- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Remailer Reply Blocks
by Matthew J Ghio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

from finger remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu: >This feature currently uses the DES cypher, which is considered non-secure. >Not only that, but this system greatly facilitates a chosen plaintext >attack, which is a strong attack. This is not a cryptographically optimal >system in this respect. In other words, a determined adversary with >suffecient resources could probably decrypt the response block, and thus >break your anonymity, fairly easily. I will soon switch from DES to IDEA, >which is thought to be a more secure cypher... Which is why my remailer uses 3DES and adds random padding to the address before encrypting it. Random padding will thwart many chosen plaintext attacks, especially if you do some transpositions prior to encrypting it. Since the text to encrypt is so small, doing five or ten consecutive DES encryptions with different keys would not use up much CPU time, but could dramatically increase security. Also I compress the address slightly by stripping off the high bits so that 8 bytes fit into 7. Just a few suggestions to keep in mind... Overall, looks pretty good. BTW, what's the number that it prepends to your email address when you get a reply?

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RE: cypherpunks and politics (Re: USWA)
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Jamie Lawrence The point is that even if you think anyone with a viewpoint opposing yours is automatically stupid and not worth your time (and I don't think that too many of you are that bad off ;), aren't they at least worth using to further something you believe strongly in? It might do well to be careful in alienating potential allys by flip political jokes and comments. ......................................................... >From a cartoon in the Wall Street Journal a couple of days ago: A couple are sitting on a park bench, and she says to him: "I'm sorry, Bernie, but my financial planner says you're a non-performing asset and should be dumped!" Blanc

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Re: PGP encryption
by snyderra＠dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:59 PM 4/14/94 -0400, marssaxman(a)aol.com wrote: >Are there any shareware/freeware/PD PGP-like encryption systems for the >Macintosh? Or is there a Mac version of PGP and I just haven't heard about >it? > >-Mars There's RIPEM Mac, which I heartly endorse. Does RIPEM and PEM messages (can pull your AOCE signer from System 7 Pro as a Unaffiliated User certificate), and does it quite well. I have a set of AppleScripts I use to link it up with Eudora, my mail program. I can send it to anyone who wants it, if they provide a statement of their citizenship (US or Canada) and their agreement not to violate the export or RSAREF license agreeements. Also available from ripem.msu.edu, although you'll have to mail the ftp site's maintainer the same info I need. MacPGP also exists, but isn't as friendly to use, and is generally available where the standard PGP is located. Bob -- Bob Snyder N2KGO MIME, RIPEM mail accepted snyderra(a)dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu finger for RIPEM public key When cryptography is outlawed, bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl.

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:11 PM 11/7/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 5:16 PM -0800 11/7/96, Peter Hendrickson wrote: > >> While the term "police state" is not well defined, I do not believe it >> applies to what I am describing. (There is a risk that it could develop, >> however.) >> Laws forbidding the use of cryptography have ominous free speech >> implications as we would be attempting to outlaw concealed meaning. >> Concealed meaning can be pretty well concealed and that makes >> for difficult and dangerous legal questions. > If the only means of detection is raiding homes to inspect them for > contraband--something not even done during the height of the anti-drug > hysteria, at least not on a regular basis--then I stand by my comment that > stopping private use of cryptography requires a police state such as the > world has not yet seen. Perhaps initially, during the state of emergency declared by our heroic and courageous President, some unfortunate abuses of authority may occur. But, after the first 90% of the terrorists are incarcerated, we will have the luxury of returning to an orderly legal system replete with search warrants. Keep in mind that the drug laws face a large number of dedicated opponents who will go to great trouble to evade the laws. I suspect that these people are in the majority, although I don't know for sure. I find it hard to believe that any sizeable number of people would find the Four Horsemen scenario tolerable. >> On the other hand, the action of running a program which uses forbidden >> crypto systems is pretty unambiguous and could be effectively isolated >> from other kinds of speech. > Oh? How? If the output of such a program looks like quantization or Johnson > noise in a recording, then how could this form of "speech" be effectively > isolated? Sorry, I wasn't very clear. What I mean is that once you've been caught red handed with a stego program, the game is up. That is, I think it is possible to get ideas of who is operating illegally from interceptions. (I may well be wrong.) But, the actual evidence is easily collected off your computer. A program which performs encryption or stego is not very ambiguous about what it is doing. >> Many kinds of speech are already illegal. For instance, I am not allowed >> to copy somebody else's speech because it would violate copyright laws. >> I am not allowed to break verbal contracts. In essence, I am punished >> later for the something I said if I am forced to keep my word. But, >> this does not constitute a police state. > Careful! Some of your examples are not examples of _prohibited_ speech, but > are instead examples of _actionable_ speech. The Constitution is fairly > clear that the government cannot be a filter or censor for speech. > Hence, requirements that people speak in English, or in some other language > that the government can understand, is not required. Not even in a criminal > case, as a matter of fact. (If I speak only Skansko-Bravatlian, and am the > only such speaker in the world, I cannot be compelled to study English or > even Spanish prior to a trial.) > Requiring people to speak or write in a language that is understandable to > some GS-10 at Fort Meade would appear to violate the First Amendment in a > rather serious way. As encrypted speech is really just another language > (tell me I'm wrong on this, anyone), encrypted speech appears to be fully > protected by the First Amendment, which says that Congress shall make no > law about speech, blah blah. Under the right legal environment, and we are not far from it, none of this matters. The Courts can be quite liberal when they think there is a good reason for it. Take seating in restaurants. If you read the Constitution you won't find where the Federal Government is empowered to regulate this. The Courts decided that the Commerce Clause was a reasonable justification. This argument resembles the peace of God. All the Justices have to say is that the Constitution does not specify private speech, just public speech. The same way it doesn't say "assault rifle" it says "arms". The same way it doesn't say "commercial speech" just "speech". The Constitution will likely be a powerful support for cryptoanarchy, but only because I doubt widespread opposition to strong cryptography will arise. >> What I am proposing would not require an end to fair trials or warrants >> or really any other legal customs we have. > I strongly disagree. Prosecution would involve making certain _forms_ of > speech illegal (not the same thing as the _content_ being illegal, as in > ordering the kililng of another, or treason, or shouting "Fire!" > improperly). But we are not objecting to content! We don't care what goes inside the encryption - unless it involves extortion, murder, child pornography, or weapons data - we care that communication has been limited. Cryptography is not a language because nobody can understand it but the recipient. We simply want the recipient to share with the rest of the class - that is an independent legal issue from persecution for one's beliefs which is of course, and thankfully, unconstitutional your Honor. Or how about this argument: It isn't the encrypted message that we care about so much, your Honor. We care that it is evidence that the perpetrator did commit the illegal act of encrypting his communications using military-grade technology which is now highly illegal. When I say it doesn't really put an end to most legal customs, I mean that the courts do not have to behave all that capriciously to make the law stick. For the most part people know how not to break the law and the people who are convicted did break it. Other speech rights do not immediately dissolve away. Yes, there is a risk that they will do so later, but the police state is not required to suppress cryptoanarchy if there is strong public sentiment supporting it. > And detection and collection of evidence would almost certainly involve > illegal searches and seizures. Not in the presence of wide public support. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Mr. Squish
by consensus＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I explained to a list manager about our problems regarding the source of SQUISH and the system administrator that does not respond to requests to deal with the problem. >Return-Path: <rburns(a)cap.gwu.edu> >Received: from cap.gwu.edu by mail.netcom.com (8.6.4/SMI-4.1/Netcom) > id MAA05785; Tue, 18 Jan 1994 12:47:43 -0800 >Received: by cap.gwu.edu (4.1/SMI-4.1) > id AA18334; Tue, 18 Jan 94 15:47:25 EST >Date: Tue, 18 Jan 1994 15:42:14 -0500 (EST) >From: Roger Burns <rburns(a)cap.gwu.edu> >Subject: Mr. Squish >To: Christopher Allen <consensus(a)netcom.com> >Message-Id: <Pine.3.07.9401181514.C17300-b100000(a)cap.gwu.edu> >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII > > >> Do you mind if I forward the above message to the cyperpunks list? Or would >> you be willing to do so yourself? > >Sure. I don't have ready access to Usenet, so feel free to post my comments. >BTW, I found two typos in my original message, so below I copy a revised >version. > >-- Roger rburns(a)cap.gwu.edu > >---------- Forwarded message ---------- > >Thank you for response. If I may give some unsolicited advice, I would >take a "Margaret Thatcher" approach to the postmaster who is allowing this >problem to fester. > >I would (1) trace down his office phone number (through nic whois or >nslookup or whatever) and ring him up and explain that allowing abuse of >the Internet is an abrogation of his company's contract for obtaining an >Internet connection, and that if he doesn't consent to handling this problem >appropriately, you will seek to have his company disconnected from >Internet based on that abrogation. > >If he doesn't succumb to that threat, I would then (2) phone thru his >company's main switchboard and ask to be connected to the postmaster's >boss, and explain to the boss that you will be seeking to have his >company's Internet connection ended due to the postmaster's >irresponsibility in allowing an unstable person to wreak havoc on the >worldwide computer network community. > >Now while it might be a pain to actually follow through on this threat, if >you put enough of a poker face on what you say, the bluff might very well >be enough at either step 1 or step 2. > >Good luck! And I hope I don't have to deal with this problem! (But if I >do, I've outlined how I will proceed.) > >-- Roger Burns rburns(a)cap.gwu.edu ..Christopher Allen ..Consensus Develoment Corporation ..4104-24th Street #419 ..San Francisco, CA 94114-3615 ..(415) 647-6384 Fax ..(415) 647-6383 Voice ..email: consensus(a)netcom.com ..mosaic frontpage: .."ftp://netcom.com/pub/consensus/www/ConsensusFrontDoor.html"

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Re: RSA Questions
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:54 1/18/94 +0000, SuperDupont wrote: >Hi Cypherpunks ! > >I've got a few questions about the RSA encoding (if they're answered somewhere >in litterature, just give directions, thanks) > > If the public encryption key is e (the exponent) and n=p*q (the modulus), > then the encryption scheme is: > > cypher= (plain^e) mod n. > > Number theory tells us that the reverse operation (taking the e-th root) > can be performed, as long as we know p and q: we know how to compute d > such that for any plain<n, (plain^e)^d=plain. > > Now my questions are: > > 1. Is there a way to determine ALL the possible values of d verifying: > (plain^e)^d=plain for any plain<n (or at least have an evaluation for > their number) ? > > In other words, is there a way to know the number of keys that unlock > what your public key locks ? > > 2. Is there a way to determine ALL the possible values of d verifying: > (plain^e)^d=plain for *a given plain* ? > > In other words, is there a way to know the number of keys that unlock > *a given message* ? > >Here's an example that's quite worrying (maybe because I chose p and q >to be random primes, and they have bad properties): > >e=17 # Exponent >p=967 # Prime p >q=1031 # Prime q >n=p*q=996977 # Public modulus > >phi=(p-1)*(q-1)=994980 >g=gcd(p-1,q-1)=2 >f=phi/g=497490 >d=(1/e) mod f=234113 # A possible value of d given by number theory > >Here's the result of the exhaustive search for the answer to question No. 2: > >plain=12345 >cipher=(plain^e) mod n >decipher=(cipher^d) mod n > >The possible values for d (138 of them) are: > >3393 10603 17813 25023 32233 39443 46653 53863 61073 68283 75493 82703 89913 >97123 104333 111543 118753 125963 133173 140383 147593 154803 162013 169223 >176433 183643 190853 198063 205273 212483 219693 226903 234113 241323 248533 >255743 262953 270163 277373 284583 291793 299003 306213 313423 320633 327843 >335053 342263 349473 356683 363893 371103 378313 385523 392733 399943 407153 >414363 421573 428783 435993 443203 450413 457623 464833 472043 479253 486463 >493673 500883 508093 515303 522513 529723 536933 544143 551353 558563 565773 >572983 580193 587403 594613 601823 609033 616243 623453 630663 637873 645083 >652293 659503 666713 673923 681133 688343 695553 702763 709973 717183 724393 >731603 738813 746023 753233 760443 767653 774863 782073 789283 796493 803703 >810913 818123 825333 832543 839753 846963 854173 861383 868593 875803 883013 >890223 897433 904643 911853 919063 926273 933483 940693 947903 955113 962323 >969533 976743 983953 991163 > >That makes a probability of 0.013% >Looks to me like it's a LOT. Maybe I'm wrong. > >-zap > >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. >Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, >and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. >Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi. Laudable Paranoia! In short the numbers: cipher, decipher, plain, d and e must all be relatively prime to p and q for all of this stuff to work. In practice, since p and q are very large, the probability of the cryptanalyst finding another value d that deciphers your message is about the same as him finding p or q. That is the same probability of him factoring pq by guessing. In your example 138 out of 996980 is about the probability of being divisible by either p or q. You might check to make sure that the message that you are enciphering is relatively prime to p and q. You could better spend your, however, verifying that your hardware had not made a mistake, which is more likely, unless, however you are sending one of your factors so that a friend can share your secret key. In that case, however, anyone with your public key can compute your secret key,

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Re: Rejected mail (fwd)
by Jim Wilson (VA) 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded FYI -Jim -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.4 mQBNAi2Ig+EAAAECALImsR18LE9I6NKICf8TVhbV6yJgF95ynGHnWnNo1ERfdqzk Zl3Icl2N5klNM3KQ9zM3uN/z55smi2QOiD3hL80ABRO0L0phbWVzIEQuIFdpbHNv biA8amR3aWxzb25AZ29sZC5jaGVtLmhhd2FpaS5lZHU+ =JTj1 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ................................ . == = = James D. Wilson. . " " " P. O. Box 15432............................. . " " /\ " Honolulu, HI 96830-5432......Fr. Excelsior........ . \" "/ \" jdwilson(a)gold.chem.hawaii.edu.FRC/FAM/AASR/GWB/OTO. ................................................................... ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 15 Apr 1994 13:55:53 -0500 (CDT) From: Jim choate <ravage(a)bga.com> To: "John C. Brice" <ag588(a)hela.INS.CWRU.Edu> Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Rejected mail > > ag588 is rejecting mail from you > One really annoying bug in all the remailers and such out there is the above message. I figured it out the first damn time I saw it. I don't need a copy for every post to the c-punks list. The way they should work is send the notice the first time the rejection is activated. After that it should not send any kind of responce, I am being rejected after all....

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re: call for security products!
by SGT=DARREN=S.=HARLOW%ISB%MCTSSA＠nwsfallbrook3.nwac.sea06.navy.mil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I work with a Banyan Vines Network which contains it's own logs. What type of logs are you wanting to maintain? I may be able to help point you in the right direction. Sgt Darren Harlow - Computer Security Internet: harlow%isb%mctssa(a)nwsfallbrook3.nwac.sea06.navy.mil or another less reliable address: harlow(a)mqg1.usmc.mil "The views expressed are my own, and always will be..." - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAi2pYOoAAAEEAJ0Fdc1HDwlww3Wz8JPeQDZT2Gk/q1gh0J+4njtUC66HXngN DNyxzoGnZVcA0bbkirsCdjvvZlsP84QVgxdijzgW4pNOJKowJgrQWFftGEqJKH5b I2NxJrk0kmKt/jli5kV/wDs9Rr4PxXQjGN4B+uJOCSlyWX+fnWNyHMOkIY2tAAUR tENEYXJyZW4gSGFybG93IDxoYXJsb3claXNiJW1jdHNzYUBud3NmYWxsYnJvb2sz Lm53YWMuc2VhMDYubmF2eS5taWw+ =v34V - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLa8zRmNyHMOkIY2tAQHm7AQAmde5g8D4MPorbwPyxx+P1mMoBOtw0W1/ sXIsXUgNaMwEQLGohuYYGOU05KITqPGCynhaRTBoj2jGhH4nmay7h/OBt421nGI8 Pvthbt4aBkiPHdaNecESs085CWHdvUzTyBErWdgZuHueGHoI+z2tPdcAaxDdZ3R1 M3BcYEFCia8= =3Mv6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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'Nother MIT talk on crypto...
by Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Thursday, April 21, 1994 > Refreshments at 4:00pm, Talk at 4:15pm in NE43-518 > > ``WHICH KEY ESCROW, IF ANY?'' > or > ``Fair Cryptosystems vs. The Clipper Chip'' > by > Silvio Micali > MIT > >Wide-spread use of cryptography will greatly enhance our privacy, but >will also make court-authorized line-tapping impossible. In an effort >to make cryptography ``compatible'' with law enforcement, the Clinton >Administration has been advocating the use of a new encryption >technology: the Clipper Chip. > >Whether cryptography should be regulated at all is an important >question, one that should be debated at all possible levels of our >society. This talk, however, focuses primarily on TECHNICAL points >that are crucial to make an informed decision. In particular, we >address the following questions: > >* Does Clipper Chip really make cryptography and law enforcement > compatible? > >* Does Clipper Chip introduce unwanted and/or unforseen dangers? > >* Are there better alternatives to making encryption and law > enforcement compatible, if this is what we want?

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Curve Encrypt 1.0 Release (repost)
by W. Kinney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Apologies if this shows up twice. My first try seems to have gotten lost... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Curve Encrypt 1.0, IDEA encryption for the Macintosh is now available for ftp from ripem.msu.edu, directory: pub/crypt/other/curve-encrypt-idea-for-mac Read the file pub/crypt/GETTING_ACCESS for information on how to get access to the ftp site. I plan to also make CE available through csn.org (Mike, are you listening? Your mail is bouncing). Curve Encrypt is a freeware drag-and-drop encryption application for the Macintosh. It uses IDEA cipher-feedback mode with a 255 character pass phrase, and encrypts both the data and resource forks of files. Source code is provided. Distribution: Curve Encrypt (c)1994 Curve Software. Permission granted for distribution within the United States only. It's fine with me if you make the software available by giving it to your friends, putting it on _local_ BBS's, taping floppies to stalls in the men's room, things like that. But don't export the software, and don't make it available on places like international anonymous ftp sites. And please make sure that the people you give the software to understand the export restrictions. This applies the application and the source and anything that _contains_ Curve Software copyrighted source. Is this sufficiently clear to keep me from getting Swanked? All releases are verified with PGP signatures. Public key: - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3 mQCPAiz+bEEAAAEEAMUbtdwYC1vY+s5559ERIvC1MT+Yaw3ozheaHcUciJe7cSAk k9TpAQd7iKukKnQe5kK1YtvYm0JP6fmNrcO8AmG5ukvcOlyuri618sjpXncpQ1cL 5xeV80f3JtmheGMnqAzTK8OyfJ7zRh1PhAZcT/vVzf+JGuCuVcJkEfxTVMrJABEB AAG0K0N1cnZlIFNvZnR3YXJlIDxraW5uZXlAYm9nYXJ0LmNvbG9yYWRvLmVkdT6J AJUCBRAtBLJRIDvxOj7zTo0BAQLFA/9fmt+S3PyHcl4OpfRz0iGhtYvfq9gZW/Oq vxWJiQBExgjtDhwq6keAO6c75D7MqJJKxIUGXOU97h92DmEn54M5SKtwVGDPkG78 I3WMDA90SUAdzhbXbKKKtO+rgeCBHuPftoI/PXGxSaDNspuIzoUjpIpNYrR9o6he gIJsbMDi/YkAlQIFECz/Arz37+E6SINj8QEB43kD/R8Vfk6fhnFz+C410Nv6cdlx 3pPAnFRv1JNOWwlfgEAoBx/TEbgNjQv70M3Q3rDoU5HdG5kgBTHbnFL3JEFIwt7W A7Dqoj0L+W06+HvJygoKQ4Gqh7qiKxHNESEivdT4VBdEi7tCGfkRMSWNGNa9Dp+F 6iGsuFIZWx+kFoq1vZ9X =OBJZ - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- This key is also available from the key servers. Enjoy! -- Will Curve Software <kinney(a)bogart.colorado.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLT0xCMJkEfxTVMrJAQHGlwP/TtbZFG+Dt0UcAnswiG6pgKBRgP9OCsih nGx33tKxFJRwUwIp8kQrayG6MwjDfYXuk/mRALtHnmvjsure5Hi3NpgjwWxibYg8 2Ua00VhZQygm+vyrZ7Tf9Tat8u2zpYzfDIPUS119gznDSQ0tzwwRpRqfn8cLrpme KHTWBVqFkE8= =Ybhj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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