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Re: This is not "cash" if the government demands a report...
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:51 PM 4/29/97, Kent Crispin wrote: >On Tue, Apr 29, 1997 at 01:01:59PM -0800, Tim May wrote: >> At 11:26 AM -0800 4/29/97, Kent Crispin wrote: >> >> >I was refering to your purchase of the 'vette -- presuming the dealer >> >followed the law, the sale would be reported, and the amount, and >> >hence the transaction is not anonymous, even though you paid cash... >> >> Ah, Kent, so you are citing the government's intervention in cash >> transactions (part of the War on Some Drugs, of course) as evidence that >> cash has flaws. Well, I wouldn't call this cash, not if the government >> demands that True Names be taken down and reported. > >OK. What would you call it, then? Perhaps you could think of another >catchy, short name for those greenish bits of paper and circular metal >objects I have in my pocket that I use to pay for lunch? The coins in your pocket are 'legal tender' or currency, a non-intrest bearing bearer bond issued by the treasury. Ecash and its ilk are private currencies, similar in some ways to traveller's checks and money orders which are unsecured and uninsured debts of the issuer, but legally closer to the tokens issued at an amusement park or or the premium stamps (like Blus Chip or S&H Green) which have all but disappeared. Constitutionally, the government has only limited rights to restrict private the issueance and use of private currencies (Stamp Act of 1861 and its current codification under Title 18.) --Steve PGP mail preferred Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | tel: (702) 658-2654 CEO | fax: (702) 658-2673 First ECache Corporation | 7075 West Gowan Road | Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Rejecting Dialog with Government Vermin
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 21:32 4/29/97 -0800, Tim May wrote: >At 9:15 PM -0800 4/29/97, Jim Bell wrote: >>For example, I consider a major nuclear powers' possession of nukes to be >>one of the most serious examples of "nuclear terrorism" there is, but on the >>other hand I believe that an appropriate use of crypto (AP) could force any >>owners of nuclear weapons to dismantle them. Few people challenge this >>claim. If I'm right, crypto is a solution rather than a problem. Why not >>remind that journalist that her false impression is the real problem, not >>crypto. > >I believe you are incorrect that AP would force dismantling of nukes, for >reasons I am weary of repeating (you repeat your matra, I repeat mine), Well, you're entitled to be wrong! B^) I have always been willing to defend my assertion, and since it hasn't been discussed recently I think it's not too soon to rehash, as weary as you may be. Assuming AP works in particular, and crypto-anarchy works in general, both will work to reduce and minimize the "height" and size of government entities everywhere. Looked at from a cost/benefit standpoint, since nuclear weapons are generally of a certain minimum size and cost, they only "work" if the enemy is sufficiently numerous and segregated from the non-enemy populace to make attack with a large bomb effective. Reduce the size of the largest government unit, and it's harder to find a useful target, thus reducing the benefit of owning nukes. Also, if an AP system were available to an individual or group that previously owned nukes, it would be a far more economical (and specific) tool to defend itself from enemies of a certain limited size. (you can't nuke a terrorist cell, for instance, at least not without making far more enemies than you originally had.) At some point, nukes will become far "larger" a weapon than any owner can reasonably use, and at that point he will disassemble it due to sheer uselessness. (if you don't believe that the average size of the potential nuke-owners will get smaller, then you obviously don't believe in AP and/or crypto-anarchy!) AP dramatically increases the "cost" of owning nukes as well: If I were free to do so, I'd be happy to donate money to help force the few nuke-owners to dismantle their bombs. Assuming more than a small fraction of the population is sympathetic to this use of AP (and even if they generally would oppose other uses) this will work. Nukes won't be useful to "fight back" against AP and/or crypto-anarchy, and in fact threatening their use will do nothing except strength the argument in favor of the development and use of AP as an anti-nuke tool. Generally, in order to claim that a fully-functioning AP system WON'T dismantle all nukes, you've got to be able to postulate the kind of nuke-owning organization that could survive in a post-AP world, and further suggest what reason that organization would have to own them. > but >I agree that serious discussion of such game-theoretic issues is just too >scary, too extreme, too un-American for almost everyone. You'd be surprised. Since having had at least my second "15 minutes of fame" locally, I've had many discussions of the AP concept with average citizens. Admittedly, many of them were no more familiar with the cryptographic details than you might expect, so they pretty much accepted that part of the proposal as a given. However, every one of them seemed to accept the idea that if my system would do, generally, what it appears to do from first principles, the conclusion that it would shut down militaries and dismantle nukes follows directly. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Rejecting Dialog with Government Vermin
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:40 AM 4/30/97 -0500, Bradley Felton wrote: >What is needed is a "Bonsai" government, that is kept carefully pruned into >exactly the desired shape, and is never allowed to outgrow its pot. With >this analogy in mind, I would posit: > >4) Insufficient pruning mechanisms. The pruning mechanism was put in by the Founding Fathers in form of the Second Amendment. The problem was that the People decided they wanted to give up the pruning mechanism for some (perceived) temporary safety. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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Re: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison"
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 17:19 4/30/97 -0800, Tim May wrote: >(A copy of this message has also been posted to the following newsgroups: >alt.cypherpunks, talk.politics.crypto, comp.org.eff.talk) >CDT and other Washington insider groups are busily singing the praises of >the SAFE encryption bill, despite some acknowledged "minor flaws." > >Well, the flaws are not minor. The bill does not give Americans any rights >they do not already have, and does not ease export of strong crypto in any >meaningful way. In fact, the bill contains odd language implying it is >essentially only financial software which is easier to export, and then >only if the receiving country (huh?) allows it...since when is the duty of >U.S. Customs to pass products for export based on whether Baluchistan, for >example, wants the product? I agree with everything you've said, here. SAFE is truly awful if it attempts to make use of encryption illegal. Prosecuting the underlying crime, if a crime was done, should be considered more than enough. The thugs are afraid of getting whacked. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Welcome to RebaNet
by Registration＠Reba.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, and welcome to RebaNet! I hope you enjoy what we have put together for you on my web site. We've tried to make it fun and entertaining, as well as informative. RebaNet is filled with extras such as: chat, message boards, Reba Review, and you'll even have to opportunity to send me questions through Ask Reba. Isn't modern technology just amazing? I still find it hard to believe that I can write you a letter, hit send, and you have it waiting in your e-mail box just minutes later! From time to time, I will send you email messages. This is a great way for me to keep in touch and let you know what's going on with me. Love, Reba

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Problems with SAFE bill
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've received a few comments along the lines of "Why are you supporting the SAFE bill?" Here's my post to f-c about it from last week that might give some background. In short, I think this legislation is not good. -Declan (I sometimes forget to send f-c posts to cypherpunks, even when they're on-topic. If you want to join, subscription info is at the end.) ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 24 Apr 1997 18:17:09 -0400 From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: FC: Crypto moves forward: Commerce Dept panel and SAFE markup Encryption is again bubbling to the surface of Washington politics. Today the Department of Commerce announced that it was creating a new committee to advise it on crypto-issues. A department official told me it would be composed of "businesses that export encryption," and interested parties have 15 working days to file comments. A way for the White House to split industry opposition and persuade high tech firms to buy into key escrow? Hmm... On the Hill, crypto legislation that would lift export controls is about to advance farther than ever before. (Last fall, Sen. Exon killed any chance that pro-crypto legislation had in the 104th Congress.) Rep. Bob Goodlatte's crypto bill (SAFE) will move to subcommittee markup next Tuesday at 2 pm in Rayburn 2237. After the full committee reports the bill, it moves to the international relations committee. Sen. Conrad Burns also would like to move forward with his Pro-CODE bill in May. Problem is, Goodlatte's SAFE bill, which has about 70 cosponsors, does more than just relax export controls and prohibit mandatory key escrow. It also creates new criminal penalties for using encryption to further a criminal act. Now, some say that it's innocuous -- and a good tradeoff for getting export controls lifted -- but I'm not convinced. When encryption is widespread and present in telephones, radios, cell phones, wireless modems, web browsers, televisions, and maybe light switches, *any use* of any electronic appliance will involve encryption. (Who wants a hacker playing with your toaster?) Remember that Maryland bill that would criminalize sending "annoying" or "harassing" email? If the Goodlatte bill became law, Marylanders who signed their messages with PGP or telnetted to local ISPs could be slammed with an all-expenses-paid trip to the Federal pen for five years. In other words, SAFE would turn state misdemeanors into Federal felonies. This is not good. A coalition of groups is sending a letter to Goodlatte tomorrow supporting the bill but expressing concern over the criminalization provision. Interested in signing on? Email David Sobel: sobel(a)epic.org. -Declan ***************** Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act (Introduced in the House) `Sec. 2805. Unlawful use of encryption in furtherance of a criminal act `Any person who willfully uses encryption in furtherance of the commission of a criminal offense for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of competent jurisdiction-- `(1) in the case of a first offense under this section, shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both; and `(2) in the case of a second or subsequent offense under this section, shall be imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both.'. ***************** Federal Register, April 24, 1997: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE President's Export Council Subcommittee on Encryption; Notice of Establishment The Secretary of Commerce has determined that the establishment of the President's Export Council Subcommittee on Encryption is in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed on the Department by law. The Subcommittee will advise the Secretary, through the Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, on matters pertinent to the implementation of an encryption policy that will support the growth of commerce while protecting the public safety and national security. The Subcommittee will consist of approximately 25 members to be appointed by the Secretary to assure a balanced representation among the exporting community and those Government agencies with a mandate to implement policy regarding encryption. The Subcommittee will function solely as an advisory body. Interested persons are invited to submit comments regarding the establishment of the Subcommittee to Lee Ann Carpenter, Committee Liaison Officer, OAS/EA/BXA, U.S. Department of Commerce, MS: 3886C, Washington, D.C., 20230. Telephone: 202-482-2583. FAX: 202-501-8024. Dated: April 18, 1997. Sue E. Eckert, Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. [Thanks to JYA. --Declan] ------------------------- Time Inc. The Netly News Network Washington Correspondent http://netlynews.com/ -------------------------------------------------------------------------- This list is public. To join fight-censorship-announce, send "subscribe fight-censorship-announce" to majordomo(a)vorlon.mit.edu. More information is at http://www.eff.org/~declan/fc/

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Re: Eternity service proxies
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:41 AM 5/1/97 +0100, Adam Back wrote: > >[btw what do people think of the practice of putting To: cypherpunks, >and Bcc: coderpunks@toad, cryptography@c2 as I have done here? Works for me. [...] >My announce was rather hurried, and someone suggested to me the use of >a proxy as an architecture for interfacing to the eternity service >rather than the cgi based system I have. > >The person who suggested this to me also described some work on a >"universal proxy framework" which is designed to enable things like >"cookie-cutting, onion routing etc." Also it was suggested this is a >cheaper way to implement a proxy. [...] This is true for some value of cheaper. The proxy framework provides services to the proxylets. Therefore it is cheaper to write a proxylet than it is to write a proxy. However, the advantages of using a proxy framework to enable multiple local proxies are not limited to reducing the work effort of the proxylet author. The framework also would provide registration services, which are pretty much a requirement for dynamically loadable proxylets to exist on a machine without requiring user intervention. After all, the proxies have to operate in a certain order to be functional. This order would be hard to achieve without the proxies knowing about each other. And since the proxies almost by definition have no idea what is happening on the other side of that socket (or however you want to implement the proxy-to-proxy interface), somebody needs to watch over them to make sure they get used in the right sequence. To give an example of a machine with a moderate number of client side proxies, you might have 1. A DNS resolver proxy that intercepts the *.eternity TLD's. 2. The actual Eternity proxy that builds the NNTP requests. 3. A crypto proxy that encrypts the NNTP requests between the localhost and a suitable NNTP server. 4. An Onion Router/Pipe-net/jondo proxy that allows for anonymous access of the NNTP server. And that's just for the Eternity service. Add to this a POP/SMTP proxy that automatically encrypts/decrypts all mail, an https proxy that beefs up 40 bit SSL to 128 bits, a proxy that provides for on the fly decryption of webpages that are _stored_ encrypted, and before you know it you have ten proxies on a machine that all have to be used in a specific order. Ten proxies that have no way of knowing about each other. A proxy framework soon becomes a requirement. >My ideal interface would have been a web proxy, as this allows the >user to transparently integrate this into their browser. You may be >able to set your browser to use the proxy to handle *.eternity, and >have the rest go direct, but I'm not so sure on this point. Sure. The user should never have to use special tools to access information. That's the beauty of using proxies. You use a standard browser as front end. All the rest is taken care of transparently by the proxies. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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Privacy news: Oakland Cameras, Levi employee files, FileGate
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It's been a busy day for privacy issues in the Oakland Trib. Surveillance Cameras in Oakland ------------------------------- Bay Alarm is trying to sell the City Council a $500K-$1.5M closed-circuit TV system for watching people in public places. The three picknickers didn't litter, but the camera mounted on the public library building could zoom in enough to that the council could tell a ham sandwich from roast beef, and whether the two joggers were wearing Nikes or Reeboks. "Anybody who is a law-abiding citizen is not going to be concerned about this.. "When I'm out in a public place.... I don't have an expectation of privacy" said Councilcritter Nate Miley (East Oakland/Elmhurst), who wants a test run in his district, where residents have bars on their windows and are afraid to go out at night. Police Chief Joseph Samuels likes it too. "This is technology spying on our citizens from camera on light poles" said John Crew of the ACLU police practices project, speaking against it. Bay Alarm said that some British cities have dealt with privacy fears by setting up monitoring centers away from city and police offices, where tapes are kept in case a crime occurs -- crime victims can call up the police and ask them to play back tapes, said Mark Demier of Bay Alarm. The camera systems are also capable of taking pictures in the dark. Personnel Data Theft Plaguing U.S. Firms --------------------------------------- Levi Strauss & Co. recently had a disk drive stolen from an office computer. It had background information on over 20,000 current and former employees, including names, addresses, SSNs, birthdates, and bank account numbers. It appeared to be just a crude theft of the $500 hardware, rather than somebody trying to steal the information itself, and is "not likely" to be used fraudulently because it's "written in a language difficult to decode", but the affected employees have been notified. Dave Banisar of EPIC is one of the various experts quoted. Insiders Chip In for FileGate Fall Guy Defense ---------------------------------------------- Remember FileGate, with the White House accessing confidential background files of hundreds of Republican Administration workers? Remember Craig Livingstone, White House staffer who resigned after it was revealed that his office was responsible for it? Well, he was never charged with anything, but he had about $9550 in legal expenses to advise him when he talked to Congress, and apparently 55 of his good friends decided to help him out. Hillary Clinton's chief of staff gave $50, Bill Clinton's golf partner Vernon Jordan gave $250, D.C.City Council member Charlene Davis gave $100, and overall it averaged out to about $200 per insider. Petty cash, perhaps, but it goes to show you the Clinton Administration's attitudes toward violation of privacy and abuse of power. Needless to say, the Associated Press story was a bit more balanced in tone than my summary here :-) ---- And in other news, San Leandro High School students, mostly the drama club, led a protest against against a proposed school board policy that would ban profanity, obscenity, libel, or slanderous speech in school-produced publications and productions. (Out, Out, <censored> spot!) "We want to be able to have the plays we've had in the past", said Sean Givens. "We're not doing profanity, we're doing ideas." Last year the drama department canceled a production of "The Breakfast Club", though it was allowed to go on with modified language. And Mike Royko died. The world will be a quieter place without him. He'll be missed. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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Eternity service proxies
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[btw what do people think of the practice of putting To: cypherpunks, and Bcc: coderpunks@toad, cryptography@c2 as I have done here? I do this for stuff when I'm interested in comments of people who are on cryptography but not cypherpunks, similarly for coderpunks to avoid the non-crossposting issue with coderpunks, and avoid extra moderation work for Perry with cryptography. I know you get multiple copies if you're on all lists, how else does one reach you all? Myself I have a procmail recipie which junks multiple copies, like: :0 Wh: msgid.lock | formail -D 128000 msgid.cache ] My announce was rather hurried, and someone suggested to me the use of a proxy as an architecture for interfacing to the eternity service rather than the cgi based system I have. The person who suggested this to me also described some work on a "universal proxy framework" which is designed to enable things like "cookie-cutting, onion routing etc." Also it was suggested this is a cheaper way to implement a proxy. Here are some comments on possible architectures for an eternity service. There are a number of places where one might put a eternity server: - cgi script on your ISP for yourself and others to use - cgi script and local web server on your dial up linux box - standalone eternity proxy running on an ISP - local proxy - proxy framework module (local or remote? does it support both) - apache module "eternity proxy module" - browser plugin (if this has the power to do it) My ideal interface would have been a web proxy, as this allows the user to transparently integrate this into their browser. You may be able to set your browser to use the proxy to handle *.eternity, and have the rest go direct, but I'm not so sure on this point. Regardless, the proxy can forward requests as cacheing proxies do for documents not in *.eternity. My first consideration was to get a proof of concept going as quickly as possible. What you are looking at is a weekend hack + 3 days debugging and cleaning up. Proxies have higher user requirements to set up, you need root, or at least ability to leave processes running indefinately, and some mechanism to restart them on reboot (or do it manually). My cgi-bin implementation allows you to run with cgi access, and cron, or at a pinch to do without cron even. Local proxies have higher development costs, in that it involves windows code to be of use for the majority of users, which has much higher development cost. The universal proxy framework (which I am not familiar with) would allow a local proxy to be implemented more easily if I understand correctly. Local handling of at least the last layer of decryption would help from a security point of view. Or the local proxy could be a full eternity server for your own use. The ones I've made possible with my cgi based implementation are the first two, I chose them over proxies simply because they are the easiest to implement first. Basically what I have implemented is a poor mans remote proxy or (with a local webserver) a poor unix person's local proxy. You give it URLs of the form: http://www.foo.com/cgi-bin/eternity?url=http://blah.eternity/blah/ The cgi script modifies on the fly URLs in documents (if they are type text/html) and involve *.eternity to have prefix: cgi-bin/eternity?url= Well actually it copes with local, and site relative urls also (where site is the eternity virtual site). Normal URLs are left as is. Proxy is the more elegant way to do it as you don't have to re-write urls on the fly. There are advantages to running the server (proxy or otherwise) on an ISP rather than locally: - if you're using the cgi solution and an SSL web server you get SSL encryption on the link. This way people don't get to see your requests, if they are handled locally by your ISP from it's news spool. - it has lower bandwidth requirements which may be an advantage, as you don't have to down load all the eternity documents, only the ones you want to read as you browse them - if the eternity server is running on your ISP and the ISP has a local newspool people outside the ISP can not see your requests go to the NNTP server to see which articles you are reading. There are some advantages to local proxies: - you don't rely on the ISP or the eternity service operator not to log exdirectory URLs, and not to log your accesses. (However note that your ISP can observe your use of the NNTP server, unless you protect against this by saving all eternity web pages locally, so that you never have to do a NNTP lookup per article). - if you are accessing URLs which are private (encrypted with a password inside the final layer) you don't need to give this password to the server to get it to decrypt for you. (You don't need to with the remote proxy, but you get back a PGP message which you then have to manually decrypt, unless you can figure out a browser plugin to automatically decrypt PGP documents on the fly as they are read). A local proxy used in combination with remote proxy or cgi-proxy would allow another architecture. Your local proxy obtains it's article hash -> message-id/newsgroup/article-number database from a real remote eternity proxy which is watching news as it comes in. Then it can fetch the articles itself with lower overhead. Another architecture (moving more towards Anderson's meaning of an eternity service) is the idea of forwarding requests between eternity servers. In this way the eternity servers would be "remailing" your requests. If your entry point into the eternity service network was via an SSL protected link, and the links between the eternity servers were encrypted, the eternity servers as a whole would disguise who was accessing what. You could allow proxying of normal web pages too, and create a distributed version of anonymizer.com as a side effect. Adam -- Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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PGPSteps
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've done a semi-major update of "PGPSteps" and included key revokation in the set-up part. Also various URL's were added/corrected/updated. I've tried to include Windows 95 references as well (where applicable). By now I consider "PGPSteps" "complete" in terms of the installing procedure. I hope, it's still simple and easy, although it's a couple page longer now. If you have any comments, corrections etc., please let me know. Ciao Harka PS: Dave, please update it on the Web page. Thanks :) -- /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE ...more info at */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! -> http://www.epic.org */ /* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- PGPSteps -------- Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Installation - Step by Step by Harka <harka(at)nycmetro.com> last updated: 05/01/1997 "PGPSteps" (c) may be distributed freely without charge, left unchanged and the intact signature. The latest version is available by sending an e-mail to harka(at)nycmetro.com with the subject: SEND PGPSTEPS (finger for update info). See also http://bureau42.base.org/public/pgpsteps.txt for a recent version. Note: This document is intended for first-time PGP users. It is meant as a short step-by-step reference guide for the installation of PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), versions 2.6.2 and 2.6.3i, on an IBM compatible computer running DOS/Windows. However, it is _not_ meant to replace the PGP-documentation in any way. As a matter of fact, it is highly recommended to read at least pgpdoc1.txt (included in the PGP-distribution) _before_ actually installing the program. Much more additional info not covered here you'll also find in the various comprehensive FAQ's (see FURTHER INFORMATION at the end). Portions from the PGP documentation have been used herein. Thanks to Philip Zimmermann, Perry Metzger, Colin Plumb, Derek Atkins, Jeffrey I. Schiller, all of the Cypherpunks list and others. It might be useful to print this document out as a reference. ==================================================================== So you feel like having some more privacy by using PGP? Wise decision! Congratulations :) All install steps in short -------------------------- --download the respective PGP version --create C:\PGP directory --copy the downloaded zip into C:\PGP --unzip pgp262.zip (pgp263i.zip) into the C:\PGP directory --unzip second archive pgp262i.zip (pgp263ii.zip) into the C:\PGP directory, recreating the directories by using pkunzip's -d option --edit autoexec.bat, adding the lines SET PGPPATH=C:\PGP SET PATH=C:\PGP;%PATH% and SET TZ= (see below). --save autoexec.bat and reboot --create key pair with pgp -kg --sign key with pgp -ks yourID -u yourID (only version 2.6.2) --add keys from keys.asc to your public keyring with pgp -ka keys.asc --verify integrity of PGP distribution archive with pgp pgp262i.asc pgp262i.zip (pgp pgp263ii.asc pgp263ii.zip) --copy keys and the downloaded zip-file to floppy as a backup --create Key Revokation Certificate with pgp -kd yourID --extract revoked key with pgp -kxa yourID revoke into a file called revoke.asc --copy revoke.asc to the backup disk --copy secring.pgp and pubring.pgp from backup disk back into the C:\PGP directory, overwriting the revoked keys --write-protect backup disk and keep in a safe location --add public key to a key server (optional) --have fun (it all sounds more complicated than it is...promised :)) Getting PGP ----------- The latest official US-version is PGP 2.6.2 (freeware). If you are a citizen of the United States, you can download pgp262.zip from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) at http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp.html The latest international version is 2.6.3ia (freeware). If you live in any other country than the US, you can download pgp263i.zip from the International PGP-Homepage at http://www.ifi.uio.no/pgp/ The reason for two separate versions are patent law issues. If you use the international version in the US (or vice versa) you might be in violation of these patent laws. Both versions are, however, essentially the same thing. Therefore download and use the one, that applies to you. Having downloaded PGP, create a C:\PGP directory. In DOS you can use MD PGP from the C:\ prompt and in Windows 3.1 you can use the File Manager. Here go to the FILE menu and CREATE DIRECTORY (in Windows 95: EXPLORER/select MAIN FOLDER (c:)/FILE/NEW/FOLDER, name the new folder PGP). Copy the downloaded pgp262.zip (or international pgp263i.zip) into your new C:\PGP directory. You might want to copy pkunzip.exe into your PGP directory as well - makes things easier :). (You will need PKUNZIP version 2.04g or later to uncompress and split the PGP262.ZIP archive file into individual files. PKUNZIP is shareware and is widely available on MSDOS machines. A Windows-version called WINZIP is available as well. More details if necessary you'll find in the PGP documentation in a file called setup.doc.) Unzip the archive in the C:\PGP directory with: pkunzip pgp262.zip or pkunzip pgp263i.zip Now you'll find a second zip file pgp262i.zip (pgp263ii.zip) in your PGP directory, plus a corresponding file pgp262i.asc (pgp263ii.asc). The .asc (ASCII)-file is the signature, that let's you verify the integrity of the archive (after you've installed PGP). Unzip pgp262i.zip (pgp263ii.zip) with: pkunzip pgp262i.zip -d or pkunzip pgp263ii.zip -d Remember to recreate the directories by using pkunzips -d option! (You should now have a subdirectory within C:\PGP called DOC, i.e. C:\PGP\DOC. As you might have guessed already, that contains the PGP documentation :)). Setting the Environment ----------------------- Next, you can set an MSDOS "environment variable" to let PGP know where to find its special files. Use your favorite text editor to add the following lines to your AUTOEXEC.BAT file (usually on your C: drive): SET PGPPATH=C:\PGP SET PATH=C:\PGP;%PATH% In DOS you can use EDIT by typing EDIT C:\AUTOEXEC.BAT . You'll probably already have a couple of SET lines, just put the one's for PGP in there somewhere. In WINDOWS 3.1 you can go to Program Manager (the main screen) and go to the menu FILE, RUN and type SYSEDIT (in Windows 95 use START/RUN/SYSEDIT). This will open several files, including the AUTOEXEC.BAT. Go to that window and include the SET lines from above. Substitute your own directory name if different from "C:\PGP". While you're editing the AUTOEXEC.BAT, include the TZ variable as well. The TZ (Time-Zone)-variable tells MSDOS what time zone you are in, which helps PGP create GMT timestamps for its keys and signatures. If you properly define TZ in AUTOEXEC.BAT, then MSDOS gives you good GMT timestamps, and will handle daylight savings time adjustments for you. Here are some sample lines to insert into AUTOEXEC.BAT (see above on how to), depending on your time zone: For Los Angeles: SET TZ=PST8PDT For Denver: SET TZ=MST7MDT For Arizona: SET TZ=MST7 (Arizona never uses daylight savings time) For Chicago: SET TZ=CST6CDT For New York: SET TZ=EST5EDT For London: SET TZ=GMT0BST For Amsterdam: SET TZ=MET-1DST For Moscow: SET TZ=MSK-3MSD For Aukland: SET TZ=NZT-13 Your AUTOEXEC.BAT should now look similar to this example: @ECHO OFF C:\MCAFEE\VSHIELD /anyaccess /xmsdata /only a: PROMPT $P$G PATH=C:\NC;C:\DOS;C:\;C:\NC\WINSOCK;C:\WINDOWS;C:\MCAFEE SET PGPPATH=C:\PGP SET PATH=C:\PGP;%PATH% SET TZ=EST5EDT SET MIXPATH=C:\NC\PI SET TEMP=C:\TRASH SET WINPMT=[WINDOWS] $P$G SET BLASTER=A220 I5 D1 T4 SET GALAXY=A220 I5 D1 K10 P530 T6 C:\DOS\SMARTDRV.EXE 1024 512 /X C:\MCAFEE\VSHIELD /reconnect win : If it does, EXCELLENT! Now save it and reboot your system to run AUTOEXEC.BAT, which will set up PGPPATH and TZ for you. Generating Your First Key ------------------------- Being new to PGP, it might be a good idea to create a test key first, so that you can play around with it and even pretend to send messages back and forth. That will give you some feeling on how it works (and also take some of the fear away :)). But note, that this is for _testing_ purposes only, it's not your actual key yet! I recommend to play around in DOS using the command lines, so when you use one of the many shells and front-ends available later on, you'll know what's going on "behind the scenes". To generate your test key, go to DOS and type: pgp -kg Since this will be a test key only, choose the smallest key size (1), make your keyID Test Key <test(a)test.com> and the pass phrase TEST. Then generate the key. Now you'll find two new files in your C:\PGP directory: secring.pgp (your secret keyring) and pubring.pgp (your public keyring). Basically you're ready to play now. You might want to start by signing your own public key (Note: the international version 2.6.3i already does that automatically for you during key generation) by typing: pgp -ks test -u test ("test" being the ID for the key, that you sign and the second "test" the ID, that will be used to sign with. Since you sign your own key, both ID's are the same. Later on with your real key, however, the ID "test" will be replaced by your actual name and the key to be signed will very likely be somebody else's). You could also add the public keys from C:\PGP\keys.asc to your public keyring with: pgp -ka keys.asc After having added the keys, you now can also verify the integrity of the PGP archive (good idea!) by typing: pgp pgp262i.asc pgp262i.zip or pgp pgp263ii.asc pgp263ii.zip PGP should tell you that it has a Good Signature from: Jeffrey I. Schiller <jis(at)mit.edu> It will also tell you that it doesn't "trust" the (jis(at)mit.edu) key. This is because PGP does not *know* that the enclosed key really belongs to Jeffrey. Don't worry about this now. Read the section "How to Protect Public Keys from Tampering" in Volume 1 of the PGP manual. (If you get a Good Signature, you could now actually delete pgp262i.zip & pgp262i.asc or pgp263ii.zip & pgp263ii.asc to save some space. But keep the original archive that you downloaded around.) Or you can take some document and sign it clear-text with pgp -sta filename and then verify it by typing pgp filename.asc Or you can encrypt files, sign them, wipe them, extract keys, check fingerprints or, or, or... At the end of this document you'll find a very helpful command line summary with enough options to play with. And, of course, read the actual PGP documentation before you move on to the next step!! Getting set up for real ----------------------- Alright, you've played around with PGP, might have generated several keys, sent messages "back and forth", read the documentation and maybe the FAQ's, and generally you feel pretty comfortable with it. Of course, you actually want to now use PGP in the "real world". :) Since you've edited the autoexec.bat, have set up the PGP directory etc. already during the test run, all you actually have to do to get back to "ground zero" is delete the files C:\PGP\SECRING.PGP, C:\PGP\SECRING.BAK (if there), C:\PGP\PUBRING.PGP and C:\PGP\PUBRING.BAK (if there). Now generate your actual key with: pgp -kg This time choose at least "military grade" (option 3, 1024 bits) for your key size. Note, that both 2.6.2 and 2.6.3i support up to 2048 bit keys. If you want the maximum key size, you'll have to actually type 2048, instead of simply choosing 1, 2 or 3. For the key ID use the generally used format of: firstname lastname <handle(a)domain.name> example: John Doe <jdoe(a)whatever.com> (including the < >). Now choose a _strong_ and _long_ passphrase. At least 20 different characters are recommended. Try to avoid simple words but include as many different (random) characters as possible. Example: Passphrase "Thomas" is really not a good one, especially if that's your name. "Thomas is wandering over the Red Square" is better already, but wouldn't stand long either to a dictionary attack. "Th0m@$iswaN-Der1ngOVE/RtH%r&dS\QA~<" would therefore be a much better choice. Use your imagination and remember: long, unguessable and many different characters! (see also the Passphrase FAQ and the Diceware Homepage in FURTHER INFORMATION on how to get a good passphrase) _Never_ write your passphrase down, don't tell it to anybody (not even to your boy/girlfriend, husband, mother or whomever!) and never let anybody look over your shoulder, when you type it in!! Now finish generating the key. Btw., when it comes to "type some random text", don't hit the same key over and over again :). Type your favorite poem or an article from the newspaper until it beeps. Sign your own key again with pgp -ks yourID -u yourID (only 2.6.2.) and then make backup copies of the keys and the original pgp zip-archive (that you downloaded) to a floppy disk. While you're at it, extract your public key with pgp -kxa yourID yourID and copy yourID.asc to the disk as well. Keep this file on your hard drive too; you'll probably need it quite often to cut & paste your public key from into e-mail. Next create a Key Revokation Certificate. This will be used in case you either somehow loose your secret key completely or if somebody has gotten a copy of your secret key and you have reason to believe, that they got (or will get) your passphrase too. Obviously something you want to avoid at all costs! A Key Revokation Certificate is basically your public key with a stamp "REVOKED" on it. This you can send to people (or a key server) if your secret key ever gets compromised. It will essentially tell their PGP: DON'T USE yourID's KEY EVER AGAIN 'CAUSE IT'S COMPROMISED! (see also PGP-documentation). Before you create your Revokation Certificate, make sure that you have made backup copies of your keys (secring.pgp and pubring.pgp) to the floppy-disk. You will need them! To revoke your key type: pgp -kd yourID You'll have to type in your passphrase and then your key get's revoked. If you check with pgp -kc yourID , you'll see, what it looks like. Next extract your (now revoked) key with: pgp -kxa yourID revoke into a file called revoke.asc. This is the file, that you'll send to people in case your secret key get's compromised. Copy the Key Revokation Certificate (revoke.asc) to the floppy-disk with your backup-keys. Now all you actually have to do to get your keys from "REVOKED" back to "normal" is to copy the backups (secring.pgp and pubring.pgp) from the floppy-disk back into your C:\PGP directory. Overwrite the existing (revoked) keys with the backups. If you now check with pgp -kc yourID, you should see your regular public key again (no "REVOKED" anymore). On your backup disk you should now have at least the following files: pgp262.zip -the original PGP-distribution archive (or pgp263i.zip) secring.pgp -your secret keyring pubring.pgp -your public keyring yourID.asc -your normal public key revoke.asc -your revoked public key (Revokation Certificate) autoexec.bat -(optional) Write-protect the disk and keep it in a safe place, where _nobody_ but you has access to it. That's almost it for installing PGP... As an optional step, you might want to make your public key generally available by sending it to a public key server. See http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html for an easy Web-form, where you can submit your own key or get the public keys from others (works also via e-mail). Check http://www.pgp.net/pgpnet/www-key.html for other WWW-key servers. You're finished with the setup now and ready to roll!! (Was pretty easy, huh? :)) Most common mistakes in the beginning ------------------------------------- 1. Sending your secring.pgp and/or your passphrase to somebody else. DON'T!! You don't need to share any of this with public key cryptography (see PGP documentation for more details). All that people need to encrypt mail to you or check your signature is your _public_ key. 2. Sending the entire file pubring.pgp to somebody else. No need to either. Extract only your _own_ key with pgp -kxa yourID filename into a file. This file you can now send either as attachment or simply cut & paste the key into your e-mail window and send it as regular e-mail (the same applies to the Revokation Certificate in revoke.asc; in case you ever need it). 3. Writing down your passphrase. As strange as it may seem, but despite all warnings a lot of people still do that. DON'T! EVER! Besides, after using PGP on a daily basis, you really should not forget your passphrase anymore anyway. 4. Not keeping physical control of secring.pgp Don't let _anybody_ get a copy of your secret keyring. Because the only thing, that will stand from there between them and all your e-mail is your passphrase. And if it's a weak one (that they can crack or guess) or they even know it (see "Writing down your passphrase"), then it's over with security and privacy. And that would be very unfortunate indeed. The same applies to the floppy disks with the backups. As a common tag line on the Internet goes: "My public key you can get with the subject: Send public key. My secret key you can pry out of my cold, dead fingers!!" 5. Not being careful with plain-text(s) PGP only protects messages and files as long as they are encrypted. If you save the de-crypted text(s) to your hard drive or even print them out and leave them laying around on your desk, then PGP can't help you anymore either, if somebody finds it. So either delete the files (wipe them with pgp -w filename) or encrypt them to yourself or encrypt them conventionally (pgp -c filename), if you need to keep them. 6. Not reading the PGP documentation at least once no comment, except RTFM! Front Ends and Plug-In's ------------------------ Of course, most of us get pretty tired after a while doing everything manually via command lines. That's where so called front-ends come in. These are additional programs, that make things like PGP much easier to use. There are literally tons of them out there (check http://www.ifi.uio.no/pgp/utils.shtml) for some of them. Personally I recommend the following three: ** AutoPGP ** by Stale Schumacher <staalesc(at)ifi.uio.no>, the same guy, who also wrote the international PGP version 2.6.3i. (Shareware; registration fee is 15$) This is a DOS program designed to work together with QWK/SOUP-standard offline mail readers, such as OLX, Blue Wave, 1st Reader etc.. It makes sending/receiving PGP messages really, really easy, especially if you have lots of them. check http://www.ifi.uio.no/~staalesc/AutoPGP/ to download it. ** Private Idaho ** by Joel McNamara <joelm(at)eskimo.com> (Freeware) A Windows front-end not only for PGP, but also for anonymous remailers and NYM-servers. Nice and easy to use interface, and it works together with most popular mail programs. If you have a SLIP or PPP connection, you can even send/receive PGP messages right from Private Idaho itself. If not, you can "port" messages from the PI window into your regular mail program (Netscape Mail, for example) with the click of a button. If that doesn't work, you can still write your messages in Private Idaho, encrypt/sign them and then cut & paste it into your normal e-mail program (and vice versa, of course). It also comes with a PGP Quickstart file for Windows, in case you really don't feel comfortable setting up PGP in plain DOS. But why would you, since you're reading this...:) check http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/ to download it. ** PGPMail ** by Pretty Good Privacy Inc. (29,95 $ for US users, who have PGP 2.6.2 already installed) Contact: <pgpservice(at)pgp.com> - From the masters themselves a full-featured plug-in for the Windows 95/NT versions of Eudora 3.0 and Netscape Mail. You actually don't even need to have the freeware PGP version installed. All you'd need is PGPMail 4.5 (pgpmail45.exe). However, the price given above is a special discount given to PGP 2.6.2 freeware users (see web page for details). PGPMail 4.5 makes PGP-encryption not only easy, but fast as well. During installation it will add a few buttons to your Eudora window, which means, that you never have to leave Eudora (or Netscape) to encrypt/decrypt/sign etc.. Highly recommended, for newcomers and seasoned PGP-users alike. check http://www.pgp.com/products/PGPmail.cgi to download it (US-citizens only). PGPMail is export-controlled software. Therefore a URL outside the US can not be provided here. If you live outside the US and you use Windows 95/NT, you might want to check the windows95 directory at: ftp://ftp.replay.com/pub/replay/pub/pgp/pc/ for any other front-ends and/or plug-in's available. Here's a quick summary of PGP v2.6x commands -------------------------------------------- To encrypt a plaintext file with the recipient's public key: pgp -e textfile her_userid To sign a plaintext file with your secret key: pgp -s textfile [-u your_userid] To sign a plaintext file with your secret key and have the output readable to people without running PGP first: pgp -sta textfile [-u your_userid] To sign a plaintext file with your secret key, and then encrypt it with the recipient's public key: pgp -es textfile her_userid [-u your_userid] To encrypt a plaintext file with just conventional cryptography, type: pgp -c textfile To decrypt an encrypted file, or to check the signature integrity of a signed file: pgp ciphertextfile [-o plaintextfile] To encrypt a message for any number of multiple recipients: pgp -e textfile userid1 userid2 userid3 - --- Key management commands: To generate your own unique public/secret key pair: pgp -kg To add a public or secret key file's contents to your public or secret key ring: pgp -ka keyfile [keyring] To extract (copy) a key from your public or secret key ring: pgp -kx userid keyfile [keyring] or: pgp -kxa userid keyfile [keyring] To view the contents of your public key ring: pgp -kv[v] [userid] [keyring] To view the keys in the keyring with the signatures: pgp -kvv [userid] [keyring] To view the "fingerprint" of a public key, to help verify it over the telephone with its owner: pgp -kvc [userid] [keyring] To view the contents and check the certifying signatures of your public key ring: pgp -kc [userid] [keyring] To edit the userid or pass phrase for your secret key: pgp -ke userid [keyring] To edit the trust parameters for a public key: pgp -ke userid [keyring] To remove a key or just a userid from your public key ring: pgp -kr userid [keyring] To sign and certify someone else's public key on your public key ring: pgp -ks her_userid [-u your_userid] [keyring] To remove selected signatures from a userid on a keyring: pgp -krs userid [keyring] To permanently revoke your own key, issuing a key compromise certificate: pgp -kd your_userid To disable or reenable a public key on your own public key ring: pgp -kd userid - --- Esoteric commands: To decrypt a message and leave the signature on it intact: pgp -d ciphertextfile To create a signature certificate that is detached from the document: pgp -sb textfile [-u your_userid] To detach a signature certificate from a signed message: pgp -b ciphertextfile - --- Command options that can be used in combination with other command options (sometimes even spelling interesting words!): To produce a ciphertext file in Ascii radix-64 format, just add the - -a option when encrypting or signing a message or extracting a key: pgp -sea textfile her_userid or: pgp -kxa userid keyfile [keyring] To wipe out the plaintext file after producing the ciphertext file, just add the -w (wipe) option when encrypting or signing a message: pgp -sew message.txt her_userid To specify that a plaintext file contains ASCII text, not binary, and should be converted to recipient's local text line conventions, add the -t (text) option to other options: pgp -seat message.txt her_userid To view the decrypted plaintext output on your screen (like the Unix-style "more" command), without writing it to a file, use the -m (more) option while decrypting: pgp -m ciphertextfile To specify that the recipient's decrypted plaintext will be shown ONLY on her screen and cannot be saved to disk, add the -m option: pgp -steam message.txt her_userid To recover the original plaintext filename while decrypting, add the -p option: pgp -p ciphertextfile To use a Unix-style filter mode, reading from standard input and writing to standard output, add the -f option: pgp -feast her_userid outputfile Further Information ------------------- All of the following FAQ's and sites have much more additional information not covered here, URL's, book references, ftp-sites etc.. Check 'em out... Where to get the latest PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) FAQ; by Peter Herngaard <pethern(at)datashopper.dk>: ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/getpgp.asc The Beginners Guide to Pretty Good Privacy; by Bill Morton <wjmorton(at)nbnet.nb.ca>: http://www.clark.net/pub/rothman/pgpbg11.asc The comp.security.pgp FAQ (the "official" PGP FAQ): http://www.pgp.net/pgpnet/pgp-faq/ The International PGP FAQ (for version 2.6.3i); by Stale Schumacher <staalesc(at)ifi.uio.no>: http://www.ifi.uio.no/pgp/FAQ.shtml or via email with (empty) message to <pgp(at)hypnotech.com>; subject: GET FAQ The Passphrase FAQ; by Randall T. Williams <ac387(at)yfu.ysu.edu>: http://www.stack.nl/~galactus/remailers/passphrase-faq.html The Diceware Passphrase Home Page http://world.std.com/~reinhold/diceware.page.html Pointers to other Cryptographic Software http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh/crypto/software.html Usenet: alt.security.pgp Want to know more about Privacy and Civil Liberties issues? ----------------------------------------------------------- check out these organizations and web sites: ** Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) ** http://www.epic.org/ ** Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) ** http://www.eff.org/ ** Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) ** http://www.cdt.org/ ** The Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW) ** http://www.vtw.org/ ** American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) ** http://www.aclu.org/ ** Encryption Policy Resource Page ** http://www.crypto.com/ ** Democracy Net ** http://www.democracy.net/ ** Privacy International ** http://www.privacy.org/pi/ ** Amnesty International (AI) ** (general human rights) http://www.amnesty.org/ ==================================================================== May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve and may all living beings find the way to happiness... harka(at)nycmetro.com Finger or e-mail for public key [KeyID: 04174301] Fingerprint: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBM2hsfzltEBIEF0MBAQG4Gwf/W24G2sxwqVzeSIO5BBKpyWd03G1xH6Jz qhkgOWfSRJ1V+2pwCXP4TAtb+ldgjB2jxtx5rv5XGC/2KWaUgjM0mhN8OAZXPb6R Nu/WKyzt5GJTN9SDe12xVC/jtBPQuTQPENFp07tx4e2KU3PlOrn/vpvHRzFk/Dfb Ck2LBw61uEyaSP2ZFdUM2exK6lioDBaUKmSW+zJWcfFfnlgaUPQRuWCmQFJidD71 u4tHO0y5VHg4G/3yXi1vuw4iUcjFcCqyqnGCAIyFmagi281xZsUI9ZgJx6Lu82c7 tD/OwOAojFbamUK1d9ISqFA8InnT+L4kpn046FaSgrrhl4njuRcOBg== =7vIU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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