- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: CYPHERPUNK considered harmful.
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:57 AM 9/13/95 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >While I have had some qualms about the name, on balance I think it has been >good for us. After all, it's not as if _other_ groups don't already exist! >In particular, the British branch of Cypherpunks disliked the name >"Cypherpunks" so much that they used a different name for themselves, the >"U.K. Crypto Privacy Association." It doesn't seem to exist anymore, for >whatever reasons. But the name may have been a factor, at least. Note too that Brits differ from Americans. "Wired" worked well here from the beginning but has had problems there. Differing national characteristics. DCF "Let's all just agree to disagree. My system can thrive with widespread disagreement among rabid individualists --- can yours?"

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Re: Cypherpunks vs. Coderpunks
by Leslie Todd Masco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Tim May, an unelected spokesman of the Cypherpunk Ghetto (tm) wrote: > Apparently the Cyphepunks list is thus being left to those of us who either > don't want to code, or have no skills at coding, or who think the > sociopolitical issues are more interesting. I think you're misinterpreting what's going on. Participants in the Coderpunks list are not generally abandoning Cypherpunks. Some people who have long been absent from the Cypherpunks list have joined it, but I've seen posts from most of the Cypherpunk participants of Coderpunks on Cypherpunks since it was formed. My concern is that the two lists will become more disjoint than they already are. I believe that the content of Cypherpunks is enhanced by having the programmers present, just as the coders benefit from the guidance of seeing the possibilities opened by their endeavors. The remailers network is the most obvious example of the benefits of this synergy. I'd hate to see us lose later rewards that could otherwise be reaped. I don't believe that it'll be sociopolitical content that'll chase the coders away: if the constant fighting over indisputable metaphysics doesn't do it, the fighting over who was killfiled by whom first and who's a total loon will. -- Todd - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMSAgvSoZzwIn1bdtAQE0CQF/Zk1TkLEnHKcBsi1IETtwqMP7y6oO6dmF R3bAM7bpP2Rg4HphYkxEAIyo6zztkDrr =jTwL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Resend Encryptogram to Xenon.
by qwerty＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I think someone sent me an encrypted message, but I deleted it by 's Message?', 'd', 'q'. Unfortunately FUCKING UNIX just said "Message?": No match, but I didn't see that till too late and now the message is gone. Oh why oh why didn't I use the Mac Clipboard instead :-( ? Is there any way to get it back? I have an idea of who it might be so I'll send him too. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLVrblwSzG6zrQn1RAQFinwP+MS8WdoXu+pyxuR7uZe3qE6mjf7QdnvdW mDz4kT6vOf3gPik5/SC0gQrAET6Rjs4dtE/vZMH4QvL+9tCmyGLwktr0Fqc7ybZN pqLRuOiQcwHwiVRMn10/kqrcZjgHj6gCRDPMqo2p3M5JavwIcXTWIvALy/4X+iTU YKmqpuwlHss= =5IBW -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Using /dev/random for PGP key generation? Be Wary
by rngaugp＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Subject: Using /dev/random for PGP key generation? Be Wary I have created a modified version of pgpi for use with a hardware random number generators. Recently, there has been some confusion because people have assumed that I wished people to use this version with NOISE.SYS or an RNG that gathers entropy from timing events called /dev/random. I did indeed mention /dev/random in the readme file, but I did this only because I thought /dev/random would be a likely path for a hardware RNG on a unix system. ( I have never tested this software under unix, but I see no reason why the "RNGDRIVER" feature of the modified PGPI would not work under unix.) Be assured that I originally planed the modification to be used with a real hardware RNG. I tested it with the CALNET/NEWBRIGE RNG under DOS and OS/2. The "RNGDRIVER" feature I tested with OS/2 and the driver in RNG810.ZIP available at ftp.cdrom.com. You may be able to compile and run it under other OSes as well. I see no reason why not. It is my understanding that NOISE.SYS gathers entropy from timing certain events. I have recently learned that a /dev/random works under Linux also by gathering entropy from timing. I am unsure about using my modification, together with these drivers that are not connected to a real hardware RNG. In what way would the use of these drivers' methods of gathering entropy be superior to PGP's method of getting entropy from keyboard timing? If you choose to do something like this, you should think carefully and make a careful study of the code. One thought for the future: It would be nice if BBS'es that run unattended could have a version of pgp that they could run without worrying about running out of entropy! (Because no one is there to type on the keyboard.) Perhaps something like NOISE.SYS (that would get entropy from the COM ports) put together with my mod to pgpi could be made to work. But careful thought an careful design should be done first. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3 Charset: cp850 iQCVAgUBMR63hs29s2mG+tTVAQFyKwP+Mh95ZNwwrBF+UjEKlEcfaiWY5ab8NthC b3j4cmv9PUXLrCM4DUH2iXtY2f9YNN9GsWT1S1Eu2b0368VBkQTm1+eWcKiDVmlB DumNmt4rZPhYam7wc/5gyGdIyzhGJBeJ0ZOP1kd4w0TfLsDprwKGOD1a0N7T3Ycz gFqBX34x59s= =MDXi -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Corporate Use of Anon WWW Proxies
by futplex＠pseudonym.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I pulled this from the firewalls list (use majordomo(a)greatcircle.com to join)] Alex Eveleigh <Alex.Eveleigh(a)kellogg.com> writes: > Subject: Monitoring Activity on the Internet [...] > I would like to get some opinions on how easy it would be for someone > to monitor what information is being accessed on the Internet by our > company. For example how easy would it be for our competition monitor > all sites that people in our company are accessing and what > information we are pulling off the Internet. This struck me as rather ironic in the wake of The Govt. Could Be Reading _Your_ Home Page. It also sparked me to draw the short connection between industrial espionage (and simple industrial nosiness), and anonymous Web proxies. An obvious point, really, but companies often have an interest in concealing the nature/extent of their Web crawlings, too. Perhaps there's a market niche, or a few pro-anonymity publicity points, here for someone. -Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com> "Everybody's got something to hide except for me and my monkey" -J.L. & P.McC.

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Stewart Baker's web site & OECD international crypto policy
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Stewart used to be General Counsel for NSA. He retired to move into private law practice with Steptoe & Johnson. He has a variety of short papers on encryption, network law & policy available on his law firm's web site, http://www.us.net/~steptoe/. My favorite was his summary report on the OECD meeting in December, ~steptoe/286908.htm, at which the US tried to parade some of the fruits of its behind-the-scenes efforts to convince other governments to become as authoritarian as the US government on crypto policy. If the US government can quietly convince other countries to support Clipper-like systems (including "mandatory key escrow" and "trusted third parties") then they can say, "See, this is a real problem -- all these other countries are having to deal with it too." Of course, if their covert US efforts to stir these people up become widely known, the technique will have less impact. The US government's efforts have failed to convince citizens and industry that there's a problem, when they won't tell us what the problem is but assure us that it's a really big problem. Our own government is now colluding with other governments -- against us and their own citizens -- in a joint attempt to attempt to rob the ordinary people of the world of our rights to privacy, free speech, and free assembly. It would be interesting to see notes from other participants in the same OECD meeting(s). Another 1-hour meeting was scheduled in Canberra on Feb 9. Anyone know what happened there? John Gilmore -- Love your country but never trust its government. -- from a hand-painted road sign in central Pennsylvania

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Minor Risk to LSB Steganography
by futplex＠pseudonym.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last week I attended a lecture given by Dexter Kozen at Cornell, on "Efficient Algorithms for Optimal Transmission of Video Data". He mentioned in passing a couple of approaches to choosing data that may acceptably be lost in the process (i.e. without excessive picture quality degradation). One scheme (which I believe counts as a "corona method") involves simply discarding the LSBs of all the encoded pixels or whatnot. This method was not at all a focus of the talk. Anyway, I thought I'd mention it as another minor potential threat to the use of LSB steganography in video transmission, e.g. MPEG streams. -Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com>

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Re: MS CryptoAPI (fwd)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 07:28 PM 2/13/96 -0500, Rich Salz wrote: >Okay, so how the hell did Microsoft get export approval for this? I mean, >this is the classic crypto-with-a-hole; a service-provider interface (SPI) >with DLL's means "plug your crypto here". This is usually considered an >"anciliary" device in ITAR language, and therefore export controlled. I >mean, how long until you see MSWord with "full privacy" option? > >Word I've heard is that the office of Export Control has had a lot of >turnover and "nobody knows anything" anymore. At the risk of blowing my usual horn, I would argue that one advantage in vocal, common, and loudly hostile talk against government is that they have begun to understand how unhappy we are with them. To make an analogy with late-1700's France, the sound of a guillotine being tested probably had a remarkable effect on the upper strata of their society; likewise, dicussions of how we can all chip in and bump off the whole lot of the bastards might remind a few of they key government players that they are not immune from eventual retribution. Resulting in "a lot of turnover." If we make a "reasonable assumption" that most of those government employees aren't stupid, and they discover that the prospect for Crypto-Anarchy (trademark owned by Tim May?) is good, it seems reasonable to assume that they'll want to avoid being around when THE END comes for their employer. Jim Bell Klaatu Burada Nikto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMSF8vvqHVDBboB2dAQExXQP+JHO6P80VfXE1+x5JmstA14dg+wlmXBK2 +8UYUnD7IpK2QzIKoEbmot2/WfUK/9zzOiuRuXvzc6FxfscRm7xNzNO28vviTN5U osVNgm72t/R2jZspMPr+cYE3GcxDIcQvTEOth5Tz9J9q7TfI4+NPl68fN7sqEOsG m44PPIy6F2I= =m3hQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Using /dev/random for PGP key generation? Be Wary
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:56 AM 2/12/96 -0500, rngaugp(a)alpha.c2.org wrote: >... >I am unsure about using my modification, together with these drivers >that are not connected to a real hardware RNG. In what way would the use >of these drivers' methods of gathering entropy be superior to PGP's >method of getting entropy from keyboard timing? If you choose to do >something like this, you should think carefully and make a careful study >of the code. If there are no common-mode sources, xoring two streams will not reduce the entropy. If you use PGP's keyboard timings for one stream, and (e.g.) disk drive randomness for the other, the output of the xor of the two streams should have at least as much entropy as the best of the two. However, I would be worried if /dev/random and PGP were both using keyboard timings to generate entropy. Bill

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Digital Cash on sci.crypt
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There has been some discussion on sci.crypt of digital cash and its facilitation of kidnapping, extortion, etc. Here is a posting I made when mentions an on-line paper on the topic. I had met the author, Markus Jakobsson, at Crypto 95, but I only had a chance to check out his web site yesterday. awc(a)slcawc.aug.ipp-garching.mpg.de (Arthur Carlson TOK ) writes: >[In response to a discussion of whether digital cash could be used to >provide anonymous collection of ransom money] >Is there really no technical fix for this? To enable the prevention of >double spending in off-line systems, the ID of the withdrawer is coded >into the coins in a way that is verified by the bank. If the victim's >relatives can undo enough of the code to satisfy the bank, why can't >they undo the rest to detect when the coins are spent? Alternatively, >why can't the bank put an identifier on the coins (in a way that isn't >destroyed by the unblinding) that amounts to a message encoded in the >public key of the withdrawer? Then the withdrawer can make the >destination of the ransom money visible by revealing his private key >(after the victim has been released, of course). (He also reveals >every dime he spent in the last year and all his kinky love letters, >but, hey, we're trying to catch a kidnapper here.) There has been considerable discussion of this problem in the literature recently. A paper I found yesterday on the net is by Markus Jakobsson and Moti Yung: Revokable and Versatile Electronic Money, at <URL:http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/markus/revoke.ps> (postscript format). It has references to other work as well. The specific attack I discussed earlier applies to the current DigiCash scheme (or at least how it is assumed to work). Offline cash systems would be more complicated. The references in the paper mentioned above describe how these attacks would work on such systems and some ways of avoiding them. However there is a more powerful attack, which the Jakobsson paper addresses, in which the bank as a whole is coerced. Maybe terrorists threaten to blow up the World Trade Center unless Citibank engages in a specific protocol which will leave the terrorists with millions of dollars in fully blinded electronic cash. Even if the normal withdrawal protocol has signatures, etc. which would prevent this, Jakobsson shows that there is a corrupted protocol which if the bank is forced to follow it will leave the criminals with valid but untraceable electronic cash. The solution in the paper is to make it so that none of the ecash issued by the bank is untraceable. Under normal use it is anonymous, but if necessary the authorities can break the anonymity. This is sometimes called "Clipper cash" after the U.S. Clipper chip proposal which had similar privacy properties. With Jakobsson/Yung's approach even the more powerful attack can be defeated because the cash is traceable, and no amount of coercion will allow the attacker to create valid but untraceable cash. While these approaches are technically interesting, the political implications are more ominous. While Jakobsson labels the entity who has the power to break the anonymity an "ombudsman", implying that he defends the interests of the cash holder, he could equally well be called a "policeman" because he is the one who catches the criminals. It is all a matter of how you look at it. The question is whether these various threats of kidnapping, blackmail, extortion, etc. are good enough reasons to go to a cash system where privacy is protected only at the sufferance of government agencies. There are plenty of precedents for governments misusing supposedly- private information, such as the use of phone records to track down those who resisted the German regime during World War II. One of the attractive aspects of electronic cash has been its immunity to this form of governmental coercion. The overwhelmingly negative response to the Clipper chip proposal (other than in the cryptographic and law enforcement communities) may apply to Clipper cash as well. A related issue is the possible competition of rival cash systems. As with Clipper, where it would apparently be necessary to forbid the use of alternatives, so with Clipper cash it would seem that people would prefer true anonymity over conditional protection, even if you call the cash tracer an "ombudsman". So there would seem to be a need for governments to criminalize the use of fully anonymous electronic cash in order to force people to use the ones which the government could track. Whether this will even be possible in an increasingly global financial system remains to be seen. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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