- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

SQUISH II, the SEQUEL
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, my mailbox has been awfully quiet lately from cypherpunk rants, and I need a bit of a massage at the moment, so I wanted to ask you a question. Have you considered what I was saying about preventing `abuse' of remailers? I have given you some time to formulate a plan. so-- could someone email me your new official Cypherpunk ethical guidelines for anonymous posting, involving your opinions and procedures on libel, harassment, and `violent death threats'? what's that? you don't have an official policy or any safeguards? I guess that means that `anything goes' (quite literally!) kind of a disturbing policy, because someone simultaneously very ingenious and malicious could create some major annoyances. I guess you already know that. but even the past `operations' could pale in comparison to future ones. the possibilities are really limitless. imagine what can be accomplished when no one is held accountable for what they post! why, it is a recipe for Utopia. cypherpunks, I so admire your vision of the future. BTW, I want to commend you anonymous site operators for your resilience. it does appear that the remailers are fairly secure, at least, that is the picture portrayed to `outsiders'. of course, with insiders, it is a different story. but in a certain interesting application of anonymous remailers, e.g. an enemy attacking the remailers themselves, the confidentiality of identity among `insiders' is not critical. in fact, it can be very satisfying for an enemy to strike his foe, even while the foe sees his face, but can do nothing about it because of his own predicament. even more delightful (for the attacker, that is!) is the situation where the `predicament' is not even due to the attacker, but entirely the enemy himself. in other words, the most effective and devastating tactic of guerilla warfare is to twist technology to get your enemy to shoot *himself*.

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He's baaaaack!
by remailer＠merde.dis.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just when you thought it was safe to go back on the internet... He's baaaaack! Remailer operators, please lock him out now, before he does whatever he is getting ready to do. Better yet, set it up so when he sends to a remailer, he gets back a hundred copies, and one gets forwarded to his sysadmin with his name on it.

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Encrypted Snail Remailer.
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Disclaimer: Please take this as a work of science fiction, a short monologue by the character in a novel. It is meant to stimulate discussion and to express concerns that have recently turned from vague to clear, in my mind. I have great respect for the people out here, but I can not help myself. I very much want a secure network of remailers, but I fear the problem is the design, inflexible and non-private, of the internet itself. This is dedicated to those such as Phil Zimmerman and Pr0duct Cypher, individuals who seem to see the larger picture, that which involves humanity, not just internet culture 1994. -=New Secure Remailer Service Announcement=- For discussion purposes only until I post my mailbox address and buy that 128/256MB drive ;-) ! Ultimate in remailer technology. Only slightly slower than many Cypher remailers, but much less traceable. Up to 250MB at once. Encrypt your message with the (possibly anonymous) public key of a friend or contact, signing it with your anonymous secret key. Encrypt that, along with the friend's postal address, with my public key. Put it on a new DOS or Mac floppy, or 128/256MB Optical Disk, avoiding finger prints and DNA on the postage stamp. Send it with a fake return address from a pubic mailbox to my yet to be announced post office box. I will decrypt the forwarding address on my PowerBook, not at home, and mail it from various Manhattan street mailboxes, with no return address (or one you send me). I will then securely overwrite the file from my hard disk. Of course, you can include an anonymous encrypted return address as part of your message to the recipient. The cost is $5 cash, plus $1/MB of encrypted message to cover the CPU time. Express mail would in fact be AS fast as the serious Cypher remailers, but would cost you $20 since I have to pay in cash at a post office, or get a money order to use FedEx, and then make up a fake return address if you leave one out. Until a new generation of internet remailers are produced, I make claim to my remailer service being much more secure. There is also no need keeping logs to protect my liability, since no one knows that my remailer was where it came from. One of the most serious weakness of any internet remailer is that you tell someone spying on the recipient exactly which remailer site a piece of mail came from, as well as when. I asked about faking internet mail but was told that this was "frowned upon" for internet mail. Too bad. REALLY too bad. With mine, it could be any individual in NYC, and the time of day doesn't mean much. It thus involves a lot more than a few keystrokes on the assumed NSA internet logging database to trace it back to the sender. Fairly obvious and fairly illegal spying on me and the other manual remailers out there would be required, as well as opening mailboxes before the mailman arrived. A TEMPEST attack on a PowerBook in public in different locations just isn't going to happen very often. Bugging my PowerBook isn't possible since I always carry it with me (and know what it's insides look like in detail). Secure encryption being available to the common man is what will change the world. I'm not yet convinced that internet remailers will have a similar influence unless they are able to resist the presence of full site-to-site monitoring by the government and hackers, a thing which should thus be assumed by their designers. Cryptoanarchy doesn't mean the internet. It means encryption. Given that snail mail encrypted remailing is already possible, the reason for a new, secure remailer generation isn't really security but is speed, convenience, flexibility, and cost. The same reasons for ANY use of the internet. But current serious remailers are neither fast nor convenient, and they don't have a BILLION messages going through them a day to mix your secret messages into, like postal mail DOES. They tag mail as having BEEN remailed as well. Even when ALL e-mail is encrypted you haven't done anything for anonymity until all e-mail is also REMAILED, with no logs or remailer sites appearing in the headers. E-mail is free now. Remailing needs to be free too, or what advantage has it over snail mail, given that it does the same thing? The only way I can see all mail being remailed, assuming it is already all encrypted, is if every personal e-mail account was itself a remailer. I don't see this happening unless the Cypherpunks themselves write the software for the "data highway". Otherwise I will never trust remailers since as I've said to others, I can't SEE the wires. PGP is what's happening. Digital money too. But the INTERNET, even with (centralized) remailers is just a Big Brother nationwide wiretap. So don't use wires. What is my liability, if I am a remailer and the authorities intercept a message to a gangster? None, since they don't know I remailed it. Can any internet remailer be so lucky? I could say I don't KNOW if I remailed it (no logs), even if they find a return address as encrypted in my public key; "Any one of dozens of Manhattan snail remailers could have sent it." However, if your return address IS encrypted with my public key, law enforcement can, most likely LEGALLY, demand my pass phrase. Of course they'll only know the return address using the pass phrase and secret key of the receiver. Again though, this situation is BETTER security than internet remailers, since the pass phrase for the remailer is in my head, not plain text in a perl code. They can't secretly download my memory, or at least not YET ;-). Breaking into your remailer site without a trace is conceivable though. I'd find it similarly attractive but more rewarding than dumpster diving. Commercial sites are easiest, especially small high tech companies. Are these sites TEMPEST secure? Tempest based on simple radio receivers is primitive compared to what modern spectroscopy could conceivably do, even at a distance. I'd imagine ACTIVE spectrosopies could do much more or you could actively induce a current in a given direction at a given frequency. How about having your CPU mail me its secret key and pass phrase? Things like this are only getting easier, fast. VERY fast. Another reason to not trust fixed-location centralized remailers. I don't even like the idea of personal accounts on a Unix machine. Every laptop should be an internet node, and an encrypted remailer. Only when central remailers are no longer there to attack will we have safe anonymity without using snail remailing. Hell I can't even get more than three fucking e-mails in response when I ask for INFORMATION about the existing remailers. I thank Eli and Hal, but I guess the NSA doesn't hand out info on the dozen Cypherpunk remailers IT is running. Zero knowledge (yup), reputations (lowsy or non existent except for anon.penet.fi), information markets (selling remailer pass phrases and sendmail logs), anonymous networks (snail mail only), collapse of governments (yes, but not using the existing nationwide wiretap, er... internet). Fuck, I'm sounding like Detweiler. But I'm ranting for MORE cryptoanarchy. Another internet-like standardization such as that of e-mail headers, has very sadly crept into PGP itself, weakening it as the secure encryptor. PGP 2.3a still has no "random data block" output format, in which the ONLY way to even KNOW it's a PGP message is to successfully decrypt it. I asked about this on alt.security.pgp, generated little interest, but was told a future version may have this option (just gossip). I say it should be the STANDARD. Internet-like standards should NOT be the guiding force behind CRYPTOGRAPHIC standards. Get the fuck off the internet, and write me a real encryptor. How can steganography work if it's so easy to figure out if what is extracted is an encrypted message? Given the upcoming non-voluntary second generation Clipper, steg will have to become the norm. And don't port PGP to the Mac and Windows, port it FROM them; over 100 million strong and growing. "Five to one baby." News of the revolution will not be posted. Thanks for PGP. Thanks for the CPU. Like those Cypherpunk T-shirts though! Boot up and slam dance. Kewl! Nice sig! If my remailer, the ONLY acceptably secure encrypted remailer that exists, catches on, I may add a modem feature, involving pay phones. I've already written the needed secure code (none). And remember, security begins with people, not technology, always has, always will. -=Xenon=- P.S. gosub disclaimer. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLVM1wwSzG6zrQn1RAQF8kwP/YetocN9urSgB4X9u70ZABFeLawEkwu56 jFDWZgDG+Z/81vFkVWTC7gvfDDB4Rjy0qeEhuq187zeRJ3fKCRPkkHz7swDV3V+o RA9waKWz7tdxglkW98bJIKpC9rYp4lvtxPWgtAsLTs6b9tJqvXmp2S+OcjcyV6sE gKI25vPg5Ww= =zjED -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: Magic Money questions
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Magic Money is available from csn.org in the same directory as pgptools. Be sure to add in the fast mp_inv posted here. It speeds up the unblinding of a 1024-bit coin from 2 minutes to 3 seconds. Thanks to whoever posted that code. I will include it in the next release, as soon as some people shake down the current one for bugs. fb(a)cyberg.win.net wrote: >A few questions. Since the client which generates the proto-coins is >under the control of the consumer, the bank has no way of making sure >that he is not running his own code, or that the RNG he is using is >cryptographically strong, or even that he is not distributing modified >client programs to other users. If his RNG is bad, he is only hurting himself. If he gets the same coin as another person, and that coin has already been spent, his coins will bounce, costing him money. Same is true if he corrupts his packets - the server looks for the ASN string, and if it's not there, bounces the transaction. He can run his own code if he wants to. >How does the bank deal with collisions in the 16 byte values of coins? There shouldn't be any, except for deliberate double-spending. The coins are 128-bits, so you'd need 2^64 of them before the odds favor a collision. The odds of a coin collision are equal to the odds of two messages having the same PGP signature. >What if the user picks the numeric values for the server to sign in a >way which leaks information about the banks private key? RSA is much >more secure when signing random-esque data, like a message digest, >than it is when signing numbers provided to it by some outside party. This is a problem, if this attack is feasible. The coins won't spend if they don't have the proper ASN string in them, but the server has no way to see what it is signing. Can someone produce values which will reveal the private key? I've heard of attacks which involve getting signatures on factors of a message, and multiplying them to get a forged signature. These won't work here, because each coin value is signed with a different d. All you could do is multiply several invalid coins of value x to get one valid coin of the same value. But a signature leaking the private key - that is a new one for me. Please tell me about this attack. How would one prevent it without using a cut-and-choose protocol? Applied Cryptography suggests (page 106) that it is okay to dispense with the cut-and-choose portion of a blind signature in cases (such as this one) where the user is motivated not to provide a corrupted coin. The coins use different e's from the bank's PGP key, so a coin could not be used to forge a message from the bank. >Similarly, how can the consumer trust the bank's representation that >money has already been spent? Surely the bank should be required to >publish a list of cancelled coins and timestamps with a running MD5 >hash periodically for inspection by the unwashed masses. There is no punishment for double-spending. The transaction is simply thrown out. The bank, in fact, has no way to identify the customer. What could the bank hope to accomplish by claiming that a coin was already spent? It can print more coins at any time, so it has no reason to cheat. A server will have to protect its reputation by not printing too much money or otherwise making its users angry. If you want to put in an MD5, it wouldn't be hard. >What do you do about lost messages from the server to the client. >Once coins have been recorded as spent, they cannot be redeemed again. >Yet the mail message containing the new coins may have been lost in >transit. What can be done? The server can hold onto outgoing messages for a while, and can have a means of remailing those which are lost. Or the message can be mailed back to the user through two different routes, to increase the reliability of the system. But one cash-like property of digital money is that, if you lose the data, you're SOL. I don't claim the system is perfect. But it's a start, and in my opinion, that is what digicash needs right now: a start. These Clipper postings have me worried. It seems as though the government is in a big hurry to get Clipper on the market. They only have one shot at this. What needs coded now? A menu-driven PGP? Any ideas for new projects? Pr0duct Cypher -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLVNAjcGoFIWXVYodAQHtgwP+OTFcxAbZL8uvVeBbwwn4/N1jnLGeHFRB lw7U3Y3ciESs0PBRDu1JO4hOqzpW7Ch+GkY1z+ueWD8m4+EoroacJMcTI28EKGm3 +2eV0KpQsKfcfsPCfMFVKhqBRAzcwJhFdziFbPvG9g4CU9/Huz4ff8KiSud8zdWO n8odZHk5zTs= =6Yw2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Why RSA?
by derek＠cs.wisc.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

First, my sincere gratitude for the replies to my queries regarding public key cryptography patents. To pay back such generosity, I will summarize. Also, I have done a little more digging and will present my findings, even though those findings include more questions! My original question was why cypherpunks don't just pick some non-RSA public key algorithm to achieve widespread distribution of cryptographic tools. My contention is that for such widespread distribution to occur, the price must be small in comparison to the average user's electronic communication outlay, and the tools must be beyond reproach legally so that it can be distributed by commercial email tool providers in a form that is elegantly integrated into the user's environment. My mother will not fetch, install, and configure PGP, though she might pay $10 - $20 more for an email product with "privacy enhancements". My reading of the comp.patents FAQ leads me to understand that any use of PGP by an individual in the U.S. is in violation of U.S. law (though the chances of being prosecuted are vanishingly small). Cypherpunks probably don't care too much about that, but the masses waiting for conversion probably do. The reasons for the desirability of widespread public key tools are obvious, even without considering the collapse of governments. For example, digital signatures can be used to authenticate electronically-distributed software upgrades, and so on (but this is all old hat to the folks on this list!). Unfortunately, as Perry Metzger pointed out: > All are patented in so far as one of the patents covers ALL public key > schemes. Some, like Rabin's scheme, have possible technical advantages > over RSA. First, a note: "Rabin's scheme" is (as Perry said) the one provably linked to factoring (a major advance!) and I assume it's the one implemented in RPEM. According to the RIPEM FAQ, PKP squashed that development by claiming that their patents were broad enough to cover Rabin's scheme, and the effort was abandoned "for pragmatic reasons" (another example of how superior technology can be suppressed by monopolies). Now, I've looked a little further into the patent issue, and I remain kind of confused. I went to the library and read the four patents in question (but only made a hardcopy of the first chronologically). I found the documents difficult to understand (for legal rather than crypto-tech reasons). All four applications were made in 1977-1978, and the patents were granted variously from 1980-1984. The earliest one has Hellman, Diffie, and Merkle as inventors; the second just Hellman and Merkle. Both are assigned to Stanford University. It seems to me that one of these is the one that covers, broadly, public key cryptography -- presumably the earliest one (4,200,770), since it has all three major players as inventors and the language of the eight claims seems to be rather broad (though only the second patent, 4,218,582, has the phrase "public key" in its title). Patent 4,405,829, granted in 1983, is for the RSA algorithm [footnote: the RSA patent apparently celebrated its tenth birthday two days ago; was there a party?]. There is no overlap between this patent's inventors and assignees and the earlier more general patent. Here's a question for somebody in the know: if the earlier patents cover all public key cryptography and RSA is a public key system, isn't it in violation of the earlier broader patent? Does PKP pay license fees to Stanford, or were they granted exclusive rights by Stanford as well as MIT? Similarly, apparently a public-key scheme called Warlock has been granted patent protection. How is this possible if somebody else holds patents covering all of public key encryption? If I understand patents correctly (hah!) they last for 17 years from the time they are granted. This means that the earliest public key patent will expire in about 3.5 years. After that presumably there will be no restrictions on new public key systems. The RSA patent would expire in 2000. If somebody could clarify which patent is the "broad" public key patent, I'd appreciate it (even with them right in front of me, I can't tell)! My guess is that it would have to be either 4,200,770 or 4,218,582 -- if it's the latter, how did Merkle get squeezed out of inventorship? Respondents to my initial questions pointed out that the patents may be over-broad and could be challenged on those grounds; given the history of how public key crypto was invented, it seems to me that it would be difficult to contend that the idea is obvious (Simmons says that the idea "stunned" the crypto community) -- but I'm no lawyer, and I'll leave that issue to those with more skill, brains, and money than me! For now, then, my conclusion is that for four more years at least, licensing RSA from PKP is probably the only viable commercial option for companies who wish to give their users public key crypto capabilities. It seems that the designers of Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) agreed with this assessment, as they took the unusual step of including proprietary RSA in their standard. For their part, in RFC 1170, PKP states: "We assure the interested parties that Public Key Partners will comply with all of the policies of ANSI and the IEEE concerning the availability of licenses to practice this art. Specifically, in support of any RSA signature standard which may be adopted, Public Key Partners hereby gives its assurance that licenses to practice RSA signatures will be available under reasonable terms and conditions on a non-discriminatory basis." That sounds good -- but is troublingly vague. I have stated earlier what *I* think is are "reasonable terms" for the inclusion of a minor feature like PEM-compliance in an email processing system, but I don't get to decide that. If anybody knows more specifically how the standards bodies interpreted "reasonable", please let me know. As I am contemplating developing a PEM-compliant product, I will be writing to PKP to discuss licensing arrangements, but information from others (best: expressed publicly) would be helpful. If RSA is the only game in town, let's at least be clear about the price of admission. There seems to be a chance that manufacturing PGP-aware products (but not distributing PGP itself) could slide by, but it could also be interpreted as "inducement to infringe" which would apparently be actionable. The second point in my earlier message, largely obsoleted by the answer to the first, involved the development of new public key systems. Given that selling or otherwise using or distributing a new system now would invite litigation, the question is rather moot, but I'd like to thank L. Detweiler and P. Metzger for their comments on the all-important issue of trusting new algorithms. Finally, I suppose that it's always possible to come up with some radically new encryption technique that could be used to support authentication and yet have nothing to do with public key crypto... but I'm not holding my breath. Regarding the recent proposals for the construction of a toolkit, I'm all in favor and would personally welcome the opportunity to contribute to such an effort as a hands-on supplement to my crypto education. I have extensive experience with C and C++, and am VERY familiar with TCL (pronounced 'tickle', for those not in the know). A good start would be a clear statement of purpose. If this "Why RSA" thread has been too basic and has caused frustration for that reason, please forgive me. I have learned a great deal, and I hope that somebody somewhere else has profited as well. derek

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Re: NY Times Article...
by freeman＠MasPar.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Now, the real question is, will those who still call themselves "post- > human" in a million years have learned much worthwhile since the > extinction of homo sapiens? :) Fellow post-Australopithecines, how goes it? 8:) -- Jay Freeman

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Re: the public key minefield
by baumbach＠atmel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> derek(a)cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn) > >* in broad terms, what would I have to do to develop an > > algorithm that works from a user's perspective like > > p.k.c. (ie public/private keys, the central functional > > point of all the wonderful schemes based on pkc) but > > doesn't violate patents? L. Detweiler writes: > others have well addressed how patent issues are involved in this. but > this appears to be a simple technical question on one level. What does > it take to come up with a good public key system? How about a poor public key system? What is the simplest public key system you can invent, if you didn't care that it is trivial to break? If the NSA can crack RSA, does that change the fact that it is a pkc? message=99 public_key= 1/3 private_key= 3 encrypted_message= message * public_key message= encrypted_message * private_key Would PKP reading of their patent claims cover this pkc? Seems overbroad! Peter Baumbach baumbach(a)atmel.com

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News You Can Use
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

AP 09/21 0844 Encryption Software Copyright, 1993. The Associated Press. All rights reserved. SAN JOSE, Calif. (AP) -- A federal grand jury is investigating exports of a controversial computer program in a case that could affect how software is distributed worldwide. U.S. Customs officials asked for an investigation into ViaCrypt of Phoenix and Austin Code Works of Austin, Texas, and the companies' plans for foreign distribution of software, including PGP, a program that turns data into an indecipherable code using encryption technology. William Keane, an assistant U.S. attorney, confirmed that an investigation is continuing, but declined to comment on the case. The PGP program has been distributed worldwide over computer networks by some computer enthusiasts who oppose the U.S. government's trade regulations on encryption. The National Security Agency, which monitors international communications, has supported strict encryption technology export regulations, arguing that it would be difficult to keep tabs on hostile governments and foreign terrorists. But opponents say the restrictions hurt sales and violate the First Amendment that protects the right to publish information about encryption. "I wrote PGP to make democracy healthier. I didn't do it to make money," said Philip Zimmermann, a computer consultant who developed PGP. "We believe everything we are doing is above board and well within the law," said ViaCrypt president Leonard Mikus. He said the company had no intentions of violating export regulations. WP (Washington Post) 09/18 Encryption Program Stirs Security Debate By John Mintz and John Schwartz Washington Post Staff Writers Computer industry officials and civil-liberties activists are launching new attacks on the Clinton administration's plan to make the so-called clipper computer chip the national standard for encrypting, or scrambling, data and voice communications. Under the clipper plan announced this year by the Clinton White House, police agencies that receive court authorization for a wiretap to intercept encrypted communications would then need the technological cooperation of two independent "escrow" agents to crack the code. Earlier this week administration officials told congressional staff members that the two escrow agents will be officials of two government agencies: the Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and a non-law enforcement section of the Treasury Department that has not been selected. Yesterday industry and civil-liberties groups criticized that selection because they said NIST and Treasury are not independent, but arms of the same federal government that could some day be called upon to listen in on their communications. Douglas Miller, government affairs representative of the Software Publishers Association, made up of U.S. software firms, said his group has "grave doubts" that foreign corporations will encrypt their communications with the clipper chip because "the U.S. government holds the key." A main reason the administration is promoting clipper is that the U.S. National Security Agency, the super-secret code-breaking agency, wants to discourage use of highly capable, non-clipper encryption programs that are becoming increasingly popular but that the NSA can't pierce. Industry officials for years have regarded NIST as a stalking horse for the NSA. Jerry Berman, director of the Washington office of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which promotes public-interest causes in technology-policy areas, said NIST is "so close to the NSA that it can't give the public comfort that this is a true escrow system." John Podesta, assistant to the president and a key White House staff member on this issue, said such objections are "a phony issue." "We clearly are looking for procedures and escrow agents that would maintain privacy and confidentiality and security of the keys," Podesta said. "Cryptography lends itself to a certain degree of paranoia." Kate Martin, director of the Center for National Security Studies of the American Civil Liberties Union, mocked use of the term "escrow" in this case. An escrow agent is someone who is independent of two parties potentially in conflict, like a settlement attorney at a real estate closing, she said. "As long as the escrow agents are government agencies, it's misleading to call them that," she said. "The government doesn't have a fiduciary obligation to the people whose (communications) keys it holds," but only to the government. "The whole idea continues to be structurally flawed," said Bruce Heiman, attorney for the Business Software Alliance, a group of top U.S. software firms, such as Microsoft, Novell, Lotus and Apple. Companies and individuals who transmit secure information "will have serious doubts about the integrity of the system." Since the government currently prevents the export of many powerful U.S.-made encryption techniques, the administration's attempts to promote its clipper chip "will discourage use of encryption, period, or hand over the market for encryption to foreigners." When one listens to an encrypted conversation, it sounds like a crackle or buzz. Under the plan, every law-enforcement agency will have a special personal computer or "black box" to descramble that crackle, but the device will work only when they have been given a special key from the escrow agents. When police get a judge's permission to intercept an encrypted conversation or stream of computerized data, they would use the box to determine the special encryption identifier or label assigned to that particular encryption device. A detective would notify NIST and Treasury that he or she has permission to listen in on the party. NIST and Treasury would have a list of the secret encryption key numbers - extremely long lists of 0s and 1s - for every encryption device sold in the United States. NIST and Treasury would find the appropriate one on the list, and then they would send the needed key number to the police over telephone lines. The police would then insert that decoder number into the black box to tap the phone line in question. The ACLU's Martin said the government, given lists of secret encryption numbers, "has an enormously greater ability to eavesdrop than it's ever had." Government officials deny that. Duncan Frissell The $1 Trillion/year Health Security Act of 1993, the most expensive government program in the hisotry of mankind. --- WinQwk 2.0b#0

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No Subject
by Eric.K.Kuecherer＠Dartmouth.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please remove me from the list. -kuech-

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Re: Dale defends free society from the NSApunks (was Re: Encryption ?
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Graham-John Bullers <real(a)freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> writes: > Problem with sex? No, thank you, Graham. Stick you alt.2600.moderated (an even lamer forum than thew "cypher punks" mailing list, if you can imagine that). > > http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html > > : real(a)freenet.edmonton.ab.ca > Graham-John Bullers email > : ab756(a)freenet.toronto.on.ca --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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