, chuck_grassley(a)grassley.senate.gov, senator_specter(a)specter.senate.gov, senator_thompson(a)thompson.senate.gov, info(a)kyl.senate.gov, senator_dewine(a)dewine.senate.gov, john_ashcroft(a)ashcroft.senate.gov, michigan(a)abraham.senate.gov, senator_leahy(a)leahy.senate.gov, senator(a)kennedy.senate.gov, senator(a)biden.senate.gov, senator_kohl(a)kohl.senate.gov, senator(a)feinstein.senate.gov, russell_feingold(a)feingold.senate.gov, dick(a)durbin.senate.gov, senator(a)torricelli.senate.gov CC: steve dillingham <" Steven.Dillingham"@hq.doe.gov>, Robert Nordhaus <" Robert.Nordhaus"@hq.doe.gov>, mrgall(a)ix.netcom.com, jy(a)jya.com, art morales <armoral(a)sandia.gov>, federico pena <" Federico.F.Pena"@hq.doe.gov>, RJPARK(a)sandia.gov, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, ukcrypto(a)maillist.ox.ac.uk Monday 6/22/98 1:02 PM Senate Judiciary Committee http://www.senate.gov/committee/judiciary.html Republicans Orrin G. Hatch, Utah, Chairman senator_hatch(a)Hatch.senate.gov Strom Thurmond, South Carolina senator(a)thurmond.senate.gov Charles E. Grassley, Iowa chuck_grassley(a)grassley.senate.gov Arlen Specter, Pennsylvania senator_specter(a)specter.senate.gov Fred Thompson, Tennessee senator_thompson(a)thompson.senate.gov Jon Kyl, Arizona info(a)kyl.senate.gov Mike DeWine, Ohio senator_dewine(a)dewine.senate.gov John Ashcroft, Missouri john_ashcroft(a)ashcroft.senate.gov Spencer Abraham, Michigan michigan(a)abraham.senate.gov Jeff Sessions, Alabama Democrats Patrick J. Leahy, Vermont senator_leahy(a)leahy.senate.gov Edward M. Kennedy, Massachusetts senator(a)kennedy.senate.gov Joseph R.Biden, Jr., Delaware senator(a)biden.senate.gov Herb Kohl, Wisconsin senator_kohl(a)kohl.senate.gov Dianne Feinstein, California senator(a)feinstein.senate.gov Russell D. Feingold, Wisconsin russell_feingold(a)feingold.senate.gov Richard Durbin, Illinois dick(a)durbin.senate.gov Robert Torricelli, New Jersey senator(a)torricelli.senate.gov Purpose of this e-mail is to give written proof of criminal judicial misconduct by Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals clerks Hoecker, Fisher, and Judges Moore, Barrett, Weis and help get this matter settled. Thursday March 30, 1995 I wrote Tenth Circuit clerk Hoecker to request a copy of the docket sheets for case 94-2205 Payne v. Sandia Corporation, et al Hoecker did not answer my letter. On Tuesday March 5,1996 I wrote Judge Lucius D. Bunton to ask his help to get a copy of the docket sheets. No response. On Monday September 23, 1996 Arthur R Morales and I wrote Henry A. Politz, Chief Judge U.S. Court of Appeals - Fifth Circuit to ask his help to get a copy of the docket sheets of my case and Morales Tenth Circuit case 95-2204. Tenth Circuit also refused to send Morales copies of docket sheets for his case. Politz is Bunton's boss. No response. Friday May 30, 1997 I wrote Antonin Scalia to get this help to get a copy of the docket sheets. No response. 5 May 1998 citizen John Young finds docket sheets on Source: PACER, U.S. Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit, 1-800-279-9107 and posts them on Internet at http://jya.com/whp-10usca.htm Docket as of April 10, 1998 0:05 am Proceedings include all events. 94-2205 Payne v. Sandia Corporation, et al shows that I filed my Brief of the Appellant on 2/19/95. 2/23/95 [835344] Appellant's brief filed by William H. Payne. Original and 7 copies. c/s: y. Served on 2/19/95 Oral argument? pro se. Appellee/Respondent's brief due 3/24/95 for Thomas P. Wright, for Robert Surran, for Paul A. Stokes, for Mary J. Stang, for Tommy A. Sellers, for Craig A. Searls, for Albert Narath, for Preston B. Herrington, for Peter S. Hamilton, for Roger L. Hagengruber, for James R. Gosler, for Harold L. Folley, for Robert L. Ewing, for C. William Childers, for Harvey J. Brewster, for Sandia Corporation (mbm) mbm writes "Appellee/Respondent's brief due 3/24/95" Sandia had sent me a copy of its brief by 3/28/96. I filed attached MOTION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S DEMANDS ON BASIS THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLEES FAILED TO FILE BRIEF WITHIN 30 DAYS SPECIFIED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 31 on Tuesday the 28th day of March, 1995 My February 28 MOTION at the Tenth Circuit is filed WITHOUT notice of service logged. 4/4/95 [845484] Appellant's motion filed by Appellant William H. Payne [94-2205] to grant appellant's demands on basis that appellees' failed to file timely brief. Original and 3 copies c/s: y (mbm) In 1995 FRAP 25 (a) stated "[b]riefs shall be deemed filed on the day of mailing if the most expeditious form of delivery by mail, excepting special delivery, is used." FRAP 25 has been changed by 1998 to http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/docs/frap-iop.htm#25a Since I mailed Appellant's motion filed by Appellant William H. Payne [94-2205] to grant appellant's demands on basis that appellees' failed to file timely brief on 3/28/98, it is likely Sandia's lawyer Friedman received it 3/29/95. Tenth Circuit logs 3/30/95 [844759] Appellee's brief filed by Sandia Corporation, Harvey J. Brewster, C. William Childers, Robert L. Ewing, Harold L. Folley, James R. Gosler, Roger L. Hagengruber, Peter S. Hamilton, Preston B. Herrington, Albert Narath, Craig A. Searls, Tommy A. Sellers, Mary J. Stang, Paul A. Stokes, Robert Surran, Thomas P. Wright. Original and 7 copies. c/s: y. Served on 3/27/95 Oral Argument? y (appellant is pro se) Appellant's optional reply brief due 4/13/95 for William H. Payne (mbm) Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure [FRAP] 26 (c) states (c) Additional Time after Service. When a party is required or permitted to act within a prescribed period after service of a paper upon that party, 3 calendar days are added to the prescribed period unless the paper is delivered on the date of service stated in the proof of service. http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/docs/frap-iop.htm#26c While the Tenth Circuit ASSERTS Appellees brief was, in fact, served on 3/27/95 evidence given below points to the brief was served, in fact, on 3/29/95. I allege that Friedman affixed a false date of service to Sandia's brief. I WAS NEVER PROPERLY SERVED. I wrote Wednesday March 29, 1995 Dan Friedman Simons, Cuddy & Friedman Pecos Trail Office Compound 1701 Old Pecos Trail POB 4160 Santa Fe, NM 87502-4160 505-988-4476 505-984-1807 FAX Dear Lawyer Friedman: Today at 14:00 hours I found a green and white about 9x13 inch envelope in our mail box at my home. Mailing label indicated that the envelope came from your firm. CONFIDENTIAL was stamped on the mailing label. I wrote "Received at 14:00 hours on W 3/29/95 with no POSTMARK OR STAMP by W. H. Payne" at the bottom of the envelope. There was no STAMP OR POSTAGE METER LABEL or POSTMARK on the envelope. Therefore, I gave the envelope to US Postal Service supervisor Mel at 14:49 hours today at the Postal Receiving station at 9904 Montgomery, NW in Albuquerque. Mel has a copy of the cover of the envelope with Mel's note written on it. Mel told me the post office was going to return the envelope to your firm for proper mailing. I ask: 1 What did this envelope contain? Please identify the documents precisely. 2 If any Certificates of Service were included in the envelope, then what were the dates affixed to these documents? 3 Who placed this envelope in our mail box? Lawyer Friedman: It appears you missed an important filing date. And are in the process of attempt to correct your failure. But may be using illegitimate methods to conceal your failure. Please respond as soon as possible so that we all may discover what has happened here." ... Lawyer Friedman did not respond to the above letter. But Friedman did mail me Appellees brief many days later in envelope showing TRUE MAILING date. Certificate of service on received Appellees brief did not reflect postmark date. 10th Cir. R. 25.4 in 1995 page 62 reads Papers not accepted for filing. -- The clerk shall not file papers that do not comply with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and these rules See 10thCir. R. 42.1 But Tenth Circuit clerks Fisher and Hoecker despite my protests and submission of evidence may have stamped FILED on Sandia's IMPROPERLY SERVED Appellee/Respondent's brief according to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Laywer Friedman FALSIFIED THE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. Friedman DID NOT MAIL ME "Served on 3/27/95." d) Proof of Service; Filing. A paper presented for filing shall contain an acknowledgment of service by the person served or proof of service in the form of a statement of the date and manner of service, of the name of the person served, and of the addresses to which the papers were mailed or at which they were delivered, certified by the person who made service. Proof of service may appear on or be affixed to the papers filed. When a brief or appendix is filed by mailing or dispatch in accordance with Rule 25(a)(2)(B), the proof of service shall also state the date and manner by which the document was mailed or dispatched to the clerk. http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/docs/frap-iop.htm#25a Crime apparently committed by Hoecker and Fisher is § 1017. Government seals wrongfully used and instruments wrongfully sealed Whoever fraudulently or wrongfully affixes or impresses the seal of any department or agency of the United States, to or upon any certificate, instrument, commission, document, or paper or with knowledge of its fraudulent character, with wrongful or fraudulent intent, uses, buys, procures, sells, or transfers to another any such certificate, instrument, commission, document, or paper, to which or upon which said seal has been so fraudulently affixed or impressed, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/1017.shtml Despite my protests of judicial misconduct Judges Moore, Barrett, Weis award decision to Sandia 10/6/95 [890055] Order filed by Judges Moore, Barrett, Weis "...All outstanding motions are denied..." (found in Order & Judgment of 10/6/95) [879579-1] Parties served by mail. (pdw) when these judges should not have had Appellees brief before them. Then in an apparently attempt to conceal what happened 10/6/95 [890076] NOTE: THIS ENTIRE CASE IS SEALED. Terminated on the Merits after Submission Without Oral Hearing; Judgment Affirmed; Written, Signed, Unpublished. Moore, authoring judge; Barrett; Weis. [94-2205] (pdw) I WON MY APPEAL, pro se, ON A TECHNICALITY but judges Judges Moore, Barrett, Weis awarded the win to Sandia Labs! Members of Congress, judicial misconduct in this matter has been well-documented. Court records filed with the Tenth Circuit. But CURRENTLY under seal. Lawyers involved in this matter attempt to use the legal strategy of IGNORE and STONEWALL to attempt to deny me justice. Ignoring and stonewalling by lawyers forced Morales and me to seek visibility so lawyers could no longer ignore and stonewall. Lawyer attitude apparently is that they ignore rules of civil procedure or even the law so long as their actions are invisible to public scrutiny. Visibility was achieved by suing the National Security Agency which revealed even more judicial misconduct http://www.jya.com/whp052898.htm. I would like to settle all matters involved with this unfortunate cyrpto-related matter, which includes criminal violations of the Privacy Act. DOE lawyer Steve Dillingham asked me to prepare a settlement offer in 1994. I wrote a settlement letter May 22, 1994 to Dillingham. Nothing happened. June 11, 1998 I made several modifications to my 1994 settlement letter and sent it e-mail to Robert Nordhaus, Chief Counsel, DOE. I ask that you 1 help with settlement of my six-year-old since I won my appeal at the Tenth Circuit, 2 investigate Tenth Circuit case 94-2205 Payne v. Sandia Corporation, et al to bring the guilty to justice. Sincerely william payne 505 292 7037 I am not reading e-mail http://jya.com/whpfiles.htm http://www.apcatalog.com/cgi-bin/AP?ISBN=0125475705&LOCATION=US&FORM=FORM2 http://www-hto.usc.edu/software/seqaln/doc/html/gfsr.3.html Coauthor Lewis in the above is one of my former MS and PhD students in computer science. http://www.friction-free-economy.com/ Monday 6/22/98 1:04 PM Members of Congress Purpose of this e-mail is to give written proof of criminal judicial misconduct by Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals clerks Hoecker, Fisher, and Judges Anderson, Barrett, Logan and request a congressional investigation. After several years, with Payne, of trying to get Tenth Circuit to send docket sheets from my case, citizen John Young http://www.jya.com/index.htm locates docket sheets and posts them Morales Case Dockets 10th USCA June 12, 1998 on Internet at http://www.jya.com/arm061298.htm. Source: Online records Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals via PACER GENERAL DOCKET FOR Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Docket #: 95-2204 Filed: 9/29/95 Nsuit: 3440 Morales v. Sandia National Lab. Appeal from: United States District Court for the District of New Mexico I filed 11/9/95 [898274] Appellant's brief filed by Arthur R. Morales. Original and 2 copies. c/s: y. Served on 11/7/95. Oral argument? pro se. Appellee's brief due 12/11/95 for Sandia National Lab. (pdw) Sandia files its FIRST ATTEMPT at 12/11/95 [905033] Appellee's deficient brief filed by Sandia National Lab.. Appellee's corrected brief due 12/21/95 for Sandia National Lab. additional copies received 12/11/95. (fg) Tenth Circuit court clerk Patrick Fisher writes Wells on December 11, 1995 concerning Sandia's deficient brief [C]orrections, however made, must be accompanied by proof of service upon all other parties to the appeal. ... and issues 12/14/95 [905975] FIRST notice of rules violation for Deborah D. Wells for Appellee Sandia National Lab. (sls) Wells submits 12/21/95 [907974] Appellee's brief filed by Sandia National Lab.. Original and 7 copies. c/s: y. Served on 12/20/95 Oral Argument? n Appellant's optional reply brief due 1/8/96 for Arthur R. Morales (mbm) but DOES NOT serve me with a copy. Wells later admits in 2/1/96 [917660] Response filed by Sandia National Lab. Appellant/Petitioner motion to clarify Original and 3 copies. c/s: y response Null Relief Code (fg) Certificate of Service date 30th day of January, 1996, [h]ad Appellant simply made a phone call to the Tenth Circuit, he could have established that the Defendant-Appellee's corrected brief was indeed filed on a timely basis, ... I protested by filing 1/3/96 [909965] Appellant's motion "for the Court to Grant Appeal" filed by Appellant Arthur R. Morales [95-2204]. Original and 3 copies. c/s: y. (pdw) 1/3/96 [909966] Appellant's motion "for New Trial" filed by Appellant Arthur R. Morales [95-2204]. Original and 3 copies. c/s: y. (pdw) 1/3/96 [909967] Appellant's motion "to Discipline Defendant-Appellee" filed by Appellant Arthur R. Morales [95-2204]. Original and 3 copies. c/s: y. (pdw) because Sandia did not properly serve me in violation of Fisher's December 11, 1995 order. The Tenth Circuit court of appeals should NOT, by its own rules, filed Appellee's brief filed by Sandia National Lab.. Original and 7 copies. c/s: y. Served on 12/20/95 10th Cir. R. 25.4 in 1995 page 62 reads Papers not accepted for filing. -- The clerk shall not file papers that do not comply with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and these rules See 10thCir. R. 42.1 And is doubtful whether court clerk Fisher had any authority under appellate procedure to permit Wells to correct her deficient brief. Rather Sandia's brief did not comply with with Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and should have been summarily rejected for filing. I WON, pro se, my appeal to the Tenth circuit on a technicality but Judges Anderson, Barrett, Logan awarded the win to Sandia Labs. 4/2/96 [932848] Order filed by Judges Anderson, Barrett, Logan denying parties' motions for general relief(found in Order and Judgment of 4/2/96)--"...During the course of this appeal, the parties have filed various motions for dismissal, summary grant, and sanctions. We find no merit to any of these motions, and they are [920851-1] Parties served by mail. (pdw) by accepting and judging on a documents which was not permitted to be before the court by its own rules. Judicial misconduct in my case has been well-documented as it is in Payne's case. Payne and I speculate that similar judicial misconduct may have occurred at the Tenth Circuit. Sandia lawyer Robert J Park wrote me a settlement letter on Feb 18, 1998. I filled in the blanks and made minor handwritten chages and returned it on February 22, 1998. But my offer has not yet been accepted. I ask that you 1 help have my settlement offer accepted, 2 investigate judicial misconduct in case 95-2204 and punish the guilty. Some citizens can only express such frustrations with the US court system with violence. I seek change by legal reform. Sincerely Arthur R Morales 505 345 1381

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Dupes in NSA Release
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We need confirmation that pages 11 and 14 are the same in the NSA algo release except for the words "Figure 7" and Figure 8." And that Figures 7, 8 and 9, showing "key formation diagram" are the same on purpose. We've asked ever-helpful Ed Roback at NIST about it but no answer yet. Amazingly, thanks to Vanessa Talieri, NSA has cheerfully Fedexed us a hardcopy, due in tomorrow.

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RE: CIA 4 Nags: Hackers Crypto Y2K Foreigners
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just don't understand how, in 1998, anyone could let Tenet get away with a claim about key recovery like this. Didn't anyone ask him how he expected high-tech hackers (especially those possibly aided by foreign intelligence agencies) to use key recovery? Ern -----Original Message----- From: John Young [SMTP:jya@pipeline.com] Sent: Thursday, June 25, 1998 5:37 AM To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: CIA 4 Nags: Hackers Crypto Y2K Foreigners June 24, 1998 CIA Head Forsees Better Hackers Filed at 5:43 p.m. EDT By The Associated Press WASHINGTON (AP) -- Intrusion into government computers [SNIP] Unless the computer industry and the government find a legislative compromise, the government could fall victim to hackers able to hide their own actions in impenetrable encryption codes. It may take a major computer-hacker incident to create the political pressure needed to allow the government the "recovery" power to access encrypted databases. "There is a train wreck waiting to happen unless we deal with the recovery aspect of the encryption debate," Tenet said.

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Navy fights new hack method http://www.abcnews.com/sections/tech/CNET/cnet_navyhack980925.html Tim Clark CNET NEWS.COM Hackers are banding together across the globe to mount low-visibility attacks in an effort to sneak under the radar of security specialists and intrusion detection software, a U.S. Navy network security team said today. Coordinated attacks from up to 15 different locations on several continents have been detected, and Navy experts believe that the attackers garner information by probing Navy Web sites and then share it among themselves. "These new patterns are really hard to decipher--you need expert forensics to get the smoking gun," said Stephen Northcutt, head of the Shadow intrusion detection team at the Naval Surface Warfare Center. "To know what's really happening will require law enforcement to get hold of the hackers' code so we can disassemble it." The new method involves sending as few as two suspicious probes per hour to a host computer, a level of interest that usually won't be detected by standard countermeasures. But by pooling information learned from those probes, hackers can garner considerable knowledge about a site. Northcutt said the new technique for attacks was discovered only this month and has been detected at Defense Department facilities as well as in private sector sites, including some outside the United States. The Shadow group has posted descriptions of the attacks and countermeasures, and the information has been forwarded to CERT, which investigates security attacks. "Most intrusion detection systems have a threshold, a radar. These attacks are intentionally sliding under that threshold so normal intrusion detection tools will not detect them," said Tim Aldrich, principal analyst at the Navy facility. The Shadow team said that although the new method is harder to detect, it should not affect sites that are well-secured. But the technique puts sites with weak security at greater risk. The attacks do not involve a new hacker tool or new kind of attack, but rather represent a low-visibility technique for perpetrating attacks. For example, one coordinated attack that involved at least 14 locations simply probed a Web site for security weaknesses without mounting a break-in. The Shadow Intrusion Detection team said it cannot determine how many people might be involved in the attacks--hackers frequently use many different machines to launch their attacks. But the number of individuals involved is less important than the technique itself, Northcutt said. The technique could be used to scan or mount attacks from more than 100 Internet addresses. The security experts also suggested that makers of commercial intrusion detection software need to counter the new method. "This stealthy probing enables large amounts of parallel firepower, which means many attack attempts [from many sites] over a short time frame," said a note distributed by the System Administration Networking and Security (SANS) Institute. Going public with a news of new hacker techniques is somewhat unusual in the secretive network security community, which often fears that publicizing attacks before countermeasures are known will tip off attackers to vulnerabilities. "We went public in hopes of raising awareness," Northcutt said. "You're only going to be able to find stealthy stuff by looking for stealthy stuff." But before publicizing the new hacker technique, he added, the Shadow team had checked to be certain it would not jeopardize any official actions against the attackers. He also thinks that users of the attack may be caught. "If they're working together, it ought to be easier to track them down because they leave more of a trail," he said.

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PRIVACY....and how to keep it!
by helper1＠privacy-consultants.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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SORM: New ex-KGB moves in telecom
by Maksim Otstavnov 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To whom it may concern: The text between [Start of translation] and [End of translation] lines below is a verbatim translation of the two drafts of documents which are currently in the state of approvement by the two Russian ministries: Federal Security Service (FSB, one of the five special services inheriting to KGB) and State Committee on Communications (Goskomsvyaz'). The originals (and comments) are available at the Libertarium Webpages (www.ice.ru/libertarium/sorm) Inconsistencies of the original texts (including but not restrictive to: paragraph misnumbering, language vagueness etc.) are left intact. I left the two Russian abbreviations: SORM for the System of effitient research measures, and FSB for the Federal Security Service, to avoid confusion in future. In short: if approved, the rules will provide exKGB with technical facility to _directly_ and covertly wiretap _any_ information transmitted via telecommunication networks including telephone, telegraph, Internet etc. and there will be no means to ensure KGBists obtained a court warrant (required by Constitution and other federal legislation) before wiretapping. Any informed comments (of legal and technological, not emotional nature) from both organisations and from individual experts are welcome. I am grateful to all involved with obtaining the documents. Hope some day I will be in a position to mention them by their names... - - Maksim Otstavnov [Start of translation] Approved Deputy Director Federal Security Service A.A.Bespalov "____"___________1998 Confirmed "____"___________1998 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS TO THE SYSTEM OF TECHNICAL MEANS PROVIDING FOR THE FULLFILMENT OF EFFICIENT RESEARCH MEASURES IN THE DOCUMENTAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS Approved Head of the Telecommunications Management A.Yu.Rokotyan "____"___________1998Ç. First Deputy to the Director General Of the Central Research Institute of the State Telecommunications of Russia Yu.A.Alekseev "____"___________1998Ç. 1. PURPOSE 1.1. The system of technical means destined to provide for the system of efficient research measures (SORM) in the networks of the documental telecommunications (NDTC) is being arranged at the basis of the Russian Federation legislation and is meant to provide for technical support of the above research measures in the telecommunications networks which are used for supplying customers with telematic services, data transmission services, and access to the world global information network of INTERNET. 1.2 The actual technical requirements (TR) concern all NDTC regardless of their forms of ownership formed previously or being currently formed according to the Russian State Communications Committee licenses. 1.3. SORM should provide for reading of all information (both incoming and outgoing) belonging to the specific subscribers of the network(s) in question. 1.4. The actual TR should be observed regardless of what means of information protection may be used in the NDTC. 1.5. The actual TR should be observed while providing additional services to the NDTC subscribers. 1.6. The actual TR should be observed for each individual subscriber regardless of the type of his connection to the DTC networks (individual or collective). 2. SET OF EQUIPMENT The set of SORM equipment should include: hardware and software means (HSM) providing for the requirements fulfillment by SORM, these means should be part of the distant control center (DCC) - HSM SORM DCC; hardware and software means (HSM) providing for the requirements fulfillment by SORM these means should be part of the NDTC node equipment - HSM SORM NDTC; communication channel (communication lines and channeling hardware) providing for establishing of communication between HSM SORM DCC and HSM SORM NDTC; Note: The channeling hardware should be part of the HSM SORM NDTC equipment. SORM software security and confidentiality protection means. 3. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SORM ORGANIZATION 3.1. NDTC SORM management should be controlled from the DCC by way of its cooperation with the HSM SORM DCC via communication channels providing for controlling commands transmission from the DCC to HSM SORM NDTC and for information transmission from HSM SORM NDTC to the DCC. 3.2 SORM should provide for transmission of the following information from the HSM SORM NDTC to the DCC: about the HSM SORM NDTC readiness; about the results of DCC commands fulfillment; about unauthorized interference with the HSM SORM NDTC work. 3.3. SORM should provide for transmission to the DCC the NDTC subscribers data base with the following information about subscribers at the request of the DCC operator: registration date in the DTC networks; electronic address; registration address; additional services provided (including internet roaming (and voice communication services). 3.4. At the DCC command SORM should provide for receiving of the following information pertaining to any individual user: statistic information reading; reading of information (both incoming and outgoing) belonging to specific subscribers. Note: This command may be documented by the communications operator. 3.5. SORM should provide for determination of: subscriber's telephone number if he uses common carrier telephone line (providing this line allows for this) for using telematic services and data transmission; subscriber's electronic address if the latter uses other telecommunication networks for using telematic services and data transmission. 3.6. While reading statistical information SORM should provide for transmission of the following information to the DCC HSM SORM NDTC: period of work in the NDTC; telephone or commuted telephone line number or network address (of an other network) used for NDTC access; network addresses used for reception or transmission of information via NDTC. 3.7. While reading information SORM should provide for transmission of the following information to the DCC HSM SORM NDTC: period of work in the NDTC; telephone or commuted telephone line number or network address (other network address) used for NDTC access; real-time information transmitted via NDTC and belonging to specific subscribers. 3.8. The SORM reaction time from the moment of DCC command transmission to the moment of its fulfillment confirmation by the HSM SORM NDTC reception should not exceed 30 seconds (excluding the communication services access discontinuation). 4. HSM SORM NDTC AND HSM SORM DCC COMMUNICATION INTERFACE 4.1. Communication between SORM and DCC should be conducted via the data transmission channel. 4.2. Data transmission channel reservation should be provided. 4.3. Switch to the reserve channel should be provided in case of the main channel fault. 4.4. The information exchange should be conducted via isolated communication channel in a duplex regime at a speed not less than maximally allowed for the NDTC subscribers. 4.5. Interface of communication with the channeling equipment should comply with the ITTU recommendations V.36, V.24, G.703. 4.6. Protocol of digital data exchange between SORM and DCC should comply with the X.25 ITTU recommendation (edition of 1995) for single chain LAPB procedure. Note: When protocols used for the networks information exchange differ from those recommended by the ITTU X.25 (such as TCP/IP), the protocol of information exchange between SORM and DCC may differ from the protocol mentioned in paragraph 4.6. as agreed with the FSB of Russia and the network administration. 4.7. The protocol of connection between SORM and DCC (the type of service information, SORM/DCC interaction algorithm, arrangement of the information transmission) should be defined in the process of SORM software development by agreement with the FSB of Russia. 5. SORM EFFICIENCY CONTROL 5.1. Functional control of the SORM hardware and software efficiency against the background of the NDTC equipment functioning should be provided for during the exploitation. 5.2. DCC should receive information concerning faults interfering with the work of the NDTC SORM. 5.3. Performance control of the information exchange channels between SORM and DCC should be provided for. In case of the damage of information exchange equipment data transmission should be cancelled and a corresponding message should be transmitted to the maintenance personnel while automatic switch on to the reserve channel should be fulfilled. 6. UNAUTHORIZED INFORMATION ACCESS CONTROL 6.1. The possibility of unauthorized interference with the process of functioning and interaction between the HSM SORM NDTC and HSM SORM DCC should be excluded. 6.2. The possibility of unauthorized access to the data and software providing for the HSM SORM NDTC interaction should be excluded. 6.4. DCC should receive reports on all attempts of unauthorized access and interference with the HSM SORM NDTC functioning. 6.5. Information exchange between SORM and DCC should be secured. 7. SORM INITIALIZING AND RESTART 7.2. In case of SORM node software restart the information about this fact should be transmitted to the DCC. 7.3. Technological conditions of the SORM node software restart should include the procedure of HSM SORM NDTC restart. 7.4. A possibility of restarting part of the software controlling the work of the HSM SORM NDTC should be provided for at the DCC command. _____________________________________________________________________________ Approved Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation A.A.Bespalov "____"___________1998 Confirmed "___"___________1998 THE ORDER OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SYSTEM OF THE EFFICIENT RESEARCH MEASURES IN THE DOCUMENT TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS First Deputy to the Director General of the Central Research Institute of the State Telecommunications of Russia Yu.A.Alekseev "____"___________1998 Administrations of the telecommunications documental networks (DTC) including the services of data transmission, telematic services, Internet informational resources access services that are guided by the "Technical Requirements To The System Of Technical Means Providing For The Fullfilment Of Effecient Research Measures In The Documental Telecommunications" should conduct the following technical and administrative operations. A plan of measures to be taken in order to implement the system of efficient research measures (SORM) in the network consisting of two stages (the first stage may be missing) should be developed and coordinated with the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. The first stage - implementation of limited functions SORM using standard equipment of the telecommunications provider, experimental running of the system and evaluation of its compliance with the main technical SORM requirements. The second stage - full fledged SORM implementation considering the results of the experimental exploitation. The first stage provides for: 1. Development and coordination with the FSB of the technological scheme and SORM functioning algorithms at the telecommunications operator's network based on the technical requirements. 2. Correction if necessary of SORM technical requirements considering the results of the first stage implementation. 3. Development of the list of SORM hardware and software used at the first stage and according to the results of the first stage (stating type, cost, supply conditions and payer for each item). 4. Preparation of proposals and coordination with the FSB of Russia of the necessary communication protocols for data exchange between SORM equipment and standard equipment of the telecommunications provider if the provider complies with the SORM technical requirements (stage 2). 5. Purchase and delivery of the SORM equipment in accordance with the list provided by p. 3 6. Allocation of necessary technical means for checking and tuning of the SORM software at the provider's equipment. 8. Organization of the intercity communication line between telecommunications operator and the DCC. 9. Preparation of the exploitation and technical documentation for the SORM including the regulations for the duty services interaction. 10. Testing and tuning of the SORM hardware and software during interaction with the telecommunications operator standard equipment. The first stage is completed as the SORM acceptance report is signed and it is accepted for experimental exploitation as the result of the joint tests (FSB as the contractor and the telecommunications operator as the performer.) The second stage provides for: 1. Development of the SORM requirements for the telecommunications operator equipment based on the "Technical Requirements To The System Of Technical Means Providing For The Fulfillment Of Efficient Research Measures In The Documental Telecommunications" (adjusted if necessary according to the results of the first stage) containing the list of: hardware and software means providing for the implementation of the SORM requirements and included into the equipment of the node (nodes) of DTC network - HSM SORM NDTC; hardware and software means providing for implementation of the SORM requirements and included into the DCC equipment - HSM SORM DCC; type of channel for communication between NDTC and HSM SORM DCC; type of equipment for the communication channel between the HSM SORM NDTC and HSM SORM DCC; the data exchange velocity between the HSM SORM NDTC and HSM SORM DCC; protocol of the data exchange in the communication channel between HSM SORM NDTC and HSM SORM DCC; protocol of junction between HSM SORM NDTC and HSM SORM DCC; information security and privacy protection software for the SORM. Telecommunications operator should coordinate technical requirements with the FSB of Russia. 2. The specification of the specific hardware and software that should be included as part of the standard equipment of the telecommunications operator and of the DCC (stating type, cost, supply conditions and payer for each item) is compiled according to the technical requirements. The specification is coordinated by the telecommunications operator with the FSB of Russia organs. 3. Technical design development for the SORM implementation by the telecommunications operator's enterprise is fulfilled by the organization licensed for the fulfillment of design works by the order of the telecommunications operator. 4. Development of the SORM technical exploitation documentation including regulation for duty services interaction. 5. SORM equipment assembling at the telecommunications operator's enterprise is fulfilled by the organization licensed for the fulfillment of assembling works by the order of the telecommunications operator. 6. Testing and tuning of the SORM software at the telecommunications operator's equipment. 7. Conducting joint SORM tests (FSB of the Russian Federation as a contractor and the telecommunications operator as a performer). The second stage is concluded with the SORM industrial exploitation acceptance report which is jointly approved by the telecommunications operator management and the FSB of Russia representatives. [End of translation] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0.1iRu Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBNZJq7XGCEHWOiJDhAQE6cwP9Fm9c8js94liPIbQa+UHUAsPFuOAmEUQd QsMIlNgJjTtRvmoDZS6fjxYbLgbO4imEOtsKEeIMJsZqX8UC0er2tk7VO3eK0968 EzM8w3+t8yFLB98/tWGE9Ghz2HiZh/ywoRiGX8Y08ZkKitYgOk/Aq4EmBHVQp92X ePOimdtAtdY= =BdJi -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Maksim Otstavnov <maksim(a)volga.net> http://www.ice.ru/otstavnov/ -- - chief, Labs of Civil & Financial Crypto -- - editor, "CompuNomika" monthly -- - maintainer of The Russian PGP HomePage

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