- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

RE: McVeigh? Nimrods.....
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 4 Jun 1997, Chris DiBona wrote: > Do these children > who may be important to you have parents who "care" about them enough to > scour the planet to find a good,safe day care that isn't withing the blast > radius or > shooting range of : [list of public places elided] Perhaps taking your kids to day care in a downtown area is not a very good idea in the first place. But putting them into daycare inside a federal building is criminally stupid. Some on this list will even say that the kids' deaths fortunately reduced the negative impact their parents can have on the gene pool. --Lucky

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Re: NIST GAK meeting writeup, LONG part 3 of 3
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:22 PM 12/13/95 -0600, you wrote: >> The term "voluntary" implies (!) that people don't have to do >> something, right? If that's really the case, then the escrow agent >> should have no obligation to do what is called "voluntary." > >Voluntary GAK means the system is voluntary for the USERS, not for the ESCROW >AGENTS. What is the point of certifying escrow agents if they can still >thumb their noses at the LEAs? I disagree. The issue is one that might be called "standing." Who, exactly, is responsible to whom in such an arrangement. Let's suppose key escrow (for keys for non-exported encryption devices) is REALLY VOLUNTARY. In that case, the escrow agent's only legal responsibility is to the owner of the encryption device. The government isn't a party to this voluntary arrangement, and thus hasn't a complaint if the escrow agent refuses to comply. I could, for example, enter into a voluntary arrangement with an escrow agent so that he would be obligated to erase the key no more nor less than 5 days after he received it. If he did so 1 day after, and I needed the key, he would have breached his obligation to ME, but not to the government. Likewise, if he failed to erase the key, he would likewise be breaching his agreement with me. Unfortunately, I think you've fallen into the too-common trap of assuming that the government can insist, unilaterally, on people's behavior even absent laws which specifically require or prohibit specific performance. > The proposal is talking about throwing >CERTIFIED ESCROW AGENTS in jail for not complying with the authorities and >has absolutely nothing to do with users like you. But you haven't established that an "escrow agent" has any duty to the government. > I don't see how a system >where you don't have to register your keys but the escrow agents can be >imprisoned for not releasing a key in their possession is any less voluntary >to you. It _is_ less voluntary, because it interferes with my right to escrow my key with an organization that is willing to take the dispute to arbitrary levels of uncooperativeness with the government. I might insist, for example, that the organization only store the key outside the country (beyond the reach of US Courts) and require MY PERMISSION for them to release it to the government. I might also insist that they further encode the key so that only an independent foreign organization (out of reach of US courts) could provide the key to decrypt it. If key escrow is REALLY REALLY REALLY "voluntary", then such arbitrary restrictions should be do-able. >Certainly the whole escrow thing is a sham and it couldn't possibly work if >it were really voluntary (witness the documents FOIA'ed from the FBI...). Yes but... > We >all know that but there isn't anything sinister in the escrow agent >requirement for releasing keys under penalty of law Yes, there is. I STILL refuse to accept the idea that a "key escrow agent" (if he's keeping a VOLUNTARILY escrowed key, one not for export) must automatically be considered to be subject to the whim of government orders. > Believe me, if we continue to have >voluntary GAK with no escrow agent requirements or certification when (if?) >Mandatory GAK comes down the escrow agent certification and penalties will >most definitely be part of the deal. So I wouldn't worry about quibbling >over the voluntaryness just because of the proposed escrow agent >requirements. Here's why you're wrong. The government wants us to accept an arrangement they've described as "voluntary." (Naturally, we will refuse.) It is better to be able to show that we're refusing BECAUSE THEY'RE LYING about the "voluntaryness" of the system, because that makes us appear reasonable (which we are) and them appear unreasonable (which they are.) Playing along with their their assertion that the system is "voluntary" would make it look like it is we who are being unreasonable. So the position I'll take is this: "You claim you are willing to accept that the system be 'voluntary.' Okay, the only thing I'll tolerate is one which has the maximum number of 'voluntary' aspects. Anything less and you're lying." I'd insist, for example, on the unfettered ability to turn off the key escrow "feature" on the telephone (with a switch on the side, labelled "Good encryption vs. Big Brother's listening". I'd insist on its ability to talk to other telephones which have to corresponsing key escrow. Etc, etc, etc. If they resist, we can then say, "Oh, you must have been LYING about this system being voluntary! SO what else are you lying about?!? I think you're being unreasonable, so I have no intention of complying with ANY of your requests, however reasonable they may appear to be on the surface, because I cannot trust you!" And _THAT_ would obviously be a reasonable position. The key, however, is that we must expose the lying, and to do that we must use whatever inconsistencies we can. This is not "quibbling": It is establishing the credibility (or lack of it) of THE ENEMY.

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Re: NSA net trolling
by Eric Murray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's a copy of your message back to you as you requested: lmccarth(a)cs.umass.edu writes: > > Wayne Madsen wrote somewhere: > > A knowledgeable government source claims that > > the NSA has concluded agreements with [...] Netscape to > > permit the introduction of the means to prevent the anonymity of > > Internet electronic mail, [...] > > I suspect this may actually mean that they're pushing Netscape to > incorporate cryptographic authentication into browser email, which I think is > a useful development. (Hey, I read that Netscape employees get fined $1 for > referring to Navigator as a "browser".) > > At any rate, it's an excuse for me to ask some questions: > > (0) > I'm not aware of any class library objects or methods in stand-alone Java > for calling the local mail transport agent. Is there any class library > support in Java+{Navigator, HotJava, Mosaic, NetCruiser, the AOL web tool, > etc.} for calls to the local mail agent configured in the browser ? > > I would prefer not to reinvent SMTP using the Socket class in my own applets. > Ideally I'd like to have an applet that presents a form with some entry boxes > and check boxes, quantizes and encrypts the input according to the check box > settings, and spews the resulting byte streams to the MTA. > > (1) > As I recall, I used to be able to set (as an Option) the path and name of the > local MTA (e.g. /usr/lib/sendmail) in an earlier version of Netscape. That > seems to have disappeared in Navigator 2.0. Is there indeed no longer a way > to set that ? > > It occurs to me that we could have achieved partial integration of > remailing into Navigator quite cheaply with that option. > > Comments from Sun and/or Netscape and/or anyone else would be welcome. > Thanks :) > > -Lewis "You're always disappointed, nothing seems to keep you high -- drive > your bargains, push your papers, win your medals, fuck your strangers; > don't it leave you on the empty side ?" (Joni Mitchell, 1972) > > -- Eric Murray ericm(a)lne.com ericm(a)motorcycle.com http://www.lne.com/ericm PGP keyid:E03F65E5 fingerprint:50 B0 A2 4C 7D 86 FC 03 92 E8 AC E6 7E 27 29 AF

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Re: Who "invented" remailers?
by Mark Grant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alan (alano(a)teleport.com) wrote: >Currently, use of the Mixmaster remailer system is out of reach of most >of the average users out there. The only serious project to address that >need has been Private Idaho and development has stopped on that project. Privtool (my PGP-aware mail program for Unix) has supported Mixmaster remailing for years (just click a box and off it goes) and would also support nym.alias.net if it hadn't gone down just as I started building in the capability (it currently supports decryption but not posting). Anyone who wants to use my remailing code is free to rip it off under the GPL. Currently there are at least two people developing Private Idaho and possibly more. However, even command-line Mixmaster remailing is much simpler than using the Type-I remailers. >Currently the nymserver network is in pretty bad shape as well. They are >difficult to use and are dependant on the whims of the remailer network. I've been playing with Premail and found it pretty easy to use. As I said above, reliability is the main problem; particularly when you lose the entire domain now and again. Mark

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My messages & CC: 's
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi, For those of you that may be responding to some of my post you should be aware that the To: & Cc: lines are being modified. This is being done by my PGP auto-encrypt scripts. A complete distributution list is provided in the header of the message on the X-Distributution: line. This is just to make you aware that even though your address is the only one in the To: or Cc: lines the message may have been distributed to others including to one of the cypherpunks list. Please check the X-Distribution: line before assuming that it is a private correspondence. Thanks, - -- - --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html - --------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a Charset: cp850 Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000 iQCVAwUBM5bDE49Co1n+aLhhAQGUiQQAgQ8TF/Ww7Qt7HyAIUtkv7jY5QG32x20g T0miyjDAZ8qgA0QcjoTdt+JcJLexG76wdj5GR3XWdYtX24RyqUD3CNHPTnTufQmN fIebZOt+WcewQggB31jm5L+Vp7BiJfdzUuW90XVzM5yGSFjF91Rg/9KXFpe/a8Xv nCy/dTYQ0l8= =j3lG -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: nude gifs plz
by sja＠tekla.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Password pirates plunder XXX sites, from The Netly News
by Donald E. Eastlake 3rd 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Although you can never completely eliminate it, technological fixes to do velocity checking, source IP address profiling, etc., seem so obvious I just don't see how this can be any sort of insurmountable problem... It should have been obvious from the start that you would have a lot more people trying to steal service from a porn site than from, say, a Disney site. Donald On Wed, 4 Jun 1997, Robert Hettinga wrote: > Date: Wed, 4 Jun 1997 23:47:10 -0400 > From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> > To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu > Subject: Password pirates plunder XXX sites, from The Netly News > > --- begin forwarded text > > Date: Wed, 4 Jun 1997 12:01:22 -0700 (PDT) > From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Password pirates plunder XXX sites, from The Netly News > MIME-Version: 1.0 > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net > Precedence: bulk > Reply-To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> > X-Loop: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net > > [We include links to sites with porn passwords in today's story, BTW. > --Declan] > > ******* > > http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1015,00.html > > The Netly News Network (http://netlynews.com/) > June 4, 1997 > > Porn Free > by Chris Stamper and Greg Lindsay (thenetlynews(a)pathfinder.com) > > Sexfilms.com used to be a small, members-only adult site > that shipped full-frame videos over a super-fast T-3 line. Traffic on > the site was comfortably low for about a year, owner Ray Alba says, > until one name -- "Joe Camaro" -- started appearing with some > frequency. Actually, it started appearing 500 times a minute. From > Sweden, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore -- just about anywhere. Somebody > was passing out the password. > > Download speeds faltered, from 300K/sec to 6K/sec. And then the > servers themselves began to crash. Finally, Alba had to shut down the > site for several weeks to clear out Camaro and numerous other accounts > that had leaked out to the Net. Alba was the latest victim of... Porn > Piratz! > > A huge number of passwords to pay-only porn sites are loose on > the Net. Just surf newsgroups like alt.sex.passwords or do a simple > search through a typical web engine and long lists of logins are easy > to find. Some of these logins are giveaways from people who ponied up > the low, one-time-only flat fees that many sites charge. Others, > apparently, were obtained with phony credit card numbers. Who knows > how Porn Piratz get the rest. But they do: A Hustler executive told us > that Hustler's sites have seven times its paid membership logging on > every day. > > [...] > > --- end forwarded text > > > > ----------------- > Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox > e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA > "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, > [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to > experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' > The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ > > > > For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to > "dcsb-request(a)ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help". > ===================================================================== Donald E. Eastlake 3rd +1 508-287-4877(tel) dee(a)cybercash.com 318 Acton Street +1 508-371-7148(fax) dee(a)world.std.com Carlisle, MA 01741 USA +1 703-620-4200(main office, Reston, VA) http://www.cybercash.com http://www.eff.org/blueribbon.html

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17 Dec '03

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Body Bunker Usage
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We offer excerpts from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center "Catalog of Training Programs FY 1997-98": Financial Fraud Institute The FFI takes the proactive role of arming the student with specialty skills and techniques to develop solid prosecutable cases in a range of crimes. Included are crimes involving government contracts, procurement fraud, illegal tax shelters, complex financial transactions supporting terrorism and criminal conspiracies, asset removal/seizures, money laundering activities involving drug smuggling organizations and other illegal enterprises, insurance frauds, electronic funds transfer fraud, and employee embezzlement. Also addressed in training are technical crimes involving computers and networks such as unauthorized access to government data systems and complex fraud cases using or involving computer systems. Training programs: Computer Evidence Analysis Criminal Investigations in an Automated Environment Financial Crimes Investigations Financial Forensics Techniques International Banking and Money Laundering International Financial Fraud Microcomputers for Investigators Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture Seized Computer and Evidence Recovery Specialist Telecommunications Fraud White Collar Crime Windows Applications for Investigations http://jya.com/ffi.htm (34K) ----- Security Specialties Division The design, development, and conduct of courses relating to antiterrorism, physical security, and officer safety and survival is the prime mission of the Security Specialties Division (SSD). Courses include; Bombs and Explosives, Personal Protection, First Response, Handling Sensitive/ Classified Information, Criminal Information/Intelligence, Officer Safety and Survival, Physical Security, Surviving Hostage Situations, and Weapons/Explosive Detection. Training programs: Advanced Physical Security Antiterrorism Contingency Planning Antiterrorism Management Criminal Intelligence Analyst Crisis Management First Response Officer Safety and Survival Physical Security Managers Protective Security Operations Seaport Security/Antiterrorism http://jya.com/ssd.htm (22K) ----- The former addresses, among others, "encryption/decryption, disguised data, data hidden by programming techniques, hackers and phreakers." The latter addresses, among others, "left-wing terrorism, right-wing terrorism, animal rights and environmental extremists, assassinations and body bunker usage."

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just what we #$%^&* needed from big brother....
by attila＠primenet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Welcome to 1984+ what else with useless and illegally constituted bureaucrats add to their total infringement of every facet of our life. .NEW SYSTEM LINKS LENDERS, IRS .The Internal Revenue Service is developing an electronic program to link .mortgage lenders with the IRS, allowing them to exchange e-mail comparing .stated earnings on the mortgage application with actual tax return .information for the previous couple of years. If the cross-check turns up a .more than $10,000 discrepancy between the earnings claimed on the application .and those declared for tax purposes, the IRS has the option of pursuing the .loan applicant via an audit. IRS has targeted the system at self-employed .borrowers, who often declare high earnings in order to qualify for a larger .loan, but lower earnings when it comes to paying taxes. "Who knows what .their real incomes are?" asks one mortgage broker. (St. Petersburg Times 2 Nov 96 D5 courtesy of Edupage) -- one of the few things we all share: the utter, corrosive contempt for our elected officials. Politicians are like diapers. They both need changing regularly, and for the same reason.

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