- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Fighting the cybercensor
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:40 PM 1/27/97 -0500, Phillip M. Hallam-Baker wrote: > > >jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> wrote in article <5ch9f2$cuu(a)life.ai.mit.edu>... > >> Look, I've proposed what I consider to be a remarkably consistent method to >> prevent the kind of political tyranny that you criticize, and I don't see >> any recognition of this fact. > >Thats because its a whacko solution that has no credibility >or consistency. "I love you too! B^) Question: What is a "whacko solution"? Why do you believe AP qualifies? Can you list any other "solutions" which are, indeed, "solutions" which are NOT "whacko" by your definition? (I'm trying to determine whether or not you even agree that there is a problem!) Let me pose an issue here by counterexample: Suppose there was a plantation, containing a master and his slaves. You are told that the slaves are "unhappy". (They're unhappy because they're slaves!!!) That's a "problem." Okay, let me propose that there are at least two broad "solutions" to this "problem": First, change the working conditions just enough to make the slaves acceptably happy. Or, second, eliminate the slavery altogether. Both are "solutions". The first, obviously, is only a "solution" from the stanpoint of the master. The second appears to be only a "solution" from the standpoint of the slaves, since the master obviously doesn't want to lose his slaves! Could you legitimately call the second solution a "whacko solution"? (It would be, from the limited standpoint of the master.) How about the first? That's the problem with using such a poorly-defined term as "whacko" to describe anything, particularly when many people don't agree. And here's a question: What do you mean by "credibility"? I've explained it in enough detail to convince a rather substantial number of intelligent people that it is likely to be possible, and to some it sounds like it is desireable. >If anyone tried to set up such a market and a price went out >on any of the heads of state fantasized about Mr Bell would be >dead as a doornail in a week. A claim which doesn't disprove the functionality of AP one whit. In fact, quite the opposite: If AP was, indeed, non-functional, then nobody would bother with me at all. The fact that you think they would shows that you believe AP threatens SOMEBODY. This means that your arguments, as minimal as they are, are internally contradictory. They simply don't hold together. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: libsln.htm -- Is Libel a Crime?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:20 AM 1/29/97 -0500, aga wrote: >On Tue, 28 Jan 1997, jim bell wrote: >> One obvious problem with the LACK of a criminal libel statute, from the >> standpoint of the "government-controlling-class," or "the bigshots," is that >> it's impossible to sue (and collect from) a (comparatively) poor person for >> defaming him...but it's still possible to put him in jail. Civil libel is, >> therefore, essentially useless to a government agent as a means of keeping >> the masses in line. >> >> >> Myself, I believe that libel should be eliminated as a cause of action in >> civil cases as well as it has, de facto, in the criminal area. If anything, >> the ability to sue for libel makes things worse: There is an illusion that >> this is easy and straightforward, if not economical. It is neither. The >> result is that people are actually MORE likely to believe a printed >> falsehood because they incorrectly assume that if it wasn't true, it >> couldn't be printed. >Interesting analysis here, but remember; libel is just one kind of >"defamation" and an action for defamation will always be actionable. Sure about that?!? >The constitution gives us the right to call the President a >motherfucker any time we want to, yes... >and it also gives the motherfucker >the right to sue. While admittedly it has been a long time since I've read the entire US Constitution, I am not under the impression that it does what you claim. Could you be more specific about the particular section which does this? > Sueing is better than fighting in the streets. For the LAWYERS, who are paid regardless of the outcome, that certainly appears to be the case. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: RC5-12/32/5 contest solved
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:37 PM 1/28/97 -0800, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com wrote: >Any bets on whether the $5000 RC5-12/32/6 contest will be solved >before the www.rsa.com contest status web page is updated? :-) > >Or how long before someone in the government starts talking about >how 56 bits takes 65,000 times as long to solve as 40 bits, >which is 26 years for a whole building full of computers, >and even 48 bits ought to take a month and a half for a whole >building full of computers (or supercomputers, if they hype it up....)? This, as I pointed out long ago, is why I didn't think a "crack the DES key" contest is necessarily a good idea, at least if it's ordinary Von-Neumann-type computers doing the searching. It makes DES look artificially good. Assuming it's possible to build a chip which tests solutions in a massively-pipelined mode, the 400,000 or so solutions per second tried (for what is probably a $2000 machine) would probably increase to 100 million per second per chip (at a cost of maybe $100 per chip, if implemented in parallel). That's 5000 times more economical, which would translate to a find in 2-3 days if the same dollars in hardware were invested. _THAT_ is the break we should hope the media publicizes, not the one that will eventually happen when accomplished by PCs or Suns, etc. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: RC5-12/32/5 contest solved
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:37 PM 1/28/97 -0800, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com wrote: >Any bets on whether the $5000 RC5-12/32/6 contest will be solved >before the www.rsa.com contest status web page is updated? :-) > >Or how long before someone in the government starts talking about >how 56 bits takes 65,000 times as long to solve as 40 bits, >which is 26 years for a whole building full of computers, >and even 48 bits ought to take a month and a half for a whole >building full of computers (or supercomputers, if they hype it up....)? This, as I pointed out long ago, is why I didn't think a "crack the DES key" contest is necessarily a good idea, at least if it's ordinary Von-Neumann-type computers doing the searching. It makes DES look artificially good. Assuming it's possible to build a chip which tests solutions in a massively-pipelined mode, the 400,000 or so solutions per second tried (for what is probably a $2000 machine) would probably increase to 100 million per second per chip (at a cost of maybe $100 per chip, if implemented in parallel). That's 5000 times more economical, which would translate to a find in 2-3 days if the same dollars in hardware were invested. _THAT_ is the break we should hope the media publicizes, not the one that will eventually happen when accomplished by PCs or Suns, etc. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Best Computer School?
by Hal Abelson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rick Osborne <osborne(a)gateway.grumman.com> writes: The only thing I didn't have that the next MIT applicant had was money. I made the mistake of letting them know that I was dirt poor and would need full aid/grants/etc, and to quote "The Great Escape" it was "Zzzt! To the Russian front!" Just to set the record straight, MIT's admissions is need-blind. Lots of things go into our admissions decisions, but whether or not an applicant needs financial aid is not one of them. Admissions and financial aid are handled out of separate offices, and the people making the admissions decisions don't even see the financial aid requests. One exception: We are experimenting with the possibility of considering the amount of aid needed in the case of a few international applicants, but even here this is only a minor consideration for a small number of applicants. For domestic applicants, financial aid plays no role at all in the admissions decision. -- Hal Abelson

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Best Computer School?
by Hal Abelson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rick Osborne <osborne(a)gateway.grumman.com> writes: The only thing I didn't have that the next MIT applicant had was money. I made the mistake of letting them know that I was dirt poor and would need full aid/grants/etc, and to quote "The Great Escape" it was "Zzzt! To the Russian front!" Just to set the record straight, MIT's admissions is need-blind. Lots of things go into our admissions decisions, but whether or not an applicant needs financial aid is not one of them. Admissions and financial aid are handled out of separate offices, and the people making the admissions decisions don't even see the financial aid requests. One exception: We are experimenting with the possibility of considering the amount of aid needed in the case of a few international applicants, but even here this is only a minor consideration for a small number of applicants. For domestic applicants, financial aid plays no role at all in the admissions decision. -- Hal Abelson

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Re: The Politics of Export Restrictions
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Agreed. It's the Republicans who are the most adamantly pro-crypto. They'd love to use it as a noose to hang Gore in 2000. If Gore switches positions -- which I think unlikely -- it'll just be another area where both parties agree. A minor point: since Gore has been the chief crypto-critic of this administration, if he switched he'd leave himself open to charges of waffling. Then again, some administration officials tell me they expect this debate to be resolved within a year, so go figure. -Declan On Wed, 29 Jan 1997, Greg Broiles wrote: > At 09:44 PM 1/29/97 -0800, Rick Hornbeck wrote: > > >Is it possible the unreasonable crypto export restrictions are simply being > >imposed at this time for the purpose of making Al Gore look good when he > >runs for President in 2000? > > I suppose it's plausible, but it's an opportunity open to both candidates, > and more plausibly (because of lack of collaboration) to the Republicans - > e.g., Dan Quayle and the "Crypto Freedom For Americans" platform, promising > to rescue Silicon Valley from those evil regulatory Democrats. > > If I were an evil politician trying to set up a trick like you suggest, I > think I'd want a scheme that my opponent(s) couldn't hijack and use against > me. > > -- > Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: > gbroiles(a)netbox.com | > http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. > | > >

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KOW_tow
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1-28-97: "New Crypto Engines From Trusted Information Systems Allow Easy International Use of Strong Encryption " By supporting any application that calls for the use of algorithms such as DES, Triple-DES, or 128-bit RC2 or RC4, "this product will allow Windows users to use encryption as easily as they use a mouse. Previously, if developers wanted to use encryption in their products, they had to consider writing two different versions, dealing with changing export regulations, and so on. Now, they can write one version of the program and sell it worldwide, knowing that the CSP will handle the encryption legally and safely." "Two Companies Set to Offer Key Recovery Services Using Technology from TIS " SourceKey and Data Securities International (DSI) have applied for approval to operate Key Recovery Centers to support exported encryption products. TIS also announced today that it is in negotiations with the National Computing Centre, Ltd. of the U.K. and Philips Crypto BV of the Netherlands to license the first non-U.S.-based Key Recovery Centers for third party use. "Burns Prepares To Reintroduce Encryption Bill" "This time around," Burns said, "we intend to put a bill on the President's desk and find out if he is truly on the side of the users and providers of rapidly expanding high-tech goods and services." It would prohibit a mandatory system under which producers or users of hardware and software would be required to surrender a decoding "key" to a third party. ----- KOW_tow

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Re: OTP security
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> 1.You've got 16 hardware devices that each generate random noise. > 2.One of the devices fails (or is sabotaged) and emits a predictable stream > (10101...) > 3.The other 15 devices are just fine, and the stream generated by one > device does not effect the stream of another. > 4.You do not know of the (failure/sabotage) until *after* you've generated > your encyrted documents and they are out of your hands. > > So the revamped question is: > How secure are those documents now? Bottom line: You have lost some possible decryptions of the cyphertext. Every 16th bit is now determined therefore each 2nd byte has only 128 possible states. This, rather suprisingly, does not seem to affect the security (though I would say this is a flawed conclusion as we have a pile of sand problem here, how many grains make a pile, how many rngs can be flawed before the security is affected?) I really haven`t had the time to look at it properly, I will do so in the near future as it seems to be an interesting problem... Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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The Politics of Export Restrictions - Clarified
by Rick Hornbeck 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I agree the strategy would have to be hijack-proof. Something like Gore experiencing a convenient "change of heart" towards the end of this current term and convincing Clinton and the administration to soften crypto export restrictions which would make Gore look like a hero to the high-tech community just in time for the election. Naturally this would have to be carefully scripted but the objective would be to keep the democrats in power. Just a theory. >Return-Path: <owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com> >Date: Wed, 29 Jan 1997 23:43:43 -0800 >From: Greg Broiles <gbroiles(a)netbox.com> >To: Rick Hornbeck <rnh2(a)ix.netcom.com> >Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Re: The Politics of Export Restrictions >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > >At 09:44 PM 1/29/97 -0800, Rick Hornbeck wrote: > >>Is it possible the unreasonable crypto export restrictions are simply being >>imposed at this time for the purpose of making Al Gore look good when he >>runs for President in 2000? > >I suppose it's plausible, but it's an opportunity open to both candidates, >and more plausibly (because of lack of collaboration) to the Republicans - >e.g., Dan Quayle and the "Crypto Freedom For Americans" platform, promising >to rescue Silicon Valley from those evil regulatory Democrats. > >If I were an evil politician trying to set up a trick like you suggest, I >think I'd want a scheme that my opponent(s) couldn't hijack and use against >me. > >-- >Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: >gbroiles(a)netbox.com | >http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. > | > > >

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