- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

lambda 2.13 - Parental control abuses and Crypto leaks
by jt＠freenix.fr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

lambda 2.13 contents ... * Parental control abuses * Crypto Soap Opera : new leaked documents in France and at the OECD * Short-circuits : - U2's hacked: Big Lie in Cyberspace - Serbia's fight for democracy reach digital age - Radikal censorship (sorry for langage mistakes, the text has not been reviewed by an English third party) * * * * * Peacefire vs Cybersitter Parental control abuses * * * * * An insider quarrel between blocking-software CyberSitter and one of the Web site blocked has emerged recently. A US youth association against Net censorship, Peacefire (wwww.peacefire.org) claimed on December 7 : "Sometime today or yesterday, CYBERsitter put www.Peacefire.org on its list of blocked sites. Next time users of the program update their "filter file", they will see our web page blocked along with Playboy.com, Penthouse.com etc. (not to mention NOW.org, Members.GNN.com, and C2.org) Apparently, the company president read our page about CYBERsitter at: http://www.peacefire.org/censorware/CYBERsitter.html and didn't like it." Solid Oak Software (www.solidoak.com) owner of the blocking program, claims Peacefire put online some advices or tips to abort CyberSitter efficiency for teenagers; claimed one time of "copyright infringements"; and decided to urge Peacefire's IAP to block its account. Remember that these softwares were designed to allow parents to control their child's access to the Internet. "Parental control", as it is called, was suppose to give ways for parents to self-censor Internet content. But when people trust the technology and give too much faith to black-listed sites maintained by other individuals' moral standards, parents don't really keep on their "parental control" anymore. They even fail to tackle their own responsability towards their childs. On December 27 the CPSR (www.cpsr.org) wrote a protest letter to Solid Oak. Abstracts: "Your own description of your product provides a fairly concise description of CYBERSitter's restrictions: "any site that focuses on topics such as adult or issues, illegal activities, bigotry, racism, drugs or pornography". Using this list", the CPSR went on, "any determined individuals with web browsers might easily build a profile of sites that are blocked by CYBERSitter. Several members of our group dowloaded your demo, and quickly verified that your software completely or partially blocks access to sites such as the National Organization of Women (http://www.now.org) and the Yahoo search engine (http://www.yahoo.com) Since CYBERSitter's behavior can be easily categorized, Peacefire's publishing of a list of blocked sites does not justify blocking Peacefire's site, or any similar unsavory activities. ... By blocking sites that focus on topics such as [sex] and drug use, SolidOak may filter potentially educational materials regarding AIDS and drug abuse prevention." As Haselton wrote later, "Most letters to the president, Brian Milburn, at bmilburn(a)solidoak.com, or to their support staff at support(a)solidoak.com, are now being bounced with the message, "this account has been configured to reject all messages on this topic..." i would guess that their mail software at those accounts is rejecting all messages with the word "Peacefire" in the subject line, so remember to leave it out if you decide to write to them about this. (And thanks for your support if you do!)" P.S.- The European Commission has submitted draft guidelines to member States concerning the Internet's content regulations. They were quite reserved about the real efficacy of content control specifications like PICS, but nonetheless approved it: http://www.echo.lu/best_use/best_use.html * * * * * French Crypto Sop Opera : other leaked documents * * * * * If you're an encryption addict and fluent in French, jump to the document published by Planete Internet magazine : http://www.planete-internet.com/crypto/decret It is a draft decree prepared by the SCSSI, the security agency, which draws a preliminary picture of future French "trusted third party" agencies (TTPs), or "key recovery agents". A brief summary of what the French electronic notary will look like: The government - The SCSSI * Will say which encryption product will be concerned; all crypto systems will be OK if a key recovery scheme is scheduled; (PGP and the like are not on the list of "approved" products); * Will decide which firm is OK to become a TTP; but no justification will be needed for negative requests; The TTP, "le notaire" * All commercial firms or entities (SA, SARL, consortiums...) will be concerned; * But all its members, CEOs or associates must be "French": like the majority of its finantial assets; * Will be submitted to "professionnal secret" and obliged to keep third party encryption keys away from illegal wiretapping activities; The (commercial) user * Will be obliged to use authorised encryption products; * Will engage itself to fully cooperate with the TTP; The (basic) user * Even if the sheme will not be mandatory, using encryption without the backing of a TTP will be considered illegal; * Huge finantial and logistical procedures will discourage NGO's, small companies and the citizen to protect legally its electronic communications. The new and fully complete policy is scheduled in France in the comming weeks. * * * * * PS - Leaked document from the OECD's crypto hearings Australians cryptographers at http://www.ozemail.com.au/~firstpr/crypto/oecd_dr2.htm published the draft paper that were on the agenda of the Dec. 16-20 closed-door meeting in Paris, revealing the broad and detailed policy toward an international cooperation for "lawfull access" to encrypted communications. * * * Short-circuits * * * U2 hacked? Big Lie in Cyberspace --------------- You surely read numerous stories about the U2 rock band that were "robbed" in Cyberspace by hackers that traveled through cables of a digital camera that broadcasted on the Internet views of their Dublin studio. Hackers put 2 new songs online from a site in Hungary, the story went on. Strange hacking, hey??! The story, which broke in the London's Sunday Times on November 17 (follomed by a naive Le Monde in Paris) was just dope -- a fake, phoney and bull story. Read, for example, what a fan from the Nederland says -> www.universal.nl/users/mirrorbal/u2.htm Number 1 : he told the real story to the Times which didn't even publish a word of it. What's the story? A videotape with 45 sec abstracts from both songs were released by Island Records-Hungary in November (it was the scheduled date for U2's upcomming album, but now scheduled in March!). And a guy simply put a microphone besides his TV and put the digital stuff online. Where's the hack? The Hungarian explains also the story, but didn't erase the songs from his server: w3.datanet.hu/~karpati/ Serbia's fight for democracy reach digital age --------------- Read David S. Bennahum's last MEME bulletin about Serbia's democratric fight: http://www.reach.com/matrix/. Bennahum spent one week in Belgrade and met democrats willign to create cyber-rights organisations like the EPIC or the CDT. Follow their fight daily on the Internet : http://eurasianews.com/erc/serbopp1.htm Radikal censorship --------------- A magazine banned in Germany, the leftist Radikal, available online in the Nederlands, was the target of German policemen on Dec. 11. After failing to urge Nederlands authorities to block the Web site last September, German police decided to act as usually, with the help of their Dutch counterpart and raided a house in Vaals. It turns out that they acted to block Radikal at the source : its paper version. Read the news on: http://www.xs4all.nl/~tank/radikal http://www.xs4all.nl/~felipe/germany.html * * * * lambda 2.13 - www.freenix.fr/netizen * * * * Jerome Thorel =-= Journaliste / Reporter =-= Paris, France lambda bulletin =-= Planete Internet Editor

1 0

New crypto regulations
by gt＠kdn0.attnet.or.jp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Concerning the new crypto regulations: " Note to paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) of this section: A printed book or other printed material setting forth encryption source code is not itself subject to the EAR (see Sec. 734.3(b)(2)). However, notwithstanding Sec. 734.3(b)(2), encryption source code in electronic form or media (e.g., computer diskette or CD ROM) remains subject to the EAR (see Sec. 734.3(b)(3))." This is a big question for me. How does the fact that the same exact information, when stored on magnetic media, cause it to lose its freedom of press protection? Has magnetic media never been tested in court for freedom of press applicability? What are the laws that outline the differences between magnetic media and printed media? Specifically, the one(s) that permit the non-protection of magnetic media? Does this mean that if a journal published an article on some strong non-key escrow encryption algorithm that included source code, it could not later offer that same article on a CD-ROM collection? or provide that same source code online?

11 14

HOW TO HACK www.pgp.com -- stupid CGI script xploit
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Go to www.pgp.com Go To "Keyserver" Go To "Query" In the search window, type `whoami` (note the back quotes). Watch for result. How stupid. Seems to be a common problem of cgi scripts. like the one in norway... xaxaxa

1 0

RE: Crypto reg clarification from Commerce Department
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

These make more sense with the following modifications to the clarification: (c) Definition of U.S. person. For purposes of this section, the term U.S. person includes: (1) Any retard who is a citizen of the United States, a permanent resident alien from Planet X, or a protected person formerly-known-as-criminal as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3); (2) Any juridical organization under surveillance by the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including foreign branches; and (3) Any Borgs in the United States. .. Blanc

2 1

Re: "Structuring" of Communications a Felony?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:08 PM 12/29/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >As to the "anonymous speech" rulings, I mainly know of the 1956 Georgia >case, in which the Supremes struck down a law requiring that leaflets >handed out have a name attached. I don't know of more recent rulings, >especially ones related to the Internet. This was upheld by another recent case involving an anonymous pamphlet from an Ohio woman. >If origin-labelling is unconstitutional, as Steve claims, then on what >basis can the U.S. Postal Service require identification for packages over >one pound? Surely what is inside the package may be considered "speech" (by >those interested in pushing the point). The new rule doesn't require that ID be presented at the Post Office. You just have to present the package in person and fill out a form. They could try and require ID later, of course. >And there are many other situations where anonymity is no longer allowed, >where once it was. The gambling example Brian Davis brought up is an >example: for the purposes of tax collection, regulation of gambling, etc., >winners of nontrivial amounts must identify themselves. They have to identify themselves they don't have to present identification (an important distinction). Brian also pointed out that the guy could have avoided the problem if he'd been smarter. >1. A sharp increase in spamming, mass mailing, threatening letters, >etc....sort of like the "denial of service" and spamming/looping attacks >seen here on Cypherpunks, and being seen widely on the Net. This will >increase pressure to "do something about it." A Senator Exon type person >will introduce legislation to require e-mail be labelled. If they have yet to successfully mandate positive ID for bank or credit accounts, how can they expect to successfully mandate positive ID for something as ephemeral as an Email account? >In closing, I think the Supreme Court will, when it eventually agrees to >hear a relevant case, will differentiate between protected anonymous speech >in public forums and the labelling of sealed packages, sealed letters, and >sealed e-mail. They will argue along the lines of saying that the labelling >law is for the protection of society and not for tracking down dissidents. >The effect will of course be the same, but this will be the fig leaf which >allows them to uphold such laws. Though they have not done so over the several centuries we've had anonymous postal mail. DCF

1 0

Re: Export proposal
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:24 PM 12/29/96 -0800, sameer wrote: [...] > Stewart Baker has been quoted as saying that banned "easily >scanned printed texts" isn't far away. (Rebecca Vesely's Wired News >article) The language of the new regulations supports this view. It seems to me that the USG wanted to ban easily scannable text, but wasn't sure how to best define "easily scannable". This is a property that is difficult to define. Once they come up with a workable definition, expect the regs to be amended. >We are now just one step away from non-GAK crypto being >illegal in the US. As Michael Froomkin has noted, this will require an act of Congress. I expect the administration to send a pro-GAK bill to Congress in 1997. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred Make your mark in the history of mathematics. Use the spare cycles of your PC/PPC/UNIX box to help find a new prime. http://www.mersenne.org/prime.htm

2 1

Just another government fuckover: New crypto regulations
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- books are and have been protected prior to the US Constitution. one can presume books with crypto source code would be protected accordingly; one Federal judge (Patel in SF) has ruled source code is protected under freedom of speech and therefore can be published; yet another judge in the Washington area has ruled it is not. There is no question the feds will appeal Patel's ruling in the Ninth Circuit (known to be pro rights in general, but difficult to predict). eventually it will go to the US Supreme Court. my personal opinion is the Supreme Court will rule against it using a rationale that the actual source code sections of a book can be classified as can any other intellectual property under the National Security Act. Secondly, they will not consider that form of speech an inalienable right. I had my rounds with the bastards years ago, no fucking humour whatsoever, and prone to use the IRS to enforce what the courts could not afford to enforce due to the requirements of disclosure in the courtroom at the time (which have since been plugged); and if that does not work, set you up for financial fraud, fraud by wire, or dope. Today dope is the perfect charge; it has been whipped into a frenzy by the feds and their CIA infiltrated media. let me assure any doubters the real extent of terror which the spooks can apply. the US Government has not been a legal government for years; it is a private club which can be bought, and its services sold to the highest bidder. It is a collection of whores who are part of a cabal of the very rich and powerful; it is totally unaccountable to the public it represents. Waco, Ruby Ridge, and the bombing of their own federal building in Oklahoma City in order to scare Joe Couch Potato into giving up personal freedoms for security are perfect examples of a government drunk on it owns powers. Just like Oswald, they have a perfect patsy with the defendants in OKC. P.J. O'Rourke states it correctly: "And the Clinton administration launched an attack on people in Texas because those people were religious nuts with guns. Hell, this country was founded by religious nuts with guns." O'Rourke also said: "Giving money and power to the government is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenaged boys" and there is no better example than the cocaine stoned, reckless mentality of Bill Clinton. an important fact to keep in mind in US judicial review: few of the judges can be relied on 1) to resist pressure from the Feds and 2) to take the rights of the people seriously and as 'inalienable rights.' this may sound pessimistic and cynical, but the courts have been sliding, in some cases rather quickly, to a position that echoes the UN Bill of Rights: the UN's "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (ICCR): Article 18 states that "everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion" but specifies that "freedom to manifest one's religions or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and necessary..." in other words, I do not think we will see the feds permit the use of books to export cryptography. this almost becomes irrelevant outside the academic world in the provisions of the regs which effectively block hardware or software products and in effect seem to cut off the loophole of US companies funding overseas operations and importing the results, etc. the new regs basically ban it all ways. and the new regs are not the supposedly improved and friendly versions promised --they are draconian. books are an intellectual 'solution' to the problem. the real problem is the hardware. in order to negate governments and their virtually stated intentions of blocking our inalienable freedoms, particularly freedom of speach, we must be able to distribute universal crypto worldwide, and be able to improve it as the shadow governments of the various spook shows improve their ability to break our code. this last round on the ITARs blew out distribution. asking visitors to your web sites if they are U.S. citizens is not going to be sufficient for Bubba's goons: Janet Reno and Jamie Gorlich. the only real solution is guerilla warfare; anonymous distribution; overseas' establishment of clearing houses for updates and source code. freedom of information is just that simple; there are no compromises. Patrick Henry said: "Give me Liberty or Give me Death." publish, publish, and civil disobedience. Patrick Henry used handbills. knowledge is knowledge --get it in the public domain, and in the public's hands even if you must go door to door like a fuller brush salesman... but your product is free and it is for their freedom. don't waste your time getting out the vote; get out there and fight. contribute. if you do not have the balls to do it, you are not for freedom. the only natural cure for corrupt government is bright sunshine. and a rope. == Tyranny Insurance by Colt Manufacturing Co. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: Encrypted with 2.6.3i. Requires 2.6 or later. iQCVAwUBMsd+nb04kQrCC2kFAQGxVQP5AUM06j8anB3MLUzMUe8WjOqhVwPjSd7d RhaGyrRwAdSpU1CPSYNX9+zsTnaJtgsN0rQYLrbKQD1eKDPKAQlnz5vJ6SAVhRwi nNF2e4Pj/wD7SVBwHFmjsaOpWmNx9+ON++/EZNbs3c3nH/2n7tiC7eJJcte+apNE G3lwdSSxXhU= =MD+E -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

5 10

Re: Legality of ...? More Dale
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 24 Dec 1996, Dale Thorn wrote: >When my dad ran a bread truck in the 1950's, a mafia character who >had a bad day paid him $20 or so in pennies, and my dad said he took >it with little argument. Dale, you must serve some purpose in my life. Perhaps it is to teach me humility. I strive to understand your purpose.

2 1

Re: ssn hack
by Lurker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:10 PM 12/28/96 -0600, Jazzmin Belle Sommers wrote: > >I still find that the best line of defense regarding privacy is a complete >second identity. Does anyone know how to apply for proper papers (taxpayer >ID#, checking account, picture ID of some sort) for a second identity? As >far as I know, it is not illegal to have one, as long as it is not used for >fraud. I'm an artist, yeah, that's it. > I'm not sure that you can go through such a procedure to attain a legal "alias"; but on the other hand why the hell would you want to? Think about it, if you will paper work with an institutions to attain an alias you would have to give them in formation about you identity. Short of commiting fraud by giving false informaiton do you think that you have really gain any privacy? Anyone can still find out who you are.

2 1

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 30 Dec 96 6:48:57 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net +#*#+#+ 1:44 99.99% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de +++++++ 1:06:00 99.99% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com +++++++ 33:39 99.98% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -++++++ 1:11:39 99.98% nym config(a)nym.alias.net *##*### :19 99.97% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net ------+ 1:37:49 99.97% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++++++ 1:06:32 99.96% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ------ 2:20:53 99.86% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com _ .-*+* 17:45:40 99.70% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com **** +* 8:06 99.55% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net * **+* 29:35 99.50% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com *##** * 1:02 99.43% replay remailer(a)replay.com * -** + 1:13:13 98.96% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com --- - 7:19:53 95.17% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net .-.- - 10:43:57 91.13% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0